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“Therefore both writers and readers of history should not pay so much attention to the actual 
narrative of events, as to what precedes, what accompanies, and what follows each. For if we take 
from history the discussion of why, how, and wherefore each thing was done, and whether the 
result was what we should have reasonably expected, what is left is a clever essay but not a lesson, 
and while pleasing for the moment of no possible benefit for the future.” 
  









“The ultimate goal of the Atlantic nations should be  
to develop a genuine Atlantic commonwealth,  in which common institutions  
are increasingly developed to address common problems.” 
 
Dean Acheson, 1961 Report to President Kennedy 
 
 
“When all is said and done, Great Britain is an island;  
France the cape of a continent;  
America another world.” 
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Editorial Note 
For all editorial matters, I have followed The Chicago Manual of Style (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993, 14th edition). For reasons of readability, I have therefore made use of 
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Every study is an odyssey of the mind. My odyssey may have been long in time, stretching out 
over fifteen years of intermittent work, but I am grateful for having learned so much along the 
way. Its length in time, I feel, allowed for ideas to mature. Nor do I apologize for the heftiness of 
this study. In this regard, I sympathize with Thomas Mann’s words in the foreword to his big 
novel Der Zauberberg (1924): “We shall tell it at length, in precise and thorough detail – for when 
was a story short on diversion or long on boredom simply because of the time and space required 
for the telling? Unafraid of the odium of appearing too meticulous, we are much more inclined to 
the view that only thoroughness can be truly entertaining.”1 As both de Gaulle and Uncle Sam 
conjure up powerful images and associations, a study of this sort lends itself to taking one side or 
the other and hence to ready-made conclusions and worn-out clichés, which I was determined to 
avoid. Now that I have reached my destination and drawn my own conclusions, based in the main 
on a thorough review of the documentary record, I am resigned to the verdict of the reader. 
 While an odyssey such as this one is largely solitary, it could not have been completed 
without the help of others. In particular my wife Gioia has been an indispensable source of 
support and a sound judge of all that has been written in the subsequent pages. As she has had to 
share most of the burden, this book is dedicated to her. I furthermore thank my father for setting 
the example of thoroughness in academics, even as I cannot claim to understand his mathemical 
field of research (phase portraits of planar quadratic systems). I thank my mother for her 
stubborn and oft-repeated belief that issues beyond academia continue to be far more important. 
 I thank Professor Alfons Lammers for his encouragement in the early years of this 
project, before Professor Henk Wesseling took over as graduating professor. I am much obliged 
to both. I also thank Professor John L. Harper of the Johns Hopkins University and Professor 
Alan Henrikson at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy for their early-on advice. 
This study would have been impossible without access to the documentary wealth from 
American archives. The dedicated staffs of the various presidential libraries administered by the 
National Archives and Records Administration have not only helped me during my research 
visits, but they have also responded promptly and liberally to my many requests from the 
Netherlands for additional documentary material. They have furthermore been of assistance in 
declassifying some material. In much the same vein, I thank the Roosevelt Study Center in 
Middelburg (The Netherlands), which owns an impressive collection of research material. 
                                                 






Researching at these great institutions was made possible by grants from the Reiman-De Bas 
Fund (administered by the Bernhard Fund), the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research 
(NWO), the John F. Kennedy Library, and the Roosevelt Study Center. I also acknowledge the 
great service provided by the State Department’s Office of the Historian by providing online 
access to an increasing number of volumes of the The Foreign Relations of the United States series, as 
well as the similar service provided by the University of Wisconsin through its digital collections. 
In the Netherlands, whenever I had trouble finding an article or a book, Peter de Zeeuw of the 
Netherlands Ministry of Defense never failed in his efforts to assist me. 
Lastly, I would like to thank my present and former colleagues at the Ministry of Defense 
in the Netherlands for their tolerance of and interest in my academic hobby. Jacques de Winter 
and Lo Casteleijn have generously allowed for extra leave. Along with Jan Geert Siccama and 
Arnout Brouwers they have also taken precious time to comment on parts of this study. More 
generally, I have benefited from my contacts with them in ways that I hope are reflected in the 







How does one take the measure of a statesman the size of Charles de Gaulle? The Frenchman 
was without doubt one of the giants of his time. He saved his country from eclipse in 1940 and 
from civil war in 1958 almost by force of personality. His political life was enveloped by a unique 
sense of national mystique. The quasi-mystical attitudes and feelings surrounding his mission – to 
restore France to a position of greatness – were an unalienable part of his larger-than-life political 
persona and of his political philosophy. To many he was the General, le Grand Charles, the ‘man 
of June 18th,’ the miraculous reincarnation of Jeanne d’Arc, Georges Clemenceau, and Louis XIV, 
rarely ever just de Gaulle – a brigadier-general of the French army who, animated by an adamant 
loyalty to his country, turned into a remarkably effective and strong-willed political leader in 
times of extraordinary crisis.  
Among Americans, too, de Gaulle’s Olympian stature summoned a respect that devolved 
to few other foreign leaders. Walter Lippmann, America’s foremost commentator on foreign 
affairs, confessed that, “having been one of his American admirers since June of 1940, when he 
raised his flag in Britain and summoned the French to go on with the war, I cannot pretend to 
write dispassionately about General de Gaulle.” 2  Cyrus Sulzberger, a long-time European 
correspondent of the New York Times who often visited de Gaulle, thought of him as the “last of 
the giants” in an “age of mediocrity.”3 He was voted Time’s ‘man of the year’ in 1958. “He has 
given Frenchmen back their pride, swept away the miasma of self-contempt that has hung over 
France since its ignominious capitulation to Hitler in 1940,” the news weekly judged.4  
De Gaulle’s popularity among Americans probably reached a peak in April 1960, during a 
state visit to the United States. The symbolic value of his rendezvous with President Dwight 
Eisenhower, his wartime companion, was easily recognized. The historic achievements of the 
French president and his efforts to extricate France from Algeria were dwelled upon in a spate of 
well-disposed press reports. Senators and congressmen regaled the visiting statesman with a 
standing ovation as he spoke, in an address to a joint session of Congress, of his country’s 
dedication to the cause of liberty. “Despite changes of fortune, the Americans and the French 
feel for one another a friendship now two centuries old, and still as much alive as ever,” de 
                                                 
2 Quoted by Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (New York: Random House, 1981), 399, from a column 
written in 1960. Also: “Walter Lippmann and Charles de Gaulle,” in: Robert O. Paxton and Nicholas Wahl, eds., De 
Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1994), 377. 
3 Sulzberger’s two volumes of published notes – The Last of the Giants (New York: Macmillan, 1970) and An Age of 






Gaulle stressed. “France, for her part, has made her choice. She has chosen to be on the side of 
the free people. She has to be on that side with you.”5 His ensuing tour of American cities was 
the jubilant cortège of an old comrade-in-arms, with large crowds gathering along streets and on 
squares to catch a glimpse of the General’s statuesque appearance. New York even bestowed on 
him the honor of a Broadway ticker parade, with the bells of Trinity Church ringing the 
Marseillaise, and an estimated one million onlookers. At the end of his journey through America, 
de Gaulle volunteered to the mayor of San Francisco that it had been “le plus agréable” of his 
life.6 
But American opinion about de Gaulle was not always this unequivocally positive. 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s hostility to the World War II leader of the Free French has 
become something of a legend. De Gaulle’s popularity in the United States during the early years 
of the Fifh Republic was moreover at an artificial zenith. The implications of his dissenting views 
on the transatlantic relationship were not yet visible in 1960 and seemed of minor importance 
compared to the Cold War showdowns with the Soviet Union. But during the remainder of the 
1960s, in particular after 1962, de Gaulle’s policy of ‘independence’ and ‘grandeur’ made him the 
culprit of successive crises within the Western alliance. In 1963, after de Gaulle’s veto of British 
membership of the Common Market, the American public had already become evenly divided on 
the question of France’s dependability; by July 1966 – after France’s announcement of its 
withdrawal from NATO and with de Gaulle openly courting Moscow – the majority of 
Americans stopped viewing France as a dependable ally and many described de Gaulle as 
“power-hungry,” “egocentric,” and “overly nationalistic.”7 President Lyndon Johnson received 
thousands of letters from infuriated citizens urging him to stand up against the General. They 
wanted to see diplomatic contacts with France reduced to the very minimum; they planned to set 
up a campaign to discourage American tourists from going to France; they urged Johnson to 
demand that France pay off its remaining war debts to the United States instantly; a retired 
colonel of the Air Force announced his decision to destroy or return the “Croix de Guerre avec 
Palme Vermeille” that de Gaulle had personally awarded him for his valor in World War II.8 
Characterizations of de Gaulle had thus deteriorated from proud to obstinate, from solemn to 
haughty, from visionary to acting mainly in narrow self-interest. 
                                                 
5 “Discours prononcé a Washington devant les deux chambres réunis en Congrès,” 25 April 1960, in: De Gaulle, 
Discours et messages, vol. 3, Avec le renouveau (Paris: Plon, 1970), 196-200. 
6San Francisco Chronicle, 29 April 1960. 
7 Gallup Poll in the Washington Post, 9 July 1966. 
8 Letter, Robert Pace to President Johnson, 1 April 1966; letter, Robert C. Brown to President Johnson, 13 April 
1966; letter, R.E. Kendall to President Johnson, 9 June 1966; all in: White House Central File, Subject File, CO81, 





Most Americans came to understand that de Gaulle’s return to power in May 1958 had 
signalled an important change in the Franco-American relationship. Even as many of the policies 
of the Fifth Republic were arguably a continuation of those of the Fourth, the change was more 
than one of style.9 De Gaulle brought France, as Michael Harrison put it, “the novelty of resolute 
leadership and the pride of an ambitious program,”10 with important implications for the Franco-
American relationship and – more broadly – for European integration and the Western alliance. 
During his eleven years as president of France, de Gaulle was both America’s staunchest Cold 
War ally – in particular in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 – and its greatest detractor 
within the alliance. Besides his achievements in bringing political stability to France and his check 
on European integration, his ‘loyal’ opposition to the superpower made him one of the 
outstanding political figures of the 1960s. When Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, a noted French 
historian, decided to count how often the political leaders of his day were mentioned during a 
conference on American-European relations in 1965, de Gaulle even finished well ahead of his 
competitors. In those circles, he observed, de Gaulle had become an “obsession,” and 
exasperation over his nationalist policies had produced a new and bizarre branch of learning: 
“Gaullology.” 11  Duroselle had ample reason to conclude that this score was evidence of 
damnation mixed in with admiration. Apart from the mesmerizing quality of his leadership, the 
depth of his political vision, and his undeniable achievements, de Gaulle’s size can therefore also 
be measured by the degree of controversy he evoked. “Être grand, c’est soutenir une grande 
querelle,” he had quoted from Shakespeare’s Hamlet in Le fil de l’épée (1932).12 In the 1960s, his 
greatest quarrel would be with the Americans. 
                                                 
9 Etienne Burin des Roziers, a long-time aide of de Gaulle, rightfully disagreed with historians who emphasized the 
continuity between the Fourth and the Fifth Republic, observing that the instructions he received as a diplomat 
“changed completely as de Gaulle came back to power” and that this had far-reaching ramifications for France’s 
relationship with the United States. In: Paxton and Wahl, eds., De Gaulle and the United States, 422-3. 
10 Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1981), 54. The governments of the Fourth Republic, to be sure, also had chafed under American postwar 
predominance and often resisted the roles assigned by Washington. In particular the Suez crisis of 1956 had a major 
impact on French foreign policy, and as French historian Maurice Vaïsse noted, “Gaullist France was already on the 
horizon in 1956.” Vaïsse, “Post-Suez France,” in Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds., Suez, 1956: The Crisis and 
its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 335. For accounts of Franco-American relations under the 
Fourth Republic, see Irwin M. Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991); William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for 
Leadership in Europe (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); John W. Young, France, the Cold War and 
the Western Alliance, 1944-49: French Foreign Policy and Postwar Europe (London: Leicester University Press, 1990); and 
Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
11 Jean Baptiste Duroselle, France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1976), 220.  
12 De Gaulle, Le fil de l’épée (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 2nd édition, 1944) (1932), v. The Dutch historian H.L. Wesseling 
has pointed out that de Gaulle’s citation – which would translate into “to be great is to sustain a great argument” – 
was not entirely correct as it refers to the following passage in Hamlet: “Rightly to be great is not to stir without great 






* * * 
 
As a history student sifting through the documentary wealth available at the United States’ 
presidential archives three to four decades later, I was struck by the strong sentiment that de 
Gaulle and his policies provoked among American officials. Since de Gaulle sought to reduce 
American military, political, and economic might in Western Europe, it was probably inevitable 
that he was seen by policymakers in Washington as a difficult – or adversarial – ally. From the 
documentary record, however, he comes across as much more: an irrational, vainglorious leader 
possessed by a folie de grandeur who endangered the fundamental achievements of postwar 
American foreign policy. Many officials seemed to wear their distaste for Gaullism as an albatross 
around their necks. They appeared to denounce Gaullist foreign policy ever more strongly 
because it ran counter to their own ideas about the transatlantic relationship and of the place of 
the United States therein. Apart from the man himself, I became intrigued by the American 
perception of de Gaulle. 
France in the 1960s clearly presented the United States with problems unlike those posed 
by any other European ally. De Gaulle’s challenge to American leadership could hardly be more 
overt, since it was a mainstay of the political views he laid out in his writings, speeches, and press 
conferences (which he turned into virtual pièces de théâtre). Unease about de Gaulle’s policy of 
independence in fact appeared to be an important determinant of American policies towards 
Europe, confirming Walt Rostow’s reminiscence that “a good deal of European and Atlantic 
policy was […] taken up with coping with de Gaulle’s enterprises in ways which permitted the 
EEC and NATO to survive.”13 Policymakers in Washington also often seemed consigned to a 
state of uncertain anticipation about de Gaulle’s next move. “Our working situation in Gaullist 
France is not unlike that in the Soviet Union where we have to look to the small, symbolic 
actions to identify significant policy trends,” one White House staff member observed (even 
though the Central Intelligence Agency had de Gaulle “taped”).14  
                                                                                                                                                      
Gaulle en Hamlet,” NRC Handelsblad, 22 May 1999. 
13 Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (New York: MacMillan Co., 1972), 394. Rostow 
served in the Kennedy White House staff and, from November 1961, as chairman of the Policy Planning Council at 
the State Department. In March 1966, he became President Johnson’s National Security Adviser. 
14  Memorandum, David Klein to McGeorge Bundy, 3 April 1963, France-General, CS, NSF, box 72, John F. 
Kennedy Presidential Library (henceforth abbreviated as JFKL). Bohlen revealed that one of de Gaulle’s closest 
advisers served as an informant of the American embassy and “had him taped.” The problem, however, was that de 
Gaulle very often did not apprise even his closest advisers and ministers of his next move. Bohlen quoted in Note C., 
page 41, file 4, box W-13, Arthur M. Schlesinger jr. Papers, JFKL. François David, too, has suggested that the CIA 
had a confidential source of information within de Gaulle’s cabinet. François David, “Les Etats-Unis et les débuts de 





This is not, therefore, a study of French foreign policy during de Gaulle’s presidential 
tenure but of the United States’ response to this policy. It looks at one of the most turbulent 
episodes in this bilateral relationship from the receiving end of de Gaulle’s politics of grandeur. It 
is particularly concerned with understanding this response in the context of American approaches 
to the transatlantic relationship after World War II. Based on the American documentary record, 
it attempts to answer the following broad questions: 
 
I. How did Americans interpret de Gaulle’s policy of ‘independence’ within the larger 
framework of their ideas about the transatlantic relationship? 
II. How did consecutive administrations actually deal with the challenges posed within this 
framework by de Gaulle’s ‘independent’ foreign policy from 1958 to 1969? 
III. Did de Gaulle’s policy of ‘independence’ modify American policies towards Europe and 
the Atlantic alliance? 
* * * 
 
One should, of course, have solid reasons for adding to the already massive body of scholarly 
literature on American postwar diplomacy and on the Franco-American relationship. I am 
nonetheless convinced there is reason to add a pebble of my own to this ever rising mountain.  
To begin with, this study will examine in more detailed depth than most studies before it 
how consecutive American administrations dealt with the Gaullist challenge on a number of 
defining issues; it will, as a result, also advance some alternative conclusions.  
Chapters three and eight are mainly concerned with the politics of organizing the Atlantic 
alliance. Chapter three describes how Eisenhower and President John Kennedy grappled in vain 
to come to terms with de Gaulle’s memorandum of September 1958, which proposed a 
‘tripartite’ security organization that would coordinate the policies of the United States, Great 
Britain, and France across the globe. The chapter will underline, inter alia, that Eisenhower’s 
search for a compromise with de Gaulle continued up to the end of his tenure and preoccupied 
him more than is commonly understood; Kennedy, too, showed interest in the tripartite issue 
during his first year in office, even as the gist of his policies ran counter to de Gaulle’s vision. 
Chapter eight analyzes Johnson’s response to the French withdrawal from NATO in 1966 and de 
Gaulle’s politics of “détente, entente, coopération” with the Communist bloc. It will demonstrate how 
the United States in fact anticipated the French withdrawal well in advance and deftly used its 
occurrence to provide new impetus to an alliance long held hostage by French obstructionism. 





former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, were seriously disenchanted by Johnson’s refusal to 
stand up to the General. 
Chapters four and seven focus on political and military issues concerning the defense of 
the West, dealing in particular with the vital role played by nuclear weapons. Chapter four details 
Kennedy’s drive to shift the emphasis in NATO’s military strategy from massive retaliation to 
flexible response, his quest to unify the strategic deterrent of the alliance under American control 
and his all-out attempt to abort the French nuclear effort. Chapter seven argues that de Gaulle 
was to a larger extent than hitherto recognized, responsible for torpedoing the American 
proposal for a sea-based multilateral nuclear force (MLF) in 1964, at the end of Johnson’s first 
year in office. It moreover puts forward that the MLF must be seen as the last big Atlantic 
project of American foreign policy, and that its demise caused important shifts in the foreign 
policy mode of the United States vis-à-vis Europe. 
Chapters five and six deal principally with the American clash with de Gaulle over the 
movement toward European unity. In these chapters in particular, Jean Monnet (‘Mr. Europe’) 
emerges as a central figure in American policymaking next to Acheson and Undersecretary of 
State George Ball. While chapter five focuses on the Kennedy administration’s activist policies in 
1962 to ensure the Atlantic orientation of an integrated Europe, chapter six shows how it is 
forced to scramble for a response to de Gaulle’s blunt obstruction of these policies in January 
1963. De Gaulle’s veto of Kennedy’s design for an Atlantic ‘partnership’ revealed the limits of 
American power in Western Europe more clearly than any other event in the history of the 
transatlantic alliance (save perhaps the demise of the European Defense Community in 1954). It 
served as a catalyst to change Washington’s perspective on European affairs. 
Chapter nine, finally, sets out how the policy designs of both countries were reaching a 
dead end, creating the conditions for a shift from divergence to accommodation. This chapter 
will give ample attention to the American response to de Gaulle’s attack on the dollar, to his 
criticism of the Vietnam War, and to the turbulence of 1968. It underscores that a remarkable 
rapprochement between Washington and Paris was nonetheless already underway in Johnson’s 
final year in office. This rapprochement laid the groundwork for an accommodation with France 
within a changed transatlantic relationship in the Nixon years. The emergence of a different – 
more conservative and even Gaullist – European policy under President Richard Nixon and his 
National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger marked the end of the era in American foreign policy 
that had been dominated by a liberally-bent bipartisan establishment. The realist turn in American 
foreign policy in the late 1960s was a vindication of many of de Gaulle’s foreign policy views; 





Although these chapters are arranged in chronological order, the aim has not been to 
provide a chronological account but to highlight the evolution of the disagreement with France 
over the transatlantic relationship by focusing on key areas. This study thus does not, for instance, 
contain separate chapters of the United States’ dealings with France in the context of the 
Algerian conflict (or of the broader issue of decolonization), the Berlin crises of the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, or the war in Vietnam. This is not to argue that these issues were unimportant to 
the bilateral relationship. Neither are they ignored, as the reader will find out. But they are 
considered less central to the aims of this study, which concentrates on the American experience 
with de Gaulle in the context of the transatlantic relationship. 
In addition to providing a detailed analysis of how American administrations dealt with 
the Gaullist challenge and drawing some alternative conclusions, this study responds to the need 
for a monograph that explains the American reception of de Gaulle’s policies and assesses their 
implications for American foreign policy. 15  Such a monograph has been lacking, despite the 
wealth of both primary and secondary material. It is important for at least three reasons. 
                                                 
15 The monograph that approaches this one the closest, because it likewise covers the bilateral relationship within the 
transatlantic framework from 1958 to 1969, is Frédéric Bozo’s Deux stratégies pour l’Europe. De Gaulle, les États-Unis et 
l’Alliance Atlantique, 1958-1969 (Plon et Fondation Charles de Gaulle, 1996), which has been translated as Two 
Strategies For Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001). John 
Newhouse’s De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (New York: The Viking Press, 1970) may also be mentioned as such; 
while well-informed, he did not, however, have the important benefit of archival research. Frank Costigliola covers a 
much longer period in France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II (New York: Twayne Publishers, 
1992), but his chapter on the period of de Gaulle’s presidency equally deserves mention (pages 118-159). The same 
can be said of Charles Cogan’s Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France Since 1940 (New York: 
Praeger, 1994); however, although de Gaulle looms large throughout the book, only his chapter on the Multilateral 
Force falls within the scope of this study. Vincent Jauvert’s readable L’Amérique contre de Gaulle. Histoire secrète, 1961-
1969 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2000) makes no academic claims and is subordinated to only a few documents. The 
contributions of scholars and ‘witnesses’ in Paxton and Wahl, eds., De Gaulle and the United States, are highly relevant 
to this study, but do not constitute a monograph. For other valuable accounts of the bilateral relationship in either a 
longer or shorter timeframe, see: Duroselle, France and the United States; Maurice Ferro, De Gaulle et l’Amérique. Une 
amitié tumultueuse (France: Librairie Plon, 1973); Jeffrey Glen Giauque, Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic 
Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955-1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); 
Harrison, The Reluctant Ally; Richard F. Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (University of 
California Press, 1993); Erin R. Mahan, Kennedy, De Gaulle, and Western Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); 
and Marvin R. Zahniser, Uncertain Friendship: American-French Relations Through the Cold War (New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1975). Political scientist Stanley Hoffmann has not devoted a full-scale study to the topic, but he has written 
extensively on Franco-American relations during de Gaulle’s hold on power; see in particular: “De Gaulle, Europe 
and the Atlantic Alliance,” International Organization XVIII, Winter 1964: 1-28; “Perceptions, Reality and the Franco-
American conflict,” Journal of International Affairs 21, no.1, 1967: 57-71. The same applies to David Calleo, see in 
particular Europe’s Future: The Grand Alternative (New York: Horizon Press, 1965) and The Atlantic Fantasy: The United 
States, NATO and Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970). Henry Kissinger, too, has written 
perceptively on Franco-American relations under de Gaulle; see, e.g., The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the 
Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw-Hill for Council on Foreign Relations, 1965), chapter 2; Diplomacy (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1994), chapter 24. William I. Hitchcock devoted a chapter to “the Gaullist temptation” in The 
Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, 1945-2002 (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 221-241. Geir 
Lundestad has similarly included a chapter on de Gaulle’s challenge in “Empire” by Integration: The United States and 
European Integration, 1945-1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 58-82. For a more complete listing of 





Firstly, whereas de Gaulle’s anti-Americanism has been given ample attention (and has 
often been overstated), the anti-Gaullism among American policymakers largely stands to be 
examined. De Gaulle was the first postwar European leader to seek less rather than more 
American involvement in Europe. De Gaulle’s willful search for independent French – and, by 
extension, European – policies vis-à-vis the United States set him apart within the Western 
alliance. However, while this remains the crux of l’affaire de Gaulle, the American attitude towards 
this self-willed European leader and his pretension to an international role of weight was an 
equally defining part of the dispute. What made it so difficult for many Americans to disregard de 
Gaulle’s abrasive style, to accept his fundamental allegiance to the Cold War alliance, and to 
assess his – at times remarkably clairvoyant – propositions about world politics at face value? 
Why was it not possible to find common ground with the one European leader who appeared 
ready to assume more responsibility? What made him unpalatable as the harbinger of a resurgent 
Europe? 
Secondly, a historical examination of the American experience with de Gaulle is not 
merely important in the context of the history of the bilateral relationship but also in that of 
American foreign policy. During the Fourth Republic, American policymakers were still 
overwhelmingly concerned about the deleterious effect on the Western alliance of supposed 
French weakness; the Fifth Republic’s foreign policy transformed their concerns about the 
implications of a Europe which regained its strength and composure. De Gaulle brought the 
question of how to cope with a resurgent Europe to the fore in a way that could not be ignored 
in the United States. How Americans responded is indicative of how they approached all of 
Europe after World War II. This is only compounded by the fact that no debate between Atlantic 
allies has matched the range and the depth of the Franco-American dispute from 1958 to 1969. 
The study of the American experience with de Gaulle therefore will tell us more about postwar 
American views of Europe than a study of American attitudes toward any other European 
country. The French, John Dos Passos already wrote in Journeys Between Wars (1938), “embody a 
stubborn, unfanatical, live-and-let-live habit of mind, a feeling in every man and woman of the 
worth of personal dignity that is, for better or for worse, the unique contribution of Western 
Europe to the world. […] It’s easy to forget how central the French people are in everything we 
mean when we say Europe.”16 
Thirdly, in so far as the American experience with de Gaulle has been reviewed, I find 
there to be sufficient reason to add my own perspective and findings. Historians who have 





dismissive attitude towards de Gaulle. They have attributed this attitude on the part of American 
policymakers to an overriding reluctance to share power or, worse, to a combination of hubris 
and blinding parochialism. Assessments of this type are to be found particularly in the work of 
the French historian Frédéric Bozo and his American colleague Frank Costigliola. As this study 
will differ with them, a brief review of their main conclusions is in order. 
Bozo’s Deux stratégies pour l’Europe (1996) deals specifically with the bilateral relationship 
during de Gaulle’s Elysean years within the context of the Atlantic alliance and is without doubt 
the most relevant here. His assessment of the American reaction to de Gaulle is determined by 
his chief contention that the latter’s foreign policy, surpassing the “narrow nationalist objectives 
that have long been attributed to it,” was “truly a grand design.” Bozo emphasizes that de Gaulle 
genuinely aimed to bring an end to the Cold War: he carved out ‘European’ autonomy vis-à-vis 
the United States, broke with the logic of opposing blocs, and actively promoted a fundamental 
relaxation of East-West relations through ‘détente, entente et coopération.’ Bozo does not see de 
Gaulle as the cause – least of all the culprit – of the “existential” crisis within the Atlantic alliance 
in the mid-1960s. He claims this crisis above all reflected “ongoing transformations of the power 
relations that underpinned the international system”– in other words: Europe reemerged, the 
Cold War abated, and de Gaulle was if anything the champion of an adjustment of the Cold War 
alliance to these new realities. Regardless of the overriding significance he attaches to de Gaulle’s 
design to ‘overcome the blocs,’ Bozo disavows the “accepted wisdom” that de Gaulle sought to 
weaken the Atlantic alliance. De Gaulle’s objective, Bozo finds, “was not so much to weaken 
NATO as to transform the Western group of nations, if not somehow to reinforce transatlantic 
ties.” (emphasis added) 
Not surprisingly, therefore, Bozo finds American policies toward France under de Gaulle 
seriously flawed. He criticizes the United States for resisting the validity of de Gaulle’s 
revisionism and for putting its foot down to maintain the bipolar status quo. American 
policymakers were stuck in their preconception that de Gaulle was above all a French nationalist 
with anachronistic notions of grandeur. Their policies were “reactive” and “devoid of a truly 
constructive vision to pit against de Gaulle’s design.” Only eventually did the United States feel 
compelled to adopt “a more constructive and dynamic approach” – a reference to the Johnson-
led revitalization of the alliance in the wake of the French withdrawal from NATO in 1966. 
Oddly, Bozo commends the United States for what at other times he has found objectionable: it 
reestablished its leadership within the alliance. The United States effectively rebuilt a political and 
strategic consensus within NATO, but not – Bozo notes – without integrating important 
                                                                                                                                                      





elements of de Gaulle’s vision. The renewed consensus stressed the desirability of détente in 
East-West relations, gave a greater role to nuclear deterrence in the new alliance strategy than 
envisioned at first, and tolerated the Gaullist model for military cooperation – i.e. the Lemnitzer-
Ailleret agreements – within the allied framework. Of the two strategies for Europe, however, 
Bozo finds the one put forward by de Gaulle superior and largely faults the United States with a 
singleminded focus on dominating the Western alliance.17 
Costigliola’s France and the United States (1992), the most comprehensive chronological 
account of the bilateral relationship through the Cold War, is also highly critical of American policies 
with regard to France. Costigliola sharply condemns consecutive American administrations for a 
fundamental unpreparedness to share power within the alliance. He portrays the Franco-American 
relationship as one between, on the one hand, a hegemon systematically engaged in unilateral power 
politics and, on the other hand, a particularly difficult client that resents taking orders and 
consistently questions the wisdom of the schemes in which it is asked to cooperate. American 
policymakers are exposed as manipulative – perhaps even hypocritical since their oft-stated 
preparedness to consult allies as real partners was merely of a rhetorical nature. Irked by persistent 
diatribes among American politicians and officials against “those damn French,” Costigliola finds 
that most of the blame for the querulous nature of the Franco-American relationship lay in 
Washington. American officials and politicians emerge from his largely narrative account as notably 
insensitive to French concerns and interests. They were given to self-righteous behavior and 
belittling complaints about the supposed mental lapses and feminine unsteadiness of the French. 
Costigliola gives much weight to metaphors which cast de Gaulle during the Roosevelt years as an 
indisposed “bride” or a “temperamental lady” and the Fourth Republic as a “weak sister”; extending 
such metaphors, he typifies Ronald Reagan’s America and François Mitterrand’s France as an “odd 
couple.” Costigliola pronounces no distinct verdict on American approaches to France during the 
1960s, except to note that when de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, “Americans generally stopped 
feminizing France.” In a string of metereological metaphors, however, he suggests that what has 
“most often been a cold alliance” went into “the deep freeze” in the 1960s to be followed by a “slow 
thaw” only after de Gaulle’s departure.18 
While Bozo dispels interpretations of de Gaulle as a narrow-minded nationalist, Costigliola 
exposes the behavior of consecutive administrations toward France as domineering and belittling. 
Both call attention to a persistent American reluctance to share power with its European allies and 
to a general lack of understanding in American policymaking circles of de Gaulle and his vision. 
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Both are largely justified in this regard. The documentary record strongly suggests that the United 
States was at least partially responsible for allowing the transatlantic dialogue to degenerate into a 
Franco-American quarrel. It is true that many American policymakers habitually castigated de 
Gaulle as a narrow-minded nationalist obsessed with grandeur. They found his opposition to 
American leadership hard to swallow. They found his pretension for a distinct role for France 
hardly justified given its modest national resources. They tended to set de Gaulle apart from his 
political environment, narrowing down their differences with him to a confrontation between, on 
the one hand, the United States and most of its allies and, on the other hand, ‘one elderly ruler in 
Europe.’ This attitude of ridicule and reprehension failed to do justice to the quality of de 
Gaulle’s strategic vision. It also made it inherently more difficult for consecutive American 
administrations to come to terms with this vision in a more constructive way. 
Yet none of this can be satisfactorily explained by a supposed small-mindedness or a 
singular attachment to power on the part of American policymakers. Nor is it true that American 
policymakers all exhibited this attitude, or exhibited it in the same degree. In a general sense, 
deprecating behavior towards de Gaulle was mostly to be found within the State Department and 
less in the White House and the Defense Department. There were also important philosophical 
differences between the various administrations with regard to de Gaulle. Neither Bozo nor 
Costigliola has made a genuine effort to put American attitudes towards de Gaulle in perspective. 
Costigliola, in particular, devotes scant analysis to the principal considerations which motivated 
American policies towards France. His view of the bilateral relationship and his preoccupation with 
exposing the manipulative ploys and the almost childlike recriminations on the American side 
provide us with relatively little insight into the rather more complex American experience with de 
Gaulle. Both disregard the fact that the strong American reaction to de Gaulle was partly due to 
the latter’s uniquely confrontational style and his wounding criticisms of American leadership. 
They do not consider the possibility that de Gaulle sought a certain amount of friction in his 
relationship with the United States in order to further his political objectives, both domestically 
and internationally. Above all, no effort has been made to consider the reactions in the United 
States towards de Gaulle in the context of American ideas about the transatlantic relationship, 
perceptions of European history, and self-perceptions as a nation and a civilization. While I have 
no reason – or desire – to exonerate Americans where criticism is due, this study makes an effort 
to understand the American disposition toward de Gaulle in the historical and political context in 
which American policymakers believed they operated. 
 






Besides a conventional study into diplomatic history, this study is a less conventional history of 
ideas in American foreign policy – in this case a history of the evolution of American ideas about 
the relationship to Europe.  
There is, of course, a wide range of approaches to explaining the American experience 
with de Gaulle. One approach is to follow the realist school of thought and to stress the 
hegemonic nature of American foreign policy after World War II. This study will indeed give 
plenty of evidence for hegemonic behavior vis-à-vis the Gaullist challenge on the part of the 
United States, even if it will also make clear that American hegemony was more accommodating 
than is sometimes suggested. The United States was the leader and the manager of the Atlantic 
alliance. It was looking for an efficient division of labor among the members of the alliance that 
left its controlling position intact. The bottom line for Washington usually was to retain the 
ability to control or to influence European events in its own interests. American Cold War 
policies vis-à-vis France were hence aimed at fashioning it into a cooperative ally. De Gaulle, 
however, had no interest in subjecting France to a division of labor drawn up in Washington. 
Because Americans did not like to think of the Western alliance in hegemonic terms, they 
preferred to speak of American ‘leadership.’ But exercising leadership often is not all that 
different from exercising hegemony, even as it reflects the degree of consent considered desirable 
within the Western alliance for the charted course.  
However, while the ‘hegemony approach’ thus addresses an important dynamic in the 
Franco-American relationship during the Cold War, it would not add significantly to existing 
interpretations. Both Bozo and Costigliola have stressed that the United States’ hegemonic 
behavior, of which they are highly critical, was a chief cause of the Franco-American conflict in 
the 1960s. Henry Kissinger has similarly faulted the American division-of-labor approach to the 
alliance for creating unnecessary tension in the relationship: 
 
We looked at the alliance as if it were a technical problem of assembling a certain number of 
boards in which burdens were assigned on the basis of a kind of quota. Overall efficiency would 
be the motive of all participants of the Atlantic relationship. There would be an appropriate 
division of labor […]. The problem for de Gaulle was not how to relate France to a division of 
labor, but his conviction that before France could relate itself to anybody, it had to relate itself to 
itself, that it had to have some sense of its purpose.19 
 
                                                 





By giving singular attention to how power is distributed and exercised within the Western alliance, 
the ‘hegemony approach’ furthermore has the disadvantage of overlooking other important 
dimensions of the American perspective on de Gaulle’s challenge. It is, in particular, less 
instructive about American reactions to the political nature of this challenge. These reactions 
would not have been so strong if de Gaulle’s policies had been perceived merely as the irksome 
but not abnormal objections from a satellite to the dominance of the superpower. 
 Another approach to explaining the American experience with de Gaulle is to contrast 
American and French attitudes in a more philosophical light. Charles Cogan’s Oldest Allies, 
Guarded Friends (1994), for instance, provides important clues in this regard. Cogan, who spent 
twenty-three years abroad for the Central Intelligence Agency acquiring inter alia first-hand 
knowledge of French politics, appears to join Costigliola and Bozo in stating that the United 
States has “systematically refused to give consideration to the national interests of France” and 
that “too often in the past, America has seen dialogue with France as an act of ratification of its 
wishes.”20 But he recognizes, too, that France has been highly sensitive to real and perceived 
infringements on its national independence, in particular in the areas of foreign policy and 
defense. Cogan explains this not only from the country’s frightening roller-coaster ride during 
World War II and its severely weakened position after the war, but also from a particularly 
French brand of nationalism which takes an exalted view of the state and believes French 
civilization sends a universal message to mankind. Cogan’s analysis thus takes on a more 
philosophical nature than either Costigliola or Bozo. He contrasts French and American political 
cultures, societies, and historical experiences. He shows how communication is hampered by the 
fact that the French tend to think of politics in abstract notions, while the pragmatic mindset of 
Americans is inclined to go with what works.21 Cogan also sees the impact of demographics, 
noting that, in contrast to most other Europeans, the French have not emigrated en masse to the 
United States. One result is that there has been no distinctly pro-French element in American 
public opinion; another that American society has been predominantly shaped by its British roots.  
Ultimately, Cogan believes, the Franco-American argument boils down to an uneasy 
encounter between two universalist pretensions that have their roots in the two main liberal 
revolutions of the eighteenth century: the American Revolution (1775-1783) and the French 
Revolution (1789-1799). The American and French universalisms have accounted for overblown 
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aspirations and self-perceptions on either side. They are not ideologically incompatible, allowing 
for a certain fundamental solidarity arising from a shared commitment to liberty, explaining why 
the two countries have found themselves on the same side when confronted with less compatible 
universalisms. But they are nonetheless distinct, causing France and the United States to act on 
different wavelengths. Cogan’s approach of contrasting the two universalisms is helpful to 
distinguish between American-style versus French-style thinking. But it tends to overestimate the 
degree to which there were two coherent or monolithic bodies of thought. It is for this reason 
less helpful in explaining the diversity of responses in the United States to de Gaulle’s foreign 
policy. It is furthermore less useful in comprehending its evolution in relation to the transatlantic 
relationship.  
This study therefore hopes to find added value by looking at the American experience 
with de Gaulle from a somewhat different angle. It attempts to explain this experience in the 
context of longstanding American attitudes towards Europe, of the distinct traditions which have 
historically shaped American foreign policy, and of conceptions of the transatlantic relationship 
that prevailed in the United States during the early decades of the Cold War. This aspect of the 
study is necessary in order to gain deeper insight into the – variety of – responses in the United 
States to de Gaulle; in addition, it will help us understand some of the less tangible changes in 
American foreign policy as a result of the de Gaulle experience. Washington and Paris had 
important interests that go a long way in explaining why they often clashed – and these will 
certainly be discussed. But there was much more at play. I have come to agree with the political 
scientist Philip Cerny, who has written that the Franco-American conflict of the 1960s was “the 
accumulation of a series of divergences which were not so significant in themselves, but which 
became crucial when set in the context of the conflict of paradigmatic perspectives.”22 I have also 
come to appreciate the wisdom in Polybius’ classic words, cited in the epitaph, which admonish 
the historian “not [to] pay so much attention to the actual narrative of events, as to what 
precedes, what accompanies, and what follows” and to consider “the discussion of why, how, 
and wherefore each thing was done […].”23 
Perusing the extensive documentary record, I began to realize in particular that American 
policymakers were imbued with certain notions about – the American relationship to – Europe 
that prejudiced their assessments of de Gaulle. Behind the differences on a range of topics lay a 
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fundamental disagreement about the nature of the transatlantic relationship. To de Gaulle, there 
certainly was historical solidarity between the United States and France, but there could be no 
bonds which would tie both sides of the Atlantic permanently together; in the final analysis, the 
Atlantic alliance was to him a temporary expediency to stave off a specific threat. Many 
Americans, in contrast, had come to view the transatlantic relationship in ideological and organic 
terms. The Cold War had transformed their mental map of the Atlantic Ocean, changing it from 
a geographical and mental barrier into a mare nostrum. “With the development of the Atlantic 
Community,” the American political philosopher Louis Halle typically observed in 1957, “it has 
become instead of a broad wilderness separating two worlds or two hemispheres, a lake which 
makes close neighbors of all who live on its shores.”24  
Was there one predominant conception of the transatlantic relationship in the United 
States during the early decades of the Cold War, one that has influenced American policymakers 
in thought and in action? Amid the huge diversity of views, I was struck in the course of my 
archival research by persistent and widespread references to the transatlantic relationship as an 
evolving Atlantic “community.” This more encompassing notion of a “community” was 
furthermore elaborated in an avalanche of policy papers, historical studies, political treatises, and 
citizen’s initiatives. The Atlantic community – or slight variations thereof – was the catchword in 
the American political discourse from the late 1940s until the late 1960s to describe the 
transatlantic relationship. It implied that the Atlantic alliance was much more than a security 
response to a temporary exigency. It had unmistakable ideological and civilizational connotations. 
Organizations with transatlantic membership, such as NATO and the OECD, were seen as the 
expressions of an underlying reality and the harbingers of growing Atlantic unity. The notion of 
an Atlantic community indeed had all the characteristics of a foreign policy paradigm.25 As a 
result, there seemed to me to be some truth in the observation of two American policymakers in 
1965 that “for almost twenty years America’s major foreign policy has been sustained on a 
nightmare and a dream. The nightmare was the Soviet threat in Europe […]. The dream was an 
‘Atlantic Community.’”26 But was there any reality to this dream? Did Americans all mean the 
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same thing by it? Was it more than a rhetorical convention? In order to understand the American 
reaction to de Gaulle, I first had to come to grips with the notion of an Atlantic community. 
Diplomatic historians have traditionally shied away from giving much weight to the idea 
of an Atlantic community in explaining the United States’ policies towards Europe during the 
Cold War. Because of its admitted vagueness, it is indeed tempting to argue that this notion had a 
mostly rhetorical or even propagandistic function. The Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad, for 
instance, has flatly stated that “the deepest reason” for the absence of more Atlantic integration 
“was quite simply that there was virtually no interest in the United States in anything that would 
reduce American sovereignty.”27  
The concept of the transatlantic relationship as an evolving community of like-minded 
nations was nonetheless an important and influential characteristic of the perspective of the 
postwar generation of American policymakers. The Atlantic community idea served as a beacon 
in their view of the evolving world system, perhaps something akin to a mental map.28 In this 
perspective, the institutional development of organizations such as NATO and the OECD not 
only seemed logical but also just the beginning of something more permanent and more desirable. 
The idea of an Atlantic community was more than a hyperbolic restatement of Cold War 
solidarity. The prevalence of the notion indeed reflected the fact that the transatlantic relationship 
had become the object of high-strung expectations among Americans after World War II. It was 
also one premise for the activist American support for European integration and unity from the 
late 1940s to the mid-1960s, for within an Atlantic community any European entity that might be 
created would likely be agreeable to American interests and ideals. What is more, Atlanticism was 
to most American policymakers the peacetime alternative to American isolationism and 
European nationalism. In this light, as in others, they regarded de Gaulle as a dangerous 
obstructionist: his foreign policy appeared to awaken ghosts of the past.  
This is far from saying that all Americans in the early decades of the Cold War 
unequivocally subscribed to the notion of an Atlantic community or meant the same thing by it. 
On the contrary, this study suggests that its emergence as an idea in American foreign policy is to 
be explained in part by its ability to wed the conservative and the liberal traditions of American 
foreign policy and their essentially different approaches to Europe. Postwar American foreign 
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policy can be seen as an uneasy yet reasonably effective synthesis between these two traditions, 
embodied by a bipartisan foreign policy establishment that determined the broad outlines of this 
policy. On the one hand, the idea of an Atlantic community could be supported from the 
conservative perspective as the extension of the Anglo-American strategic partnership to Western 
Europe; on the other hand, liberals tended to lend support to the Atlantic community as a scaled-
down version of Wilsonian one-worldism in the context of the Cold War. The idea of an Atlantic 
community, in addition, incorporated the fundamental ambivalence felt towards Europe, making 
it a kind of compromise between the tendency to limit American engagement in Europe and the 
inclination to reform it. Under the pressure of the Cold War, the notion of an Atlantic 
community thus helped to bridge important differences within the internationalist segment of the 
American political community. This, in turn, also helps to explain both the pervasiveness and the 
ambiguity that has led diplomatic historians to neglect its function.  
The first part of this study is therefore devoted to understanding where each side of the 
argument came from. Chapter one provides an analysis of de Gaulle’s vantage point, focusing on 
the ideas underpinning his foreign policy and on his views of the United States and Europe. 
Chapter two describes how Americans have approached the transatlantic relationship following 
World War II, dissecting the notion that this relationship was evolving into an ever closer 
Atlantic community.29 It argues that postwar American diplomacy was to an important extent 
defined by the interplay between the liberal and the conservative tradition in American foreign 
policy, by the New World’s ambivalence toward the Old World, and by a historical evolution 
from aloofness to engagement in geopolitical approaches to the European question. It suggests 
that the emergence of the Atlantic community as an idea in American foreign policy is to be 
explained by its ability to wed the conservative and the liberal traditions of American foreign 
policy and their different approaches to Europe.  
 
 
                                                 
29  Parts of this chapter have been published earlier in Sebastian Reyn, Allies or Aliens? George W. Bush and the 












From the Atlantic to the Urals: De Gaulle’s ‘European’ Europe and 
the United States as the Ally of Ultimate Recourse 
 
 
This book is about the reactions in the United States to France’s foreign policy from 1958 to 
1969. It cannot, therefore, do without an investigation into this foreign policy. Since de Gaulle 
was the sole master of this policy, this implies an examination of his political philosophy and his 
views on – the conduct of – foreign affairs and on the United States and the transatlantic 
relationship. There is no need to go extensively over ground that is well covered; the body of 
scholarly work on de Gaulle and Gaullism is imposing enough. But some understanding of de 
Gaulle’s perspective will help us to obtain a clearer view of the similarities and dissimilarities with 
the American vantage point described in the next chapter; it will naturally cast light, too, on the 
question why these perspectives led to a confrontation on many – albeit not all – issues. An 
examination of de Gaulle’s body of thought is moreover instructive since it helps to steer clear of 
all-too-easy stereotypical images of de Gaulle as ‘vainglorious,’ ‘haughty,’ ‘authoritarian,’ and ‘anti-
American’; de Gaulle was far too thoughtful a statesman to be dealt with in such a trite manner. 
In addition, it must be recognized that the narrative of de Gaulle and the Americans did not 
begin in 1958. In particular de Gaulle’s experience with the United States during World War II is 
a necessary background to his relationship with the Americans in the 1960s. Besides reviewing de 
Gaulle’s political philosophy, this chapter will therefore focus on the period up to and 
immediately following de Gaulle’s resignation as in early 1946. 
De Gaulle, France, and the Nation-State 
De Gaulle and France: A Mythical Relationship 
Any analysis of de Gaulle’s political views must begin by acknowledging his fealty to France; or, 
more precisely, to the mythical conception of France – “dedicated to an exalted and exceptional 
destiny” like “the princess in the fairy stories or the Madonna in the frescoes” – that is stirred up 
in the opening lines of his War Memoirs – “inspired by sentiment as much as by reason.”1 
This celebrated invocation of France as a great and radiant power despite its twentieth-
century misfortunes had not come into being in isolation. It had been nourished by de Gaulle’s 
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upbringing and by the drama of his time. Charles André Marie Joseph de Gaulle entered the 
world on November 22, 1890, in the northern industrial town of Lille, as the third child and 
second son of Henri de Gaulle and Jeanne Maillot. His cultural and social mindset would 
continue to belong to that of the Nord, even as he grew up in Paris. “All his life long,” Paul-Marie 
de la Gorce wrote, “when he called to mind the French nation it was the people of the north of 
the country that he saw.”2 The older de Gaulle embodied a serious, hard-working, and ambitious 
France, a far cry from the bonhomie of the south. The Parisian environment in which he was 
raised was puritanically Catholic, strongly intellectual, and deeply patriotic. The de Gaulles were 
well versed in French politics, history, and culture. The country’s fate was a constant topic of 
conversation at the family’s dining table: his father – a teacher by profession – was “imbued with 
a feeling of the dignity of France,” de Gaulle observed in his War Memoirs; his mother cherished 
“an uncompromising passion for her country, equal to her religious piety.”3 The young Charles 
moreover possessed an extraordinary sense of self-awareness, which he linked with an equally 
notable patriotic fervor. Even in boyhood, he prepared himself for a momentous contribution to 
his nation’s lot: “I was convinced that France would have to go through gigantic trials, that the 
interest of life consisted in one day rendering her some signal service, and that I would have the 
occasion to do so.”4 
 De Gaulle’s urgent desire to rise to the call of duty was undoubtedly much reinforced by 
the real threats to the French state, both internal and external, as he was growing up. The France 
of his boyhood years was marked by the gaping divisions in French society exposed by the so-
called Dreyfus affair, named after a Jewish army officer on the French General Staff – Captain 
Albert Dreyfus – who in 1894 was falsely charged with delivering defense secrets to Germany. 
The affair pitted the conservative France of the Ancien Régime – the army, the monarchists, the 
Catholics, the nationalists – against the republican France of the anti-clericals, the writers and the 
artists, the freemasons, the Protestants, and the Jews. It ravaged French politics at the turn of the 
century, becoming increasingly tied up with the survival of the Third Republic and bringing the 
country dangerously close to civil war. De Gaulle may have been too young to experience the 
affair itself: the case against Dreyfus would drag on until 1906, when the Appeal Court finally 
reversed the initial conviction, but it was essentially brought to a closure when a presidential 
pardon was issued in 1899. The Dreyfus affair, however, echoed for a long time in French society 
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(and in particular within the army). His family moreover had struggled with the issue. Although 
conservative by inclination, it respected the institutions of the French Republic and was 
committed to a fair and truthful treatment of the case. As de Gaulle’s father believed in Dreyfus’ 
innocence, the family had distanced itself from the nationalist diatribes common in conservative 
circles at the time.5 What ultimately saved the country, according to one historian, was “the spirit 
of fonctionnarisme” within the army, the idea that “its officers in the last resort were servants of the 
state, bound by an oath to whoever held the legal authority of the government.”6 When de Gaulle 
chose to pursue a career in the army in 1909, at age eighteen, it was in part because of a personal 
“search for a synthesis and a unity” in a society that had been bitterly divided. “The army of the 
Republic,” his biographer Jean Lacouture explained, “was perhaps the only State corporation in 
which there was expressed that unanimity which Charles de Gaulle dreamt of, and expressed in a 
style marked with its fundamental conviction of being the pick of the nation.”7 
Besides the internal woes of the French state, the young de Gaulle was highly alert to the 
vicissitudes of the European great power rivalry at the turn of the century. For one, the loss of 
Alsace Lorraine to Germany in 1871 had shaped the outlook of generations of Frenchmen – and 
de Gaulle was no exception. When still a fifteen-year old student at a Jesuit college, he wrote a 
remarkable twenty-page essay describing how “General de Gaulle’’ would save his country from a 
German-led invasion by other European powers in 1930.8 And upon having joined the army, de 
Gaulle prepared himself and the soldiers under his command for the coming war – which finally 
came in 1914. Much of the rivalry between Europe’s great powers at the time concentrated, of 
course, also on colonial issues. In 1898, French aspirations for a transcontinental African empire 
had come to a humiliating end as French forces led by Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand were 
finally ordered to retreat from Fashoda (now Kodok) on the upper White Nile in the face of a 
stronger British force.9 France also clashed several times with Germany over colonial issues, in 
particular over Morocco in 1905 and again in 1911. 10  Colonial squabbles like these, which 
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revolved around prestige as much as around interests, greatly excited French public opinion and 
whipped up a nationalistic fervor. Despite his young age – he was not yet ten years old during the 
Fashoda crisis and twenty-one when the German gunboat Panther moored in Agadir – de Gaulle 
was equally, if not more, alert to such events.11 “As an adolescent,” he professed in his memoirs, 
“the fate of France, whether as the subject of history or as the stake in public life, interested me 
above everything.”12 
De Gaulle not only had the impatience of a pubescent performer but also the mind of an 
intellectual. The de Gaulle family was one of lawyers, writers, historians, and teachers – a “family 
of learning and erudition.”13 The young Charles, too, had a lively interest in history, poetry, 
literature, and philosophy. His intellectual landscape was densely populated with the great writers 
and philosophers of classical and French history as well as those of his own time.14 De Gaulle’s 
brand of patriotism, however, cannot be understood without the particular influence of the 
socialist publisher-poet Charles Péguy (1873-1914). The similarities between de Gaulle’s “certain 
idea of France,” as laid out on the first page of his War Memoirs, and Péguy’s writings have been 
noted elsewhere, as has the oddity of their intellectual affinity.15 What de Gaulle liked about 
Péguy, according to Lacouture, was that “this socialist and Dreyfusist should have become the 
most fearless celebrator of French nationalism.”16 He was impressed with Péguy’s argument in 
the Dreyfus affair that what was at stake was not the physical security of France, as the army and 
its defenders at the time contended, but its spiritual salvation. He was also enamored by Péguy’s 
polemic charges against the pacifism of the socialist Jean Jaurès and his exaltation of the soldier’s 
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life, with its strong sense of community and emphasis on group ethic. While Lieutenant de Gaulle 
was preparing his troops for the coming war, Péguy was preparing the French mind. Like de 
Gaulle, Péguy was not just a man of letters, but also a man of action: the former was wounded in 
the Belgian city of Dinant in the war’s opening days, the latter died in battle a few weeks later. 
Péguy’s writings were imbued with mystical notions that were to be at the core of de 
Gaulle’s conception of France: the continuity and integrity of French history, the unshakeable 
belief that this history endowed it with greatness and destiny, and that it gave evidence of the 
unbreakable bond between the nation and its military. In particular the idea that French history 
should be seen as a continuum was far from common wisdom at the time. On the contrary, the 
Dreyfus affair had exposed there were two French nations engaged in a virtual war at the turn of 
the century – one representing the Ancien Régime, the other the French Revolution and the 
Enlightenment. “The concept of the unity of French history, in other words the synthesis of 
republic and monarchy, was one of Péguy’s major contributions to French nationalism,” the 
Dutch historian Henk Wesseling therefore observed.17 With the possible exception of Philippe 
Pétain, no one more than de Gaulle embodied this synthesis between the republic and the 
monarchy as well as the symbiosis between the army and the French nation. Peguy’s notion of 
the insoluble bond between France and its military was moreover manifest in de Gaulle’s own 
writings, in particular in La France et son armée (1938).18 Péguy’s idea of France as a historical entity 
with a life and a spirit of its own, deserving of salvation and separate from its constitutional 
appearance at a given time, was later to underpin the most daring move of de Gaulle’s life: to 
assume the cloak of the French state after Nazi Germany had conquered large swaths of French 
territory in June 1940. 
De Gaulle was not a radical in any ideological sense and he steered clear of the 
xenophobic nationalism of Maurice Barrès and of Charles Maurras’ Action Française. But he was a 
radical in defending France and his conception of it. De Gaulle even eventually came to think of 
himself – or rather his political persona: General de Gaulle – as its incarnation. Before the war he 
had written that it would take a “man of character” to salvage the country, not just from its 
external enemies but also from the self-defeating bickering of France’s political classes, and 
through his writing he appeared to be steeling himself for such a role.19 For this reason, it can be 
said that on June 18th, 1940, when he called on the French to continue the war against Nazi 
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Germany, de Gaulle came into his own: he was France. This was the “trial” he had been preparing 
for since boyhood. The sense of embodiment had not left him in March 1958, when he was 
approached to resume the reins of power in order to salvage the country from the Algerian crisis. 
As he reminisced shortly before his death: 
 
When I saw the politicians gathered together again for the first time, I felt at once, no mistaking 
it, their hostility to everyone. They did not believe in the slightest that I was a dictator, but they 
understood I represented the State. That was just as bad: the State is the devil, and if it exists, then 
they do not. They lose what they value most, and that is not money but the exercise of their 
vanity. They all loathe the State.20 
 
Whether the vanity of the ‘politicians’ was greater than de Gaulle’s vanity is, of course, a 
debatable question. The least one can say is that there may be different kinds of vanities. De 
Gaulle’s vanity appeared not to be personal – in private he was a man of modest ways – but 
something far larger: the vanity of a whole nation. To de Gaulle, French interests and the unity of 
the French people were always of primordial importance. Since France – its interests, its 
aspirations, its continuation as an independent nation – was forever uppermost in his mind, there 
can be no doubt that he was a nationalist. 
 
The Primacy of the Nation-State and Foreign Policy  
Given this devotion to France, it is not surprising that to de Gaulle the nation-state was the sole 
entity that genuinely mattered in politics. In his perspective, a strong state was indispensable for 
giving structure and meaning to national political life. It was required for fulfilling the most 
elementary of all human needs, that of security; it was also the tool par excellence for realizing the 
collective aspirations of a people. “I regarded the state not […] as the parties wished it to become 
once more, a juxtaposition of private interests which could never produce anything but weak 
compromise, but instead an institution of decision, action and ambition, expressing and serving 
the national interest alone,” de Gaulle wrote. In this view, all areas of policy tended to become a 
function of foreign policy. What is more, de Gaulle’s conception of the state’s functions required 
the presence of a strong executive at its core rather than a system of checks and balances. “In 
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order to make decisions and determine measures, it [the state] must have a qualified arbitrator at 
its head.”21  
De Gaulle’s conception of the state as giving fibre to the will of a nation moreover 
entailed that he could not conceive of any authority or community legitimately transcending it. 
International organizations were essentially societies of nation-states. They did not possess 
political legitimacy on their own, nor should they be allowed to usurp it. The perennial reality of 
the nation-state moreover led him to regard the conduct of foreign affairs as the management of 
bilateral relationships in a constantly changing balance of power rather than as the maneuvering 
within a multilateral framework. This did not mean that de Gaulle was opposed to all forms of 
international organization. He proved capable of envisaging a mechanism for policy coordination 
between a small number of nation-states in his tripartite memorandum proposal of September 
1958 (which will be discussed in chapter three) and an intergovernmental network of organized, 
regular consultations between nation-states as proposed in his 1961 plan for a European union 
(see chapter five). But he never departed from his basic belief that the nation-state is the building 
block of the international system. He was profoundly sceptical of the United Nations – “les 
nations dites unies” – and stipulated that France would maintain “la plus grande réserve” toward it.22 
He abhorred the idea that France should be submerged in a multilateral system that sought to 
transcend national sovereignty, be it European integration or NATO’s integrated military 
structure. It would, de Gaulle believed, amount to an abdication of the unalienable responsibility 
of any nation-state to its people.  
There is hence little doubt that de Gaulle was a foreign policy realist and that this puts 
him squarely in the camp of conservative thinkers about international affairs. “Logic and 
sentiment do not weigh heavily in comparison with the realities of power,” he declared in his War 
Memoirs (in the context of describing his meeting with President Roosevelt in July 1944). “What 
matters is what one takes and what one can hold on to; […] to regain her place, France must 
count only on herself.”23 In the same conservative vein, he regarded force as an intrinsic part of 
life and – as he wrote in Le fil de l’épée – not without virtue since its application was “the 
prerequisite of movement and the midwife of progress.”24 De Gaulle’s approach to international 
affairs certainly had little in common with the Wilsonianism that had inspired the League of 
Nations or the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which renounced war for all time. He censured the 
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treaty-based policies of French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand and his supporters as  
“shamefully denationalizing.”25 France, he lamented in Vers l’armée de métier (1934), had become 
the “Pénélope” of international politics, weaving her web of parchment agreements as the 
international dangers multiplied. “This liberal understanding of which we are so prodigal is not 
reciprocated,” de Gaulle warned; on the contrary, “the egotism of nations becomes more and 
more stubborn.”26 In his view, national power was therefore the deciding factor. From 1932 to 
1937, as a relatively junior yet already imposing officer at the Secretariat-General of the Conseil 
Supérieur de la Défense Nationale, de Gaulle had been intimately involved in the preparation of war 
with Germany  – a war that he considered inevitable. It persuaded him that the impending battle 
required the effective mobilization of the nation’s resources. Good will was not enough; force – 
in particular, military force – was indispensable. And instead of seeking peace through solemn 
but unrealistic treaty pledges, the situation required hard-nosed alliances of convenience with 
Germany’s foes. “It is a question of surviving,” he wrote to his mother in defense of the Franco-
Russian Pact of 1935; “all the rest is mere words.” “Il s’agit de survivre, tout le reste est 
littérature.”27 
This emphasis on the importance of national power in international affairs is not to say 
that de Gaulle believed that this power be applied without restraint. On the contrary, he was an 
proponent of the judicious, non-ideological approach to balance-of-power politics typical of the 
pre-revolutionary days and exemplified by Cardinal Richelieu and Louis XIV. The French 
diplomacy of the Ancien Régime, he eulogized in La France et son armée (1938), exhibited the “just 
proportion between the ends pursued and the forces of the state.” France was almost continually 
at war, “but the wars of the period rarely aroused great national passions” and “the majority of 
Frenchmen […] were to be allowed to live their lives peacefully.”28 De Gaulle was, it should be 
stressed, far from an unqualified admirer of Napoleon. As a military man, he inevitably admired 
the military genius and the bravura of the Corsican. But de Gaulle criticized the self-annointed 
emperor’s lack of moderation in no uncertain terms. For it was Napoleon’s unbending drive for 
continental hegemony through military conquest that ultimately had left France bereaved and at 
the mercy of its enemies. “The nature of imperial power pushed France into an infernal cycle of 
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battles,” de Gaulle concluded. “Once the ratio between the end and the means is snapped, the 
maneuvers of a genius are in vain.” Napoleon thus compared unfavorably to the governments of 
the old regime, who “strove incessantly to increase their territory, to support their allies and to 
weaken their rivals, but they avoided great jolts, ruptures of the equilibrium and upheavals.”29 De 
Gaulle could be uncompromising in his defense of the French interest, but he was not a 
warmonger. 
The primacy de Gaulle accorded to the nation-state in the international system was 
furthermore not just a result of his penchant for realism. It was equally influenced by the 
romantic nationalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, according to which the state 
derived its political legitimacy from the particular attributes and the unity of those it governed. 
De Gaulle’s views of the nation-state can in particular be compared to those of the early 
Romantic nationalism of Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803). This German poet and 
philosopher posited that the geography determined the economy of a people and its customs and 
identity, and talked of the “physiology of the whole national group,” a life form imbued with a 
“national spirit” and the “soul of the people” (Volksgeist). Besides a political and legal entity, a 
nation was organic, whole, and sui generis. De Gaulle likewise regarded the nation-state as the 
principal vehicle of the collective personality of those who were reared within its realm. He 
interpreted the behavior of nation-states as if they had a personality, with a life of its own, 
instilled by largely immutable facts of geography, religion, language, culture, and historical 
experience. The English were thus “insulaire” and “maritime” – a trading nation with global 
connections; the Germans, haunted by a restless and uncertain ambition engendered by the 
combination of their economic and cultural achievements and their central geographic situation; 
Italy, “the sorrowful mother of a dead Empire”; the Jews, “un peuple d’élite, sûr de lui-même et 
dominateur”; the Chinese, “une race, oú la capacité patiente, laborieuse, industrieuse des 
individus a, depuis des millénaires, péniblement compensé son défaut collectif de méthode et de 
cohesion...”; and so on.30 “He who is France,” Jean Lacouture poignantly remarked, “speaks 
better with nations than with men.”31 
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One result of de Gaulle’s views on the perennial pre-eminence of the nation-state was 
that he attributed little consequence to the ideological disposition of a regime. Reason of state 
was a more important explanation of a nation’s behavior than ideological persuasion. The first 
motive was lasting and deep-seated, whereas the latter was essentially temporary and superficial. 
“L’étendard de l’idéologie ne couvre en réalité que des ambitions,” he said in a press conference 
in 1963, elucidating his refusal to comment on the ideological rivalry between Moscow and 
Beijing.32 Ideology was to de Gaulle, as Le Monde’s editor André Fontaine wrote, “transitory, 
while the fact of nations endures – and with it the fundamental rivalries, born of geography and 
nourished by history.”33 De Gaulle’s views were therefore teleological and ontological rather than 
ideological: he interpreted human behavior and events as part of a predestined historical process 
and expressions of the fundamental nature of people and nations, not as a result of some 
organized collection of ideas about how society should work.34 His aversion to interpret events 
from an ideological vantage point undoubtedly also reflected his quest for national unity, since 
ideological divisions were a major threat to this unity. De Gaulle’s assessment that the role of 
ideology in international affairs was marginal certainly affected his view of the Cold War. While 
he did not discount the ideological threat of communism, more than any other statesman he 
stressed that reasons of state were more important factors, thus putting the United States and the 
Soviet Union on the same moral plane. This assessment, too, typified him as a conservative and 
realist. It also revealed, once again, the primacy de Gaulle accorded to the nation-state and the 
destiny of France. The nation-state was to him the prime vehicle of historical reality, which 
caused the political scientist Edward Kolodziej to compare its role in Gaullist thought to that of 
classes in Marxist theory: “Where Marxism portrays history as the struggle of classes, Gaullism 
speaks of the rise and fall of nations.”35 De Gaulle’s military and political career was wedded to 
the decline of French power rather than its rise. He rose to prominence because of France’s near 
eclipse in World War II; in 1958, he was requested to resume the levers of power in order to 
restore stability to a France riven by the Algerian conflict. At the same time, de Gaulle sought to 
embody and symbolize France’s continuation and hence resurgence as a major power. In the 
words of his biographer Jean Lacouture: 
 
The philosophy inspiring Charles de Gaulle’s diplomatic words and actions is simple and strong: 
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all human activity is ordered around the nation, which in turn is shaped by history and geography, 
armed by the State, held together by common interests, animated by culture and led by a hero. 
[…] His foreign policy was merely a long march in which France would be dragged back to the 
position it once could claim in the pantheon of nations.36 
 
Grandeur and Independence 
Since de Gaulle understood that the classic ingredients of power were shifting away from France, 
his foreign policy program comprised a reinvention of French power. The old ingredients – 
military prowess, economic and industrial strength, colonial empire, diplomatic standing – had to 
be replaced or amplified with new ones. In general terms, to speak in today’s international affairs 
jargon, it had to rely more on ‘soft’ power and less on ‘hard’ power (although the latter remained 
important and had to be updated in the nuclear age).37 This reinvention of French power was 
required above all by the Cold War dominance of the United States and the Soviet Union and by 
the unstoppable process of decolonization. At the same time, however, it could not do without 
references to France’s time-honored place in international affairs. De Gaulle’s view of ‘eternal’ 
France demanded that the story of the nation be told in terms of continuity as well as renewal. 
The reinvention of French power under these circumstances implied there was an inevitable but 
conscious gap in Gaullist foreign policy: the gap between the modest means available to the 
French state relative to the superpowers and the pretension to play a prominent role. Two 
notions require closer inspection in this regard: ‘grandeur’ and ‘independence.’ Such an inspection 
is justified as well because of their significance for Franco-American relations: many Americans 
did not share de Gaulle’s exalted view of France’s position in the world and did not consider it 
justified on the basis of means or historical record. They thus had little patience for the gap in 
Gaullist foreign policy between means and ambition, deriding it as folly – folie de grandeur. 
The first thing that must be said about the notion of grandeur is that it had an important 
domestic function. 38  Much of de Gaulle’s political program was geared towards getting the 
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French to retrieve their amour propre. The future of France as a sovereign state, he believed, was 
contingent on the conviction among the French that their country means something to humanity 
as a whole. Grandeur became an important ingredient of Gaullist foreign policy in part because it 
addressed a deep political and psychological need among the French for reassurance in a time of 
decline. It entailed positioning France as a paragon of civilization and a moral force on the basis 
of its historical, political, and cultural achievements. It referred to – and cultivated – an ambition 
to be regarded as pertinent to the course of world events. It was built on the ardent desire de 
Gaulle expressed as early as in 1934: “de jouer un grand rôle dans de grands événements” (“to 
play a great role in great events”).39 De Gaulle’s other writings also gave ample sustenance to the 
‘domestic’ interpretation of grandeur. It was, above all, articulated in the incomparable words on 
the opening page of de Gaulle’s War Memoirs: 
 
The positive side of my mind assures me that France is not really herself unless in the front rank; 
that only vast enterprises are capable of counterbalancing the ferments of dispersal which are 
inherent in her people; that our country, as it is, surrounded by the others, as they are, must aim 
high and hold itself straight, on pain of mortal danger. In short, to my mind, France cannot be 
France without greatness. (“La France ne peut être la France sans la grandeur.”)40 
 
As such, grandeur was a foreign policy guideline that resonated easily in French society; it 
was specific enough to reverberate broadly and vague enough not to alienate even the French 
Communists. The pretension to speak for an international constituency that was much broader 
than France, the desire for status and independence, and an attitude of inflexibility in negotiations 
were broadly supported and were features of French diplomacy even during the Fourth 
Republic.41 Most Frenchmen are moreover not devoid of a sense of cultural superiority, believing 
that France – even as it may no longer rank among the most powerful – is a moral superpower; 
this view, incidentally, is not much dissimilar to the popular American image of the United States 
as a ‘city upon a hill.’  
In addition, the notion of grandeur did serve to enhance French influence abroad. It 
appealed to the psychology of power inherent in Hobbes’ adage that the “reputation of power, is 
power; because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need protection.”42 Grandeur, in 
Raymond Aron’s estimation, is “power recognized by others, power whose fame spreads […] 
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across the world.”43 Or as Michael Harrison wrote: “Grandeur is secured when France receives 
the homage of the world and her status is recognized and confirmed in the behavior of others.”44 
In fact, in the absence of the physical components of great power, the aspiration to count for 
something more than the sum of these components had become one of the most vital political 
assets of French foreign policy. De Gaulle’s politics of grandeur both reflected the fact that 
France had little power to wield and served to disguise it. It turned the relative absence of power 
into a virtue and an asset, thereby enhancing France’s international position. While it drew from a 
large reservoir of sentiment and nostalgia, it was therefore a rational approach to furthering the 
interests of the French state in an international environment dominated by other powers. 
De Gaulle’s notion of grandeur was closely related to that of ‘independence’ in that, as 
Stanley Hoffmann once observed, “independence is the condition of grandeur.” 45  An 
‘independent’ foreign policy above all meant that France retained the right to decide for itself, 
without such a decision being imposed by “any other State or by any other collective body.”46 De 
Gaulle’s emphasis on a foreign policy autonomously arrived at did not negate the reality of 
interdependence in international relations; de Gaulle was a realist enough not “to confuse 
national independence with self-sufficiency.” 47  He considered a system of international 
cooperation entirely feasible and even necessary for the preservation of peace. But he was not 
prepared to engage in institutional bonds that would subject France to the decisions of others. 
The fact that France was relatively short of power was hardly a reason to be more accepting of 
supranational integration or of the will of more powerful nations. On the contrary, it made it all 
the more incumbent on France to preserve a measure of independent judgment, for the 
alternative was that it would gradually be subsumed in a larger entity that was not of its own 
making. The intransigent defense of the national interest was one way – and a fairly effective one 
– for a medium power such as France to hold its own against greater powers in an 
interdependent world. It reduced the implications of French dependence in an interdependent 
world to more tolerable and manageable proportions and it enhanced the French position in an 
inherently competitive international system. What is more, an ‘independent’ foreign policy served 
to strengthen the self-awareness and sense of unity among the French, as it allowed them to think 
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they were making a difference in the world. De Gaulle’s claim to independence in the conduct of 
foreign affairs thus gave fibre to his politics of grandeur. 
The implications of the primacy of the nation-state and the notions of grandeur and 
independence were most apparent in the military realm. The glory of the nation was expressed 
through its military. In de Gaulle’s view, national defense was considerably more than a system of 
military measures designed to protect a state against foreign adversaries. National defense was the 
core responsibility and the primary source of legitimacy of the state, and hence could not be 
entrusted to others. “The defense of France must be French,” de Gaulle declared in his legendary 
speech to the École Militaire of November 3, 1959. “The Government’s raison d’être has always 
been the defense of the independence and integrity of the territory. […] If, therefore, a 
government lost its essential responsibility, it would lose by the same token its justification.”48 
And in 1960, in a press conference, he asked: “How indeed in the long run could a government, a 
parliament, a people give their money and their services with all their heart in time of peace, and 
make their sacrifices in time of war, for a system in which they are not responsible for their own 
defense?” In de Gaulle’s view, the French defense effort could only be sustained if its defense, 
“while being of course combined with that of other countries,” remained national in character.49 
To him, the allied system of military integration that had been built up under NATO’s banner in 
the 1950s was thus an anathema. 
De Gaulle’s reading of the significance of grandeur and independence in relation to 
national defense was carried to its full implications in the nuclear realm. In the 1959 speech to the 
École Militaire, he revealed his ambition to build “a [nuclear] force capable of acting exclusively on 
our behalf, a force which has been conveniently called a force de frappe susceptible to deployment 
anywhere at any time.”50 This ambition, as Wilfrid Kohl has pointed out, was inspired more by 
considerations of a political nature than by military requirements: de Gaulle presumed that the 
existence of such a force would in particular give France political clout vis-à-vis both its enemies 
and its allies.51 The development of an ‘independent’ nuclear force was indeed central to de 
Gaulle’s foreign policy from the moment of his return to power in 1958. It was both the most 
physical and the most symbolic evidence of his determination to ensure a position ‘in the first 
rank’ for France. It was the only way in which France could hope to deter Soviet aggression with 
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means of its own (i.e. without being wholly dependent on the United States). And it was the 
surest way of strengthening France’s position vis-à-vis its allies, in particular the United States 
and Germany. 
The emphasis on grandeur and independence can also be seen to have greatly influenced 
the style of de Gaulle’s foreign policy. It meant that much of French foreign policy under de 
Gaulle had a highly symbolic quality; its rhetorical profile was at least as important as its real and 
often more pragmatic stance in negotiations. It also entailed a refusal to act as “demandeur,”  
meaning a party that asks for favors, since this would enhance France’s dependence on the 
willingness of other nations to – continue to – grant it favors and thereby potentially reduce its 
self-esteem. In the defense of the national interest, France had to be impervious to the interests 
and opinions of others. The disinclination to act as a demandeur was, again, most obvious in the 
nuclear realm. Although de Gaulle was a strong proponent of an autonomous French nuclear 
program, he was not principally opposed to purchasing American nuclear technology.52 But he 
would never openly request it, nor would he have accepted any strings attached. Great Britain’s 
growing dependence on American nuclear assistance, which reduced it more than once to the 
humiliating position of a satellite reliant on the sustained munificence of the superpower, was an 
abomination to de Gaulle. French diplomacy could not claim independence unless it 
disassociated itself from the United States. 
In addition, the notions of grandeur and independence influenced de Gaulle’s 
constitutional ideas. It implied that only a strong presidency could credibly pose as executor of 
the nation’s independent will and assume the near-monarchical allure associated with grandeur. 
Only a strong president could be expected to rise above the level of party politics and to 
incarnate the general interest. De Gaulle’s profile as a leader was laden with heroic symbolism. 
Apart from his commanding personality, this image was the result of a calculated policy to 
minimize internal dissension and maximize the effect of the nation’s external policies. It even 
required him to make a deliberate distinction between the public and the private de Gaulle. The 
downside to all this posing, however, was that it fostered the image of de Gaulle as haughty, self-
absorbed, and unbearably obdurate. Among non-Frenchmen, it tended to repel rather than to 
attract. The record of the effectiveness of de Gaulle’s politics of grandeur in the international 
domain would therefore be decidedly mixed. But there is no question that he succeeded in 
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forging a lasting national consensus on the perimeters of French foreign policy and in providing a 
presidential leadership model that none of his successors could afford to ignore. 
 
A Conservative in the Modern Age 
Neither the fate of France nor the nation-state was the be-all and end-all of politics to de Gaulle. 
A review of de Gaulle’s political ideas and values would certainly be inadequate if it did not 
include an examination of him as a conservative statesman. Such a review is all the more 
pertinent for our purposes because his conservative outlook shaped his appraisal of the United 
States as a civilization model. Vice versa, this review will be instructive because the precise make-
up of his conservatism was often mistaken by his detractors in the United States and elsewhere 
for reactionary; de Gaulle, however, was not a man who could be easily dismissed as the 
backward-looking representative of the old school of European politicians. 
In many ways, de Gaulle was a conventional French conservative. He was raised a devout 
Catholic with a steadfast belief in the ‘natural order of things.’ He deeply valued social cohesion 
and stability and was averse to unrestrained and dislocating capitalism. And he was, of course, a 
military man who cherished many of the values that appear to come with the profession – 
discipline, order, and a deep attachment to the state. But he was not ‘conservative’ in all senses of 
the word. Far from being reactionary, de Gaulle sought in various ways to bring his views in 
agreement with the requirements of the modern age. His penchant for going against the accepted 
wisdom of the establishment often even put him in the role of the dissenter. In spite of his 
conservative outlook on matters of politics and society, his record would therefore also become 
that of a “rebel”53 and a modernizer. 
This combination of an intrinsic conservatism and a receptivity for modernity was first of 
all obvious in his professional domain, that of the military. In the aftermath of World War I, 
France possessed the world’s most powerful military force – “la première du monde,” as the 
young Charles asserted to his father in 1919.54 During the 1920s, the French army was still so 
large that British and American commentators found the country “militaristic” and “obsessed 
with security.”55 Military dominance, however, also fostered an attitude among its military leaders 
that was deeply averse to modernization. Following the Locarno Pact of 1925, which ensured the 
diplomatic rehabilitation of Germany in return for a non-aggression pact between France, 
Germany, and Belgium (underwritten in turn by Britain and Italy), France began to invest heavily 
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in defensive fortifications in order to further insure itself against a future Germany military threat. 
As a young officer given to impatience and extraordinary self-assurance, de Gaulle had no 
sympathy for the outmoded thinking that led to the Maginot Line (so called after Minister of War 
André Maginot). From the mid-1920s onwards, through his writings and lectures at France’s 
military schools, he earned the reputation of a firebrand continually at odds with the military 
establishment (despite the tutelage he received from France’s “military god” Marshal Phillipe 
Pétain).56 In Vers l’armée de métier (1934), then lieutenant-colonel de Gaulle castigated the defensive 
and old-school stratagems of the French general staff. “Tomorrow the professional army will 
move entirely on caterpillar wheels,” he prophesied.57 His advocacy of a radical overhaul of the 
French military by building up professional armored forces equipped with armored vehicles and 
trained in rapid manoeuvre was not well received by his superiors, inviting criticism from those 
who continued to discount the importance of the tank on the battlefield as well as those who 
valued citizen armies. His dogged insistence on the matter earned him the nickname colonel Motor 
among his fellow officers and ultimately even led to a fall-out with Pétain.58 In January 1940, a 
few months before the war, de Gaulle was still trying to convince the leadership of his ideas on 
mechanized warfare in a remarkable memorandum sent to eighty military and political top 
officials.59 Germany’s stunning application of mechanized military maneuver in the spring of 
1940 would gain him belated – albeit overblown – recognition as a pioneer in this field.60 “During 
those difficult hours I could not help imagining what the mechanized army of which I had so 
long dreamed could have done,” de Gaulle mourned in his War Memoirs.61 In terms of military 
matters, de Gaulle was clearly on the side of modernity.62 
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De Gaulle’s ability to unite his conservatism with liberal modernity – as opposed to its 
fascist and communist alternatives – was, however, most observable in other areas. This ability 
was arguably most significant in relation to constitutional matters. For most of his political life, 
de Gaulle has had to defend himself against charges of protofascism and Bonapartism, which 
greatly unnerved him. His military background, his authoritarian bearing, his low opinion of 
‘politicians,’ his daring claim to personify France, the personal cult – all of these aspects gave 
sustenance to doubts about his democratic standards from the outset. His views were frequently 
associated with rightwing thinkers considered unsavory; or as Resistance leader Emmanuel 
d’Astier once observed, de Gaulle “was to make of Nietzsche, Charles Maurras and Machiavelli a 
very personal salad.” Such assessments, however, rested on superficial analysis. “There is 
obviously a good deal of Nietzsche in the superman de Gaulle created and became,” the British 
journalist Nora Beloff – not a friend of de Gaulle – wrote in 1963, but she agreed that “his 
orthodox Catholic upbringing and convictions always made it impossible for him to accept the 
cult of physical violence and totalitarianism adopted by other Nietzsche disciples.”63 De Gaulle 
also rejected Maurras’ reactionary nationalism and monarchism, considering it outmoded and 
extremist; de Gaulle accepted – and even stood up for – France’s republican form of 
government.64 He viewed liberal democracy as an important legacy of European history and an 
unalienable part of Western civilization. And if de Gaulle was Machiavellian, his Machiavellianism 
was little more than the “moderate Machiavellianism recognized by the classical political 
philosophers or by reasonable observers of political life as a constituent and permanent element 
of politics”65 – not the unprincipled pursuit of the personal or national interest that is normally 
conjured up. Moreover, while de Gaulle’s radical-minded patriotism and his tendency to ground 
his policies on the “general will” earned him the epithet of “revolutionary Jacobin,”66 he was in 
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truth far too moderate and too fond of order and stability to be considered a twentieth-century 
disciple of Robespierre. 
Any thorough analysis of his political views must therefore conclude that de Gaulle was a 
firm supporter of French democratic values and institutions. “In the great argument between 
democracy and dictatorship,” as Lacouture put it, “Charles de Gaulle has never hesitated about 
which side to take.”67 Such an analysis would also have to acknowledge his early and consistent 
rejection of totalitarianism, in both its fascist and its communist guises. De Gaulle, despite his 
authoritarian style, was not susceptible to dictatorial temptation. For absolute rule was bound to 
degenerate into despotism and could only end in debacle, as he declared in 1946:  
 
What is dictatorship but a great adventure? Its beginning undoubtedly appears advantageous. […] 
But it is the destiny of dictatorships to indulge in excesses. […] In the end, the spring breaks. The 
nation again finds itself broken and in a worse condition than it had been before the adventure 
began.68 
 
De Gaulle had his share of misgivings about democratic politics, as is well known. But 
this did not connote that he rejected the democratic system of government. In this regard, his 
approach to democracy was not dissimilar to that of Alexis de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-
century French aristocrat whose penetrating analysis of the burgeoning democratic order in the 
New World in De la démocratie en Amérique (1835) had raised concerns about the implications of 
individualism and materialism on the social fabric of society and on the standard of democracy. 
Like Tocqueville, de Gaulle accepted the new democratic order as the wave of the future and 
acknowledged the value of an open society based on individual liberty. Both also tried, however, 
to square their dedication to liberty and social stability with their fear for the conformity and 
materialism of an egalitarian society.69  
One particular challenge that democracy faces was, in de Gaulle’s view, the seemingly 
endless struggle to establish a leadership capable of counteracting disunion without inviting 
tyranny. “[…] Even as I dismissed the notion of my own despotism,” he declared in his War 
Memoirs, “I was no less convinced that the nation required a regime whose power would be 
strong and continuous.” 70  De Gaulle spelled out his constitutional views most clearly in his 
Bayeux speech of June 16, 1946. Not only did he denounce dictatorship, he also stated that in 
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order to inoculate democracy against anarchy and moral confusion – and thereby reinforce the 
yearning for dictatorship – it needed an elite devoted to the nation – “exercising a kind of priestly 
function based on sacrifice and example” – as well as a strong head of state as “arbiter above 
political contingencies” and guarantor of “national independence” – indeed as the focal point of 
national politics. De Gaulle proposed to invest the president with the power to dissolve 
parliament and to invoke special emergency powers; a two-house legislature meanwhile would 
limit itself to legislative functions. He only stopped short of proposing the election of the head of 
state by universal suffrage, explaining later that he did not want to conjure up memories of the 
first election of this kind in France (which had brought Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte to power in 
1848, who would go on to stage a coup four years later).71 
In de Gaulle’s view, democracy hinged on the quality of leadership. It is therefore not 
surprising that he had given much thought to the marks of an effective leader in modern society. 
De Gaulle never viewed himself as a professional ‘politician’ and always maintained a disdainful 
distance from the political class. Neither was he a populist, even though he repeatedly sought to 
obtain his legitimacy directly from the people’s vote. “A leader of this quality is inevitably distant, 
for there can be no authority without prestige, nor prestige unless he keeps his distance” he wrote 
in Le fil de l’épee.72 The leadership he considered necessary in a democracy was of a heroic kind. 
The leader must build on popular consent, but his prime feature is that of self-sufficiency. “When 
faced with events,” he declared, “the man of character has recourse to himself.”73 It was in this 
conception of a leader as a “man of character” that de Gaulle was probably most influenced by 
the philosopher Henri-Louis Bergson (1859-1941).74 Bergson, who enjoyed popularity in the early 
decades of the twentieth century as a celebrity, was a leading critic of rationalism and the belief 
that progress could be achieved through the scientific approach; evolution, he argued, was rather 
the result of élan vital, or ‘creative impulse.’ Importantly, Bergson also ranked intuition above 
analysis. “It is Bergson,” de Gaulle stressed in Le fil de l’épée, “who has shown that the only way in 
which the human mind can make direct contact with reality is by intuition, by combining his 
instinct with his intelligence.”75 The true leader in de Gaulle’s eyes – and the leader de Gaulle 
strove to become – relies on a perspicacity instilled by intuition as much as by logic. 
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De Gaulle’s aptitude for combining his conservatism with the conditions of liberal 
modernity was also evident in the social and economic domain. De Gaulle was both a proponent 
of economic modernization and deeply apprehensive about its effects on the social fabric of 
society. On the one hand, France needed to be in the forefront of economic and technological 
development in order to justify and to uphold its position in the first rank. This, he understood, 
required a degree of modernization and hence economic liberalization. It is the main reason why, 
on a visit to the United States in August 1945, he asked Jean Monnet to engineer the 
modernization of the French economy with the infusion of American dollars, a request that led 
to the Monnet Plan.76  
On the other hand, de Gaulle dreaded the dehumanizing effects of modernity and the 
implications of economic dependency on national sovereignty. “Would the working classes be 
the victim or the beneficiary of technical progress?” he asked in his War Memoirs.77 De Gaulle’s 
statements and social policies echoed Péguy’s thesis that the real conflict was between France and 
the pernicious and debasing influence of money and machinery. He may have been even more 
significantly affected by the socially conscious Roman Catholicism expressed in Rerum Novarum, 
the influential encyclical issued by Pope Leo XIII in 1891, and in the works of René de la Tour 
du Pin (1834-1924).78 De Gaulle certainly proved himself to be a strong proponent of social 
legislation and of imposing specific constraints on economic liberalization. As early as March 
1944, he proclaimed a range of measures in order to promote social stability and cohesion in 
postwar France as well as to protect national economic interests.79  
De Gaulle’s well known address at Oxford University on November 25, 1941, is probably 
the clearest expression of his views on the problems of modern civilization. In this speech, he 
described individual liberty as being under threat from the standardizing influence of 
modernization and globalization. One passage is worth quoting at some length because de Gaulle 
appeared not just to take aim at the mass ideologies of fascism and communism, but also to raise 
the spectre of Americanization: 
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The change in our mode of life due to machinery, the growing aggregation of humanity, and the 
widespread uniformity imposed on society have all combined to strike hard at individual liberty. 
In a world where human beings are herded together for work and pleasure, and where even their 
thoughts and interests are determined for them; in a world where housing conditions, clothing, 
and food are gradually standardized; where everyone reads the same thing in the same papers at 
the same time; where, from one end of the earth to the other, they see the same films and hear 
the same news, ideas, and music broadcast; in a world where, at the same hours, similar means of 
transport take people to the same workshops and offices, restaurants and canteens, sports-
grounds and theaters, to the same buildings, blocks, or courts for work, food, recreation, and rest; 
where men and women are similarly educated and informed, and all lead the same busy life and 
share the same worries, it is only obvious that freedom of choice tends to disappear, and 
individuality – the “essential I” – finds it increasingly difficult to survive. The result is a kind of 
general mechanization in which only a tremendous effort can preserve the individual as such. This 
is all the more true since the masses, far from reacting against such standardization, are actually 
developing a taste for it and encouraging the process.80  
 
De Gaulle accepted that economic strength hinged on the ability of market forces to play 
themselves out and understood that France had to be in on the game or be marginalized. But 
there is also no doubt that de Gaulle’s social and cultural criticism of the capitalist system was 
fundamental. This criticism moreover had important moral overtones. “For a long time,” he 
declared in Memoirs of Hope, “I had been convinced that modern mechanized society lacks a 
human incentive to safeguard its equilibrium.” The postwar social security system that he had 
helped to implement reduced its excesses, but could not salvage its morality: 
 
A social system which reduces the worker – however respectably paid – to a tool or a cog is […] 
at variance with the nature of our species and indeed with the spirit of sound productivity. 
Notwithstanding the undoubted benefits which capitalism produces not only for the few but for 
the community as a whole, the fact remains that it carries within itself the seeds of a gigantic and 
perennial dissatisfaction. It is true that the excesses of a system based on laissez-faire are now 
mitigated by certain palliatives, but they do not cure its moral sickness.81 
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Since communism was even less commendable as a system than capitalism, primarily 
because it invited an “odious tyranny on the individual” without producing any of the results 
attainable in a free society, de Gaulle sought to define a ‘third way’ between the American model 
and the Soviet one. “Condemning both these diametrically opposed systems,” he wrote in his 
Memoirs of Hope, “I believed that it was incumbent upon our civilization to construct a new one 
which would regulate human regulations in such a way that everyone would have a direct share in 
the proceeds of the concern for which he worked […].”82 Much earlier, in November 1944, de 
Gaulle tried to persuade Winston Churchill of these views. Speaking fearfully of the emergence 
of the United States and the Soviet Union as the two superpowers, he called on the British prime 
minister to support the idea of a “European equilibrium” and an “organization of nations” which 
would regard “the primacy accorded in world politics to a certain conception of man despite the 
progressive mechanization of society” as one of its greatest interests in the postwar world.83 De 
Gaulle’s concerns about the degenerating effects of modernity were thus inextricably wound up 
with his search for a Europe that did not have to endure the tutelage of the superpowers.  
De Gaulle’s Search for the European Equilibrium 
De Gaulle was not an early convert to the idea of European unity, and what he meant by it has 
remained a subject of considerable debate. “European union was […] an illusive and ambiguous 
Gaullist term,” Kolodziej judged, “more easily adapted to propagandistic and ideological 
purposes than to accurate prescription.”84 His writings and statements prior to – and in the early 
stages of – World War II certainly do not indicate a well-defined notion of ‘Europe.’ In June 
1940, just days before his call of June 18th, de Gaulle had approved of Jean Monnet’s scheme for 
an Anglo-French Union – a breathtaking proposition, for it envisioned the merger of Great 
Britain and France into one political entity with joint citizenship. But rather than revealing a 
federalist inclination or the germ of a greater European design, de Gaulle had only lent his 
support in an attempt to counter the defeatist mood within Premier Paul Reynaud’s cabinet in 
Bordeaux. The plan failed to stave off Germany’s military victory in the spring of 1940 and years 
later de Gaulle discounted its significance: “It was a myth, made up like other myths, by Jean 
Monnet. Neither Churchill nor I had the least illusion.”85  
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De Gaulle’s ideas about Europe started to take shape, however, took shape in the course 
of World War II. ‘L’Europe’ began to appear more often in de Gaulle’s speeches as a geopolitical 
stage upon which peace could only be ensured if the European nations were prepared to 
somehow engage in closer ties among each other.86 De Gaulle’s first public comments on the 
need for a system of European cooperation date from his speech for the assembled Fighting 
French in London’s Albert Hall of November 11, 1942, when he called upon the European 
nations with common interests to associate themselves with France in a “practical and durable” 
fashion.87 In March 1944, during a mass rally in Algiers, he elaborated on the theme by proposing 
“a kind of western group [...] principally formed on an economic base” in which “the English 
Channel, the Rhine, and the Mediterranean would be as arteries [...].” 88  Within his growing 
foreign policy apparatus in London, meanwhile, much thought was given to postwar Western 
European cooperation to attend to the economic needs of France. In December 1941, de Gaulle 
had established commissions to anticipate France’s postwar problems, and by 1943 the theme of 
Western European cooperation, particularly on an economic level, was well established by men 
such as Hervé Alphand, René Mayer, and Jean Monnet.89 
De Gaulle’s propensity in the majority of his wartime statements to define Europe in 
geographic terms was striking, reflecting his view of the symbiotic relationship between 
geography and politics. Europe is seen as stretching from Minsk to Bordeaux and from Athens to 
Narvik in 1941 (thus excluding Spain and most of the Soviet Union) and from the Pyrenees to 
the Volga and the Urals in 1942 (still excluding Spain but including the most populous part of the 
Soviet Union). After the war, in his War Memoirs, de Gaulle described Europe as the area reaching 
from Iceland to Istanbul and from Gilbraltar to the Urals (thus including Spain); he would 
eventually settle on defining Europe as the territory extending “from the Atlantic to the Urals.”90 
In its varying extensions, Europe presented a simple but powerful expression of a geographic 
reality, a mold within which Western civilization had settled and within which political relations 
were bound to be cast. Within this geopolitical and cultural entity, the nation-states had to strike a 
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lasting balance. “After the terrible lacerations she had undergone in the last thirty years, and the 
vast changes which had occurred the world over,” de Gaulle wrote, “Europe could find 
equilibrium and peace only by an association among Slavs, Germans, Gauls and Latins.”91 In all 
of these descriptions, the Anglo-Saxons were hence excluded;92 they did not, in de Gaulle’s view, 
inhabit the same geopolitical space. “When all is said and done,” de Gaulle observed to Churchill 
in 1940, in the dark early days of the war, “Great Britain is an island; France, the cape of a 
continent; America, another world.”93 
De Gaulle was hardly unique in espousing the need for closer collaboration between the 
states of Europe. Federal cooperation on a pan-European scale had been sponsored prior to the 
war by such men as Richard Nikolaus Graf Coudenhove-Kalergi and French Prime Minister 
Aristide Briand, and the war merely reinforced such ideas.94 European cooperation was seen 
within Resistance movements as indispensable to averting future wars. And Churchill, in a 
message to his Foreign Secretary of October 21, 1942, after having learned of Roosevelt’s idea of 
the ‘Four Policemen,’ admitted that his greatest concern was – in words that could have been de 
Gaulle’s own – “the revival of the glory of Europe, the parent continent of the modern nations 
and of civilisation.” Churchill’s support for the idea in 1942 and 1943 was, if anything, more 
explicit than de Gaulle’s: 
 
Hard as it is to say now, I trust that the European family may act unitedly as one under a Council 
of Europe. I look forward to a United States of Europe in which the barriers between the nations 
will be greatly minimised and unrestricted travel will be possible. I hope to see the economy of 
Europe studied as a whole. I hope to see a Council consisting of perhaps ten units, including the 
former Great Powers, with several confederations – Scandinavian, Danubian, Balkan, etc. – which 
would possess an international police and be charged with keeping Prussia disarmed.95 
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What distinguished de Gaulle’s support for European unity from that of Churchill was 
that it was greatly reinforced by an apprehension about the emerging dominance of the Soviet 
Union and the United States in the European realm. As the war came to a close, he was casting 
the need for a Western European alignment ever more emphatically against this background. The 
overbearing involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in European affairs, he feared, 
would either lead to a new war or to their condominium; consequently, it also put de Gaulle’s 
overriding aim – the reinstatement of France as a major power – in jeopardy.  
The concern about the emergence of the two superpowers itself was hardly new.96 Nor 
was it entirely unique at the time, as a similar concern had driven Churchill into championing his 
‘United States of Europe’ buttressed by subregional confederations. But de Gaulle’s and 
Churchill’s conceptions of European cooperation diverged as the war approached its conclusion. 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union had opposed Churchill’s pan-European ideas in the 
wartime conferences of 1943, primarily because they had no interest in giving Europe independent 
weight in the world’s councils and did not want to prejudice any understanding between Moscow 
and Washington. Increasingly alarmed by the prospect of Soviet preponderance in Europe, 
Churchill’s strategy therefore shifted toward implicating the Americans as deeply as possible in 
Europe’s postwar settlement; he considered any Western European grouping, as envisaged by de 
Gaulle, as too weak to resist Soviet pressure and too vulnerable to renewed German domination.97 
Their different approaches to postwar Europe surfaced during Churchill’s visit to Paris in 
November 1944. Defining French interests in an alliance with the British in “the equilibrium of 
Europe,” de Gaulle pressed his guest to support “an organization of [European] nations which 
will be something more than an arena for disputes between America and Russia.” Churchill, 
however, declined this invitation by famously responding that “it is better to persuade the 
stronger than to pit yourself against him.” 98  The conceptual rivalry between de Gaulle’s 
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‘European’ Europe – i.e. a Europe that has freed itself from the constraints imposed by 
superpower competition  – and Churchill’s preference for an ‘Atlantic’ Europe – which implied 
close association with the United States – thus has its origins in the latter stages of World War II. 
Their inability to agree would prejudice the 1960s debate about British membership of the 
Common Market. As his December 1944 proposal to Churchill showed, de Gaulle was not 
principally opposed to a European organization that included Great Britain. In July 1947, too, he 
implied that a European grouping would in his view have to be open to the British. The essential 
precondition remained, however, that they subscribe to the goals he had defined: 
 
[…] cette Europe soit assez large et assez prospère, non seulement pour vivre, mais encore pour 
attirer. C’est dire qu’elle ne doit être fermée à aucun peuple, du moment qu’il adhère franchement à 
l’idéal et à l’organisation sur lesquels elle serait bâtie.99 (emphasis added) 
 
The idea of Western Europe as a ‘third force’ in international affairs would continue to be 
a central element of de Gaulle’s thinking about European cooperation. In the first parliamentary 
debate on foreign policy in liberated France in November 1944, de Gaulle evoked a Europe 
which is “presently oppressed and cannot talk” but which some day will re-emerge.100 After his 
sudden relinquishment of power in January 1946, de Gaulle would carry on to give voice to the 
idea that Europe had to free itself from the tutelage of the superpowers. “If this is not done, the 
world will be divided into a rivalry between Russia and the United States,” he explained to Cyrus 
Sulzberger of the New York Times in 1947. “That would lead to a war – a horrid war.”101 De 
Gaulle was unable to resist the flow of events that led to the Cold War, and by the end of the 
1940s Paris had given up much of its aspiration to be a mediating power in the Soviet-American 
rivalry.102 Yet de Gaulle never abandoned the idea; for as he professed in his War Memoirs, one 
consuming aim of his political life had become “... to persuade the states along the Rhine, the 
Alps, and the Pyrenees to form a political, economic, and strategic bloc” and “to establish this 
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organization as one of the three world powers and, should it become necessary, as the arbiter 
between the Soviet and Anglo-American camps.”103 
De Gaulle’s ideas about the precise institutional make-up of this ‘bloc’ or ‘organization’ 
remained unclear during the war and its immediate aftermath. For one, he spoke alternatively 
about federation and confederation. 104  For another, his European idea appeared loath to an 
elaborate institutional dimension because of his conviction that the nation-state was the 
unassailable bedrock of international cooperation. He had little patience for federalist supporters 
of European unity. “On peut voir l’Europe et peut-être la faire, de deux façons: l’intégration par 
le supranational ou la coopération des États et des nations,” he wrote. “C’est la deuxième que 
j’adhère pour mon compte.”105 “De Gaulle’s notion of European unity,” Kolodziej therefore 
concluded, amounted to little more than “the residual product of intermeshing bilateral state 
accords and behavior between European states.”106  
De Gaulle, however, did prove capable of envisaging an institutional framework on top 
of this network of bilateral understandings. As early as 1947, he volunteered that “it should be 
possible to build a Europe on the basis of treaties between the European nations and to establish 
a method under which they would systematically be meeting at conferences to study common 
economic, political, and social problems.” 107  On February 25, 1953, prompted by the rapid 
institutional build-up of NATO in the wake of the Korean War and by the vigorous debate over 
the proposal for a European Defence Community, de Gaulle gave the most detailed explanation 
of his conception of European cooperation hitherto: 
 
Au lieu d’une fusion intolérable et impracticable, pratiquons l’association. […] Commençons par 
faire l’alliance des États libres de l’Europe. […] Il y faut une direction: ce sera le Conseil des Chefs 
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de gouvernements réunis d’une manière organique et périodique. A cette direction, il faut un 
instrument de travail et d’exécution. Ce sera l’État-major combiné, si l’on veut le Commissariat, 
mais un Commissariat qui n’aura pas le front de se proclamer souverain. Ainsi, seront arrêtés les 
plans, fournis les moyens, répartis les commandements. Ainsi, seront fusionnés tous les services 
qui doivent l’être: infra-structure, communications, ravitaillement, fabrications d’armements, etc. 
 Chacun entre dans l’alliance avec tous les moyens dont il dispose et tous les territoires dont il a 
la charge. L’engagement est pris, par tous, de se tenir pour attaqué si l’un d’eux est attaqué. 
Chacun s’engage également à n’entamer d’hostilités contre l’éventuel adversaire que si le Conseil 
est d’accord. Enfin, la coopération de l’alliance européenne avec d’autres puissances, notamment 
avec l’Amérique, pour la défense de l’Europe, est réglée par le Conseil. […] 
 Sur la base de cette alliance, il faut bâtir une Confédération, c’est-à-dire un organisme commun 
auquel les divers États, sans perdre leur corps, leur âme, leur figure, délèguent une part de leur 
souveraineté en matière stratégique, économique, culturelle.108 
 
In these comments, de Gaulle did not spell out the relationship between this European 
confederation and the United States. He did make clear, however, that this confederation would 
preferably include Great Britain and West Germany. One may also assume, as Michael Harrison 
has done, that in de Gaulle’s mind “they were to be equal in status and that American influence 
over Europe and individual European states would be held to a minimum.”109 To lend this 
confederation the necessary democratic legitimacy and popular support, de Gaulle moreover 
proposed a referendum in all of the participating countries as well as the creation of two 
assemblies – one elected through universal suffrage, the other appointed by the states – and of a 
judicial court. De Gaulle may have been doctrinaire in his attachment to national sovereignty, he 
was far from dogmatic in responding to the challenges of his time and was capable of ‘delegating’ 
national sovereignty in specific areas. His comments of February 1953 were, in fact, a fairly 
accurate preview of the proposal he would put forward in the early 1960s for an 
intergovernmental system of regular political consultation and cooperation between the six 
member states of the Common Market (which became known as the ‘Fouchet Plan’ – see chapter 
five). 
Apart from these ideas about the cooperation among Western European states, de Gaulle 
continued to strive for a stable continent-wide balance of power for which he most often used 
the word “equilibrium.” De Gaulle believed that only such an equilibrium – the condition in 
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which power in the European system would be evenly distributed and national interests would be 
accommodated in a healthy balance of forces – could ensure peace. It is tempting to use de 
Gaulle’s eulogy of French landscaping from La discorde chez l’ennemi as an analogy for this European 
equilibrium:  
 
In a French park no tree seeks to smother the other trees with its shade; the lawns accept being 
geometrically laid out; you do not get the lake trying to be a waterfall or the statues claiming that 
they alone must be admired. Sometimes there is an air of noble melancholy about such a park. 
Perhaps it comes from the feeling that each part, in isolation, might have shone more brightly. 
But that would have been damaging to the whole, and those who walk in the park rejoice in the 
sound sense which has produced its present splendid harmony.110 
 
Yet, while this tribute to French landscape artists may be seen as an apt metaphor for de Gaulle’s 
quest for stable relations between the European powers, this analogy would insufficiently take 
account of the earlier discussed importance of grandeur and independence in Gaullist foreign 
policy. For there is no question that de Gaulle’s foreign policy sought ‘to smother the other trees 
with its shade,’ such as in the relationship with Germany and some of the smaller Western 
European nation-states, and that there was an element in de Gaulle’s politics of grandeur of 
‘getting the lake trying to be a waterfall’ or ‘the statues claiming that they alone must be admired.’ 
It would, perhaps, be more to the point to regard de Gaulle’s Europe as a mosaic composed of 
many bits of stone and glass: some bits are indisputably larger and brighter than others, and they 
may glisten differently depending on the light at a particular moment – but taken together they 
make up a balanced and pacific image.  
If one prefers a less metaphorical description, the European equilibrium should probably 
be interpreted as de Gaulle’s twentieth century version of the nineteenth century Concert of 
Europe which had preserved peace for forty years after the Napoleonic wars (i.e. until the 
Crimean war of 1854-1856) through a system of concerted diplomatic action reinforced by 
periodic conferences to deal with problems of mutual concern. In his Memoirs of Hope, he refers to 
this system: 
 
I myself had always felt […] how much the nations which peopled it [Europe] had in common. 
Being all of the same white race, with the same Christian origins and the same way of life, linked 
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to one another since time immemorial by countless ties of art, science, politics and trade, it was 
natural that they should come to form a whole, with its own character and organization in relation 
to the rest of the world. It was in pursuance of this destiny that the Roman emperors reigned over 
it, that Charlemagne, Charles V and Napoleon attempted to unite, that Hitler sought to impose 
upon it his crushing domination. But it is a fact of some significance that not one of these 
federators succeeded in inducing the subject countries to surrender their individuality. On the 
contrary, arbitrary centralization always provoked an upsurge of violent nationalism by way of 
reaction. It was my belief that Europe could not today, any more than in previous times, be a 
fusion of its peoples, but that it could and should result from a systematic rapprochement. […] My 
policy therefore aimed at the setting up of a concert of European States which in developing all sorts 
of ties between them would increase their interdependence and solidarity.111 (emphasis added) 
 
Like the Concert system, de Gaulle’s equilibrium was a variation on the conservative-realist 
theme of balance of power mixed in with instruments of international cooperation such as 
methods to ensure regular consultation. It was marked by a reasonably even distribution of 
power, by temperance in the conduct of foreign affairs, by special responsibilities given to the 
great powers (thus relegating smaller powers to a second-class status), by keeping intact the 
ultimate sovereignty of states, and by keeping ideological differences on the back burner of 
international diplomacy. Intriguingly, de Gaulle did not preclude that even this habit of 
cooperation might in the long run evolve into something more regimented than an equilibrium: 
“From this starting-point, there was every reason to believe that the process of evolution might 
lead to their confederation, especially if they were one day to be threatened from the same 
source.”112 
 Any examination of de Gaulle’s perspective on the main actors in a European equilibrium 
– the more dazzling bits in the colorful mosaic of European nations– must begin, unsurprisingly, 
with France. It is not without significance that the first pages of his chapter on ‘Europe’ in 
Memoirs of Hope are in fact devoted to France.113 The restoration of France on the world stage 
presupposed the restoration of ‘Europe’ – and vice versa. Of all nation-states in Western Europe, 
he asserted in November 1948, “the physical and moral center is France!”114 This meant ipso facto 
that continental Western Europe would have to be arranged around a strong France rather than a 
strong Germany.  
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As the culprit of Europe’s wounding conflicts, Germany had forfeited the right to lead 
Europe and had been thrown back into a state of dependence. Unlike Germany, France could 
not be reasonably suspected of harboring the intention to annex the other states of Europe. In de 
Gaulle’s view, given its geographical position and its history of grandeur, it could moreover 
justifiably act as their spokesman in the highest councils of decision.  
De Gaulle’s preoccupation with the German question was understandable given the 
history of Franco-German conflict, a history with which he was intimately familiar through his 
personal background, his avid study, and his military experience.115 At the conclusion of the war, 
de Gaulle did not deviate much from traditional French approaches to the German question: he 
aimed to ensure French security by bolstering the French position and clipping Germany’s wings 
– in particular by placing the Ruhr under international control –and by “the abolition of a 
centralized Reich!”116 Paris also gave mixed signals about either wanting to place the Rhineland 
under international control or outrightly annex it. Germany’s political and industrial make-up 
would at the very least have to be reconfigured so that it would not be able to regain the strength 
to threaten the European equilibrium.117 This is not to say, however, that de Gaulle’s government 
or the majority of French opinion wished to see Germany completely dismembered.118 “The 
French,” the State Department assessed in late 1944, “will not sponsor the destruction of 
German industry and the reduction of Germany to an agrarian state” and “a very considerable 
proportion of the French population – possibly a majority – still holds that some Germans are 
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not beyond salvation and that a purged and chastened Germany must eventually regain an 
important position in Europe.”119 
Step by step, the benevolent aspects of French approaches to Germany were gaining the 
upperhand in the early postwar years, and de Gaulle slowly began to shift his pose in the 
direction of Franco-German reconciliation. In particular, the gradual emergence of the bipolar  
world order transformed the context of the traditional Franco-German rivalry.120 If France were 
to hold its own among the superpowers, Germany’s economic revival coupled with closer 
Franco-German cooperation was of the essence. In December 1947, with the Cold War in its 
chilly early stages, de Gaulle explained this view on Germany to John Foster Dulles, then the 
principal foreign policy adviser to the Republican Party. Decentralization was key, he stressed, 
because the threat “had always come from initiative by Prussia and the influence of that initiative 
over other Germans.” This did not mean, however, that he objected to Germany’s industrial 
revival, albeit that he envisioned a special arrangement – “along the lines of [the] TVA”121 – for 
the Ruhr area; “there has never been, and need not be, strong commercial rivalry between French 
and Germans.” On the contrary, he believed that the French and German economies were 
complementary and could well provide the nexus for “increasing economic unity in all of western 
Europe to create a solid and vigorous grouping of over 100 million people.”122 By 1947, it had 
thus dawned on de Gaulle that the reconstruction of the German economy without the 
restoration of the Reich had the potential of strengthening the power base of French diplomacy.  
And in an important speech in Bordeaux on September 25, 1949, he even presaged the treaty he 
would conclude with Adenauer fourteen years later: 
 
Mais, parmi les peuples de l’Europe, le peuple allemand sera-t-il présent? Je réponds qu’à travers 
toutes les tristesses et toutes les colères que suscite, parmi des millions d’êtres et, d’abord, parmi 
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les Français, la seule évocation de l’Allemagne, l’homme de bon sens voit les Allemands là ou ils 
sont, c’est-à-dire au centre de notre continent. Il les voit tel qu’ils sont, c’est-à-dire nombreux, 
disciplinés, dynamiques, dotés par la nature et par leur travail d’un très grand potentiel 
économique, largement pourvus de charbon, équipés pour la grande production malgré les ruines 
et les démantèlements, aptes à s’élever jusqu’aux sommets de la pensée, de la science, de l’art, dès 
lors qu’ils cessent d’être dévoyés par la rage des conquêtes. Il voit aussi l’Europe amputée, par la 
domination soviétique, d’une partie très vaste et très précieuse d’elle-même. Il voit encore 
l’Angleterre s’éloigner, attirée par la masse d’outre-Atlantique. Il en conclut que l’unité de 
l’Europe doit, si possible et malgré tout, incorporer les Allemands. 
  Mais la raison exige que, pour cela, il y ait un jour moyen d’établir entre le peuple 
allemand et le peuple français une entente directe et pratique, répondant au fait qu’ils sont, à tant 
d’égards ! complémentaires l’un de l’autre et surmontent les vicissitudes de l’ Histoire. Au fond, 
c’est le cœur du problème. Il y aura ou il n’y aura pas d’Europe, suivant qu’un accord sans 
intermédiaire sera, ou non, possible entre Germains et Gaulois.123 
 
By the same token, there is little doubt that Germany’s recovery was genuinely acceptable 
to Gaulle only as long as it continued to support France’s re-entry on the world stage. The Cold 
War, of course, ensured Germany’s inferior status in the bilateral relationship. But Paris was 
nonetheless continually apprehensive about the bilateral balance of power, in particular as 
Germany rapidly outgrew France in economic terms and was gradually freed of some of its 
political shackles of the early postwar period. De Gaulle’s opposition to the proposed European 
Defense Community in the early 1950s was in part motivated by a concern for German military 
dominance. De Gaulle’s vigorous support for the development of a French nuclear weapons 
arsenal must also be partially understood in this light. France furthermore could on no account 
afford to put all of its eggs in the Franco-German basket. Germany’s relationship with the United 
States inevitably continued to be very close, thereby reducing the potential to win German 
support for those French policies that were at variance with the western superpower; alternatively, 
there was always the possibility that the Bonn government would break free from its Western 
allegiances in a search for a separate deal with the Soviet Union on unification. In relation to the 
German question, therefore, bilateral contacts with in particular Soviet Russia and Great Britain 
continued to be of great importance to France. 
De Gaulle never wavered from his belief that Russia was the unavoidable eastern 
lodestone in the European equilibrium; the Russian empire had been a significant factor in the 
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European balance of power ever since the time of Czar Peter the Great and he was convinced it 
would continue to be one regardless of the outcome of the Cold War. In the same vein, he 
deemed a pact between France and Russia but a fact of life in intra-European diplomatic relations 
dictated by their respective geographic locations and by the Teutonic mass in their midst. De 
Gaulle had supported the Franco-Russian pact of 1935, designed to counteract the emerging 
power of Germany, and after the war he felt that “the old Franco-Russian solidarity [...] remained 
no less a part of the natural order of things, as much in relation to the German menace as to the 
endeavors of Anglo-American hegemony.” 124  Hence he travelled to Moscow as early as 
December 1944, prior to the Yalta conference, to negotiate a twenty-year treaty that revived the 
traditional Franco-Russian security pact against Germany and to underscore to Stalin that France 
would be an interlocutor independent from the Anglo-Saxons. As de Gaulle’s associate Géraud 
Jouve had explained to Soviet diplomat Serge Vinogradov earlier in the war, “the two countries 
are both continental powers and for this reason they have specific aims that are different from 
those of the Anglo-Saxon powers.”125 
 De Gaulle, to be sure, readily acknowledged that the Franco-Russian pact of December 
1944 did not have much practical value under the prevailing circumstances. He was moreover 
genuinely concerned with the Soviet threat and, in particular in the late 1940s, frequently sounded 
the alarm to his countrymen. He considered the sheer mass and proximity of Soviet military 
power in the heart of Europe – separated from France by barely “two étapes of the Tour de 
France bicycle race”126 –  as a breach of the traditional European equilibrium, a breach that the 
Anglo-Saxons in his view had allowed to occur as a result of their meek behavior towards Stalin 
at the Yalta conference. The “European equilibrium […] has been shattered,” de Gaulle said to 
President Harry Truman in August 1945, “because with the consent of America and Great 
Britain, the states of Central Europe and the Balkans are forced to serve as satellites to the Soviet 
Union.”127 De Gaulle also never contemplated a ‘reversal of alliances’ in the Cold War, as was 
sometimes presumed after he had once again lashed out against NATO or the United States. 
Preparing his March 1966 withdrawal announcement from NATO and his ensuing June 1966 
visit to Moscow, for instance, he underscored to Hervé Alphand, French ambassador to the 
United States at the time, that a genuinely improved attitude towards Western Germany and the 
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United States would still be required on the part of Moscow in order “to create European 
solidarity from the Atlantic to the Urals.”128 In 1962, he had already asserted to the same Alphand 
that “for such a Europe to be possible, great changes will have to take place. To begin with, the 
Soviet Union must no longer be what it is.” De Gaulle’s views of cooperation with Russia in the 
framework of a European equilibrium, Alphand rightfully concluded, was a “historical 
anticipation that implied no abatement of the Atlantic alliance” as long as the Soviet threat 
remained alive.129 
Yet de Gaulle’s vision of a Franco-Russian entente as the flying buttress of a durable 
European equilibrium was remarkably unaffected by the Cold War and by the nature of the 
Soviet regime. He never lost sight of his aim to restore the European equilibrium and of the place 
to be accorded in this equilibrium to Russia. “Elle [la Russie] apparaît à la France comme un 
interlocuteur avec lequel la compréhension et la collaboration sont éminemment naturelles,” he 
declared during his visit to the Soviet Union of June 1966. “Puisqu’il s’agit de faire évoluer dans 
le bon sens la situation internationale, Paris, pour en parler à l’Est, s’adresse nécessairement à 
Moscou.”130 He always considered both the Cold War and the Soviet regime as unfortunate 
interludes that would some day fade into history. The Soviet regime, which he characteristically 
separated from ‘eternal’ Russia, rested only on the “semblance of authority”;131 at other times, he 
regarded the Soviet Union simply as a vast colonial empire run by Russia.132 As he became 
convinced that the immediate threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe had receded after 
the early years of the Cold War, his words of warning made place for a willingness to seek 
relaxation in the East-West relationship as a first step towards ending the division of Europe and 
resolving the German question. In this endeavor, the French – as inhabitants of the continent – 
rather than the Anglo-Saxons would have to lead the way; in addition, he requested that Moscow 
similarly regard Paris as the main interlocutor in the West. In March 1960, de Gaulle stressed to 
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, on his visit in France, that “the solution [to the German 
problem] must be sought not in raising two monolithic blocs, one against the other, but on the 
contrary in working step by step towards détente, understanding and co-operation within a 
European framework. In this way, we shall create among Europeans, from the Atlantic to the Urals, 
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new relationships, new ties, a new atmosphere, which will take the sting out of the German 
problems […].”133 
In all of this, as may be surmised from the above, de Gaulle’s ideas on Great Britain’s 
part in the European equilibrium were deeply ambiguous.134 “La politique d’un Etat,” de Gaulle 
approvingly quoted Napoleon in one of his books before the war, “est dans sa géographie.” 
(“The policy of a State is decided by its geography.”)135 Applied to Great Britain, however, this 
dictum had confusing implications. On the one hand, the British Isles were not geographically 
part of the continent and were culturally and commercially more intimately linked with other 
parts of the globe. When de Gaulle spoke about achieving peace on the European continent, the 
Anglo-Saxons were persistently absent from the array of peoples mentioned. He also could never 
rid himself entirely of a sense of rivalry with the British for global influence; in Churchill’s apt 
words, “he is one of those good Frenchmen who have a traditional antagonism engrained in 
French hearts by centuries of warfare against the English.”136  
On the other hand, precisely because of its geographic disposition, Great Britain had 
historically and geopolitically been an inevitable participant in the continental balance of power. 
In the twentieth century it had moreover been a participant on the side of France and against 
Germany. In the run-up to World War II, the French elite had deliberately staked the national 
interest on association with Great Britain.137 In his Oxford speech of November 1941, de Gaulle, 
too, hailed Franco-British ties, analyzing how “Albion” never could accept any hegemony on the 
European continent and how this had given occasion to the Entente Cordiale to counterbalance 
Germany’s rise. He was at the time, of course, wholly dependent on British support for the Free 
French and for his mission to re-establish France as a great power; “libération” had become 
synonymous with “victoire anglaise.” But there is no reason to believe that he was not earnest 
when advocating “stronger and more sincere Anglo-French collaboration than has as ever yet 
existed once the war has been won.”138 De Gaulle greatly respected British civilization and stood 
far removed from the Anglophobia of many Vichy officials. In particular, Britain’s political 
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system inspired his envy because of its proven stability and its unquestionable commitment to 
liberty – all of which compared it favorably to that of France.139 The inclusion in his earlier 
quoted Algiers speech of March 1944 of the English Channel as one of the “arteries” of a “kind 
of western group” suggested that Great Britain might in his view as well be part of a European 
grouping.140 In November 1944, in the Consultative Assemblee’s first debate on foreign policy 
after the liberation, he furthermore declared that “the unity of Europe should be built around 
these three poles: London, Paris, and Moscow.”141 And in 1949, de Gaulle stressed that with the 
advent of aviation, Great Britain had actually stopped being an island from a strategic point of 
view.142 The ‘immutable’ facts of geography were not so absolute after all. 
In certain respects, however, Great Britain would remain an island to de Gaulle, not least 
because leading British politicians continued to describe their country in this way. British interests 
were less directly at stake in continental affairs, even in relation to the German question, than 
those of France or Russia; in addition, British political leaders were often too preoccupied with 
managing the Commonwealth and nurturing close ties with the United States to devote 
themselves wholeheartedly to building up ‘Europe.’ De Gaulle, for one, concluded that the 
British did not want to join an association of Western European states since, as he clarified to 
John Foster Dulles in 1947, “they prefer a fluidity which enables them to influence events on a 
day-to-day basis” and “do not want to decide definitively whether to throw in their lot with the 
continent or with their overseas dominions.”143 Hence, while Great Britain was entitled to play a 
substantial part in the European equilibrium as one of its three “poles,” its relative weight was 
bound to be less than that of either France or Russia. That, however, was still more than he was 
prepared to grant the other, more powerful Anglo-Saxon nation. 
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Ally of Ultimate Recourse – De Gaulle’s Views of the United States  
De Gaulle’s Core View of the United States  
Many of de Gaulle’s core views of the United States predate World War II to an extent that is 
seldom acknowledged. These views were shaped in particular by his experiences out of World 
War I and his study of American mobilization methods in the 1930s; in addition, they echoed the 
routine condemnations and concerns of European elites regarding American society. 
To begin with, the American intervention in World War I did not make a particularly 
positive impression on the de Gaulle in his twenties. As a junior officer of the French army, he 
rather tended to belittle military value of this intervention. Writing to his father from Poland in 
1919, for instance, he complained that while the French had done the fighting alongside the 
Polish, the Americans – along with, to be sure, the English and the Italians – had been “as 
insolent as they were useless” and had been interested above all in developing business ties in the 
city of Warsaw. 144  Nor had material assistance from overseas been of much weight to the 
outcome of the war. “The Armistice was signed without a single gun, a single aeroplane or a 
single tank made in America having appeared on any battlefield,” he wrote in 1934.145  
More importantly, the young de Gaulle considered the Americans lacking in reliability 
when it came to defending French security interests. Not only had they joined the war at a very 
late stage, in its aftermath they rescinded on their responsibilities as a result of the Senate’s refusal 
to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. In 1919, in an address on the Franco-Polish relationship, de 
Gaulle hence observed that the United States – as well as Great Britain – could not be counted 
upon to counteract German power and that France would therefore be well advised to seek 
continental alliances: “qui nous garantit l’alliance éternelle et surtout l’alliance immédiatement 
efficace de l’Angleterre et de l’Amérique? Pour surveiller l’Allemagne sournoisement résolue à la 
revanche, pour lui en imposer et, le cas échéant, pour la réduire encore une fois, il nous faut un 
allié continental sur lequel nous puissions compter en tous temps. La Pologne sera cet allié.”146 
De Gaulle was thus never one to build his strategic vision on American security guarantees. The 
story of the United States’ late entry would moreover repeat itself in World War II. None of this 
was unnatural in his view: the United States simply did not inhabit the European geopolitical 
space and enjoyed the luxury of distance. It had never been much of a factor in the European 
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equilibrium, least of all a consistent one. It could therefore, at best, be a distant ally, involved in 
European affairs – as de Gaulle volunteered to Stalin in December 1944 – through “...the future 
United Nations pact, in which America would play a decisive role, crowning the entire edifice and 
serving as an ultimate recourse.”147 
 At the same time, notwithstanding his deprecation of America’s contribution to the 
victory of 1918, de Gaulle was acutely aware of the unique power of the United States – and this 
awareness equally informed many of his later decisions. De Gaulle’s awe of in particular 
America’s industrial power and his attentiveness to its military implications are to be traced back 
to the 1930s, when, as lieutenant-colonel at the Secretariat-General of the Conseil Supérieur de la 
Défense Nationale, he undertook a number of studies on enhancing France’s preparedness for war. 
On January 1, 1934, for instance, he published an article in Revue Militaire Française in which he 
paid tribute to the American system of mobilization “in a tone that few European officers would 
have adopted at that time.”148 And in 1936 he recommended that France follow the example of 
the American National Defense Act of 1920 in order to allow for a massive mobilization of the 
country’s industrial resources in case of war.149 Four years later, the power of American industry 
suddenly became de Gaulle’s last vestige of hope. His professional admiration for the United 
States as a military-industrial power explains why he put more store in it than those Frenchmen 
who had capitulated to Germany’s Blitzkrieg in 1940. “You have forgone the resources to be 
offered in the future by immense America,” de Gaulle declared on June 26, 1940, in a stinging 
rebuke of Marshall Pétain’s decision to capitulate.150 In July, de Gaulle furthermore issued a 
proclamation in which he stressed to the French that they may have lost a battle but not the war, 
“because this war is a global war” (“parce que cette guerre et une guerre mondiale”):  
 
In the free world, immense powers have not yet made their contributions. One day, these powers 
will crush the enemy. On that day, France must be on the side of victory. If she is, she will 
become what she was before, a great and independent nation. That, and that alone, is my goal.151 
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Yet the sheer preponderance of American industrial power also disturbed de Gaulle, for it 
signalled not only the salvation of France but also a potential threat to its independence and 
‘great power’ status. De Gaulle was well aware that the United States would be the most powerful 
country after the war, that it would want to have the deciding voice in the peace settlement, and 
that during the war it was “already trying to rule the world” (as he observed in July 1944 to his 
associate Raoul Aglion while gazing down at the endless river of cars from his New York 
hotel). 152  This fretfulness about American power was hardly unjustified from de Gaulle’s 
perspective, as we will see. It is equally noteworthy that it has important antecedents in French 
diplomatic history. “Since Napoleon I,” one historian concluded, “French governments, 
monarchical and republican alike, treated the United States as a friend whose shadow always 
frightened them” and many Frenchmen wished to put the brakes on its emergence, “not so much 
out of hatred for the United States as of concern for the safety and independent future of their 
own country.”153 
De Gaulle’s views of the United States as an international actor were determined in no 
small part by his views on foreign policy. As a foreign policy realist, he was wont to discard 
idealistic motivations as rhetoric and to discern the self-serving motives of a policy. “As was only 
human,” he famously observed about a conversation with Roosevelt in 1944, “his will to power 
cloaked itself in idealism.”154 From the early days of the Republic, American foreign policy has 
often been laden with idealism cultivated on a belief in America’s unique history and morality. To 
de Gaulle, however, the ideological component of American foreign policy was clearly less of an 
explanation for American policies than the pursuit of interests and the innate desire to amass 
power. (In this sense, his view of the United States was similar to his view of the Soviet Union.) 
During the Cold War, despite his frequent references to the United States’ late war entries, de 
Gaulle hence appears to have been less concerned about a return to American isolationism than 
about American meddlesomeness. As he explained to President Eisenhower in 1960, he did not 
think a return to isolationism was a realistic option for American policymakers: 
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[…] while believing America to be indispensable to the world, I did not wish to see her setting 
herself up as a universal judge and policeman. As for the opposite eventuality, her drawing in on 
herself, I regarded it as highly unlikely. At the level of power to which she had attained, her 
strongest temptations were towards intervention, and besides, how could she remain detached in 
the event of a world conflict, when at any moment and from any point of the compass she could 
be dealt a deathblow?155 
 
It is, once again, noteworthy that these views of the United States as captivated with its 
own power – shrouded, as it is, in idealism – were hardly unique in French diplomatic history. As 
early as 1908, the French diplomat and politician André Tardieu used words that could have been 
de Gaulle’s: 
 
The United States is […] a world power […]. A nation of ninety million souls, which sells wheat 
to the universe, coal, iron, and cotton, cannot isolate itself. […] it has a sense of puissance oblige. Its 
power creates for it a right. The right turns itself into a pretension. The pretension becomes a 
duty – to pronounce upon all those questions that hitherto have been arranged only among 
European powers. These powers themselves, at critical times, turn toward the United States, 
anxious to know its opinion. […] The United States intervenes thus in the affairs of the universe. 
[…] It is seated at the table where the great game is played, and it cannot leave it.156 
 
And very much like Jules Cambon, a celebrated French ambassador in the United States at the 
turn of the century, de Gaulle would support European cooperation to keep the “American 
octopus” at arms length.157  
The dilemma de Gaulle continually faced in respect of the United States was that the very 
continuation of the French nation-state depended on its willingness to serve as the ‘great arsenal 
of democracy’ while this very dependence threatened to undermine his subsidiary aim to restore 
France as a great and independent power in international affairs. De Gaulle’s apprehension about 
American power was furthermore aggravated by the way American policies came about. 
American presidents had to work within a system of popular democracy and divided government. 
As a result, American foreign policy was sensitive to public mood swings and to the often 
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differing opinions of Congress and between the various branches within the executive.158 “The 
United States brings to great affairs elementary feelings and a complicated policy,” he therefore 
judged in his War Memoirs.159 
More generally, de Gaulle’s respect for the industrial might and political vitality of the 
United States hardly resulted in a desire to emulate the American example. While he appears to 
have envied the dynamism of American society, de Gaulle disliked its salient economic and social 
characteristics; his motives in “resisting the American challenge,” as Richard Kuisel pointed out, 
were certainly more varied than “primarily political.”160 De Gaulle’s conservative cultural and 
intellectual preferences, in particular his ambivalent attitude towards modernity and his 
hesitations with regard to personal liberty and individualism (which had been reinforced by 
Péguy), made him inherently critical of the American social order and way of life. His disapproval 
of the profit motive in American society, which he considered to be the “motivation of all 
activity and the basis of all hierarchy” among Americans, was barely disguised in his studies 
before the war.161 During the war and thereafter, he avowed his loyalty to “a certain conception 
of man despite the progressive mechanization of society,” by which he meant to distinguish the 
European model of civilization from those provided by the United States and the Soviet 
Union.162 De Gaulle’s views were thus a muffled echo of more strident French – and European – 
denunciations of American society as crude and excessively materialistic. Such verdicts were the 
rule rather than the exception in most of continental Europe, and the pervasive fear that France 
and Europe might be overwhelmed by America undoubtedly influenced de Gaulle as well.163 He 
did not go so far as Georges Clemenceau, who is known to have observed that “America is the 
only nation in history which miraculously has gone directly from barbarism to degeneration 
without the usual interval of civilization.” But he would no doubt have acknowledged the veracity 
of Henry Adams’ observation in The Education of Henry Adams (1918) about the general attitude of 
the European towards the American: 
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the limits and defects of the American mind were one of the favorite topics of the European. 
From the old-world point of view, the American had no mind; he had an economic thinking-
machine which could work only on a fixed line. The American mind exasperated the European as 
a buzz-saw might exasperate a pine forest. The English mind disliked the French mind because it 
was antagonistic, unreasonable, perhaps hostile, but recognized it at least as a thought. The 
American mind was not a thought at all; it was a convention, superficial, narrow, and ignorant; a 
mere cutting instrument, practical, economical, sharp, and direct.164 
 
De Gaulle’s core view of the United States cannot, however, simply be described as anti-
American. For this, his view was too complex an amalgamation of traditional European criticism 
of American society as crude and a genuine respect for its vigorous energy and industrial power; 
it was also a mixture of, on the one hand, a concern with either too much or too little American 
involvement in European affairs and, on the other hand, a solid sense of alliance and shared 
attachment to western political values. De Gaulle was not against the United States per se. But he 
did not have much affinity with American society. The American diplomat Robert Murphy may 
have been too harsh by stating that “I never regarded him as a close friend of my country” and 
that “he knew little of the United States or of Americans.” 165  But there was an element of 
slackening in de Gaulle’s powers of orientation when it came to the United States. De Gaulle 
believed every nation-state was imbued with its own character bequeathed by history and 
geography. Yet he never quite knew what to make of the New World. In the words of his 
wartime associate René Pleven: 
 
The reason that General de Gaulle misunderstood the United States and Roosevelt was that he 
was a man for whom history counted more than anything else. In order to understand states and 
policies his natural and unvarying tendency was to resort to history. That was why he was so 
successful in describing and dealing with Britain, Germany or China. But where the United States 
were concerned he was at a loss; he found no historical keys. Not that the United States possess 
no history. But de Gaulle was not acquainted with it in 1940, and did not think it could be 
compared to that of ‘real’ nations.166 
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World War II 
Neither de Gaulle’s views of the United States nor the chemistry of the Franco-American 
relationship after his return to power can be fully understood without considering his dealings 
with the Americans as leader of the Free French during World War II. De Gaulle’s thorny 
relationship with in particular Roosevelt has been discussed at length elsewhere, and the 
American president has been justly criticized for refusing for the longest time to accept de 
Gaulle’s wartime claim to represent France. “It is astonishing that the relations between 
Roosevelt and de Gaulle began as badly as they did,” Raoul Aglion observed, and that “the 
relations between the leader of the free world and the leader of a national movement of 
resistance against totalitarianism worsened instead of improved, even as the war progressed 
toward an Allied victory.”167 
It is, however, important to understand that FDR’s failure to develop a rapport with de 
Gaulle was more than a matter of personal incompatibility. Their quarrel concerned above all the 
status of France, both during the war and thereafter. For de Gaulle, France’s military defeat in the 
spring of 1940 did not diminish its claim to be treated as a great power; he insisted that Paris 
have a say in the postwar order. For Roosevelt, however, this defeat had disqualified France for 
the foreseeable future; in addition, he considered France to be part of the historical European 
problem of internecine war and endemic belligerence rather than part of its solution.168 Their 
argument must therefore also be seen as the harbinger of similar bouts of tension in the Franco-
American relationship after the war. “The French have the impression that you no longer 
consider the greatness of France necessary to the world and to yourself,” de Gaulle told 
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Roosevelt’s confidante Harry Hopkins at the end of the war. “If you want relations between our 
countries to be established on a different footing, it is up to you to do what must be done.”169  
In defense of Roosevelt, one does well to remember that when de Gaulle, in his epic 
radio address from London of June 18, 1940, summoned his people to continue the war from 
overseas, he was largely unknown to most Frenchmen and the legitimacy – and even the legality 
– of his call was very much in doubt. 170  His address of June 18th was, besides audacious, 
presumptuous to say the least – and it is difficult to overstate the enormity of his gamble. Driven 
to despair by the stunning collapse of its defense, the French government in Bordeaux – of 
which de Gaulle had been a junior member – 171 was seeking an armistice with Germany. Marshal 
Philippe Pétain, de Gaulle’s chief and mentor, had declared a few days earlier that “we must await 
the rebirth of France here, in France itself rather than relying on the conquest of our territory by 
the Allies after a period of time that cannot be estimated.”172 Who, then, was going to follow the 
call of this largely anonymous brigadier-general of the French army, who had established himself 
in relative safety in London? His call had moreover been all but drowned out by other news 
about the war and for a while it appeared little more than “a dud shell that had fallen without 
exploding.”173 The sobering fact that, by the end of 1941, de Gaulle was heading “a far-flung 
empire stretching from central Africa to the faraway islands of Tahiti and New Caledonia” and 
that the first Free French expedition, namely to take Dakar (Senegal) in September 1940, ended 
in utter failure was hardly a recommendation either; nor was the reality that most Frenchmen in 
the United States “were hostile to his mission.”174 What is more, the fate of his undertaking to 
restore France to the position of a great power would be almost entirely determined by others. 
He was reliant on Britain’s will to continue the fight and on the promise of American material aid; 
it was a position of nearly complete dependence.175 Why, however, should the British and the 
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Americans concede to de Gaulle’s assertion that he was the only legitimate spokesperson of the 
French people? Whereas Churchill had decided early on to support de Gaulle’s case because he 
had been the only one to come forward to continue the fight,176 Roosevelt saw no good reason to 
endorse the transfer of the legitimacy of an occupied country to his movement. Instead, the 
American president gave priority to maintaining good relations with Pétain’s Vichy government 
in order to persuade it not to deliver itself entirely – and the Toulon-based French navy and the 
French colonies with it – to Nazi Germany. It seemed to him the most ‘expedient’ policy 
available. Moreover, whereas the “Vichy Embassy was all-powerful in Washington,” de Gaulle’s 
representatives in the United States were a motley crew and, as Aglion remarked, little more than 
“men without a country.”177 
Even so, de Gaulle can hardly be blamed for feeling slighted by the American president; 
given de Gaulle’s ability to rally the French behind the war effort, Roosevelt’s dismissive attitude 
towards his leadership pretensions was considered unwise and unproductive even by a growing 
number of officials within his administration (albeit not his Secretary of State Cordell Hull who 
“hated de Gaulle so fiercely that he was almost incoherent on the subject”).178 Roosevelt’s instant 
and almost visceral dislike of de Gaulle stood in the way of any rapprochement between the two. 
Ever since their first encounter, near the Moroccan port of Casablanca in January 1943, the 
American president habitually derided de Gaulle as a self-appointed Joan of Arc with “the 
makings of a dictator.”179 It appears that Roosevelt perceived a feminine side to this intractable 
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character; de Gaulle’s initial refusal to come to Casablanca for a meeting with Henri Giraud 
occasioned the American president to dub the Frenchman a “bride” and a “temperamental lady” 
who mulishly resisted her destiny: to be joined up with her “groom.” 180  At the same time, 
Roosevelt’s antipathy towards de Gaulle may have been fuelled by the latter’s obvious 
imperviousness to the president’s charm. Although Roosevelt, in their first private meeting in 
Casablanca, greeted de Gaulle with “much cordiality” in an attempt to woo him into accepting 
American leadership, the leader of the Free French persisted in the “cold and austere” demeanor 
with which he had arrived.181 “Beneath his patrician mask of courtesy,” de Gaulle would observe 
in his memoirs, “Roosevelt regarded me without benevolence.”182 
There also appears to have been an element of jealous resentment on Roosevelt’s part. It 
is important to realize that he had reserved a critical role for himself in determining France’s 
make-up after the war. Roosevelt had been utterly shocked by the rapid collapse of France in 
June 1940. He also held France’s body politic, which had been unable to prevent this collapse, in 
low regard. De Gaulle was both seeing through Roosevelt’s intentions to determine the future of 
France and usurping this role by his growing ability to garner support among the French. At the 
Casablanca conference, at any rate, the American president did not hesitate to throw cold water 
on de Gaulle’s claims to represent France: 
 
none of the contenders for power in North Africa had the right to say that he, and only he, 
represented the sovereignty of France. The […] sovereignty of France, as in our country, rested 
with the people, but […] unfortunately the people of France were not now in a position to 
exercise that sovereignty. […] it was, therefore, necessary to resort to the legal analogy of 
“trusteeship” and that it was his view that the Allied Nations fighting in French territory at the 
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moment were fighting for the liberation of France and that they should hold the political situation 
in “trusteeship” for the French people. […] France is in the position of a little child unable to 
look out and fend for itself.183   
 
Neither had their rendezvous in Casablanca persuaded Roosevelt that he should 
acknowledge de Gaulle’s claim after all.184 “De Gaulle may be an honest fellow but he has the 
Messianic complex,” he wrote Churchill in May 1943: 
 
[…] further he has an idea that the people of France itself are strongly behind him personally. 
This I doubt, I think the people of France are behind the Free French Movement; that they do 
not know de Gaulle […]. I am inclined to think that when we get to France itself, we will have to 
regard it as a military occupation run by British and American generals.185 
 
And in June 1943, the American president pressured Churchill hard to withdraw support entirely 
for de Gaulle because he “has been and is now injuring our war effort” and “has proven to be 
unreliable, uncooperative, and disloyal to both our governments.”186 Roosevelt even believed that 
he had a better understanding of the future needs of the country than de Gaulle. De Gaulle, 
however, did not fail to perceive the more fundamental source of Roosevelt’s opposition in his 
War Memoirs:  
 
From the moment America entered the war, Roosevelt meant the peace to be an American peace, 
convinced that he must be the one to dictate its structure, that the states which had been overrun 
should be subject to his judgment, and that France in particular should recognize him as its savior 
and arbiter. Therefore the fact that France was reviving in the heat of the battle, not in terms of a 
fragmentary and hence convenient resistance but as a sovereign and independent nation, thwarted 
his intentions.187 
 
Upon entering the war, the United States continued to regard the Pétain-led Vichy 
government as the legitimate representative of the French people. Roosevelt was preoccupied 
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with preparing the ground for the first major Allied offensive operation: the invasion of French 
North Africa by American and British troops in November 1942 (codenamed Operation Torch). 
He set his cards on negotiating a deal with high Vichy representatives, in particular with Admiral 
François Darlan, in order to minimize armed resistance to the invading troops. Washington 
ended up retaining Darlan as civil and military chief of French North Africa in return for his 
instruction to French forces to cease all resistance.188 After Darlan’s ensuing assassination in 
December 1942 by an anti-Nazi royalist, Roosevelt set his sights on Henri Giraud, a high-ranking 
general of the French army who had escaped from German prison in April 1942 with the help of 
the Allied secret services. At the Casablanca conference of January 1943, Roosevelt forced de 
Gaulle to accept Giraud as co-president of the French Committee of National Liberation; Giraud 
would also retain control of the French armed forces in North Africa until April 1944.189 De 
Gaulle was irate at these American ‘intrusions’ in France’s affairs, in particular since none of 
these were in support of his cause. He had not even been informed of the impending Anglo-
American invasion of French North Africa (although Churchill had planned to tell him “just 
before the blow fell”),190 nor would he be informed of the Normandy invasion of June 1944 until 
two days before D-Day. “Until the whole of France was liberated,” Roosevelt had stated bluntly 
to de Gaulle’s representative André Philip, “it would be his [Roosevelt’s] government alone that 
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would determine which Frenchman would eventually administrate the free territories.”191 To him, 
de Gaulle was too reminiscent of France’s past and too similar to authoritarian rulers elsewhere 
in Europe. Was he influenced by journalist Pierre Lazareff’s description in Life of de Gaulle as an 
“ambitious royalist”?192 His relationship with de Gaulle from the outset certainly appears to have 
been tainted by the “combination of animosity and hubris” he nurtured toward the Old World, 
of which de Gaulle appeared an orthodox representative. 193  Who could guarantee that this 
professional soldier with his authoritarian demeanor was not a budding French-style Benito 
Mussolini or Francisco Franco, a reincarnation of the vengeful Georges Clemenceau, or even an 
“apprentice Hitler”?194 “It is obvious that we were mistaken in supporting Giraud, just as the 
British were mistaken in supporting de Gaulle,” Averell Harriman observed. “It’s a pity that no 
Frenchman has come forward with the courage of de Gaulle but none of the egoism.”195 This 
opinion of de Gaulle may not have been entirely unjustified at the time, and it was fed by such 
Frenchmen in Washington as the influential diplomat-poet Alexis Léger.196 It was, however, not 
giving de Gaulle the credit he deserved. 
Neither can de Gaulle be censured for fearing Roosevelt’s postwar design for France, as 
this design initially lumped France together with Germany, Italy, Japan, Czechoslovakia, and 
Rumania as culprits of the war. In the relationship between Roosevelt and de Gaulle, one 
historian rightfully judged, “the will to power of the New World collided head on with the 
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whom he habitually referred to as “l’homme” (“that man”), was legendary. He consistently held that de Gaulle, whom 
he never met, could not be considered the legitimate head of the French government since he had not been elected 
by the French people. In addition to being a diplomat, Léger was a gifted poet – using the pseudonym of Saint-John 
Perse – and he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1960. 




instinct for survival of the Old.”197 Roosevelt’s conception of the ‘four policemen’ that would 
watch over the postwar settlement not only denied France’s restoration to the position of a great 
power, but even comprised the complete degradation of its armed forces (along with those of 
Germany and Italy). In Roosevelt’s view, France would have to be treated as occupied rather than 
liberated territory and would be governed by the American military.198 France’s reestablishment as 
a power helping to maintain international peace might “perhaps be possible within 10 or 20 
years,” the American president had said to Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in May 
1942, but only after the French had given evidence of their dependability and upon the approval 
of the ‘policemen.’ Roosevelt was moreover reluctant to grant France a role of significance 
because he perceived a danger in the presence of too many ‘policemen’: “the first thing they 
might do would be to start fighting amongst themselves.”199 And in March 1943, during a  White 
House dinner with British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, he put forward the question why, 
after Germany would be “disarmed,” France should have a “big military establishment.” 200 
Roosevelt even considered detaching Alsace-Lorraine from France as well as Germany and join it 
with Belgium and Luxembourg in a new federal state, as Eden recalled: 
 
After the war, armaments in Europe should be concentrated in the hands of Britain, the United 
States and Russia. The smaller powers should have nothing more dangerous than rifles. He 
[Roosevelt] thought that the three Powers should police Europe in general. His next anxiety was 
about the future of Belgium. [He recommended] […] the creation of a new state called Wallonia. 
This would include the Walloon parts of Belgium with Luxembourg, Alsace-Lorraine and part of 
northern France.201 
 
Meanwhile, Roosevelt’s postwar intentions with the French colonies were no less intolerable 
from de Gaulle’s vantage point. In the view of the American president, “France was not only the 
defeated nation of 1940, but also the citadel of colonialism.”202 He had discerned a “palpable 
surge toward independence” as a result of which “white nations […] could not hope to hold 
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these areas as colonies in the long run.”203 In order to prepare the ground for independence, 
Roosevelt therefore proposed a system of international trusteeship instead of the mandate system 
that had followed World War I. The era was over in which the European powers determined the 
fate of other parts of the globe. 
De Gaulle’s unease about the United States’ rise to prominence during the war and its 
ramifications for France was confirmed during his first visit to Washington, in early July 1944, 
even as he was hosted with full honors and “observed with admiration the flood of confidence 
that sustained the American elite and discovered how becoming optimism is to those who can 
afford it.” He was graciously welcomed by the American president – “all smiles and cordiality” – 
and his cabinet officers and chief advisers – “a coherent ensemble […] equal to its tasks.”204 The 
meeting was arranged in order to resolve the increasingly embarrassing squabble about the 
question who should be acknowledged as the legitimate administration over liberated French 
territory. Roosevelt was sufficiently impressed with de Gaulle’s demeanor and, more importantly, 
with the passionate response of the French to de Gaulle’s return to French soil in Normandy on 
June 14 and the highly favorable response in the American press to de Gaulle’s visit and his claim 
to represent the French, to communicate to Churchill that the “visit has gone off very well” and 
that he was now “prepared to accept [de Gaulle’s] Committee as temporary de facto authority for 
civil administration in France” (albeit under the condition that Eisenhower would retain full 
military authority over war operations and that the French people would be allowed to freely 
elect their government after the war).205 On October 23, 1944, three months after the liberation 
of Paris, the United States at long last recognized the cabinet led by de Gaulle as the Provisional 
Government of France.206  
But Roosevelt’s hints at a “four-power directory” had appeared to de Gaulle “disquieting 
for Europe and for France,” as it seemed to amount to a “permanent system of intervention” 
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and “to involve the installation of American forces on bases distributed throughout the world 
and of which certain ones would be located in French territory.” De Gaulle countered 
Roosevelt’s ruminations about a directory that included the Soviet Union and China by stating 
that “it is the West […] that must be restored,” or else “barbarism will ultimately sweep 
everything away.” This, he argued, plainly required the reinstatement of Western Europe and 
above all of France to the rank of great powers. In a press conference on the last day of his visit, 
de Gaulle furthermore made clear that he expected that France “will find everything intact that 
belongs to her” in terms of colonial possessions and that “the flag of the French army may well 
fly over certain European territories.” He was thus both resisting American pressure to relinquish 
France’s colonial empire in Africa and Asia and claiming a part in the postwar occupation of the 
Axis powers.207 France under de Gaulle was not about to be cowed into a subordinate role after 
the war. 
Roosevelt’s relationship with de Gaulle would remain rancorous. Following the July 1944 
meeting, his wife Eleanor wrote in her autobiography, “I saw no difference in Franklin’s 
attitude.”208 While he recognized de Gaulle’s committee as a party to be dealt with in an official 
capacity, he continued to refuse to recognize it as France’s provisional government. As it 
happened, Stalin recognized de Gaulle as France’s head of state before Roosevelt did. Roosevelt 
wrote to an American congressman, in a letter that made its way to de Gaulle, that he considered 
the Frenchman “very touchy in matters concerning the honor of France” but suspected “that he 
is essentially an egoist.” This assessment caused de Gaulle to observe with acerbic wit in his War 
Memoirs: “I was never to know if Franklin Roosevelt thought that in affairs concerning to France 
Charles de Gaulle was an egoist for France or for himself.”209 Their relationship plummeted to 
new depths as a result of Roosevelt’s determination not to invite de Gaulle to the Yalta 
conference in early February 1945 and de Gaulle’s public rebuke of Roosevelt’s suggestion to 
meet in Algiers – on French territory, but not in the capital Paris (as the American president had 
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already been invited to do) – following the conference.210 In Roosevelt’s view, de Gaulle always 
remained a “prima donna” who lacked democratic legitimacy. 
None of this is to say that de Gaulle did not recognize that the support of the United 
States was essential for winning the war against Nazi Germany and reclaiming French sovereignty. 
On the contrary, in his appeal to the French to keep the flame of resistance alive, he had talked 
courage into his countrymen by pointing out that France, like Great Britain, was in the position 
to draw on the immense industrial resources of the United States “sans limites.”211 In May 1941, 
he had sent René Pleven, a man with exceptional business contacts in the United States, on a 
mission to establish full relations with Washington. In the early stages of the war, fearing a 
German invasion in Africa, de Gaulle had also offered the United States the military use of 
French bases in North Africa: “I am sure that France’s African possessions would be in safe 
hands if strategic points were occupied by the American Navy.”212 Washington declined the offer, 
but on November 11, 1941, it did extend the Lend-Lease Act to France, which elated de 
Gaulle.213 Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, removed any doubts de Gaulle 
still may have had about the outcome of the war. “L’entrée dans la guerre de notre alliée 
Amérique […] équivaut, tout simplement, à la certitude de vaincre,” he announced on the radio 
on December 15. “Dans cette guerre de machines, l’Amérique possède, à elle seule, un potentiel 
égal au potentiel total de tous les autres belligérants.”214 But de Gaulle also understood that the 
American war effort did not only consist of its industrial prowess. His visit to Washington in July 
1944, three weeks after he had first set foot on French soil again in four years, was not 
undertaken to “seek any specific agreements” but “to show his appreciation for the thousands of 
brave Americans who were fighting so valiantly and effectively in Europe.”215 
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 In the end, moreover, Roosevelt could not ignore the fact that de Gaulle had been able to 
establish his authority in France and that a strong France was important to the maintenance of 
international security after the war, both in relation to Germany and to the colonies. Toward the 
end of 1944, Roosevelt had reluctantly agreed to arm eight French divisions with American 
weaponry and to accord France a role in the occupation of Germany. This grudging but 
nonetheless real change of attitude toward de Gaulle’s pretensions was moreover induced by 
Roosevelt’s belief that, as he cabled a much disconcerted Churchill, “after Germany’s collapse I 
must bring American troops home as rapidly as transportation problems will permit.”216 As the 
war drew near the end, the postwar reestablishment of France as a military power was 
increasingly being considered as necessary from Washington’s perspective in order to allow for a 
substantial military drawdown by the United States. “In the long run,” Secretary of State Edward 
Stettinius thus concluded, “this Government will undoubtedly gain more by making concessions 
to French prestige and by treating France on the basis of her potential power and influence, than 
we will by treating her on the basis of her actual strength at this time.”217 Although Roosevelt 
would volunteer to Stalin at the Yalta conference that he had agreed to France’s status as an 
occupying power “only out of kindness,” by early 1945 it had unmistakably become in the 
American interest to do so.218 
 What lessons did de Gaulle draw about the United States from his wartime experiences? 
De Gaulle did not draw the lesson that the Americans were irrevocably hostile to his 
mission. The American press, including newspapers such as the New York Times and the New 
York Herald Tribune, was, in fact, overwhelmingly sympathetic to the Free French as soon as the 
movement began to show some traction in France and the French colonial empire, certainly 
more so than the French-language press in the United States; it frequently criticized Roosevelt for 
failing to recognize the Free French as the legitimate government of France. 219  Within the 
administration, there was also a diversity of opinion about de Gaulle, with the War Department 
and the Office of Strategic Services – the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency – 
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markedly more favorably disposed toward the Free French than the White House and Cordell 
Hull’s State Department. A prominent public figure such as Fiorello La Guardia, the mayor of 
New York, also strongly supported the Free French movement, and hosted de Gaulle in July 
1944 without any of the reservations he encountered in Washington. 
If there is one lesson de Gaulle drew, it was nonetheless that France could not rely on the 
Anglo-Saxons for its security interests, even as he acknowledged that without their support it 
could not have been liberated, and that it therefore “must count only on herself.” The British 
supported de Gaulle’s Free French movement, but they also destroyed the French fleet in Mers-
el-Kebir in July 1940 and pursued interests in the Near East at France’s expense. The United 
States had to be directly attacked before it entered the war. The ensuing list of wartime clashes 
between de Gaulle and the Americans is long and well-rehearsed. His response to French 
dependence on American and British support was not meekness but intransigence. Whereas 
Churchill was able to build his wartime strategy on Anglo-American intimacy, de Gaulle – more 
painfully confronted with the American “will to power cloaked by idealism” – was continually 
compelled to defend his legitimacy and to resist the Anglo-Saxon tendency to dominate 
decisionmaking in the West. He instructed French troops to keep Strassbourg in spite of 
Eisenhower’s order to withdraw from that city in December 1944. In March 1945, he ordered 
General de Lattre de Tassigny to take Stuttgart by surprise, in order to press French claims to an 
occupation zone in Germany. In both cases, even though French troops had been trained and 
equipped by the United States and had been placed under Eisenhower’s military command, de 
Gaulle insisted that the French military would respond only to French authorities. When, on the 
eve of D-Day, Churchill pushed him to visit Washington to talk with Roosevelt about the 
administration of France in the wake of the invasion, de Gaulle said: “Why do you seem to think 
that I need to submit my candidacy for the authority in France to Roosevelt? The French 
government exists. I have nothing to ask, in this sphere, of the United States of America nor of 
Great Britain.”220 To de Gaulle, World War II above all demonstrated the benefits of an unyielding 
stance in the face of superior power. Or as he observed in his War Memoirs: 
 
I was starting from scratch. Not the shadow of a force or of an organization at my side. In 
France, no following and no reputation. Abroad, neither credit nor standing. But this very 
destitution showed me my line of conduct. It was by adopting without compromise the cause of 
national recovery that I could acquire authority. It was by acting as the inflexible champion of the 
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nation and of the state that it would be possible for me to gather the consent, even the 
enthusiasm, of the French and to win from foreigners respect and consideration. […] the slightest 
wavering would have brought collapse. In short, limited and alone though I was, and precisely 
because I was so, I had to climb to the heights and never then to come down.221 
 
Yalta, the Early Cold War, and the Atlantic Community 
Recognition of the Free French as the provisional government of France was not the same as 
recognition of France as a full-fledged ally and a great power. This much became clear when de 
Gaulle was refused admittance – through Roosevelt’s doing – to the conference of the Big Three 
from February 4 to 11 in Yalta on the Crimean peninsula. The French provisional government 
had formally requested to be invited.222 Roosevelt, however, had cabled Churchill before the 
conference that “any attempt to include de Gaulle in the meeting of the three of us would merely 
introduce a complicating and undesirable factor.”223 De Gaulle could neither count on Stalin’s 
support; the Soviet leader considered his request “unrealistic in the sense that France had not 
done very much fighting in this war and de Gaulle demanded full rights with the Americans, 
British and Russians who had done the burden of the fighting.” 224  France was still marred 
politically by the collapse of 1940 and far too weak militarily to command a place at the 
negotiating table of the conquerors. 
At the Yalta conference, the last conference that Roosevelt – already gravely ill – attended, 
the Big Three confirmed the policy adopted at the Casablanca conference of demanding 
Germany’s unconditional surrender. In addition, the Soviet Union secretly agreed to enter the 
war against Japan within three months of Germany’s surrender and was promised Southern 
Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, and an occupation zone in Korea in return. At least as importantly, 
the Big Three laid the groundwork for their postwar treatment of Germany, which they agreed 
would have to be demilitarized and denazified, and of the territories in Eastern Europe in control 
of the Red Army. In addition, Roosevelt was able to ensure Soviet participation in the United 
Nations, after he had consented that each permanent member of the Security Council would be 
granted veto power and that the Soviet Union would be granted three memberships (the Soviet 
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Union, Byelorussia, and Ukraine). The contours of the postwar international order were thus 
drawn up during these tripartite talks on the shores of the Black Sea.225 
De Gaulle was resentful about being excluded from the Yalta conference, albeit “not at 
all surprised,” as he claims in his War Memoirs, because “I knew the starting point too well to 
believe we had reached our goal already.”226 But he was confident that the Big Three could not 
afford to ignore France: “For none of their decisions concerning Europe, particularly Germany, 
could be put into effect if France did not lend her voice. Soon we would be on the Rhine and the 
Danube with a strong army. Moreover, the war’s end would leave us in force on the continent, 
while America would be back in her hemisphere and England on her island.”227  
The results of the Yalta conference, where the British had “fought like tigers for 
France,”228 were moreover quite favorable for France, in particular because the Big Three agreed 
that it was to have a say in Germany’s future and to assume a seat in the United Nations’ Security 
Council – and de Gaulle recognized these results as such.229 It was decided that Germany would 
be split into four occupied zones after the war, with a quadripartite occupation of Berlin as well, 
and that France would have the fourth occupation zone, carved out from the British and 
American zones. France would also be granted a seat in the Allied Control Council, the military 
body that would administrate occupied Germany. Along with China, France was furthermore 
asked to join in sponsoring the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco in 
April 1945 and, as a permanent member of the Security Council, would be granted veto power.230 
De Gaulle’s distress about the results of the Yalta conference therefore did not concern the 
position they accorded to France, although he was gravely concerned about their implications for 
France’s colonial possessions (a subject on which he did not and could not trust the British).  
The main negative aspect of the Yalta conference, in de Gaulle’s reading, was that it failed 
to prevent the Cold War division of Europe. The Big Three had agreed that all original 
governments would be restored in the invaded countries. Democracies would be established and 
all territories would hold free elections.231 The Red Army, however, was physically in control of 
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most of Eastern Europe; at the time of Yalta, Russian Marshall Zhukov was only forty miles 
away from Berlin. Stalin was determined to establish a Soviet sphere of influence as a buffer 
against future aggression. The Russians were to keep the eastern portion of Poland for which 
Poland was to be compensated by extending its western borders at the expense of Germany. At 
Yalta, Stalin promised free elections in Poland, but it soon became apparent that he had no 
intention of relinquishing control. The elections, which were held in January 1947 and resulted in 
the official transformation of Poland into a socialist state by 1949, were rigged in favor of the 
communist party. Much earlier, on March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill – now a former prime 
minister – had already famously spoken, in his address in Fulton, Missouri, of an “iron curtain” 
that had descended “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic.” With the onset of the 
Cold War, the Yalta agreements became subject to considerable and often hot-tempered dispute 
in the West, not least in the United States. Rightly or wrongly, Roosevelt was posthumously 
accused of having been far too indulgent and naïve with Stalin or too willing to trade Eastern 
Europe for Soviet support in the war against Japan and for the United Nations. By the early 
1950s, Yalta had acquired in important American and British circles “a connotation of shameful 
failure, if not outright treason, matching that attached to the Munich Conference of September 
1938.”232 
De Gaulle became the most vocal and most consistent European assailant of the ‘Yalta’ 
system. At Yalta, the Soviet Union had been allowed its exclusive sphere of influence in Eastern 
Europe, he argued. This had nipped his hoped-for European equilibrium in the bud. “I believed 
[…] that timely action by the western Allies with regard to the masters of the Kremlin, on 
condition that such action be concerted and categorical, would safeguard the independence of the 
Poles, the Czechs, the Hungarians and the Balkan peoples,” he professed in his War Memoirs; 
“after which the unity of Europe could be established in the form of an association including its 
peoples from Iceland to Istanbul, from Gibraltar to the Urals.”233 His vision of European unity 
had been aborted by Roosevelt’s “excessive concessions” to Stalin in the dying stages of the 
war. 234  But he did not think that Roosevelt’s indulgence was the result of naiveté, which 
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distinguished him from most American and British critics of Yalta. De Gaulle rather faulted the 
United States for having wittingly arranged the destiny of Europe in collusion with the Soviet 
Union, with deplorable (“fâcheuses”) and crippling (“boiteuses”) consequences for Eastern 
Europe.235 One of Roosevelt’s chief concerns had been to devise a postwar system that would 
prevent Europe from descending back into internecine war. To de Gaulle, however, the Yalta 
‘system’ was synonymous with the division of Europe. It demonstrated the ineffaceable partiality 
of the two superpowers to establish a condominium in Europe in which they would each 
dominate one ‘bloc’ of nations. It condemned Europe to the position of a “continent misérable” 
absorbed by hegemony “sous la laquelle disparaîtraient son génie et sa lumière.”236 
France’s absence at Yalta had one major advantage: it allowed de Gaulle to freely criticize 
the – alleged or real – decisions that had been endorsed there by the Anglo-Saxons. France was 
not an accomplice of the Cold War division of Europe. It was rather one of the victims since this 
division prevented it from resuming its ‘natural’ place within the European equilibrium. Time and 
again, de Gaulle stressed that Europe had been partitioned on the shores of the Crimea and that 
France had had no part in it; as he wrote in his War Memoirs, “the world would discover that there 
was a correlation between France’s absence and Europe’s new laceration.” 237 By implication, 
European interests in unity would have been better defended if France – as the only undeniably 
European power among the victors – had been granted a place at the table. 
In the Cold War, de Gaulle from the outset nonetheless strongly supported alliance with 
the United States (on the condition, of course, that ‘alliance’ did not mean ‘submission’ or 
‘deference’ to American leadership). The Soviet threat in the heart of Europe was simply too 
overwhelming to be dealt with without the Americans. De Gaulle’s discussions with Stalin in 
December 1944 had been disconcerting, too, despite the signing of the Franco-Soviet pact. “In 
Stalin’s person,” he recalled, “I had the impression of confronting the astute and implacable 
champion of a Russia exhausted by suffering and tyranny but afire with national ambition.”238 So 
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when de Gaulle was preparing his visit to President Truman from August 22 to 25, 1945, he 
instructed his Foreign Minister Bidault to communicate “our [France’s] desire to wipe the slate 
clean of the past, start afresh and work with the US as closely as we possibly can in the 
international field. We have made plenty of mistakes in the past and we think you have made 
some, but we ardently hope to stick very close to you in the future.”239 De Gaulle’s talks with 
Truman were indeed convivial throughout. He found Roosevelt’s successor to be “an extremely 
positive man” who showed few grudges towards him, although Truman did share his 
predecessor’s disinclination to treat France as a major power and declined to support de Gaulle’s 
insistent proposals to separate the Rhineland from Germany and to internationalize the Ruhr area. 
De Gaulle was also apprehensive about the apparent “simplicity” of Truman’s world view and 
the store he put in American “leadership.” In particular his one-size-fits-all solution – to remake 
the Old World in the image of the New World, to institute American-style democracy, to foster 
federal cooperation along American lines, to grant independence to the colonies – showed a lack 
of understanding for the “complex problems of the Old World.” Yet, “the new President,” de 
Gaulle noted with a hint of approval, “had abandoned the plan of a world harmony and admitted 
that the rivalry between the free world and the Soviet bloc now dominated every other 
international consideration.”240 
Following the elections of October 1945 in which the Communists gained twenty-six 
percent of the French vote, de Gaulle’s resolve to strengthen ties with the United States only 
grew; vice versa, Washington was “genuinely regretful” when he abruptly resigned from office in 
January 1946 because it was concerned he might leave a dangerous vacuum.241 As statesman in 
abeyance, de Gaulle would continue to voice support for the Western alliance. In no uncertain 
terms, he declared sympathy with the Truman doctrine of March 12, 1947, stating that “chez le 
président des États-Unis et chez votre serviteur les mêmes causes ont produit les mêmes 
effets.”242 In the new international predicament, he explained in April 1947, the French had to 
remain who they are: 
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… c’est à dire des Occidentaux, fidèles à une conception de l’homme, de la vie, du droit, des 
rapports entre les États, qui nous a faits tels que nous sommes, à laquelle ont toujours tenu notre 
influence et notre rayonnement et qu´il nous faut défendre et faire valoir dans le tumulte du 
monde, pour servir et pour survivre.243 
 
What is more, he declared that France and the United States were tied by an unbreakable 
moral bond (“une sort de lien moral vraiment exceptionnel, qu’aucune vicissitude n’a pu 
rompre”): 
 
… chaque fois que, dans le monde, la justice se trouve blessée, une sourde alarme s’éveille à la 
fois dans les consciences françaises et dans les consciences américaines et que nos deux 
démocraties y ont toujours trouvé la même et puissant résonance quand elles ont eu à défendre la 
liberté menacée.244 
 
De Gaulle in fact expressed fervent support for most American initiatives during the early 
Cold War years. He called the Marshall Plan, including its demand for European cooperation, “une 
initiative clairvoyante,” calling the American largesse vis-à-vis Europe possibly the salvation of the 
world (“le salut du monde”).245 In April 1948, de Gaulle pressed for a security alliance – “sous forme 
de garantie réciproque” – with the United States in order to offset the menacing power of the Soviet 
Union – hence giving his blessing to secret talks already underway.246 So when the North Atlantic 
Treaty was signed in April 1949, he reacted favorably to assembled journalists: 
 
Le Pacte Atlantique […] est à mon avis une très heureuse et très importante manifestation 
d’intentions. De la part des puissances de l’Europe occidentale, en particulier de la part de la 
France, il est très naturel qu’un pareil pacte soit signé. La France sait à quel point il lui serait 
nécessaire d’être aidée par l’Amérique, si elle-même était attaquée ainsi que la liberté. 
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De Gaulle emphasized that France would equally rush to the defense of the United States if it were 
to be attacked first  – “on ne sait jamais!” – and saluted the Americans for resisting “les tendances 
classiques qui les portent vers l’isolationnisme.” 247 Interestingly, given his later antipathy towards 
NATO and its system of integrated defense, he pressed for detailed and practical arrangements 
for the provision of American assistance and underscored that the signatory nations “assument 
en commun cette défense […] d’une manière claire et effective.”248 Like many Frenchmen of the 
day, de Gaulle was concerned by the absence of an automatic assistance clause in Article V of the 
treaty as a result of the American Senate’s reserve, which created the possibility that the Anglo-
Saxons would once again leave France largely to its own devices in case of an invasion. In the 
early years of the alliance, de Gaulle thus joined those who called for substantial American forces 
on the front line as a deterrent and a guarantee for immediate American involvement in a war 
with the Soviet Union. On the day that Eisenhower arrived in Europe to assume his duties as 
NATO’s first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), on January 7, 1951, de Gaulle 
called on the United States to defend Europe –  “Américains, défendez l’Europe!” – and declared 
that “le camp de la liberté ne doit, en aucun cas, à aucun prix, perdre ce que lui reste d’Europe. 
[…] Cela implique, évidemment, que la force américaine soit mise sur pied en vue d’affluer, le cas 
écheant, massivement et sans délai de ce côté-ci des mers.”249 While de Gaulle continued to insist 
that France should play a central role in the defense of the West and stressed that the French 
would have to reserve judgment on the treaty until these practical arrangements were made, “this 
man,” as Lacouture observed, “never forgot that American power was necessary to the freedom 
of the West and that, however enormous their responsibilities, the Americans assumed them with 
wisdom and dignity.”250 
Yet de Gaulle’s choice for alliance with the United States seemed at once categorical and 
ambivalent. He continued to think that the deep involvement of the Americans in the heart of 
Europe was just as perverted as the imposing presence of the Soviets and that the former was 
only justified as the result of an aberrant and therefore transitory international situation wrought 
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by the latter. The fear of either a “horrid war” between the superpowers or a superpower 
condominium – “another Yalta’’ – would continue to mark de Gaulle’s views as well. The Cold 
War made it just as incumbent upon France to seek an alliance with the United States so as to 
safeguard its independence against the crushing pressures emanating from American-Soviet 
rivalry and to build a Europe that could both mitigate the rivalry between the superpowers and 
prevent their collusion. “Placed where she [France] is, in Europe, in Africa, in Asia, oriented 
traditionally at the same time toward the West and toward the East, she can be and wants to be a 
link and, under no condition, a pawn,” de Gaulle declared to the Constituent Assembly on 
November 23, 1945.251 And in his Strasbourg speech of April 7, 1947, in which he announced the 
establishment of the Rassemblement du Peuple Français, he said: 
 
Notre planète […] présente deux masses énormes, toutes deux portées à l’expansion, mais 
entraînées par des dispositions essentiellement différentes et, du même coup, par des courantes 
idéologiques opposés. L’Amérique et la Russie, si on a le droit d’espérer qu’elles ne deviendront 
pas ennemies, sont automatiquement rivales. […] placés là ou nous le sommes, le maintien de 
notre indépendance devient pour nous le problème brûlant et capital. […] Il implique, en même 
temps, que nous nous appliquions à refaire l’Europe, afin qu’existe, à côté des deux masses 
d’aujourd’hui, l’élément d’équilibre sans le lequel le monde de demain pourrait peut-être subsister 
sous le régime haletant des modus vivendi, mais non point respirer et fleurir dans la paix.252 
 
This inclination to occupy a halfway position in the Cold War was not only engendered 
by de Gaulle’s foreign policy views. Just as importantly, it reflected the domestic political scene in 
France and de Gaulle’s worry that the Cold War was undermining his dream of national unity. In 
his Bayeux speech of 1946, having spoken of “our ancient Gallic propensity for divisions and 
quarrels,” de Gaulle observed that “the present world situation, in which the powers between 
whom we are placed confront each other behind opposing ideologies, adds a disturbingly 
passionate factor to our political struggles.”253 And when de Gaulle declared that France wanted 
to be a “link,” not a “pawn,” Le Monde observed that “he is defining at the same time national 
aspirations and the present possibilities of French policy. No one in France desires a choice 
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between the East and the West, a choice which would aggravate certain internal and foreign 
dissensions.”254  
It is important to call to mind that there was indeed a strong neutralist opinion in France, a 
desire to be the “hyphen” between East and West, and that consecutive French governments had to 
take this into account.255 Substantial segments of French – and European – public opinion to the 
left and to the right moreover remained critical about the American way of life, which found its 
way to Europe through the Marshall Plan and the commercial activities of American business. 
The rise in living standards was welcomed and American cultural and other products were often 
popular, but there was also a strong desire to protect French society and culture against 
American-style capitalism – a desire not to be overwhelmed by America.256 The anti-communist 
scare in the United States during the 1950s, epitomized by Senator Joseph McCarthy’s anti-
communist witch-hunt and the trial of the Rosenbergs, and the racist treatment of black 
Americans in the American South further damaged the image many Frenchmen held of the 
United States. Worried about the consequences of rising anti-Americanism, the United States 
engineered a campaign to influence French public opinion, but negative attitudes persisted and 
American diplomats reported that “American prestige […], particularly in influential non-communist 
intellectual circles, has dropped to the lowest point we can remember.”257 The decolonization issue 
also furnished a constant source of terse disagreement between France and the United States, 
with Franco-American differences of view about the world beyond Europe culminating in the 
Suez crisis of 1956. While there was genuine gratitude for the American war effort and its 
generous postwar assistance, French opinion was thus never sold on the idea of an Atlantic 
community, and the dismissive attitude was stronger in France than in most other countries. “We 
and the Americans want to start building up an Atlantic Community which includes but 
transcends Western Europe,” a British diplomat recorded in his private diary in 1950, “while the 
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French still hanker after a European solution in which the only American function is to produce 
military and other aid.”258 
As for de Gaulle, he seemed to have genuinely believed that history had given ample 
evidence of a fundamental solidarity between the United States and France. This solidarity, he 
declared in one of his press conferences as president of the Fifth Republic, “has existed for close 
on 200 years as an outstanding psychological reality in keeping with the nature of the two 
countries” and it was evidenced by the fact that “among all world powers France is the only one, 
with the exception, I should say, of Russia, with which the United States never exchanged a single 
cannon shot, while it is the only power without exception which fought at its side in three wars – 
the War of Independence and the First and Second World Wars – under conditions forever 
unforgettable.” He also never wavered from his conviction that the Atlantic alliance remained a 
sine qua non of French security as long as the Soviet Union held on to its iron grip on Central and 
Eastern Europe:  
 
Indeed, so long as the free world is faced with the Soviet bloc, which is capable of suddenly 
submerging this or that territory, and which is moved by a dominating and detestable ideology, it 
will be essential that the peoples on both sides of the ocean, if they wish to defend themselves, be 
linked together to do so.259 
 
De Gaulle furthermore acknowledged that France and the United States in the final 
analysis belonged to the same Europe-grown Western civilization, for in his seminal Oxford 
speech of 1941 he had declared: 
 
This civilization, born in Western Europe, has weathered many storms. […] But so far, it has 
always managed to retain sufficient internal vitality, sufficient power of attraction, to enable it to 
finally carry the day. More than that, it has moved like a conqueror through the world, gaining 
vast regions, much to their advantage. So saturated has America become with this civilization of 
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ours that it may truthfully be said to have reached its fullest expressions beyond the Atlantic. It 
has penetrated Asia, Africa, and Oceania. As a result, first of colonization and then of the gradual 
emancipation of innumerable peoples, the moment was fast approaching when all the inhabitants 
of the earth would have recognized the same high principles and been clothed in the same 
dignity.260 
 
But de Gaulle never supported the vision of an Atlantic community. For this, de Gaulle’s 
attachment to his triptych – France, the nation-state, Europe – was simply too deeply entrenched. 
While he judged strong transatlantic ties necessary given the Soviet menace, he never came to 
view the United States as an intrinsically ‘European’ power. From his perspective, the Atlantic 
community idea was at odds with his objective of a ‘European’ Europe – the creation of a self-
sufficient equilibrium between the states and the peoples that inhabited the European 
geographical space. And its popularization was an attempt to rationalize or, worse yet, transform 
ties arising from temporary necessity into permanent institutional bonds that would submerge 
French power and identity in a larger entity dominated by the United States. 
In addition, while de Gaulle was a proponent – perhaps even an exponent – of Franco-
American solidarity, he did not think that the French and the Americans belonged to the same 
‘community’ as a fellowship of interests, least of all a community affecting the identity of the 
participants and their degree of adhesion. Nor did de Gaulle believe that transatlantic security 
was indivisible, as was often asserted in the context of the Atlantic alliance. His doubts about the 
value of the American security guarantee were buttressed by his reading of the United States’ late 
war entries in 1917 and 1941, after having been attacked first, and by the flexible wording of 
Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty at the Senate’s insistence. These doubts were further 
enhanced by the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons shortly after the signing of the Treaty. For 
a few months after the first Soviet atomic explosion in July 1949, de Gaulle remarked that “le 
Pacte [Atlantique], dans son contenu et sous sa forme actuels, perdrait, pour l’Europe, une grande 
partie de son efficacité. En tout cas, la nation doit être prévenue que rien n’oblige, ni ne prépare, 
les Etats-Unis à participer largement à la défense directe et immédiate de notre continent.”261 
As importantly, de Gaulle objected almost from the outset to the extensive military 
organization that was being built on top of the Treaty after General Eisenhower’s arrival as 
NATO’s first SACEUR in January 1951. De Gaulle objected to a security system in which, as he 
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wrote in his memoirs, “an American generalissimo with headquarters near Versailles exercised 
over the old world the military authority of the new.”262 He had rather hoped that the United 
States would be prepared to help restore France’s political and military power on the European 
continent in the spirit of the Truman Doctrine and under the banner of the North Atlantic 
Treaty. However, instead of assisting France to become the military stronghold in Western 
Europe vis-à-vis the Soviet menace, the United States sought to maintain control of the 
European allies through NATO’s integrated military command system and gave priority to 
paving the way for German rearmament. Washington moreover refrained from fully supporting 
French policies in Indochina and Africa.  
As a result, de Gaulle turned into an early critic of NATO. He publicly called for a 
“reorganization” of the Atlantic alliance for the first time on March 10, 1952. These comments 
actually prefigured his September 1958 memorandum proposal for a global security organization 
(see chapter three), as he posited that the alliance should be given global coverage in order to 
respond to the increasingly global communist threat. He also sought to prevent the institution of 
an American-German axis “under the cover of the Atlantic Pact and the European army,” 
presaging the Franco-German Treaty of Reconciliation of January 1963 (“un accord direct entre 
la France et l’Allemagne à la fois sur les sujets qui les ont toujours divisées”).263  
Most importantly, de Gaulle stressed in December 1954, “le système appelé l’OTAN” 
amounted to the abandonment of the sovereignty and the spirit of the nation: 
 
Elle [France] place ses armées, ses bases, ses communications, directement sous une autorité qui 
n’est pas la sienne. Elle est dans une situation de dépendance qui met, en fait, sous contrôle 
étranger toute action militaire et, par extension, toute action politique qu’elle entreprend dans des 
territoires qui lui sont, pourtant, rattachés […] Elle laisse à d’autres le monopole des armes 
atomiques sans lesquelles un État ne peut être que subordonné. […] Si ces conditions n’étaient 
pas, de fond en comble, révisées, comment intéresser la nation à sa propre sécurité et, par suite, à 
son propre destin?264 
 
It is for this reason that, in July 1957, de Gaulle confided to Cyrus Sulzberger of the New York 
Times that he wanted NATO “seriously modified”: 
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As it is, the alliance is completely unsatisfactory. America has taken everything. America has taken 
all the commands. America has all the responsibility. And America provides all the force. This is 
not sensible for an alliance. Look at Russia, Russia’s satellites have proven valueless. I would insist 
upon a repartition of the responsibility and the authority of the alliance. The alliance must be 
something spiritual as well as physical. And it cannot be spiritually viable unless there is some sort 
of shake up.265 
 
In February 1958, in addition, only months before his return to power, he gave a preview of 
things to come:  
 
I would quit NATO if I were running France. NATO is against our independence and our 
interest. Our membership in NATO is said to be for the reason of protecting France against a 
Russian attack. But I don’t believe that the Russians will attack at this time [...]. NATO is no 
longer an alliance. It is a subordination. [...] After France has regained her independence, perhaps 
she will be linked with the Western countries in formal alliances [...]. But we cannot accept a 
superior, like the United States, to be responsible for us.266  
 
* * * 
 
For almost eleven years following his return to the helm in May 1958, de Gaulle’s vision would 
be France’s vision. During these years, his dedication to France and the primacy accorded to the 
nation-state would continue to be the salient features of his policy. But de Gaulle was much more 
than a French nationalist whose sole preoccupation was the protection of the French national 
interest or the amplification of his nation’s glory. He was a strategic thinker of unusual acumen, 
one who actively sought to use French influence to resolve the outstanding political issues of the 
day. “Perhaps the most striking and authentic feature of this Gaullist grand design was the 
considerable feat of uniting an attractive and often logical view of the emerging international 
order with a pivotal role for France,” Michael Harrison has reasonably judged. “The coincidence 
of French national interest with a transformed global system and a revised East-West settlement 
in Europe brought French diplomacy unprecedented attention in the 1960s and gave it a 
universal appeal unmatched in the postwar era.”267 
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De Gaulle defined a response to the European ‘question’ that had been posed by a 
history of continental conflict. This response was inevitably different from the American one as it 
was informed above all by French history and by de Gaulle’s singular determination to reinstate 
France as a great power. De Gaulle’s European ‘question’ was also different from the one that 
had vexed American foreign policy. What Americans tended to define broadly as the ‘European’ 
question posed by chronic and internecine war, was to de Gaulle – as to most Frenchmen – 
above all the ‘German’ question, which, as World War II drew to a close, increasingly became 
overshadowed – albeit not entirely substituted – by the emergence of the two superpowers. De 
Gaulle’s European ‘question’ might therefore be formulated as follows: How to safeguard French 
security and influence in a Europe susceptible to German domination and to maintain a measure 
of independence and freedom of action vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as well as the United States?  
In addition, resolving this question was in de Gaulle’s analysis a European matter. The 
nation-states of Europe would have to find a modus vivendi among themselves if continental peace 
was to endure. When de Gaulle talked of European unity, he either referred to this continental 
modus vivendi defined by the equilibrium between these nation-states or, in a narrower sense, to the 
ensemble of Western European nations headed by France. In his view, the resurgence of 
‘Europe’ hinged on strengthening the position of France as the leader of the Western European 
grouping of states vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the United States; in this grouping, moreover, 
France, not Germany, would have to be the dominant nation-state (at least in military and 
political matters). France distinguished itself from the other great powers, de Gaulle stressed, 
because it had “no ambition of extending ourselves beyond the soil where we are sovereign; 
because our present frontiers are sufficient for us as they are [unlike the Germans]; because we 
presume neither to convert nor to dominate anyone, either ideologically, politically, or 
economically [unlike the Americans or the Russians].”268 
In de Gaulle’s European equilibrium, the Anglo-Saxons would play a largely subsidiary 
role. There was, in de Gaulle’s view, no question that France had to side with the democratic 
powers of the West as long as there existed the threat of Soviet domination. In this regard, 
France under de Gaulle would be as steadfast an ally as the United States could have hoped for. 
But de Gaulle had no interest in being swallowed up in an evolving Atlantic community 
dominated by the Americans. In his vision of the European equilibrium “from the Atlantic to the 
Urals,” the United States would be requested to take a backseat. De Gaulle’s policy of 
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independence and grandeur would do much to restore French self-awareness in a world in which 
France could no longer count on being in the first rank by force of numbers. This policy, 
however, inevitably set France on a course of conflict with its much more powerful American ally. 
“My only international rival is Tintin!” de Gaulle quipped to André Malraux towards the end of 
his life. “We are the little fellows who refuse to get taken by the big ones. No one sees this, 
because of my height.”269 
                                                 
269 Malraux, Felled Oaks, 33. 
 
Chapter Two 
The Atlantic “Community” in American Foreign Policy: An 
Ambiguous Approach to the Cold War Alliance1 
 
 
One of this study’s contentions is that the American experience with de Gaulle from 1958 to 
1969 must be understood in the context of the history of American foreign policy and of 
American views of Europe and the transatlantic relationship. This chapter is devoted to analyzing 
this context. It does not, therefore, focus on the historical context of the bilateral Franco-
American relationship. 
It is important to understand that American policymakers on the whole had little 
understanding of – and patience for – the postwar resilience of national perspectives in Europe. 
As geographic outsiders, Americans rather considered Europe as a whole rather than as divided 
into national societies; or, as Stanley Hoffmann put it, as “a basket of eels, perhaps, but one 
basket all the same.” 2  European-style nationalism as a political creed had moreover been 
discredited because of the sequence of wars that had emanated from the rivalry between 
European powers. Against this background, American policymakers were inclined to advise to 
Europe what had worked so well for the United States: to begin modes of cooperation that 
would rise above the level of individual states and move beyond the principle of national 
sovereignty. American reactions to de Gaulle’s policy of national independence and grandeur 
were predetermined by considerations of this nature rather than by historical experiences in the 
bilateral realm. De Gaulle’s defiance of American leadership within the Western alliance was 
moreover not only a challenge to American control over European affairs, but this defiance also 
chipped away at the Atlanticist ideology that was a derivative of the Cold War. 
This chapter will, first of all, proceed from the notion that the American experience with 
de Gaulle was prejudiced by the interplay between two main political traditions in American 
foreign policy, by the New World’s ambivalence toward the Old World, and by a gradual 
transformation in America’s geopolitical approaches to the European question from one of 
aloofness to that of engagement. As we shall see, whether Americans condemned or appreciated 
de Gaulle’s foreign policy generally depended on whether their foreign policy outlook was liberal 
or conservative. It will also help to explain why de Gaulle invoked disturbing – if also exaggerated 
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– memories among American policymakers of the ‘old’ Europe tormented by nationalism and 
internecine war. And it will help to make clear that de Gaulle’s foreign policy distressed in 
particular those Americans who favored throwing America’s weight in the scale of intra-
European politics on the side of political and economic integration and reform; those who took a 
more distant view of America’s role in Europe were on the whole less alarmed by this foreign 
policy. 
Secondly, this chapter will analyze the views and the expectations that American 
policymakers entertained about the transatlantic relationship in the 1950s and 1960s. Their  
reactions to de Gaulle’s policies vis-à-vis the Western alliance were biased by the way in which 
American policymakers themselves looked at this transatlantic relationship. It will in particular 
dissect the notion that the Western alliance was evolving into an ever closer Atlantic community. 
An analysis of the notion of the Atlantic community would, finally, be incomplete without an 
examination of its diplomatic utility. The idea would not have been so pervasive among 
Americans if it did not further the chief objectives of American foreign policy in the context of 
the Cold War. 
American Foreign Policy Towards Europe: An Interpretive Framework 
On Liberalism and Conservatism in American Foreign Policy 
American foreign policy has been shaped from the outset by the interplay of the two mainstream 
traditions in American politics: liberalism and conservatism.3 In essence, the older conservative 
                                                 
3 For the initial idea of distinguishing between a conservative and a liberal tradition in American foreign policy, I am 
indebted to Professor John L. Harper of the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Studies. The idea of distinguishing between these traditions is, in addition, a variation on the writings of 
the British historian Edward Hallett Carr and his American counterpart Arthur M. Schlesinger on the eve of World 
War II. Carr earned fame with his distinction between ‘utopians’ and ‘realists’ in The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 
(London: Macmillan, 1939), which spurred the ‘realist-idealist debate’ running through the study of international 
relations in the 1940s and 1950s (particularly in the United States). In the same year as the publication of Carr’s 
analysis, Schlesinger issued an influential article in Yale Review (December 1939) entitled “Tides of American 
Politics,” contending that American history had followed a wave pattern of eleven alternating periods of either liberal 
or conservative dominance in domestic politics. In Schlesinger’s view, conservative periods were marked by a 
“concern for the rights of the few,” an emphasis on the “welfare of property,” and “inaction” on the part of the 
government; liberal periods reflected a “concern for the wrongs of the many,” an “emphasis on human welfare,” and 
governmental activism. His son Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. redefined his father’s thesis by setting out his idea that 
American politics is characterized by cyclical rhythms shifting “between public purpose and private interest.” Arthur 
M. Schlesinger Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), 27.  Relevant, too, is the influential 
work of Felix Gilbert, who wrote that America’s attitude toward the world was shaped by “the tension between 
Idealism and Realism […] and her great moments have occurred when both were combined.” Gilbert, The Beginnings 
of American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1965). The first attempt at uncovering cyclical patterns in American 
politics, to be sure, was undertaken by Henry Adams; see “Rule of Phase Applied to History” in: Henry Adams and 
Brooks Adams, ed., The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma (1919). Adams postulated a “pendulum” model with a 
period of twelve years in which American politics alternated between periods of “diffuse” and “centralized” power. 
For an entirely different, mathemical approach to alternating phases in American politics, using differential 




tradition derived its intellectual provenance from the emergence in the seventeenth century of the 
national state and the ensuing notion of the reason of state (raison d’État) whereas the liberal 
tradition is informed by the eighteenth century progressive idealism of the Enlightenment, which 
places a premium on considerations of morality and the rights of the individual human being.4  
The appendix to this study provides a schematic survey of the American politicians and 
strategic thinkers to be associated with either tradition. In order to better understand the 
differences between the conservative and the liberal traditions in the context of American politics, 
we will briefly examine the views of the two founding fathers of American foreign policy: 
Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) and Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804). Before we do so, however, 
it is instructive to consider the disparate philosophical precepts of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) 
and John Locke (1632-1704). Of all thinkers who have contributed to the dogmas of American 
foreign policy, their contributions have arguably been the most clearly recognizable. 
 
 * * * 
 
Thomas Hobbes built his entire moral and political philosophy on the principle of self-
preservation. In Leviathan (1651) he notoriously described the life of man as “solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short.” Rather than living sociably, “men are continually in competition” and always 
at risk of falling victim to “their own impetuous desires, rashness, or indiscretion.”5 The natural 
state of society is, by extension, anarchic and warlike. Hobbes therefore stressed the need for a 
formidable state – as awe-inspiring as the terrifying biblical sea monster – and the exercise of 
absolute sovereignty in order to maintain peace. There is in Hobbes’ view no moral law to speak 
of. The only moral obligation men have is to themselves. Hobbes’ bleak conception of man and 
his environment did not mean that the interaction between sovereign states was necessarily 
characterized by war; since self-preservation is best guaranteed when there is peace, “all men 
agree on this, that Peace is Good.”6 But the natural state of affairs between sovereign states, 
                                                                                                                                                      
equations, see Daniel Barclay, “Cyclical Behavior and Ideological Change in American Politics,” Michigan Journal of 
Political Science, Volume II: Issue iii, Fall 2004: 4-38. 
4 The idea of reason of state dates back to early sixteenth-century Italy, where it was developed into a coherent 
political philosophy by Niccoló Machiavelli (although Archbishop Giovanni della Casa was the first to put the notion 
into words as ragion di stato). Reason-of-state thinking is characterized by putting the well-being of the state over 
individual considerations of morality or of ideological affinity. See, e.g., Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine 
of Raison d’Etat and Its Place in Modern History (New Haven, 1957). Although the first political expression of the 
Enlightenment was that of the enlightened despotism of the likes of Frederick the Great of Prussia and the Russian 
empress Catherina the Great, it is more typically represented by ideas about democratic accountability and the 
diminution of centralized state power, such as John Locke’s defense of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s volonté generale (general will) or Montesquieu’s trias politica. 
5 Hobbes, Leviathan, 84, 113. 
6 Johann P. Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context (London: Macmillan, 1992), 29. The quote 
is from Leviathan, chapter 15. 




Hobbes reasoned, is inherently one of the jealous protection of interests. “The law of nations and 
the law of nature is the same thing,” he posited, and “every sovereign has the same right, in 
securing the safety of his people that any particular man can have in securing the safety of his 
own body.” 7  The relationship between states is hence not governed by law or morality but 
marked by a struggle for power. Since Hobbes did not extend his logic as far as advocating a 
world government – a Leviathan amongst Leviathans – as the panacea, his ideas have been taken 
to support the concept of a balance of power as the system most likely to provide international 
peace and stability.8 
John Locke’s benevolent view of human nature gave cause to a more optimistic view of 
the world than Hobbes’. Since man was in large measure a product of his environment and his 
own innate capability for reason, mankind as a whole could be brought to a more advanced state. 
Locke developed his views on human nature and politics to a large degree in response to those of 
Hobbes.9 He acknowledged the human instinct for self-preservation, but in his opinion this 
instinct does not necessarily turn men into predators when left to their own devices. On the 
contrary, the instinct for self-preservation induces them to be sociable and to strive for and 
sustain a society in which they desire to live – a society in which self-preservation is inherently 
guaranteed: one’s interests lie in procuring the most benefits for the most people, not in a 
survival of the fittest.10 The idea that men are eminently capable of reason was central to Locke’s 
understanding of human nature. Although Locke rejected the idea of innate principles, he 
criticized the “Hobbist” for disregarding “a great many plain duties of morality.” He accepted the 
possibility of a rational demonstration of moral principles.11 As a result of the rational and moral 
behavior on the part of men, Locke reasoned, society naturally tended towards harmony. Locke’s 
perspective on human nature was closely tied to his political ideas. The preservation of civil peace 
and general well-being necessitated the establishment of government. But Locke, unlike Hobbes, 
firmly entrenched sovereignty in the individuals who make up the state. His Two Treatises on 
Government (1690) made the case for limited, representative government. The absence of popular 
consent, Locke wrote in a barely disguised reference to Hobbes, “would make the mighty 
                                                 
7 Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes, 37. 
8  The idea of a balance of power is commonly believed to be first noted by Thucydides in his History of the 
Peloponnesian War, which analyzed the relationship between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century B.C. in these terms. 
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See Rogow, Thomas Hobbes, 79; Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach,” World 
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9 See Ian Harris, The Mind of John Locke: A Study of Political Theory in Its Intellectual Setting (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 4, 93-4., 101, 105-6, passim. 
10 On Locke’s position vis-à-vis self-preservation, see Harris, The Mind of John Locke, 38-9, 99-100, 106, 217-23. 
11 Harris, The Mind of John Locke, 94. Locke criticized Hobbes’ Leviathan because it disregarded all notions of morality 
beyond self-preservation: “of the gratitude of mankind to their Creator, there is deep silence.” 




leviathan of a shorter duration than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was 
born in.” 12  The individual had unalienable rights, Locke argued, and these rights had to be 
secured against the power of the state. He regarded any attempt to gain absolute power as 
unlawful, leading to the most revolutionary of his axioms. “Whenever the legislators endeavor to 
take away and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary 
power,” Locke reasoned, “they put themselves into a state of war with the people who are 
thereupon absolved from any further obedience […].”13  
Of the two, Locke’s influence on American foreign policy undoubtedly has been the 
more pronounced.14 His political philosophy helped to justify the American Revolution (as well 
as the Glorious Revolution of 1688); it laid the foundation for the liberal inclination to regard the 
American Republic as a political and social experiment based on unalienable individual rights. But 
Hobbes, too, left an indelible mark on American political thought. Although his plea for 
irrevocable authority in the hands of the sovereign went unheeded, Hobbes’ emphasis on 
ensuring the security of the people is reflected in calls for a strong state – a state whose focus is 
on imposing law and order on a society otherwise thought to be rife with violence and on 
protecting American interests in an essentially unfriendly international environment. Hobbes has 
been the philosopher of choice within the realist school in political science, which rose to 
prominence along with the emergence of the United States as a great power,15 and his more 
dismal world view has resonated particularly with hard-nosed practitioners of foreign policy 
throughout. Both the Lockean theme of promoting individual liberty and reason and the 
Hobbesian preoccupation with safeguarding state power and the national interest in an inherently 
dangerous world have made important contributions to American foreign policy.16 
 
 * * * 
                                                 
12 Ibidem, 131-2. 
13 Of Civil Government, as reprinted in Charles Hirschfeld and Edgar E. Knoebel, Classics of Western Thought:The Modern 
World (3rd ed.) (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1980), 136. 
14 See, e.g., Roger D. Masters, “The Lockean Tradition in American Foreign Policy,” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 
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of departure for thinking about international relations. See, e.g., Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a 
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Heritage (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1979). 
16 For a more detailed analysis, see Reyn, Allies or Aliens?, 25-31. 




Traversing from the world of English philosophers to that of American politics, one can see 
traces of Lockean and Hobbesian thought as early as among the founding fathers – and of these, 
Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton most clearly represented the diverging perspectives 
on the newly born republic and its place in the world. Their vehement political debate in the late 
eighteenth century was at least in part a reflection of the philosophical debate between the two 
English thinkers one century earlier.  
Jefferson was as much a prodigy of the Enlightenment as any one in the budding 
Republic. Indeed, he told Hamilton that he considered Locke “one of the three greatest men the 
world has ever produced.”17 Locke’s allegiance to the natural rights of the individual certainly left 
an indelible mark on the Declaration of Independence (1776), which Jefferson authored and 
became the most revered document in American history together with the Constitution. Jefferson 
strongly believed that the birth of the American republic, by breaking with the European 
monarchical mould, was holding out a mythical promise to the world. He was in Paris as minister 
to France when the Constitutional Convention was called in 1787 to replace the Articles of 
Confederation with a stronger federal government. Jefferson was pleased inter alia by the 
separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches in the new 
constitution – an idea that had been borrowed from the French philosopher Montesquieu. Yet he 
was much less enamored by the absence of a bill of rights – to which “the people are entitled to 
against every government on earth” – and by the possibility to re-elect the president, which he 
thought was likely to turn him into an “officer for life.” Jefferson was prepared to accept the 
Constitution once supported by “the will of the Majority,” but not without expressing the hope 
that “they will amend it whenever they shall find it wrong.”18 He also continued to believe that 
the people were entitled to rise up against the state if it was no longer representing their interests. 
He had, as a consequence, not been as alarmed as others, including Hamilton, by the protest 
marches of destitute farmers and former soldiers throughout western Massachusetts known as 
Shays’ rebellion. “God forbid we should ever be 20 years without such a rebellion,” Jefferson 
confessed in a letter to a friend in November 1789. “What country can preserve it’s [sic] liberties 
if their rulers are not warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of resistance? 
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[…] The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and 
tyrants.”19 
Hamilton’s connection to Hobbes is less well documented, although there is sufficient 
evidence that he read his works.20 Yet in his unfailing advocacy of a strong state, both vis-à-vis its 
citizens and other states, he frequently adhered to Hobbesian logic. At the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787, for instance, Hamilton characteristically proposed a more powerful central 
government than had been envisioned in the plans put forward by Virginia and New Jersey. As 
long as the states held on to their sovereignty, he argued, there could be no effective central 
government – and such a government was in his view required both to protect the republic 
against foreign rivals and to secure domestic peace.21 While declaring himself prepared “to go the 
full length of republican principles,” he was not hopeful that they would provide the answer. He 
rather urged the Constitutional Convention to follow the elitist example of the British monarchy 
(albeit in republican form): 
 
I believe the British government forms the best model the world ever produced […]. This 
government has for its object public strength and individual security. It is said with us to be 
unattainable. If it was once formed it would maintain itself. All communities divide themselves 
into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well born, the other the mass of the people. 
The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim 
has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they 
seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct, permanent share in 
the government. They will check the unsteadiness of the second, and as they cannot receive any 
advantage by a change, they therefore will ever maintain good government. Can a democratic 
                                                                                                                                                      
(amendment XXII, 1951).  
19 As quoted in: Cunningham, Jefferson vs. Hamilton, 16. 
20 Chernow, Hamilton, 52, 110. The one thinker more explicitly associated with Hamilton than Hobbes is the Swiss 
Emmerich de Vattel, whose The Law of the Nations (1758) was widely read at the time. See, in particular, John L. 
Harper, American Machiavelli: Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 26-28. Vattel’s emphasis in The Law of Nations on a nation’s obligation to “perform the duty of self-
preservation” and “to preserve all its members” (book I, chapter two), however, are also reminiscent of Hobbes’ 
ideas about self-preservation. Harper, on the other hand, suggests that Hamilton was also influenced by Machiavelli’s 
reason-of-state thinking, albeit through the works of others. (28) On Vattel’s influence on America’s founding 
fathers, see Robert Trout, “Life, Liberty, and The Pursuit of Happiness,” Fidelio Magazine, Vol . VI No.1 , Spring, 
1997. 
21 Hamilton supported a strong federal army and lamented the fact that “the present confederation […] can raise no 
troops nor equip vessels before war is actually declared” and “cannot therefore take any preparatory measure before 
an enemy is at your door.” What is more, he considered a strong federal army necessary for preventing war among 
the states and this for maintaining unity. He had, in addition, supported the crackdown of the Shays’ “rebellion” by a 
Massachusetts expeditionary force. “A certain portion of military force is absolutely necessary in large communities.” 
From notes taken by Robert Yates and James Madison at the Convention on June 18, 1787, as reprinted in: 
Cunningham, Jefferson vs. Hamilton, 17-21. 




assembly, who annually revolve in the mass of the people, be supposed steadily to pursue the 
public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy. […] See 
the excellency of the British executive. He is placed above temptation. He can have no distinct 
interests from the public welfare. Nothing short of such an executive can be efficient. […] And let 
me observe, that an executive is less dangerous to the liberties of the people when in office during 
life, than for seven years … .22 
 
Hobbes would undoubtedly have nodded in approval. In The Federalist Papers (1787), too, 
Hamilton followed essentially Hobbesian logic in urging ratification of the new Constitution. 
Defending the authority of the federal government over foreign affairs, he stated that any policy 
must be rooted in the fact that “men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious” and that conflict is 
a fact of life in world affairs. He also denied the popular contention that democracies or 
commercial nations were less inclined to engage in war than monarchies. “There have been […] 
as many popular as royal wars.” To believe otherwise, he censured, is to believe in “Utopian 
speculations.” Hamilton moreover rejected the idea – “the deceitful dream of a golden age” – 
that the new American republic was somehow exceptional. “Have we not already seen enough of 
the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused us with promises of an 
exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses, and evils incident to society in every shape?” 
Following the ratification of the Constitution, the policies of the United States, he warned, 
should not be guided by the delusion that it constituted “the happy empire of perfect wisdom 
and perfect virtue.” 23 Hamilton’s view of the new republic was thus much less exalted – or 
experimental – than that of his political nemesis. “Unlike Jefferson,” Chernow wrote, “Hamilton 
never saw the creation of America as a magical leap across a chasm to an entirely new landscape, 
and he always thought the New World had much to learn from the Old.”24 
It was in shaping the new nation that Jefferson and Hamilton found themselves most 
directly at odds – the former serving as George Washington’s secretary of state until December 
1793, the latter as secretary of the treasury until January 1795.25 By 1792, their rivalry resulted in 
the formation of America’s first political parties, under the banners of Jeffersonian 
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Republicanism and Hamiltonian Federalism. It furthermore made itself felt in the realm of 
foreign policy on various occasions. 
Hamilton first of all disapproved of Jefferson’s conduct of foreign affairs because he 
considered it too tainted by the latter’s ideological sympathy for the French Revolutionary cause 
and by an irrational antipathy toward the British.26 What is more, the secretary of the treasury did 
not shrink from interfering in foreign policy matters to avoid a confrontation with the British. In 
the summer of 1790, for instance, Hamilton acted behind Jefferson’s back to avert a conflict with 
Great Britain in the Nootka Sound crisis between Great Britain and Spain. In the absence of 
formal British diplomatic representation in the United States, he made informal contact with 
George Beckwith, an aide to the British governor-general of Canada. Hamilton reported on his 
conversation to Washington and Jefferson, but Beckwith’s report to his superior showed him far 
more conciliatory to Great Britain than either Hamilton’s own report or official American policy. 
Hamilton in fact put the perspective of a strategic partnership between the United States and 
Great Britain on offer.27 The Hamilton-Beckwith link was the first such link in a long history of 
close personal ties between Americans and British at the highest political level. 
Hamilton also differed with Jefferson on the nature of international relations and the 
value of treaties. This became particularly clear at the outset of George Washington’s second 
term, when England, Spain, Holland, and other European nations joined the war coalition against 
France in February 1793. As Paris prepared to send Edmond Charles Genêt – “Citizen Genêt” –
to the United States and appeal to the treaty that the two countries had concluded in 1778 against 
England, Washington was compelled to formulate a position. Many looked upon the French 
Revolutionary cause with sympathy and burning moral compassion – and Jefferson was their 
natural leader. Jefferson moreover set high store on the French Revolution’s success because he 
considered the future of the American experiment itself at stake. As he wrote to George Mason 
                                                                                                                                                      
the federal government in the financial and economic realm. 
26 “They have a womanish attachment to France and a womanish resentment against Great Britain,” Hamilton wrote 
to a friend about Jefferson and his associate James Madison. “They would draw us into the closest embrace of the 
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in early 1791, in what may be one of the first expressions of the importance of ideology in 
American foreign policy: 
 
I look with great anxiety for the firm establishment of the new government in France, being 
perfectly convinced that if it takes place there, it will spread sooner or later all over Europe. On 
the contrary, a check there would retard the revival of liberty in other countries. I consider the 
establishment and success of their government as necessary to stay up our own and to prevent it 
from falling back to that kind of Halfway-house, the English constitution.28 
 
So when, in the spring of 1793, the question was raised whether the treaty of alliance with France 
was valid, Jefferson was much inclined to say it was (even though the United States was hardly in 
the position to provide active military assistance). 
Hamilton, on the other hand, had harbored little sympathy for the stampede of the 
masses in Paris and other French cities and was repulsed by – and found no justification for – the 
violence which the French Revolution brought along. 29  Fearing the consequences of any 
involvement in the European war, he saw in the beheading of Louis XVI an opportunity to sever 
the French connection. Hamilton argued to the cabinet that the treaty with France was no longer 
binding because it had been concluded with the French monarchy, not with its revolutionary 
government. Jefferson’s response showed his commitment to the principled conduct of foreign 
affairs. The secretary of state argued that in the final analysis the foreign policies of the United 
States should be governed by its moral obligations. A treaty between countries could not be 
declared void because of a change in government, since a treaty was not concluded between 
governments but between nations and, by implication, between the people who are “the source 
of all authority in that nation.” In Jefferson’s view, “compacts […] between nation and nation are 
obligatory on them by the same moral law which obliges individuals to observe their compacts.” 
He furthermore censured Hamilton’s viewpoint that the alliance with France had become 
“disagreeable” because of the change from monarchy to republic. If anything, this had 
strengthened the case for upholding the treaty, since France had parted with “ancient despotism” 
and “prepares a form of Republic extremely free.” Jefferson ingenuously argued that renouncing 
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the treaty would in itself constitute a breach of the neutrality Hamilton was seeking and give “just 
cause of war to France.”30 
The debate in the cabinet ended in a compromise of sorts. Hamilton carried the day with 
President Washington, with whom he was on considerably closer terms than Jefferson, with his 
plea for a statement of neutrality.31 Yet, his proposal to suspend the treaty altogether was not 
adopted and American economic aid to France was permitted. In the summer of 1793, Hamilton 
authored a series of brilliant essays defending the administration’s aloofness from the European 
conflict. Under the pseudonym ‘Pacificus,’ he argued that the United States had neither the 
power nor the obligation to come to France’s aid, and that the only obligation it had was to itself. 
Casting its lot with France might well bring destruction upon itself and its trade. “From such a 
contest we are dissuaded by the most cogent motives of self-preservation, no less than of 
interest.” Hamilton rejected the claim that the American Republic ought to support France out of 
gratitude for its support to the American Revolution. French support during the American 
Revolution was no more than “the conduct of a jealous competitor, embracing a most promising 
opportunity to repress the pride and diminish the power of a dangerous rival, by seconding a 
successful resistance to its authority, with the object of lopping off a valuable portion of its 
dominions.” In Hamilton’s view, there is scarcely any room for altruism in the conduct of foreign 
affairs and the moral code of the individual does not apply to the nation: 
 
… An individual may, on numerous occasions, meritoriously indulge the emotions of generosity 
and benevolence, not only without an eye to, but even at the expense of, his own interest. But a 
government can rarely, if at all, be justifiable in pursuing a similar course; and, if it does so, ought 
to confine itself within much stricter bounds. 
 
Hamilton cautioned his countrymen not “to overrate foreign friendships, and to be on our guard 
against foreign attachments.”32 
Jefferson and Hamilton continued to represent diverging approaches to the conduct of 
American foreign policy after they had left Washington’s cabinet. Most importantly, Washington 
turned to Hamilton to write his Farewell Address, which is quintessentially Hamiltonian for its 
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emphasis on commercial interests and military preparedness. The address is most commonly 
known for its exhortation to keep a distance from European politics and to “steer clear of 
permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world,” which would provide a benchmark 
for American foreign policy for more than a century. A close reading of the address reveals it as a 
rebuke of Jeffersonian principles about diplomacy.33 Washington’s caution against “permanent 
alliances” was most of all an admonition against treaties such as the one which the United States 
had concluded with France in 1778, and which had caused such division within his administration. 
Due to Hamilton’s influence on the retiring president, the Farewell Address became a reprimand 
of Jeffersonian foreign policy. 
“The reputations of those who shape the fate of nations become historical forces in 
themselves,” the historian Bernard Bailyn observed in a treatise on America’s founding fathers.34 
This is certainly true for Jefferson and Hamilton. Jefferson stands larger in American history than 
Hamilton, primarily because of his distinctive contribution to the philosophical foundations of 
the American Revolution through the Declaration of Independence and because of his two terms 
as president of the United States (1800-1808). 35  Jefferson’s vision of liberty was also more 
appealing than Hamilton’s sobering realism. In addition, the Virginian had the advantage of 
longevity, since Hamilton was killed in 1804, at the age of forty-seven, in a tragic duel. It is 
nonetheless hard to say who has been the more influential of the two. The Jeffersonian tradition 
of American liberalism is usually seen as having had a more defining influence on the United 
States. Upon having read Hamilton’s plea at the Constitutional Convention for a strong federal 
executive, John Quincy Adams (1767-1848)  wrote that he regarded Hamilton’s conceptions 
superior to the ones that were ultimately adopted, but he also observed that “if Hamilton were 
now living, he would not dare, in an assembly of Americans, even with closed doors, to avow the 
opinions of this speech, or to present such a plan even as speculation.”36 Yet Hamilton’s tireless 
efforts on behalf of a strong federal government did have a lasting impact on the American 
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political model and financial institutions. His writings came to be regarded as among the most 
insightful and coherent in American political history. One can perhaps also discern a touch of 
Hamilton in the twentieth century development of the “imperial presidency,” the transformation 
of the United States from a largely pacific nation into a military superpower, and the emergence 
of the realist approach towards international relations after World War II. Whether one sees the 
United States today as being closer to Jefferson’s empire of liberty or to Hamilton’s military and 
economic powerhouse, is in the eyes of the beholder. 
 
 * * * 
 
The point, however, is not who has exerted the most influence, but to note that there have been 
two distinct American approaches to foreign policy generated by the political forces that were 
most clearly represented in the early years of the American republic by Jefferson and Hamilton. 
Both approaches derived their propositions from domestic analogies concerning the 
interrelationship between individuals and between the individual and the state. A typical 
conservative – or Hamiltonian – American foreign policy, on the one hand, has been 
characterized by a mercantilist desire to protect commercial and industrial interests, an emphasis 
on fiscal responsibility and military preparedness, and a fundamental attachment to national 
autonomy in an essentially hostile environment. It is bound to the concept of the national interest 
and adheres to the logic of power. A typical liberal – or Jeffersonian – foreign policy, on the 
other hand, has been inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment. It revolves around promoting 
democratic values at home and abroad, self-determination, the rule of law, and free trade. Its case 
rests on the creative and persuasive power of moral ideas rather than on the logic of power.  
The interaction between these two political traditions has had a defining influence on 
American political history. Similarly, American foreign policy has been affected by their interplay 
in response to domestic and international developments throughout the history of the United 
States. For their distinctive responses to international circumstances were not only manifest in 
the rivalry between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson in the founding days of the 
Republic. They were also visible in the differences between Theodore Roosevelt (“speak softly, 
but carry a big stick”) and Woodrow Wilson (“make the world safe for democracy”) as the 
United States stepped onto the world stage in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The 
distinction between the two traditions furthermore helps to delineate the differences between 
President Nixon’s foreign policy, whose ‘rediscovery’ of national interests (including those in the 
economic realm) bore a Hamiltonian trademark, and President Jimmy Carter’s decidedly liberal 
emphasis on human rights and international mediation in the context of American history. 




Following the end of the Cold War, the two traditions have been exemplified in particular by 
President Bill Clinton’s liberal emphasis on enlarging the zone of peace and prosperity through 
the promotion of free market democracy to erstwhile enemies and by President George W. 
Bush’s conservative perspective and emphasis on national security in a world fraught with danger.  
Both the liberal and conservative traditions, upon closer inspection, have known an 
internationalist and an isolationist strain. Liberal internationalism assumes that an international 
system that is organized along strictly national lines is bound to foster armed conflict and 
disparity of wealth. The main challenge to liberal internationalists is therefore to reduce the 
centrality of the national state and to make room for an assumed tendency towards harmony on 
the part of every human being. They moreover tend to see the United States as above all a liberal 
superpower and a potential redeemer of the world. Conservative internationalism, by contrast, 
presumes that the system of conflicting national interests cannot be transformed and defines the 
challenge in international politics therefore in terms of handling the system in such a way that 
international stability as well as national security and prosperity are ensured. Conservative 
internationalists may believe in the superiority of the American model. They do not, however, 
think it incumbent on the United States to transform the international system in its own image 
and are hence more tolerant of ideological diversity.  
Just as liberal internationalism differs from conservative internationalism, liberal 
isolationalism must be distinguished from conservative isolationism. Liberal isolationists fear 
involvement abroad in particular for its corruptive effects on American democratic society and 
have traditionally been deeply suspicious of conventional statecraft. Rather than intermingling 
with the world, they have given preference to perfecting the American political and social 
experiment at home with the least outside interference. They believe American influence abroad 
would be engendered by providing a shining example to the world – or as the Puritan John 
Winthrop reminded the first settlers on their way across the Atlantic: “we shall be as a city upon a 
hill [and] the eyes of all people are upon us […]” 37  – rather than by interventive action. 
Conservative isolationists have been equally wary of foreign involvement, but for different 
reasons. Their overriding concern was not for the wholesomeness of American democratic 
society but for the solvency of the nation. Conservative isolationists have been less suspicious of 
conventional statecraft than of ideological crusades. They feared an overextension of American 
resources as a result of an activist foreign policy. The saner approach, they therefore believed, 
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was for the United States to rely on its uniquely advantageous geographic remoteness to the 
world’s areas of conflict in order to stay out of expensive overseas wars. 
Key elements of both traditions have occasionally been united in foreign policy syntheses 
or coalitions. During the 1920s and 1930s, for instance, isolationists from both the liberal and 
conservative political camps conspired to keep America at a distance from the broils of Europe. 
In the same vein, American foreign policy in the early decades of the Cold War can be seen as an 
uneasy yet productive synthesis of liberalism and conservatism precisely in support of an active 
international role that broke with long-standing axioms; this synthesis was embodied by a 
bipartisan foreign policy establishment that included Henry Stimson, George Marshall, Dean 
Acheson, John McCloy, Robert Lovett, Charles Bohlen, John Foster Dulles, and others. And in a 
more recent twist, since the late 1970s ‘neoconservatism’ has similarly provided a foreign policy 
synthesis – albeit no consensus – between conservatism and liberalism. It has explicitly sought to 
reconcile the conservative logic of power with a fervent commitment to spread liberal values, 
first in response to the relative decline of American power in the 1960s and 1970s and then in 
response to the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new age inaugurated by the terrorist 
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.  
American foreign policy is seldom either wholly liberal or wholly conservative, but mostly 
some kind of blend of the two. American policymakers have sought to combine values and 
interests in ever-changing permutations. Jefferson’s gospel of individual liberty has moreover left 
such a strong mark on American political society that even an essentially Hamiltonian American 
foreign policy can be seen to represent liberal ideas (as John Quincy Adams’ earlier quoted 
observation suggested and Nixon’s foreign policy also indicated). Conversely, no liberal foreign 
policy has been devoid of considerations that center on the national interest or on calculations 
about the relative distribution of power in the international system. In an overall sense, American 
foreign policy has tapped into the conservative tradition to guide the day-to-day conduct of 
foreign affairs while it has depended on the liberal tradition for general direction and an appealing 
vision with which to secure public support. Their interplay is thus reminiscent of Edward Hallett 
Carr’s analysis of the interaction between ‘utopians’ and ‘realists’ in international affairs, in which 
the former may be criticized for being too naïve and inflexible to engage in the conduct of 
diplomacy and the latter for lacking the creative capacity to envision a different set of 
circumstances and the moral appeal with which to generate popular support. “Utopia and reality 




are thus the two facets of political science,” Carr observed. “Sound political thought and sound 
political life will be found only where both have their place.”38 
The distinction of two main traditions in American foreign policy is not meant to be an 
inflexible guide to understanding this policy. To apply it rigidly would do injustice to the great 
range and complexity of individual perspectives. And yet Jeffersonian liberalism and Hamiltonian 
conservatism have inspired two distinct perspectives on the purposes of American power and the 
methods and principles of American foreign policy. In addition, as we will see, the differences 
between the two foreign policy traditions help us understand the inherent ambiguity in the Cold 
War concept of the Atlantic community and the variety of American responses to de Gaulle’s 
foreign policy from 1958 to 1969. Before we begin our examination of the Atlantic community 
idea and the United States administrations’ various responses to Gaullism, however, we need to 
consider two other important features of American foreign policy: the ambivalence Americans 
have historically exhibited toward Europe and their geopolitical oscillation between aloofness and 
engagement in approaches to Europe’s affairs. 
 
On the New World’s Ambivalence toward the Old World 
The imagery that Americans and Europeans have cultivated of each other has nearly always 
revolved around the contrast between the New World and the Old World. This contrast – and 
the related metaphor of an adolescent America and a parental Europe – has been so pervasive 
that it provides an almost inevitable point of reference in thinking about the transatlantic 
relationship.39 America was born in an age of exploration and discovery. The novelty of America 
was what, from the outset, most distinguished it from Europe. Explorers marveled at the 
vastness of this pristine new land; colonists rejoiced in its fertile soils; the religious found virtue 
as well as refuge in its unspoiled environment; the large natural space prepared the mind for 
experiment and enterprise. To extend Locke’s metaphor for the human consciousness, America 
was a tabula rasa waiting to be inscribed by experience. As a result, Americans have become part 
of a new cultural horizon and intellectual landscape, while Europe remained the continent of 
origin, bound by traditions long in development and a social fabric woven over centuries. 
No period of American history has been free from the seductive influence of the idea that 
America is unique and exceptional. One does well to realize that the United States has above all 
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been found unique and exceptional because it has been seen as a departure from Europe. The 
Old World has been so central to defining America’s uniqueness that the historian and librarian 
Daniel Boorstin described the American not as a homo sapiens but as a homo sapiens Europaeus, a 
human being with a particularly European consciousness:  
 
Toward her [Europe] we have felt all the attractions and repulsions of Oedipus. Only by denying 
our parent can we become a truly independent New World; yet we cannot help feeling that the 
New World is the fulfillment of a European dream. […] Few peoples have been so obsessed by a 
parental image.40 
 
It is important to understand that in the American mind the contrast of the ‘new’ versus 
the ‘old’ has most often been framed in terms of rejection. The Old World was ‘old’ in the 
pejorative sense. Since the early days of the American republic, Europe has figured as the scene 
of immovable social constraints, economic inequity, religious intolerance and endless dynastic 
warfare. In Common Sense (1776), the first published pamphlet to press for immediate 
independence from Britain, Thomas Paine (1737-1809) portrayed parental Europe with little or 
no affection: 
 
This new world hath been the asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil and religious liberty from 
every part of Europe. Hither have they fled, not from the tender embraces of the mother, but 
from the cruelty of the monster. […] As Europe is our market for trade, we ought to form no 
partial connection with any part of it. It is the true interest of America to steer clear of European 
contentions […]. Europe is too thickly planted with kingdoms to be long at peace […].41 
 
The insoluble link between the rejection of Europe and the definition of being American 
is nowhere more obvious than in the writings of St. Jean de Crèvecoeur (1735-1813), a 
Frenchman turned Indian trader and farmer who served as a French consul to New York. His 
Letters from an American Farmer (1782), which were hugely popular at the time, contained an 
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idealized image of life in the New World. He described Americans as a “new race” composed of 
people who had fled from all corners of Europe to find renewal in “this great American asylum”:  
 
Everything has tended to regenerate them; new laws, a new mode of living, a new social system; 
here they are become men: in Europe they were as so many useless plants, wanting vegetative 
mold and refreshing showers; they withered, and were mowed down by want, hunger, and war; 
but now by the power of transplantation, like all other plants they have taken root and flourished! 
 
St. Jean de Crèvecoeur did not contest Paine’s exhortation to keep a distance from the broils of 
Europe. Yet, in contrast to Paine and with amazing foresight, he discerned the fictitiousness of 
everlasting isolation and the potential, if not inevitability, for this “new race of men” to “one day 
cause great changes in the world.”42  
For much of the nineteenth century, however, the United States was on the whole 
allowed the comfort of distance. The political, cultural and moral detachment from Europe only 
deepened. In a sense, it was also Europe that withdrew from the Western hemisphere. The 
European powers were enmeshed in Napoleon’s wars that followed the French Revolution of 
1789. France sold the expansive territory of Louisiana to the United States in 1803, Spain lost its 
vast empire in South America in 1823 and Brazil separated from Portugal in 1825. During the 
nineteenth century, Europe turned away from the American continents and projected its colonial 
ambitions onto Africa and Asia. 
The Americas were thus largely left to the Americans who, after the political turmoil of 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, shifted their attention to commerce and the 
molding of their nation. After the brief interlude of the British-American war of 1812, John 
Adams (1735-1826) described the mood in the United States:  
 
Rights of Man occupied public thoughts less and the price of cotton more. … Although in 1815 
Europe was suffering under a violent reaction against free government, Americans showed little 
interest and no alarm, compared with their emotion of twenty years before. The War [of 1812] 
gave a severe shock to the Anglican sympathies of society, and peace seemed to widen the breach 
between European and American tastes. Interest in Europe languished after Napoleon’s 
overthrow. France ceased to affect American opinion.43 
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This sense of detachment grew further with the gradual opening up of the vast territory in 
the West. It is easy to forget that at the time of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, the exploration 
of the American continent was still incomplete and the west coast of the United States had only 
just begun to be settled en masse. This age of exploration, spurred by the prospect of economic 
gain as well as by the Enlightenment ideals of science and progress, had an indelible impact on 
the American national consciousness.44 The Midwestern American historian Frederick Jackson 
Turner most influentially expressed this in 1893. Turner hypothesized that the American 
character, with its combination of commercial drive and missionary zeal, had been formed by 
continuous expansionism. This, he argued, had been accompanied by a gradual alienation from 
Europe and the development of a uniquely American democracy; for it was in the American 
West that society was “formed on lines least like Europe. It is here, if anywhere, that American 
democracy will make a stand against a tendency to adjust to a European type.” 
Turner’s thesis was appealing. Yet it would be wrong to describe the American 
relationship with Europe merely in terms of rejection and detachment. It was infinitely more 
convoluted. “It is a complex fate being an American,” sighed the American novelist Henry James 
(1843-1916), who had immersed himself in the European literary life of the late nineteenth 
century, “and one of the responsibilities it entails is fighting against a superstitious valuation of 
Europe.”45 For the rejection also implied a bond. America was a continuation of Europe as well 
as a departure from it. The founding fathers of the American republic both acted in defiance of 
the Europe of kings and despots and at the same time drew their inspiration from the ideas of 
the Enlightenment which held Europe in their sway in the late eighteenth century. The act of 
revolt was itself an expression of the European consciousness. As historian Max Lerner put it:  
 
In America the vigorous European elements were brought into play against the exhausted ones. It 
was free enterprise arrayed against mercantilism, laissez faire against cameralism, individualism 
against hierarchy, natural right versus monarchy, popular nationalism against the dynastic regimes, 
social mobility against caste, the pioneering spirit against the status quo.46 
 
The revolt against the old Europe was thus only partial. Moreover, important segments of 
American society always maintained a strong sense of European belonging. This is true in 
particular for the elites of the littoral states in the East. The towns along the Atlantic shore 
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retained a lively cosmopolitanism and turned to Europe for learning, art, fashion, and fresh ideas. 
There developed, in fact, a cultural dichotomy in the United States between the East, which 
retained some remnants of traditional European life, and the rest of the country. The elites 
cultivated their European heritage and kept up the idea that they were part of European life, 
while the frontier, thrust on its own resources, became more ‘American’. 47  The East Coast 
American gentleman corresponded with Europe and sent his children to Europe to be educated. 
A grand tour of the illustrious and historic places of Europe was a mainstay in the education of the 
young American of good descent. As early as 1794, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand proposed the 
establishment of a bank in London with branches in continental Europe for American tourists 
“who indulge more than ever in traveling, either to form commercial connections with Europe, 
or to enjoy the luxury and pleasure of the old world….”48 
In sum, the American perspective on Europe can neither be fully described in terms 
either of rejection and detachment or of veneration and affinity. The ideas of the Enlightenment 
on which the United States was based had been taken from a European context in which they 
were revolutionary. Westward expansionism shaped the American mind but also led to a growing 
dichotomy between the more European East and the more American West. Americans were 
acquiring an increasing sense of identity and history of their own. Yet, Europe was also in the 
political, social, and cultural baggage of millions of new Americans and it remained the cultural 
beacon for America’s elites. 
The resulting ambivalence about Europe may be illustrated in brief with the experiences 
of successive generations of American writers who traveled to Europe for extensive periods of 
their lives. From the early to mid-nineteenth century until after World War II, an impressive array 
of American literati crossed the Atlantic for a taste of the Old World. During the nineteenth 
century these bouts of cultural pilgrimage were above all characterized by an attempt to fit into 
the European tradition. It was then still virtually impossible to think of American literature 
without reference to past English or European literature. As James Fenimore Cooper (1789-1851) 
observed in Notions of the Americans (1828), written in response to the condescension European 
travelers were given to show towards American culture, writers in the United States tapped from 
the same literary heritage as British writers.49  
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Rather than develop a distaste for the politics of Europe, which did not interest them 
much, many nineteenth century American writers were moved by a romanticist view of European 
culture and history. This was paired with an acute sense of lacking, a yearning for the aesthetic 
sensitivity and dedication to tradition that the cruder energy of American modernity could not 
provide. Washington Irving (1783-1859), the first American to earn international literary fame, 
explained his decision to leave the United States in 1815 for an extended stay in Europe as 
follows: 
 
had I been merely a lover of fine scenery, I should have felt little desire to seek elsewhere for its 
gratification: for on no country have the charms of nature been more prodigally lavished. […] But 
Europe held forth all the charms of poetical association. […] I longed to wander over the scenes 
of renowned achievement – to tread, as it were, in the footsteps of antiquity – to loiter about the 
ruined castle – to meditate on the falling tower – to escape, in short, from the commonplace 
realities of the present, and lose myself among the shadowy grandeurs of the past.50 
 
However, personal experience with Europe instilled not only a familiarity and a certain 
attachment to Europe – particularly the ‘old’, romantic, pre-industrial Europe – but also a 
consciousness of America’s contrasting virtues. Irving admitted that his long stay in Europe – he 
resided in Great Britain for seventeen years – opened his eyes “to many things that were hid 
from me while in America.” Though “dazzled, astonished, enraptured” by European history, 
culture and custom, he refused to be “ensnared” by Europe. Responding to charges in the United 
States that he had become too Europeanized, Irving argued that his European experiences had 
made him a better American, by enhancing his appreciation for the “purity” of America in 
contrast to the “profligacy” of Europe.51 
Washington Irving’s ambivalence about his European sojourn was indicative of the 
experiences of many who followed in his footsteps. A whole group of writers – Henry Adams 
(1838-1918), Henry James (1843-1916), T.S. Eliot (1888-1965), Ezra Pound (1885-1972), and 
others – can aptly be called ‘improvised Europeans’ who assumed an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ rather than 
an American identity.52 Yet, in the final analysis, even they preferred the dynamism and moral 
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fabric of American society to the staidness of Europe. Henry Adams was enchanted by the 
picturesqueness he had encountered on his travels through Europe in the mid-1900s, but found 
university education in Berlin less valuable – and far more torpid – than the one he had received 
at Harvard. A three-month long stay in Paris he regarded as having little educational value, 
describing it as “a momentary and frivolous vacation before going home to fit himself for life….” 
Not even England could serve as a paragon to America, for “the young American who should 
adopt English thought is lost.”53  
Even Henry James, the most European of American writers, recognized the moral 
superiority of the United States. Daisy Miller (1879), his most popular novella, is the story of an 
American girl whose honesty and innocent spontaneity shocks her stultified European 
surroundings. She dies after having contracted malaria fever from breathing in the night air at 
Rome’s Coliseum, a reference to the corrupt air of European society. In The American (1876), 
which could have been written by an Englishman on all other accounts, the dynamism and 
disruptive energy of the New World is pitted against the repressive traditions of the Old – and 
American good nature ultimately relishes a moral triumph over European treachery. William 
Dean Howells, a friend of Henry James, thus had reason to observe in 1902 that, 
 
as matters stand, […] we may reasonably ask whether Americans ‘most prominent in cultivated 
European opinion,’ the Americans who ‘habitually live out of America,’ are not less exiles than 
advance agents of the expansion now advertising itself to the world.54 
 
The avalanche of caustic commentaries about American culture and society by European 
travelers to the United States, emphasizing its boorish and superficial character, did not fail to 
elicit a response in kind. There was a widespread sense that what the United States lacked in 
terms of history and cultural achievement, it made up in moral stature. European civilization 
lingered in decay, whereas the modernizing energy of American society held out the promise of a 
more rational future. Many moreover considered it only a matter of time before American power 
would be felt across the globe. In The Ambassadors (1893), for instance, James documented the 
emergence of American political power in Europe, as reflected in the elevation of American 
diplomats in Europe from the rankings of ministers to that of ambassadors. James Russell Lowell 
(1819-1891), in On a Certain Condescension in Foreigners (1871), had by then already described the 
pervasive European sense of cultural superiority as “an unpleasant anachronism,” in particular 
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because it should have become clear that “the young giant was growing, was beginning indeed to 
feel tight in its clothes.”55  
The giant was indeed growing and, by the late nineteenth century, was increasingly flexing 
its muscle. But the United States’ first real brush with world politics in the twentieth century – 
World War I – was a grating experience, ending in disappointment despite military victory. As 
Americans returned to commerce and business as their preoccupations after the war, a new 
generation of writers embraced Europe as an escape from the emptiness of American society. 
Almost all of America’s important writers chose to stay in Europe during the interbellum period. 
Ernest Hemingway, John Dos Passos, Gertrude Stein, Sinclair Lewis, F. Scott Fitzgerald, 
Malcolm Cowley, Henry Miller and Sherwood Anderson all spent considerable time as literary 
expatriates in Europe. Some of them had volunteered to fight during the war, but had become 
disillusioned with it and its aftermath. In addition, they felt alienated by what they perceived as 
the pervasive materialism, conformity and provincial prejudice of American society. Hence their 
European stay was fuelled by a distaste for America as much as drawn by a pull towards the 
opportunities provided in Europe for a more bohemian lifestyle, earning them the epithet of a 
‘lost generation.’ As Sherwood Anderson (1876-1941) observed, even after the terrible lacerations 
of World War I, “Europe remained the old home of the crafts” and going to Europe was 
considered “of infinitely more importance than, let us say, getting married.”56 
Anderson, too, ventured across the Atlantic. In writings such as Winesburg, Ohio (1919), he 
had portrayed American culture and society as artistically dull and socially narrow-minded. He 
particularly despised the predominance of business and commerce in everyday life. Yet even 
Anderson was led to reassess his American identity on the basis of his European experiences. 
The final pages of his autobiographical The Story Teller’s Story (1924) are a telling account of his 
visit with a friend to Chartres. Despite the aesthetic delight of the old French town and its 
thirteenth century Gothic cathedral, Anderson could not help but feel that “we did not want to 
spend our lives living in the past, dreaming over the dead past of a Europe from which we were 
separated by a wide ocean.” The sight of Chartres – “the town made lovely not by the men who 
live there now but by men of another age, long since fast asleep” – produced no awe but a desire 
to free the American mind of the pervasive sense of cultural inferiority towards Europe:  
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Americans with cultural impulses had done too much of that sort of thing in the past. The game 
was worn out and even a ladies’ literary society in an Iowa city was coming to know that a 
European artist of the present day was not necessarily of importance just because he was a 
European. 
 
Anderson pleaded for cultural independence from Europe. What is more, he hoped that the 
United States would some day distinguish itself from Europe by the righteous and self-confident 
application of its power. He wanted to belong “to an America that was no longer a despised 
cultural foster child of Europe, with unpleasant questions always being asked about its parentage, 
[…] to an America that had at last given up the notion that anything worth while could ever be 
got by being in a hurry, by being dollar rich, by being merely big and able to lick some smaller 
nation with one hand tied behind its broad national back.” American society was not perfect, but 
at least it was still in the making. His overseas journey had convinced him that European society, 
in contrast, was suffering from the hopeless ailings that come with old age. “The future of the 
western world lay with America,” he proclaimed. “Everyone knew that. In Europe they knew it 
better than they did in America.”57 
In the aftermath of World War II, this had become as clear as ever. Yet another 
generation of American writers – Gore Vidal (1925-), Tennessee Williams (1911-1983), Truman 
Capote (1924-1984), Ralph Ellison (1914-1994), Mary McCarthy (1912-1989), Richard Wright 
(1908-1960), James Baldwin (1924-1987), Saul Bellow (1915-) – went to Europe, perhaps the last 
generation of its kind. James Baldwin’s experience as a “Negro” American writer was one of the 
most interesting. His move to Paris was motivated by an urge to escape his racial epithet and all 
the prejudices and limitations that came along with it. His years in France and elsewhere allowed 
him to lay ingrained defensive reflexes to rest and to reconcile himself to being a “nigger.” “In 
America,” he recorded in Nobody Knows My Name (1961), “the color of my skin had stood 
between myself and me; in Europe, the barrier was down.” To Baldwin, as to other generations 
of Americans, Europe was the quiet haven in which he could further develop his skills as a writer: 
“The American writer, in Europe, is released […] from the necessity of apologizing for himself. 
[…] Whatever the European may actually think of artists, they have killed enough of them off 
now to know that they are as real – and as persistent – as rain, snow, taxes or businessmen.”  
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To his own surprise, however, being in Europe also reinforced his American-ness. The 
escape from the racial divisions of American society caused the loss of an identity that had been 
wholly dependent on a specifically American environment. “Nothing is more desirable than to be 
released from an affliction,” he mused, “but nothing is more frightening than to be divested of a 
crutch.” In a more positive sense, Baldwin concluded that he shared more with his fellow 
American expatriates than with the Europeans:  
 
Like me, they [the Americans] had been divorced from their origins, and it turned out to make 
very little difference that the origins of white Americans were European and mine were African – 
they were no more at home in Europe than I was. […] It became terribly clear in Europe […] that 
we knew more about each other than any European ever could. And it also became clear that, no 
matter where our fathers had been born, or what they had endured, the fact of Europe had 
formed us both was part of our identity and part of our inheritance. […] I was released from the 
illusion that I hated America. 
 
As a black writer, Baldwin was thus well placed to fathom the experience of past generations of 
American writers who went to Europe: “if he [the American writer] has been preparing himself 
for anything in Europe, he has been preparing himself – for America.” Baldwin observed,  
 
Europe has what we do not have yet, a sense of the mysterious and inexorable limits of life, a 
sense, in a word, of tragedy. And we have what they sorely need: a new sense of life’s possibilities. 
In this endeavor to wed the vision of the Old World with that of the New, it is the writer, not the 
statesman, who is our strongest arm. 58 
 
Today, American writers no longer habitually head for Europe. Perhaps this is an 
indication that American culture has finally emancipated itself from its European roots – or that 
Europe’s cultural influence in the world at large has declined along with its political and military 
ranking. Yet Europe still runs through the veins of American culture and politics, and the 
contrast between the Old and the New World is as relevant as ever. American writers, from 
Thomas Paine to James Baldwin, have shown that America’s umbilical chord with the Old World 
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was never fully severed. They exposed the mental world – or “interior life” as Baldwin put it – of 
the American, in which Europe was never far away. Their personal experiences reinforced not 
only a familiarity and a certain attachment to Europe – particularly the romantic, pre-industrial 
Europe – but also a consciousness of America’s contrasting virtues. Admiration for Europe’s 
cultural achievements and social and intellectual sophistication existed side by side with a distaste 
for the rigidity, stifling density, and perceived moral corruption of European societies. 
Generations of American writers have tapped into the historical ambivalence in American 
conceptions of Europe that were intimately tied up with America’s self-perception as a nation 
and a civilization. This ambivalence, with its insinuations of rejection and disaffection as well as 
of affinity, cannot but have prejudiced political approaches to Europe. For one, it made, as the 
historian John Harper put it, American policies toward Europe since the early 1950s a 
“compromise […] between the impulse to control Europe and the desire to restore it.”59 
 
On Aloofness and Engagement 
The third aspect that is important for understanding American policies towards Europe is that 
these policies have historically alternated between aloofness and engagement. “Torn between 
nostalgia for a pristine past and yearning for a perfect future,” Henry Kissinger, for one, has 
written, “American thought has oscillated between isolationism and commitment […].”60 At the 
same time, however, the United States’ approaches to Europe and the world have evolved over 
time in ways that reflect its growing power. American approaches to Europe cannot therefore be 
put in cyclical terms. They are more accurately described as having evolved, not gradually but 
joltingly, from the willed aloofness enshrined in George Washington’s Farewell Address (1796) to 
a reluctant but inescapable and principled engagement in the context of World War II and the 
Cold War.61 After 1945, the terms of aloofness and engagement in American foreign policy were 
redefined to reflect an abiding interest in – and therefore a commitment to – a stable and 
peaceful Europe that would never again be able to pose a threat to the United States. And yet, 
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within these redefined terms, American foreign policy continues to be marked by shifts between 
aloofness and engagement. 
The degree to which the United States should engage its political, economic and military 
power in Europe is one of the core issues that historically have vexed American foreign policy. 
To what extent should the United States be regarded as a “European” power, i.e. a power with 
vested interests on the European continent and that is an unalienable part of Europe’s future? 
Whereas France or Germany is without a shade of doubt a European power, in the case of the 
United States this always remains a debatable question – both in the United States itself and in 
Europe. Americans have had great difficulty in deciding whether they should stay aloof or get 
engaged in European politics. For the longest time, the European ‘question’ in American foreign 
policy was predominantly defined in terms that reflected Europe’s self-destructive politics. It 
boiled down to how to steer clear from the broils of the Old World; or, as one historian put it, 
“how to protect the rest of the world – or at least their [the Americans’] own political and social 
experiment – from Europe’s destructiveness, if not necessarily to save Europe from itself”?62 But 
the rejection of Europe also implied that American interventions, once they occurred, were 
charged with an ambition to reform the European system so that it could no longer pose a threat. 
When the United States was to define itself more permanently as a European power in the 
context of the Cold War, the terms of engagement therefore required a dramatic shift in historical 
perceptions of Europe and of the transatlantic relationship.  
At least until the early twentieth century (and even during parts thereof), American 
foreign policy has been defined by a willed aloofness from the European continent. Jefferson and 
Hamilton, for instance, shared a disinclination to become entangled in European affairs in spite 
of their oft-expressed sympathies for France and Great Britain respectively. This was above all a 
reflection of the still vulnerable state of the fledgling Republic vis-à-vis the European powers. 
Due to Hamilton’s influence, George Washington’s Farewell Address (1796) left a resounding 
legacy of having as little connection with Europe as possible. “Why,” Washington implored, “by 
interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in 
the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?”63 Jefferson, harnessing 
himself for the presidential election of 1800, stated his views with regard to foreign and military 
affairs in similar ways: 
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I am for free commerce with all nations; political connections with none; & little or no diplomatic 
establishment. And I am not for linking ourselves by new treaties with the quarrels of Europe; 
entering that field of slaughter to preserve their balance, or joining in the confederacy of kings to 
war against the principles of liberty.64 
 
In his inaugural address of March 1801, Jefferson went on to call for “peace, commerce and 
honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none,” granting Hamilton the 
satisfaction that his arch-rival had adopted the core of Washington’s Farewell Address as a 
guideline for his foreign policy.65 
Neither Jefferson nor Hamilton, however, was fundamentally isolationist. On the 
contrary, they shared a sense of foreboding about America’s future strength and of the 
implications of this strength for American foreign policy. Hamilton liked to talk of the United 
States as “a Hercules in the cradle” who could in the future dictate its will to the European 
powers.66 Jefferson hoped that the United States would fulfill its destiny by spreading “the sacred 
fire of freedom and self-government” to other corners of the world.67 He foretold that it would 
some day make its power felt in Europe. “It is our business to manufacture for ourselves 
whatever we can, to keep our markets open for what we can spare or want; and the less we have 
to do with Europe, the better,” he explained in 1815, but he added:  
 
Not in our day, but at no distant one, we may shake a rod over the heads of all [Europeans], 
which may make the stoutest of them tremble. But I hope our wisdom will grow with our power, 
and teach us, that the less we use our power, the greater it will be.68 
 
Jefferson’s day of reckoning with the European powers kept itself waiting for more than a 
century. Yet American policies were undeniably affected by the growth of American power. For 
much of the nineteenth century, American foreign policy was still often conceived in the spirit of 
rejection of the Old World. At the same time, however, the United States was not averse to 
staking out a bigger sphere of influence for itself with the expansion of its power. The doctrine 
proclaimed by President James Monroe in 1823 was a case in point. On the one hand, the 
Monroe doctrine was an extension of the policy of detachment from Europe to all of the 
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Americas; it was a categorical rejection of “the political system” of the European powers within 
the Western hemisphere. On the other hand, it was a clear signal that the United States would 
assert its growing power in a steadily expanding realm. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, 
the real author of Monroe’s statement and a conservative isolationist,69 was deeply opposed to 
any policy which did not comport with American interests or consider the costs involved in 
pursuing certain objectives. But the doctrine was only isolationist in the sense that it shored up 
the argument for keeping a distance from Europe. It was in fact both expansionist and defensive 
– the first categorical expression of its kind in American foreign policy. It was moreover a 
harbinger of the preparedness to defend the geopolitical interests of the United States and the 
apparent need for ideological justification. The revolutionary character of this synthesis of power 
and ideology in support of a universally defined national interest did not go unnoticed in the Old 
World. For one month after Monroe’s declaration, Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859), the 
outstanding European statesman of his time, wrote: “They [the United States] have distinctly and 
clearly announced their intention to set not only power against power, but, to express more 
exactly, altar against altar.” 70  The Monroe Doctrine had made Metternich aware of the 
intrinsically subversive quality of American power, which he feared could one day disrupt the 
delicate European concert of nations of which he had been the principal author. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the United States still lacked a policy of direct 
engagement in Europe. It was a largely commercial and industrial power that was increasingly 
making itself felt abroad, as was reflected in books such as F.A. McKenzie’s The American Invaders 
(1902), William Stead’s The Americanization of the World (1902), H.G. Wells’ The Future in America 
(1907) and André Tardieu’s Notes sur les États-Unis (1908). But this emerging power was as yet 
devoid of any aspiration to intervene in the politics of Europe. “America has invaded Europe not 
with armed men, but with manufactured products,” McKenzie observed.71 Yet, the United States 
could not indefinitely escape more active participation in the international balance of power. In 
1898, a State Department memorandum pointedly observed that “enlargement of foreign 
                                                 
69 It was John Quincy Adams who formulated the case for conservative isolationism on July 4, 1821: “Wherever the 
standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her [America’s] heart, her 
benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to 
the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.” John Quincy Adams, 
“Address of July 4, 1821,” in: Walter LaFeber, ed., John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire: Letters, Papers, 
and Speeches  (Chicago: Times Books, 1965), 45. 
70  Halvdan Koht, The American Spirit in Europe: A Survey of Transatlantic Influences (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1949), 32. Also: Reyn, Allies or Aliens?, 65. 
71 From The American Invaders, as quoted in Zwerdling, Improvised Europeans, 16. In the mid-1890s, the American army, 
with approximately 28,000 men, ranked behind Bulgaria as only thirteenth in the world. The navy was slightly larger 
in relative terms, ranking tenth, but its vessels were outdated. Neither had the United States a professional and 
experienced diplomatic service. Nash, et al, The American People, 665. 




consumption of the products of our mills and workshops has […] become a serious problem of 
statesmanship as well as commerce” and forewarned that “we can no longer afford to disregard 
international rivalries now that we ourselves have become a competitor in the world-wide 
struggle for trade.”72 When the United States showed the first signs of coming of age as a world 
power, it was thus motivated by Hamiltonian notions of protecting commercial and industrial 
interests abroad. 
The first American experience with direct engagement in the European balance of power 
came during the first two decades of the twentieth century. The terms of engagement chosen, 
however, differed greatly depending on who was in charge. In any case, the shift from aloofness 
to engagement was not a smooth one. It was in fact botched in November 1919 with the 
rejection by the Senate of the Treaty of Versailles. 
On the one hand there was the group of men within the Republic Party centered on 
Theodore Roosevelt that whipped up a patriotic frenzy to make American power respectable. 
During the 1890s, Roosevelt, together with Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, had 
emerged as a leading advocate of a more vigorous use of national power. He was convinced that 
the prevailing isolationist outlook was no longer sufficient to protect American interests. “More 
and more,” Roosevelt declared, “the increasing interdependence and complexity of international 
and political and economic relations render it incumbent on all civilized people to insist on the 
proper policing of the world.”73 Roosevelt’s strategic outlook was particularly influenced by the 
writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the naval strategist who viewed world politics as a Darwinian 
struggle for survival and argued that the United States should focus on gaining naval supremacy, 
controlling sea-lanes, and vigorously developing foreign markets. Mahan’s case for setting up 
colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific, and for linking these by a canal in Panama built and 
controlled by the United States, lay behind the American imperialist drive of the 1890s. In 1898, 
the United States waged a war against Spain over Cuba – a “splendid little war” because it was 
short and casualties were low – and annexed the Philippines. Both as assistant secretary of the 
Navy and as president, Theodore Roosevelt actively promoted the build-up of the American navy 
which, by 1907, ranked only second to Great Britain’s royal navy.74 
For all his bravura, however, Roosevelt did not give the United States a consistent policy 
of engagement in Europe. In 1906 he broke with America’s traditional aloofness from European 
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power politics by mediating between France and Germany over their squabbles over Morocco. 
Conscious of the difficulties he would face in Congress, however, he had only reluctantly become 
involved in order to help stave off a European war. Indeed, when American participation in the 
Algeciras conference of 1906 became known, this touched off a “howl of protest” on Capitol 
Hill and in the American press for implicating the United States in the broils of Europe.75 
Although Roosevelt came closer than any of his predecessors to participating in Europe’s politics 
of equilibrium, his break with traditional aloofness was only tentative. 
On the other hand, there was Woodrow Wilson. When World War I began, most 
Americans felt that the United States had no reason to join in. Wilson was no exception to this, 
in particular because he feared that the war would divert attention from the cause of domestic 
reform. He not only officially declared neutrality but asked Americans to think neutrally and 
reserve their judgment until after the war. The United States ultimately could not avoid 
involvement in the war for reasons we will not go into. But when the United States did join in 
1917, it was not as an ally but as an ‘associated power’ detached from the eternal rivalry between 
France and Germany. Wilson was determined to have a say in the peace settlement. By 1917, 
Wilson had reluctantly come to accept that the only way in which he could hope to resolve the 
European Question was by joining the fight. He fervently believed the war should pave the way 
for democratic values, self-determination, free trade, and the rule of law. The United States 
participated in this war not simply to add its weight to Europe’s balance of power or even to 
prevent the hunnish hordes from overrunning Europe and invading the Western hemisphere. 
Wilson transformed the war into a crusade to change the nature of international relations. His 
views on America’s stake in the war set a new standard for liberal internationalism. 
It is important to note that while both Wilson and Roosevelt left powerful foreign policy 
legacies, they failed to produce a foreign policy consensus. On the contrary, during their 
presidencies the discord between the liberal and the conservative traditions in American foreign 
policy became more pronounced. It was the resilience of national perspectives in Europe and the 
absence of a foreign policy consensus at home that induced a return to the maxim of willed 
aloofness under Wilson’s Republican successors. In the 1920s, the United States in fact returned 
to its late nineteenth century position as an overwhelmingly commercial and industrial nation. 
Well into Franklin Roosevelt’s third term in office, isolationism lay as a damp blanket over 
American foreign policy. The prevailing popular sentiment was averse to intervening on this or 
that side, and believed that “the European system was basically rotten, that war was endemic on 
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that continent, and that the Europeans had only themselves to blame for their plight.” 76 
American neutrality was supported by a well-established political philosophy that could draw 
from the conservative as well as the liberal tradition. It was embodied by popular figures such as 
aviation hero Charles Lindbergh. It was even enshrined in America’s laws.77 
When World War II began, Franklin Roosevelt was thus constrained to influencing 
European events from afar. It became increasingly clear, however, that this policy was ineffective. 
In particular France’s unanticipated collapse in May and June 1940 radically changed the power 
equation in favor of the Axis powers. By the time of the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941, which 
was designed to prop up the weak British position, Germany was manifesting itself as an 
increasingly serious threat in the Western hemisphere. German submarines were sinking a half 
million tons of ships every month in the Atlantic. Great Britain might well have been tempted to 
strike a deal with the Nazi government, despite Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s intransigence. 
Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 moreover opened up an altogether different 
probability: that Great Britain and the Soviet Union alone would determine the European 
settlement after Germany’s defeat. Roosevelt became increasingly determined not to leave the 
Europeans to their own devices and convinced that the United States needed to join the fight if it 
was to have a say. As early as January 1941, well before the American entry into the war, Harry 
Hopkins informed the British that Roosevelt “regarded the postwar settlement […] as being his 
particular preserve.” There are indications that, by mid-1941, he became persuaded that 
Jefferson’s day of reckoning, on which the United States might have to “shake a rod over the 
heads of all” and settle the European Question once and for all, was imminent.78 Even then, it 
took a war event on the other side of the globe – Japan’s lightning attack on Pearl Harbor – to 
finally sway American opinion behind a strategy of involvement in Europe. 
FDR’s approach to the European Question during the war was a unique synthesis of his 
uncle Theodore’s willingness to use punitive power, Wilson’s moralistic hubris, and Jefferson’s 
deep-seated distrust of Europe. His collective security design for the postwar era was sobering in 
its brutality vis-à-vis continental Europe. It was a far cry from Wilson’s credulous, impotent 
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League of Nations; as the historian John Harper wrote, Roosevelt was “less interested in saving 
Europe from itself than in rescuing the rest of the world from Europe.”79 Roosevelt was, in the 
same vein, more concerned with preventing the re-emergence of European nationalism than with 
the threat of communism. He was also determined to eliminate Europe as the pivot of world 
politics. His vision would see Germany partitioned and France disarmed and disowned of its 
colonies. Great Britain and the Soviet Union would function as the “two regional pillars” bearing 
direct responsibility for maintaining peace on the European continent, if necessary by force. 
Overarching it all, the United States would occupy “the position of key stone or primus inter pares” 
and control events from afar. World peace would thus be secured through a concert of four great 
powers – FDR also saw a future role for China – each acting as “policemen” in their respective 
neighborhoods. 80  Continental Europe would have to be disarmed and, as he volunteered to 
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in 1942, “if any nation menaced the peace, it could 
be blockaded and then if still recalcitrant, bombed.” Roosevelt: 
 
This might be peace by dictation, but his hope was that it might be so administered that the 
peoples of the previous aggressor nations might eventually come to see that they have infinitely 
more to gain from permanent peace than from periodically recurrent wars.81 
 
Although the atomic bomb had – at least potentially – given FDR the ‘rod’ with which to 
force the Europeans into submission, this part of his vision had already become unattainable 
before his death in April 1945. The subordination of continental Europe in this system failed 
because it underestimated the resilience of various national perspectives, which were not about to 
be forced into submission despite America’s military supremacy (as Roosevelt’s experience with 
de Gaulle proved). An Anglo-Soviet understanding, which would have been necessary for 
Roosevelt’s system to work, also never developed. The British, unable to play the role of 
‘policeman’ on the European continent, were rather casting a wary eye on the establishment of 
Soviet power in the heart of Europe. Their chief aim was therefore to tie down the United States 
in Europe as a counterweight to Soviet expansionism. London moreover strongly supported the 
reinstatement of France as a European power with full rights. Besides this type of resistance from 
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European quarters, Roosevelt’s vision was probably also too privately held and too cynical ever 
to garner much support at home. The inexperience of his successor would, in any case, make 
American foreign policy much less the ‘particular preserve’ of one man. 
Under the circumstances following the war, George Washington’s admonition to steer 
clear of permanent alliances finally gave way to the preponderant reality that the United States as 
a world power could not ignore the pernicious pull of European politics. In Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson’s words, the United States could “never again be an island to itself. No private 
program and no public policy, in any sector of our national life, can now escape from the 
compelling fact that if it is not framed with reference to the world, it is framed with perfect 
futility.”82 Between 1945 and 1950, Americans gradually assumed a much greater and more active 
role in Europe than had been envisioned by FDR. In the span of a few years, through the 
Truman Doctrine (March 1947), the Marshall Plan (June 1947), and the North Atlantic Treaty 
(April 1949), the foundations for America’s postwar diplomacy were laid.  
Since the United States was no longer afforded the comfort of distance in the context of 
the Cold War, the traditional terms of aloofness and engagement in American foreign policy with 
regard to Europe were redefined to reflect its abiding interest in resolving the European problem 
once and for all. Since World War II, these terms have presumed that the United States at the 
very least had to be able to exert control over European security from a distance. The ensuing 
redefinition of aloofness and engagement reflected the importance of avoiding the mistakes that 
had led to a relapse into isolationism after World War I. Responding to the growing antagonism 
with the Soviet Union, the increasingly apparent weakness of the British global position, and the 
active solicitation by Western European nations for American protection, the United States had 
to define itself as a ‘European’ power after all – and to do so in a way that could be supported by 
conservatives and liberals at home as well as by Europeans on the ‘old’ continent. 
Aloofness was thus redefined from denoting the almost complete political disengagement 
of the 1920s and 1930s into the encouragement of European self-sufficiency and autonomy 
within a framework that guaranteed a sufficient measure of American control. The ‘new’ 
aloofness did not look to the Atlantic Ocean as a physical barrier which provided security, which 
had been a hallmark of isolationism, but confined itself to retaining the ability to influence 
Europe’s affairs from afar. It recoiled from immersing itself in what were perceived as internal 
European politics or from depleting American resources in support of ambitious policies. The 
‘new’ engagement would take the form of activist policies – from the Marshall Plan to Kennedy’s 
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Grand Design – that sought to establish European politics on a new footing in the context of the 
Cold War alliance. Since this often boiled down to remaking the Old World in the image of the 
New, proponents of engagement naturally regarded energetic, creative and purposeful American 
leadership in European affairs as essential. Europe, as Stanley Hoffmann observed, became to 
many American policymakers a “challenging building ground” on which they could give rein to a 
“great activist desire to overhaul and re-educate Europe – not with missionary or crusading zeal, but 
with the peculiar self-confidence and the expert benevolence of men who know their power, trust 
their techniques, and define their purpose with an exciting sense of concrete jobs to be done rather 
than articles of faith to be proclaimed.”83 
Charting the broad spectrum in American foreign policy between aloofness and 
engagement is one way of assorting the historical range of American geopolitical attitudes toward 
Europe. The jolting evolution of this policy from a willed aloofness in the eighteenth and the 
nineteeth century to engagement in the twentieth as well as the ongoing ebb and flow in 
American involvement in Europe have fashioned American policies towards Europe during and 
after the Cold War. The pattern of aloofness and engagement tapped into the differences 
between liberal and conservate approaches to Europe and the historic ambivalence in American 
conceptions between rejection and veneration. These three aspects of American foreign policy 
were thus interrelated. More specifically to this study, they were essential ingredients of the 
notion of the Atlantic community and were to provide a mold for the American experience with 
de Gaulle. 
The Double-Faced Atlantic “Community” 
In the thick of the Cold War, the idea that North America and Western Europe were actually part 
of an “Atlantic Community” rapidly gained currency.84 In some ways, the North Atlantic Treaty of 
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April 1949 was an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Europe, and it was certainly reminiscent 
of this doctrine in the way that it merged the seemingly contradictory logics of expansionism and 
defense.85 However, not one of the regional alliances in which the United States has become 
involved ever attained the importance or the degree of institutionalization of the Atlantic alliance. 
America’s security relationship with Western Europe was from the outset viewed differently. 
Strengthening the vitality of the Atlantic alliance was a consistent objective of American foreign 
policy during the Cold War. This required more than simply providing economic and military 
assistance to the European allies. It required a wholesale reinterpretation of the transatlantic 
relationship by Americans as well as Europeans. This relationship needed a history of affinity as 
well as a future of alluring promise. “This Treaty [the North Atlantic Treaty] is not simply a military 
treaty, but is a vehicle for closer political, economic, and security cooperation in the North Atlantic 
community,” Secretary of State Dean Acheson impressed on General Dwight Eisenhower shortly 
before his departure to Europe as NATO’s first supreme allied commander.86 And Eisenhower 
himself, now president, declared in 1957 that “NATO should not for all time be primarily a 
collective defense organization”: 
 
We hope and believe that the time will come when its defense aspect will be minor and perhaps 
even unnecessary. It has demonstrated, and we believe it will increasingly demonstrate, the 
importance of the closest association between the members of the Atlantic community. This 
association is a natural one. We have common traditions which have been passed on from 
generation to generation. We should continue to work together as a growing community and with 
increasing intimacy.87 
 
This conception of the transatlantic relationship as an evolving club of nations – a 
political community of sorts – permeated the policy statements of both Republican and 
Democratic administrations during the early Cold War decades. It was more than a figure of 
speech, for it recurred, too, within the bureaucracy. For two decades, from the late 1940s to the 
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late 1960s, the notion of an Atlantic community helped to shape American foreign policy in 
various ways: it provided justification for continued overseas engagement to American public 
opinion, it countered neutralist and nationalist tendencies in Europe, it provided a framework for 
tying Germany firmly to the West, it allowed the United States to be active in managing the 
alliance, and it generated European support for containing communism outside of Europe.  
Since the United States was not a European power in a geographical sense, the idea of an 
Atlantic community also helped to establish the United States as a European power in a 
geopolitical and – for lack of a better word – geocultural sense. Political scientists at the time 
described the Atlantic community as a “security community” or a “partial international system.”88 
But it was more than that. For the idea of an Atlantic community transformed the Atlantic Ocean 
from a geographical and mental barrier into a mare nostrum; with its development. Much was made 
of long-standing political, economic, cultural, and social bonds across the Atlantic, which had 
always existed independently of the Soviet threat. Indeed, the community’s political, economic and 
legal values and institutions, which were seen to originate in western Christendom and the 
Enlightenment, gave it all the paraphernalia of a distinctive civilization. Its emergence also 
occasioned the discovery of the “West” and the “Free World” as foreign policy concepts.  
It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the idea of an Atlantic community became an 
indispensable part of the outlook of a whole foreign policy generation. Its character has also been 
elusive and it has proven hard to establish its practical impact beyond the establishment of 
NATO and later the OECD. Neither the United States nor Europe was at any time prepared to 
cede national sovereignty to some kind of Atlantic government. This is probably also why 
historians have spent relatively little time on examining the reality of the Atlantic community. 
However, as an expression of how Americans in broad terms viewed the transatlantic 
relationship in the early Cold War era, it deserves more of our attention.89  
The emergence of the Atlantic community as an idea in American foreign policy is best 
explained by its ability to wed the two main traditions of American foreign policy and their 
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essentially different approaches to Europe. Postwar American foreign policy was an uneasy but 
reasonably effective synthesis of the conservative and the liberal tradition, embodied by a 
bipartisan establishment that dominated foreign policy making from the mid-1940s until the late 
1960s. The Atlantic community, by extension, may also be seen as a synthesis. In the context of 
the Cold War, the notion at the very least had to be able to bridge the different approaches and 
shades of opinion that existed in the United States on dealing with Europe. The idea of a 
“community” took sufficient account of the fundamental ambivalence historically felt towards 
Europe, making it flexible enough to serve as a kind of compromise between the tendency to stay 
aloof from Europe and the inclination to reform it. More specifically, it was an amalgamation of 
the traditional reliance among in particular conservatives on the Anglo-American strategic 
partnership and a liberal yearning for a world community based on universal American values.  
The idea of an Atlantic community could only attract broad support as a rather abstract goal. 
American governments could never be brought to choose the Atlantic community at the expense 
of the liberal notion of a world community or the conservatives’ attachment to national 
sovereignty. In the final analysis, the strength and the weakness of the idea of an Atlantic 
community lay in its ambiguity. 
 
The Atlantic Community as an Extension of Anglo-American Partnership 
The idea that societies bordering on the Atlantic Ocean formed a community of sorts was most 
often based on Anglo-American kinship. By the turn of the nineteenth century, when Theodore 
Roosevelt’s conservative circle dominated American foreign policy, the raid on Washington by 
British forces during the war of 1812 had faded from collective memory. The perceived 
importance of the mastery of the seas, so prevalent in Alfred Thayer Mahan’s writings, at the 
time compelled the United States to regard the powerful British navy as the first line of defense 
of the Western hemisphere. Great Britain, primarily concerned with the growing threat posed by 
Germany to the balance of power on the European continent and with holding its vast empire 
together, saw political and practical advantages as well to an informal alliance with the United 
States. Moreover, in the racial thinking of the time, it was tempting for politicians on both sides 
of the ocean to stress the natural bonds which tied the Anglo-Saxons together. “I refuse to speak 
or think of the United States as a foreign nation,” British colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain 
stated during a visit to Toronto in 1887. “They are our flesh and blood.” Prime Minister A.J. 
Balfour (1902-1905), the first foreign leader to officially recognize the Monroe Doctrine in 1903, 




similarly believed that “the two great co-heirs of Anglo-Saxon freedom and civilisation” had a 
common mission.90  
The Atlantic community as an extension of the incipient strategic partnership with Great 
Britain gained its first real prominence as a geopolitical notion during World War I. “For a 
hundred years,” Henry Adams wrote in his Education, which was published after his death in 1918 
to become an immediate bestseller, “the chief effort of his [Adams’] family had aimed at bringing 
the Government of England into intelligent cooperation with the objects and interests of 
America.”91 Hence when the United States joined World War I, Adams wrote to a friend: “Here 
we are, for the first time in our lives fighting side by side and to my bewilderment I find the great 
object of my life thus accomplished in the building up of the great Community of Atlantic 
Powers which I hope will at least make a precedent that can never be forgotten.”92  
It was not the eighty-year old Henry Adams, however, who coined the Atlantic 
“community,” but the young journalist Walter Lippmann. 93  The indiscriminate warfare by 
German submarines in early 1917 had convinced Lippmann that Great Britain’s continued ability 
to control the Atlantic was being critically undermined by developments on the European 
continent. “The moment England is in danger of actual defeat by starvation or the crippling of 
her sea power, the whole world order in which this nation has grown is imperiled,” he observed 
to a friend.  
 
[…] a victory by Germany on the high seas would make her not only supreme on the continent 
but would give her such naval power in the world (negative to be sure) that she would attract to 
herself Russia and Japan and imperil us as we have never been imperiled before.94  
 
During this time Lippmann, who was deeply concerned with “the pacifist and the 
isolationist sentiment” in the country,95 had begun to use his columns in The New Republic to 
fervently advocate the case for American entry into World War I on the side of the western allies. 
Defining ‘America’s part in the war,’ he portrayed it as siding with “western seapower” in the 
struggle against “continental landpower.” In addition, he argued that Britain and France “were 
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fighting in the main for the kind of world in which we wished to live.” Since he believed that 
America’s security hinged on the safety of the Atlantic Ocean, his plea for making common cause 
with the maritime power of Great Britain was hardly surprising: “We shall uphold the dominion 
of the ocean highway as men upheld the Union in 1861, not because the power exercised by 
Great Britain is perfect, but because the alternative is intolerable.”96 
On February 17, 1917, in a column entitled “The Defense of the Atlantic World,” he laid 
down the strategic outlook to which he would stick for the remainder of his career. Moving 
beyond the idea of Anglo-American partnership, Lippmann discerned an abiding American 
interest in the security of a wider community of European nations. Germany’s war against Great 
Britain, France and Belgium was not an internecine conflict from which the United States should 
remain apart, but a “war against the civilization of which we are a part.” The United States thus 
had an overriding interest in preventing a German victory. “The safety of the Atlantic highway,” 
Lippmann argued, “is something for which America should fight.” He explained: 
 
…on the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean there has grown up a profound web of interest which 
joins together the western world. Britain, France, Italy, even Spain, Belgium, Holland, the 
Scandinavian nations, and Pan-America are in the main one community in their deepest needs 
and their deepest purposes. They have a common interest in the ocean which unites them. […] It 
is the crime of Germany that she is trying to make hideous the highways by which the Atlantic 
Powers live. […] We cannot betray the Atlantic community by submitting. If not civilization, at 
least our civilization is at stake. […] What we must fight for is the common interest of the 
western world, for the integrity of the Atlantic Powers. We must recognize that we are in fact one 
great community and act as a member of it. 
 
He had reached this heart-wrenching conclusion through a combination of strategic 
calculus and a growing awareness of a commonality of interests with the likeminded democracies 
of Western Europe. Interestingly, his judgment on Germany’s relationship with this community 
was deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, he warned that a “victory on the high seas” would 
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make Germany “the leader of the East against the West, the leader ultimately of a German-
Russian-Japanese coalition against the Atlantic world.” On the other hand, he believed that 
Germany’s natural place was within the Atlantic community: 
 
It would be a great mistake to suppose […] that we are dealing with a single-minded Germany. 
We wage war on Germany as long as she commits her destiny to those who would separate her 
from the western world. By rights Germany should be a powerful and loyal member of the 
Atlantic world, and she will be if this war is effectively fought and wisely ended. […] It is no 
paradox and no sentimentality to say that we must fight Germany not to destroy her but to force 
her and lure her back to the civilization to which she belongs.97 
 
This sequence of events repeated itself in the run-up to World War II. Lippmann’s 
fundamental belief that the security of the United States hinged on the Atlantic community and 
Great Britain’s ability to act as a shield led him to reexamine the policy of neutrality, which he 
had initially supported, once Germany reemerged as a threat to both. By 1937, in an article in 
Foreign Affairs, he admonished that “though collaboration with Britain and her allies is difficult 
and often irritating, we shall protect that connection because in no other way can we fulfill our 
destiny.”98 The rapid German military advance in Western Europe, in particular the staggering 
collapse of France in the spring of 1940, confirmed to him that the United States could not stay 
aloof. “With the best of intentions, but with a deadly misunderstanding, we all adopted the 
isolationist view of disarmament and separateness,” he confessed in one of his columns. 99 
Lippmann believed that the United States should give more permanent thought to the 
transatlantic security link as the keystone of the postwar international order. On December 9, 
1941, two days after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, he wrote to a friend that “British-American 
unity in world affairs is the basis for any future order that will be tolerable […]: […] the 
geography of the North Atlantic favors it and compels it, and […] politically the union is a 
reunion.”100 
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During the war, as he defined the postwar order that the United States should try to 
achieve, Lippmann further developed his seminal ideas about the Atlantic community.101 Allergic 
to Wilsonian idealism, he discredited the idea of a new League of Nations. The alternative to 
isolationism, he argued, should not be framed in terms of universal interventionism.102 Since he 
believed the borders of the Soviet Union to be the most contentious, such an international 
organization, “against everybody and nobody in particular, would quickly develop a pro and anti-
Russian alignment.”103 The United States would hence be implicated in conflicts in which it had 
no immediate interests.  
Instead of the “one world” program – the hallmark of Wilsonians – Lippmann set his 
hopes on a stable balance of power between two spheres of influence in Europe. Eastern Europe 
would be neutralized to put the Soviets at ease, thus preserving the wartime alliance, while 
Western Europe would be linked with the United States and Canada in informal alliance. “The 
Atlantic Ocean is not the frontier between Europe and the Americas,” he argued in U.S. Foreign 
Policy (1943), an immediate bestseller as Americans were groping for a postwar vision. “It is the 
inland sea of a community of nations allied with one another by geography, history, and vital 
necessity.”104 In U.S. War Aims (1944), he views the Atlantic community as the “historic center of 
the international exchange economy,” defined by “the essential political character which fits our 
way of life… that the state exists for man, and not man for the state; that the state is under the 
law, not above it.” Built around the Anglo-American nexus, Lippmann described it as a zone 
from which war would be banned and “any idea of preparation for such a war … excluded from 
all plans.” The community’s smaller members would be guaranteed security through a common 
defensive system with combined forces and command arrangements – a kind of NATO avant la 
lettre. The Atlantic nations would furthermore agree to pursue a “common foreign policy in their 
relations with the non-Atlantic world.” This would, in Lippmann’s view, require “‘organic 
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consultation’ […] something more elastic than a formal treaty of alliance, and […] much less than 
political federation.”105  
Although by mid-1944 he had come to accept Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe, he 
still believed that a modus vivendi between an “Eastern regional system” and an “Atlantic 
Community” centered on the United States, Great Britain, and France was in the cards. In his 
eyes, self-contained regionalism was the key to postwar stability. Whether this was attainable 
depended at least as much on the United States as on the Soviet Union. Lippmann was, in reality, 
more concerned with American expansionism, which he believed to be part and parcel of the 
Wilsonian internationalism pervading public opinion during the war, than with Soviet 
expansionism. To him, self-containment was one of the chief objectives of postwar American 
foreign policy. 
Lippmann never wavered from this notion of an essentially self-contained Atlantic 
community. In a series of articles, later compiled as The Cold War (1947), he harshly criticized the 
containment doctrine laid out by George Kennan in the latter’s well-known Foreign Affairs article 
of July 1947 (also known as the “X-article”). Lippmann censured Kennan in particular for 
overstating ideology as motivating Soviet behavior and for his rather indiscriminate prescription 
to confront the Soviets at “every point where they show signs of encroaching.” Only in Europe 
was the United States truly at odds with the Soviet Union – and even there the conflict was not 
inevitable, Lippmann thought. A stable balance of power could still be achieved by a coordinated 
step away from the brink. American diplomacy, he argued, should focus on allaying Russian 
insecurities about American intentions. This could be achieved by a political settlement which 
revolved around a mutual troop withdrawal from Europe and strict guarantees for a demilitarized, 
but unified, Germany. The United States, for its part, would have to contain itself within the 
Atlantic community, which he described as the countries united by the Atlantic Ocean and the 
Mediterranean Sea, “which is an arm of the Atlantic Ocean,” and comprising “the British 
Commonwealth of nations, the Latin states on both sides of the Atlantic, the Low Countries and 
Switzerland, Scandinavia and the United States.”106 In these views, Lippmann would persist. They 
accounted for his criticism of Dean Acheson’s strongly antagonistic stance vis-à-vis Moscow, of 
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the establishment of NATO in 1949 (which he considered too antagonistic of the Soviet Union), 
of John Foster Dulles’ brinkmanship and multiple regional pacts, and for his later dismay about 
American involvement in Vietnam.107  
However, the Cold War, the era that he had helped to coin, had a dynamic of its own. An 
initially reluctant Truman administration became increasingly persuaded that, in order to contain 
the Soviet Union, it was necessary to set not only “power against power” but also “altar against 
altar.” Moreover, the British and other Europeans – less hopeful than Lippmann of reaching an 
understanding with the Soviet Union and, in some cases, fearing communist influence at home – 
actively sought to commit American military power in Europe. Lippmann’s most important 
legacy to American thinking about world affairs was therefore the idea that the Atlantic 
community, in essence an extension of the somewhat older strategic partnership with Great 
Britain, was a vital American security interest. While his pleas for self-restraint vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union fell on deaf ears, this notion became firmly established in the minds of the cold warriors.108 
By this time, many American officials could also draw from firsthand experience with 
British-American wartime cooperation, which had amounted to probably the closest wartime 
alliance in history. In August 1941, well before the United States’ entry in the war, FDR and 
Churchill had formulated common aims and principles in the Atlantic Charter, which helped 
define the postwar world order.109 The personal bond between the two leaders, as well as between 
their most important advisers, was an important factor that further cemented this alliance of 
natural affinity. In contrast to World War I, during World War II there was a unified Anglo-
American military command with a single commanding officer for all British and American 
troops in a certain region, joint war planning and an open exchange of military intelligence. 
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Almost every British ministry set up office in Washington during the war, swelling the number of 
British officials in the city to nine thousand.110 The Bretton Woods conference of 1944, which 
designed the postwar economic order and its international financial organizations, was largely 
negotiated between the British economist John Maynard Keynes and Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury Harry Dexter White, making it an “Anglo-American show.”111  
Anglo-American cooperation survived the war, in spite of serious disagreements over the 
British Empire, dealings with Stalin or de Gaulle, or the joint atomic weapons project. For all the 
ambivalence felt on either side, it continued to function during the Cold War. To be sure, 
London certainly has shown more allegiance to the Anglo-American partnership than 
Washington. “My whole system is based upon partnership with Roosevelt,” Churchill notified his 
Foreign Minister Anthony Eden in 1942, while Roosevelt – or any of his successors – would 
never have considered a British prime minister in the same way.112 Throughout the Cold War, the 
golden rule of British diplomacy was to make common cause with the United States. When 
neglected, as it was by Eden during the Suez crisis of 1956, it ended in a humiliating reminder of 
the skewed balance of power in their relationship. After Suez, British diplomacy devoted its best 
talents to restoring a relationship of trust with Washington. This, in a paradoxical sense, also 
persuaded the British cabinet that it could not persist in keeping a distance from Western Europe:  
 
…the Suez crisis has made it plain that there must be some change in the basis of Anglo-
American relations. It was doubtful whether the United States would now be willing to accord to 
us alone the special position we had held as their principal ally during the war. We might therefore 
be better able to influence them if we were part of an association of Powers which had greater 
political, economic and military strength than we alone could command.113  
 
The British decision to apply for membership in the European Economic Community was also 
prompted by the realization that the Americans were increasingly looking toward a unified 
Europe as a partner in world politics – in what President Kennedy would come to call an Atlantic 
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“partnership” – and were becoming increasingly impatient with British abstinence from what 
they considered, in President Eisenhower’s words, “the possible salvation of the world.”114  
As much as by natural affinity, therefore, the postwar Anglo-American relationship was 
shaped by the fact that America was on the rise while Britain was in decline. Partnership with the 
United States helped Britain to disguise this decline and to soften its impact by influencing – or 
being seen to be influencing – American policies. On the American side, the attitude toward 
Anglo-American partnership was decidedly more lukewarm. There were persistent qualms about 
appearing to run the alliance as a condominium. Whereas the British had a tendency to publicize 
their ‘special relationship’ with the United States, Washington usually played it down with an eye 
on how it might effect other allies – most of all the French. Eisenhower expressed his concern 
“over the way we present to the world the picture of British-American association” to Eden time 
and again: 
 
We must, by all means, avoid the appearance of attempting to dominate the Councils of the free 
world. […] I am certain that nothing infuriates an individual in one of these meetings so much as 
an insinuation or implication that he may be representing a country, whose convictions, because 
of some national reason, are not really important. I know […] that the French frequently feel that 
the United States and Britain are guilty of power politics on this point, and they resent it 
fiercely.115 
 
But for the United States, too, partnership with Britain continued to offer less advertised 
but important advantages, even as it was hardly prepared to concede preferential treatment to the 
British in public. Great Britain occupied the position of being the most likeminded ally in 
containing communism in Europe and beyond. Policy coordination between Washington and 
London was of particular importance to prevent the Soviet Union from taking advantage of 
British decline. Significantly, the Truman Doctrine was a response to the collapse of the British 
imperial role in the Eastern Mediterranean. In another sense, too, the strategic importance to the 
United States of its close relationship with Great Britain shifted. Until 1941, it had relied on the 
British navy’s ability to control the Atlantic and protect the Western hemisphere; after 1945, it 
became more dependent on Britain’s ability, as one of the victors of the war, to influence 
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developments on the European continent. In large measure, Great Britain’s value to the United 
States during the Cold War was as a bridgehead in Europe and as an invaluable aide-de-camp in 
making the Atlantic alliance work. In spite of the many tensions, there continued to be a shared 
perspective based on the affinity of interests, language, culture, and history. The American 
ambivalence towards the Anglo-American relationship allowed British prime ministers to 
continue banking on the ‘special relationship.’ It helps to explain firm American support for 
British membership of the Common Market, even as this would undermine the integration model 
favored by Americans at the time as the salvation of mankind. For as Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk admitted years after the fact: “we hoped that if Britain joined the Common Market, it would 
take into Europe that special relationship with the United States.”116 In this sense, for many 
architects of American foreign policy the notion of an Atlantic community was built around the 
British-American nexus. 
 
The Atlantic Community as a Scaled-Down World Community 
American liberals were inclined to approach the transatlantic relationship from a rather different 
angle. They commonly treated the idea of an Anglo-American strategic partnership with 
suspicion; Great Britain was in their view a bulwark of European-style colonialism and balance-
of-power politics with which the United States should not associate itself. Instead, liberal 
internationalists – in particular since the days of Woodrow Wilson – sought to influence world 
order through the spread of liberal principles of democracy, rule of law, and free trade. This  
approach moreover distinguished itself from conservative approaches by treating the world as 
one large community (‘oneworldism’). In the bipolar alignment of the Cold War, however, 
American liberalism was consigned to projecting its ideas on a more limited scale (despite the 
establishment of the United Nations). The transatlantic relationship became the most important 
conduit of liberalism abroad. From the liberal perspective, the Atlantic community was therefore 
a scaled-down world community. 
In spite of its failure to sway Congress in 1919, Wilson’s liberal internationalism exerted a 
powerful influence on the American mind throughout the twentieth century. The development of 
American foreign policy – and indeed of international relations – would be incomprehensible 
without an appreciation of the part played by the liberal approach. Its program of international 
reform, which mirrored a yearning for domestic reform, gave the progressive thrust to American 
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foreign policy that has often made it distinct. Wilsonianism believed in the Lockean dichotomy 
between people – who are peace-loving by nature – and their governments. To Wilsonians, 
European-style colonialism – as well as Theodore Roosevelt’s American-style imperialism – were 
deeply distasteful. They preferred instead to devote themselves to helping less developed 
countries raise their living standards. The free trade of goods and free access to raw materials, too, 
was considered essential to raising international living standards, as well as to removing a 
historical source of conflict in international affairs. As a way to reduce the chance of armed 
conflict, Wilsonians favored arrangements for arms control and disarmament to the delicate 
balancing of power or the enhancement of military preparedness. They believed in restraining 
nationalism through the international rule of law and a system of collective security, both 
embodied in organizations that institutionalized international cooperation and reduced national 
sovereignty. Wilsonianism in its purest form, in sum, amounted to the universal extension of 
liberal American values unrestrained by the considerations of Realpolitik and the balance-of-power 
thinking which had led conservative internationalists to engage in a strategic partnership with the 
British. 
During the interbellum, Wilsonian idealism punctured the isolationist straitjacket of 
American foreign policy on a few occasions. In the early 1920s American diplomats took the lead 
in disarmament, most notably at the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 which committed 
the leading naval powers to reduce their naval strength. They also negotiated the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact of 1928, which renounced war for all time and also gave the 1929 Nobel Peace Prize to its 
main architect, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg. Wilsonian sentiment in the country was still 
strong enough during the 1930s to persuade FDR to appoint Cordell Hull, a liberal 
internationalist and fervent Wilsonian, as his secretary of state for each one of his four terms as 
president. World War II, which discredited nationalism and the idea that the exercise of power 
alone could bring peaceful international order, enabled Wilsonianism to once again dominate the 
public debate. During the war, Acheson later remembered, “so strong were the gospel and 
memory of the crucified Wilson that the country was seized with a sense of national sin.”117 
Books such as Wendell Willkie’s One World (1943) or Sumner Welles’ Time of Decision (1944) were 
instant bestsellers because they offered an appealing liberal vision of the postwar order, one 
which motivated Lippmann to present his own realist conceptions.118 It was little wonder that the 
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failure to prevent the Cold War was an enormous disappointment to liberal internationalists such 
as Henry Wallace.119 But the Cold War, in a paradoxical sense, also provided them with an 
opportunity to pursue international reform with likeminded nations, in a sense heightening the 
stakes by pitting liberal capitalism against communism. 
Most liberals came around to the containment doctrine of the Truman administration 
because of the perceived communist danger to the weakened democracies of Western Europe.120 
But containing the Soviet Union was not enough. It was at least as important to reform Europe, 
which after all had been the source of international conflict. Before World War II, Europe, 
including Great Britain, had been deeply distrusted by liberals like Welles, whose plan – the 
“Welles Plan” – aimed to stave off the war by getting the European powers to accept rules of 
peaceful international behavior.121 During the Cold War this distrust of the ‘old’ Europe was 
never far beyond the horizon. But the reconstruction of Western Europe and the idea that it 
belonged to an endangered family of democracies allowed liberals to invest – ideologically and 
emotionally – in the transatlantic relationship. With the Cold War, the transatlantic relationship 
thus became the most important venue for Wilsonian values. The ‘new’ Europe became 
embodied by practical visionaries such as the Frenchman Jean Monnet, one of the founding 
fathers of European integration, who was moreover uncannily adept at befriending influential 
Americans and enlisting official American support for his ideas. 122  Many American postwar 
policies towards Europe, such as the Marshall Plan and the active encouragement of European 
integration, were in a sense derived from the aborted liberal “one world” program for 
international reform. They were invariably aimed against the ‘old’ European vices of nationalism, 
protectionism and colonialism in favor of political, military, and economic integration. With a 
Europe thus reformed, the Atlantic region was increasingly seen as a zone of economic 
prosperity and ideological affinity permanently rid of the scourge of armed conflict – an Atlantic 
community as the showcase for a future world community. 
One of the most utopian advocates of strengthening Atlantic ties during the early decades 
of the Cold War was Clarence Streit, a journalist from Missouri. His crusade for a federal Atlantic 
Union is just one illustration of how the Atlantic community came to be regarded by some as a 
scaled-down world community. Although his personal influence remained very limited, his ability 
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to associate members of the American foreign policy elite with his quest was remarkable. His 
personal story moreover is indicative of that of the American liberal in the twentieth century. In 
1917, moved by Wilsonian rhetoric, the young Streit had enlisted in one of the engineer 
regiments that the American army dispatched to France. He completed his military service as an 
intelligence officer at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. There he had his taste of traditional 
European statecraft. “The grand conference in Paris has at last opened,” he jotted down in his 
diary, “ushered in with some well-chosen platitudes from the mouth of president Poincaré. 
Surround the peace conference with a halo of high and noble thoughts, and then do your dirty 
work behind closed doors. Same old scheme that they worked in Vienna in 1815.”123 Like many 
Americans, Streit was deeply disillusioned with the results of the war. The League of Nations, to 
which he became correspondent in 1929 for The New York Times, was in his view fundamentally 
flawed because it rested on the consent of nations and lacked a strong central authority. He 
became increasingly convinced of the virtues of American-style federalism. International federal 
union, following the example of the American republic, was the wave of the future. “Nationalism 
leaves you out on the rim,” he argued in 1941, whereas “Union makes you the hub of the world.” 
Seizing on world events, he then urged such a union between the United States and Great 
Britain.124  
After World War II, Streit’s efforts on behalf of international federalism became more 
expansive. From 1946 to 1949, he authored a series of essays in his monthly magazine Freedom 
and Union, together with Owen Roberts, a former justice to the Supreme Court, and patent lawyer 
John Schmidt. These essays were published under the pseudonym Publius II – a reference to the 
Federalist Papers written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay in the 1780s to 
pave the way for the American Constitution – and emanated the spirit of world federalism. From 
1949 onwards, however, Streit and his sympathizers seized upon the North Atlantic Treaty as a 
more promising framework for their ideas.125 They formed an Atlantic Union Committee to 
persuade Congress to endorse a resolution, introduced by Senator Estes Kefauver and twenty-
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four other senators and representatives, which called on the Truman administration to convene 
the North Atlantic Treaty signatories “to explore how far their peoples, and the peoples of such 
other democracies as the convention may invite to send delegates, can apply among them, within 
the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free federal union.”126 Acheson’s State 
Department was far from supportive of the resolution, which in the end was not adopted, 
warning that putting presidential authority behind the call for even an exploratory convention on 
federal union would have grave national and international repercussions. But the administration’s 
response gave the resolution’s supporters sufficient hope of gaining official support in the future. 
For the State Department was not opposed to “far-reaching pioneering” with “new patterns, new 
methods and new institutions” and claimed to believe that:  
 
… the policy of the United States [should be] to work toward an ultimate world order adequate to 
assure the individual ‘the inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ through 
the method of progressively closer association of the U.S. with more and more of the free world, 
utilizing particularly natural affinities of heritage, democratic tradition and common interest.127 
[underlining in original] 
 
Throughout the 1950s, therefore, similar resolutions were introduced in the Senate and the 
House of Representatives. Streit particularly hoped to gain the endorsement of John Foster 
Dulles, with whom he maintained a regular correspondence. Dulles had supported the original 
resolution in 1950 and had written the introduction to one of his ‘Publius II’ publications.128 As 
Eisenhower’s secretary of state, he was compelled to oppose similar resolutions on the grounds 
that a convention on forming an Atlantic federal union was “premature.” However, Dulles 
cherished sufficient sympathy for Streit’s mission to discuss the idea of a “political body” 
overarching the various organizations in the Atlantic region with Eisenhower. This discussion 
remained abortive because Dulles’ idea was still vague and Eisenhower’s response did not 
encourage him to further pursue the issue. 129  But Dulles’ successor, Christian Herter, finally 
removed official opposition to a watered-down resolution which no longer contained any 
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reference to federalism but established a committee of private citizens to participate in an 
Atlantic Convention. It passed both the Senate and the House and was signed by Eisenhower in 
September 1960, giving the supporters of Atlantic unity a new lease on life.130  
Streit, too, continued his activities, keeping in close touch with sympathetic minds within 
the Kennedy administration.131 He had become a respectable figure in foreign policy circles, 
where he was regarded by many as one of the early pioneers of the Atlantic idea. His approach to 
strengthening Atlantic ties was considered too radical and too impractical by most, but he was 
seen to be pointing in the right direction. His proposals for Atlantic Union were the driving force 
behind the proliferation in the 1950s of local chapters of the Atlantic Union Committee and of 
the Atlantic Treaty Association on either side of the ocean.132 People like former Secretary of War 
Robert Patterson and former Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs William L. Clayton, 
one of the main architects of the Marshall Plan, were prominent members of the Atlantic Union 
Committee.133 The Atlantic Convention, which was held in Paris in January 1962, did not yield 
plans for a federal union. But its final declaration called for “the creation of a true Atlantic 
Community” with common institutions, such as a council of government leaders – reminiscent 
of Dulles’ vague idea about an overarching political body – and the transformation of the NATO 
Parliamentarians’ Conference into an official consultative assembly.134 “The idea of the Atlantic 
union is on the march,” The New York Times prophesied. “Years of work and study will be 
required before the goal is reached; but the goal is no longer Utopian and begins to look like a 
historic inevitability.” 135  Even British conservatives heralded the convention as possibly the 
“Atlantic equivalent of the Messina meeting that gave birth to the Common Market.”136 
Though Streit seems to have had few enemies, there were many dissenters who thought 
his idealism had lost touch with reality. Walter Lippmann, for one, did not take his quest in 
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earnest. In February 1917, he had supported American entry in the war by stating that “our 
entrance into it would weight it immeasurably in favor of liberalism and make the organization of 
a league for peace an immediately practical object of statesmanship. By showing that we are ready 
now, as well as in the theoretical future, to defend the western world, the corner stone of 
federation would be laid.”137 But in 1951, he wrote to a friend that he regarded the idea of an 
Atlantic government as “nonsense, and dangerous nonsense if it were to be taken seriously.” 
Lippmann thought that, by projecting the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 onto Europe, Streit, 
“an old friend of mine,” had “built his whole crusade on an hysterical illusion.” He had only 
refrained from publicly criticizing Streit’s “well-meaning, but very misguided” campaign because 
“there are so many worse things abroad.”138 Most American supporters of more Atlantic unity, 
such as Christian Herter, were much less condemning of Streit’s idealism, but thought his pleas 
for immediate federal union were too radical to be of much practical value.139 Neither was there 
broad support in Europe, where plans for institutionalizing the transatlantic relationship tended 
to be viewed as “an attempt to institutionalize American hegemony” and as undercutting the 
autonomy and identity of the European integration movement. 140  In 1962, European 
Commission president Walter Hallstein, for instance, sharply distinguished between the 
European Community – “a full economic union with strong political implications” – and the 
much less defined Atlantic community. Echoing Kennedy’s resounding call for an Atlantic 
“partnership” between “the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union 
founded here 175 years ago,” Hallstein expressed a preference for a “close partnership between 
two personalities, the European Community and the United States.” 141  The idea that the 
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transatlantic relationship needed prior calibration between two separate entities would in effect 
undermine the efforts of those who wanted to achieve greater Atlantic political and economic 
unity through NATO or other institutions.142 
The general tolerance of – or even admiration for – Atlantic ‘dreamers’ such as Streit 
indicated that his ideas were in step with American views of the transatlantic relationship from 
the late 1940s to the late 1960s as well as with genuine American interests in providing an 
Atlantic framework for the European movement towards unification. The history of the United 
States was generally seen to underscore the validity of the federal approach, the importance of the 
rule of law, and the benefits accrued from free trade and a large single market. American policy 
towards Europe after World War II was steeped in these values. The Marshall Plan, which 
exhibited all of them, had helped to make Europe more like the United States. At the end of the 
program, in 1956, one New York Times correspondent in Europe wrote that “the least one can 
report is that a permanent-looking layer of American customs has spread itself across the old 
Continent in the last ten years, to the consternation of the élite, the delight of the masses and the 
solid satisfaction of the vendor.”143 After one and a half centuries of estrangement, America and 
Europe now seemed to be converging. So when Streit approached the Kennedy White House in 
the spring of 1961 to generate support for the Atlantic Convention, he struck a sympathetic 
chord. “Probably this idea of an Atlantic Convention is just a ‘pie in the sky’,” Henry Owen of 
the State Department counseled. “But just possibly it isn’t and Streit will be seen fifty years hence 
as a very wise and far-sighted man. The need for closer union is dire enough so that I’d be 
inclined to […] put in a plug for what might be the ‘great sleeper’ of our times.”144 The Kennedy 
administration was realistic enough not to give the Paris Declaration official support. But as 
David Calleo observed in 1965:  
 
The partisans of Atlantic unity are not without formidable resources. They appeal to an influential 
section of public opinion. They occupy key positions in many governments and in the European 
Communities. Above all they have hopes of enlisting the immense power of the American 
government.145 
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Present at the Creation: Acheson and the Atlantic Community 
“The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the 
same time, and still retain the ability to function,” F. Scott Fitzgerald observed in one of his short 
stories.146 This ability was very much on display when the United States was put to the test as a 
world power in the aftermath of World War II. What made American postwar diplomacy 
successful abroad and sustainable domestically was in part its ability to accommodate the 
conservative as well as the liberal foreign policy traditions. This ability may well have been the 
most important feature of what became known as the Establishment, which towered over 
American foreign policy for at least twenty years.147  
The ‘Establishmentarians’ were a loosely connected inner circle of internationalist 
businessmen, bankers, lawyers, and civil servants who had earned themselves a reputation for 
selfless service to the nation during a time of great predicament. Arthur Schlesinger jr. once 
described the New York financial and legal community as their home base, with Henry L. 
Stimson and Elihu Root serving as “household deities,” Robert A. Lovett and John J. McCloy as 
“present leaders,” the Rockefeller, Ford and Carnegie foundations and the Council on Foreign 
Relations as “front organizations,” and the New York Times and Foreign Affairs as “organs.”148 As 
they usually did place country above party, the ‘Establishmentarians’ came to embody the 
bipartisan foreign policy consensus that was vital to preventing a return to isolationism or 
jingoism. 
Indeed, the shift from aloofness toward engagement with regard to Europe turned out to 
be one of the Establishment’s most important legacies. A commitment to resolving the European 
Question was central to its world view, as well as the need to maintain a strong transatlantic link 
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in the Cold War. In a way, this orientation toward Europe followed naturally from the European 
bent of the American East Coast, which continued to pervade the economic, cultural and 
educational life of the cities and towns along its shore. Much has been made, for instance, of 
youthful bonding experiences at Groton School in Massachusetts, where the scions of America’s 
wealthy elite were girded for a life of achievement. There they had been molded in the English 
style, steeped in Christian values and educated in classical and European history.149 If this was not 
enough to sensitize the mind to things European, it was certainly engendered by formative 
professional experiences during the 1920s and 1930s.150 
Many names, of course, can be attached to the Establishment that shaped America’s postwar 
diplomacy. Few have had more personal influence, however, than Dean Acheson. It is therefore his 
view on foreign policy and on the transatlantic relationship that we will bring into focus. As the son 
of an Episcopalian clergyman – later bishop – from a middle-class Connecticut town, his schooling 
days followed the familiar pattern of the well-to-do: after Groton, he attended both Yale and 
Harvard to study law. Acheson also fit Schlesinger’s description of the Establishment, having 
developed during the interbellum years into one of the country’s foremost lawyers and a classic 
representative of the East Coast legal community. The only difference is that he chose Washington 
over New York, becoming the private secretary of Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis in 1919 
and gaining the acquaintance of justice Oliver Wendell Holmes jr. – the two legendary figures that 
were his mentors in life. In 1921, he began a lifelong association with Covington & Burling, the 
Washington law firm that had been established to press claims arising from World War I.  
Acheson’s influence was, of course, at a peak during his years at the State Department from 
1941 to 1953. As President Truman’s undersecretary of state from 1945 to 1947 and secretary of 
state until 1953, he could claim – as he did – to be “present at the creation” of a new world order. 
His subsequent role in the 1950s to shape the Democratic Party foreign policy platform and as the 
consummate elder statesman of the 1960s who advised both the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations has been significant too.151 However, apart from having been seated in the councils 
of decision or having occupied positions of influence, Acheson above all epitomized the 
Establishment because of his propensity to abide by the logic of power in the ardent defense of 
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ideals. Indeed, his personal outlook seemed to have merged the conservative and liberal 
internationalist traditions in American foreign policy, for it combined the realist’s reliance on the 
application of power with the moral rectitude and the unshakeable belief in liberal American values 
of the Wilsonian. As a result, it lingered halfway between an emphasis on Anglo-American 
partnership and one-worldism – and, as we will see, this was matched with an increasingly strong 
dedication to the idea of an evolving Atlantic community. 
 
The Conservative Acheson  
Dean Acheson’s predilection for Britain is not only well documented, it was immediately apparent 
from his worldly personal demeanor. He dressed, talked, and corresponded like an urbane English 
gentleman. In this respect, he was very much the product of his upbringing. Middletown, the 
Connecticut valley town where he spent his “golden age of childhood,” was part of the Anglo-Saxon 
world. In his Episcopalian household there were “no clear cultural boundaries between the New 
World and the Old.” On the contrary, his parents took the boy twice to England – probably 
strengthening his family’s queer sympathy for the British side in the Boer war. The British pull on his 
mind continued while a young man. Endicott Peabody, Louis Brandeis, and Oliver Wendell Holmes 
jr. were not just mentors, they provided Acheson with Victorian-style role models. His training as a 
lawyer furthermore engendered a strong attachment to English common law, which to the legal 
expert fused the two halves of the Anglo-Saxon world into one seamless civilization. In Acheson’s 
mind, as he explained later, the American Revolution was not a nationalist uprising against the 
British, but a political act solely directed against “the villain of the piece, George III.” Acheson, in 
sum, can well be cast as one of “the last of the Victorians” in whose worldview the United States sat 
naturally alongside Britain.152 
This sense of Anglo-Saxon belonging carried over to his public career. Acheson’s enduring 
interest in law had been sparked by Harvard professor Felix Frankfurter, who was to become his 
lifelong friend as well as one of FDR’s closest advisers and, in 1939, Supreme Court justice. 
Frankfurter not only opened many doors in Washington for his protégé, not least those to the 
Roosevelt administration, but he was also the instigator and informal leader of a faction which 
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fervently believed the American political and economic interest lay in a coalition with Great Britain. 
This faction – the “ultra-British party” – gained ascendancy in the Roosevelt administration with the 
onset of World War II. It was the driving force behind FDR’s decision in September 1940 to allow 
the transfer of some fifty old destroyers of the American navy to the British. And it is likely to have 
played a role in Acheson’s appointment as Secretary Hull’s assistant secretary of state for economic 
affairs in February 1941.153 At the State Department, Acheson went on to play a central role in 
negotiating American support to Great Britain under the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941 as well as 
in designing the postwar financial system at Bretton Woods in 1944. One result was that he gained 
practical experience in greasing the squeaking machinery of Anglo-American partnership, another 
that he struck up a friendship with the brilliant British economist John Maynard Keynes who was to 
exert much influence on his views on the international economy. 154  Until at least early 1947, 
Acheson’s hopes continued to be staked on effective Anglo-American cooperation within an overall 
postwar settlement. He was therefore genuinely dismayed when Britain, “our chief ally and 
collaborator, to whom we looked to take the lead in maintaining the Eastern Mediterranean and 
sharing with us the burdens of occupation and defense of Europe,” teetered on the brink of collapse 
under the accumulated weight of its empire, a weakened economy, and the unforgiving winter of 
1946-7. Together with increasing evidence of an uncooperative attitude on the part of the Soviet 
Union, it accounted for Acheson’s agonizing reappraisal of the postwar situation during this time. At 
his prompting, the United States stepped into the void left behind by British decline.  
During the Cold War, Acheson continued to regard close Anglo-American cooperation as 
the key to a successful American foreign policy. In spite of British decline, he considered there to be 
enduring value in such cooperation because it allowed for combining American power with British 
diplomatic savvy, or as he explained in 1958: 
 
Britain, which once had the training and capability to manage a world system, no longer has the 
capability. The United States, which has the material capability, lacks the experience and the discipline 
needed for responsible management. […] Americans […] are primarily interested in their own 
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absorbing and immensely profitable affairs, and only secondarily interested in the doings and business 
of distant people.155 
 
Acheson evidently hoped that by adding British diplomatic experience to American foreign policy, 
this could help offset a historical American lack of practical wisdom about the world as well as a 
proclivity to withdraw into the Western hemisphere. In this context, he considered Sir Oliver Franks, 
the British ambassador in Washington, not only a close personal friend but, for all practical purposes, 
a member of the inner policymaking circle at the State Department.156 The importance attached by 
Acheson to Anglo-American togetherness also helps explain his utter dismay at the Suez crisis of 
1956. This crisis, he believed, was above all the result of a lack of communication between 
Washington and London. More than by London’s secretive planning for the operation with the 
French, however, he was enraged by the Eisenhower administration’s dressing down of its European 
allies and its decision to side with the Soviet Union in calling for a withdrawal of French and British 
forces from the canal. Eisenhower and Dulles, he believed, threatened to strain the relationship with 
London and the alliance with Western Europe to the point of breaking.157 
Given all of this, it is ironical that Acheson later unwittingly became the center of Anglo-
American controversy. In a speech to students at West Point in December 1962, he declared that 
Great Britain “has lost an empire and has not yet found a role” and no longer could aspire to a 
“separate power role” as long as it stayed out of Europe. Acheson’s words were interpreted in 
London as a “stab in the back,” causing an uproar in the British media and prompting Harold 
Macmillan’s reply that the former secretary of state had committed “an error which [had] been made 
by quite a lot of people in the course of the last four hundred years, including Philip of Spain, Louis 
XIV, Napoleon, the Kaiser, and Hitler.” In reality, Acheson merely had restated – in his own blunt 
words – official American support for British membership of the European Economic Community. 
This speech was taken to mean that Acheson attached no special significance to the Anglo-American 
relationship. 158  It is true that Acheson consistently rejected formalization of the “special 
relationship.” Yet, he never ceased to regard Great Britain as the United States’ natural partner and 
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most intimate as well as most capable ally. This Anglo-American partnership was an important part 
of his strategic outlook. It followed from longstanding political, cultural and social affinities and a 
basic commonality of interests that made it more effective.159 “It exists,” he explained in Present at the 
Creation. “It seems to me to be at the very heart of what we must do to try and hold the world 
together, but it seems to me to be more and more something you must know and never speak 
about.” 160  In his view, the informal alliance between Washington and London was mutually 
beneficial. Most importantly, during his tenure at the State Department, Acheson had been one of its 
main architects. 
In addition to his basic confidence in the Anglo-American partnership, Acheson can be seen 
as a conservative in international affairs because of his almost mystical regard for power in 
international affairs. Twentieth century history, he argued, had shown that the United States could 
not afford to think of itself as a “Celestial City” where power was thought of as “an instrument of 
corruption” and power politics had no place. 161  Acheson had little patience with those who 
discounted power as an instrument of foreign policy. “Power is at the root of most relationships – 
by no means the only factor, but one of vast importance,” he wrote to Truman in February 1954. “A 
balance of power has proved the best international sheriff we have ever had.”162 Acheson’s homage 
to power was perhaps reinforced by his continual urge to confront the “facts” of a situation, a trait 
that had been instilled by Justice Brandeis’ unrelenting tutelage and his own lawyerly instincts. It 
certainly also fitted his temperament, which nearly always preferred action over inaction. It explained 
his intellectual comradery with Hans J. Morgenthau, whose Politics Among Nations (1948) is regarded 
as a classic in realist thought.163  
At any rate, Acheson manifested himself as an avid proponent of power politics in his 
writings and speeches. This is most obvious in Power and Diplomacy (1958).164 As the Soviet Union 
                                                 
159 Chace writes that when Acheson found out the agenda of a meeting of foreign ministers in November 1949 
included a paper drafted by the British foreign office entitled “Special Relationship Between the United States and 
Great Britain,” he was “shocked, horrified, and overwhelmed to discover that there was a paper which spelled out 
this common law marriage in a way which I thought would utterly destroy us if it were ever known, either to our 
allies or to anybody in the United States.” He ordered all papers to be destroyed. Chace, Acheson, 246. McNay shows 
that during bilateral talks in May 1950 Acheson welcomed the idea of systematic consultation and policy 
coordination with the British. He only objected to putting it in writing. See Acheson and Empire, 58-60. 
160 Acheson, Present At the Creation, 387-8. 
161 From an address delivered on March 5, 1965, in Acheson, This Vast External Realm, 146-7. 
162 Letter from Acheson to Truman, 5 February 1954, in David S. McLellan and David S. Acheson, Among Friends: 
Personal Letters of Dean Acheson (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1980), 92. 
163 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1949). Morgenthau, 
a professor at the University of Chicago, defined international politics as a “struggle for power” and stressed the role 
of the “national interest” in determining states’ behavior. On Acheson’s relationship with Morgenthau, see Brinkley,  
Dean Acheson105. 
164 Acheson, Power and Diplomacy. On Acheson’s respect for the “facts,” see Harper, American Visions of Europe, 246, 
279-80. 




showed remarkable economic growth in the course of the 1950s and was seen to acquire 
important new military capabilities, in particular long-range missiles following the surprise 
launching of a satellite in October 1957 (Sputnik), Acheson was most of all concerned with 
redressing the balance of power. He categorically rejected the negotiation table; he instead became 
convinced that deficit spending was inevitable in order to prop up the military position of the 
West. After the 1956 presidential elections, Acheson almost single-handedly steered the foreign 
policy agenda of the Democratic Party away from the Stevensonian emphasis on arms control, 
development aid, and lessening Cold War tensions.165 Power and Diplomacy, too, was reminiscent of 
the hard-line stance of the Truman years. “The growth of Soviet power requires the growth of 
counter-power among those nations which are not willing to concede Soviet hegemony,” he 
advised.166  
Since the human and industrial resources of the Free World were superior, the main 
challenge in Acheson’s view was to persuade the democratic system to harness this residual power 
even if it meant paying an economic price. This required above all strong presidential leadership that 
paired a sense of urgency and clarity of purpose with consummate political skill: 
 
…our hope has to rest on the unusual leader who has the rare combination of the qualities which are 
needed for successful leadership in a democracy, not only courage and common sense, but that 
blending of persuasiveness and wiliness which can make the unpalatable acceptable.167 
 
Power and Diplomacy was also a frontal assault on Eisenhower’s doctrine of massive retaliation, which 
in Acheson’s view dangerously undermined the credibility of deterrence, and a concomitant plea for 
strengthening conventional forces capable of meeting “aggression by direct and local opposition.” 
The “unusual leader” of Acheson’s imagination placed power against power at every turn and 
developed the military capability to engage with limited force in limited conflicts. He did not 
succumb to the temptation either of softheaded liberalism or of deterrence on the cheap. He worked 
to prevent, in Morgenthau’s words cited by Acheson, “either the peace of appeasement and ultimate 
surrender or else the peace of Babylon and Carthage – the peace of total destruction.”168 While 
Acheson refrained from naming any contemporary politician, it was clear that in his view neither 
Adlai Stevenson nor Richard Nixon fit the mold.169  
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The Liberal Acheson 
For many of the above reasons, Acheson has usually been seen as a consummate practitioner of 
Realpolitik. His biographer James Chace called him the “quintessential American realist,” and as such 
“the most important figure in American foreign policy since John Quincy Adams.”170 The liberal 
strain in Acheson has been less recognized. It was certainly the less visible strain, not least because 
he did not care to advertise it. Without it, however, one cannot grasp his mindset. Nor could one 
understand why Acheson presided over American foreign policies that actively propagated liberal 
values as the foundation for a new world order after the terrible lacerations of two world wars. His 
exercise of American power was not without liberal purpose. 
What defines the liberal Acheson? It is not that, while a student at Yale, Acheson, like so 
many others, was enthused by the electrifying appearance and reformist rhetoric of Theodore 
Roosevelt, who had returned to politics at the head of the newly formed Progressive Party in the 
presidential elections of 1912. “I thrilled to every bugle call to action blown by the ‘Young 
Turks’, the ‘Progressives’, and most of all by ‘T.R.’, the most ebullient of them all, in the revolt 
against the ‘Old Guard’, the ‘malefactors of great wealth’, against ‘reaction’ in the person of 
Uncle Joe Cannon and the inaction in the benign and ineffective figure of president William 
Howard Taft. It was springtime and ‘T.R.’ rode again,” Acheson recalled. ‘T.R.’ had become more 
progressive since leaving the presidency in 1909. In 1912, he tried to regain the White House by 
advocating a strong central government to guarantee the rights of the people – calling, in a way, for 
the use of Hamiltonian means for Jeffersonian ends. In those days, however, “political parties 
mattered little” to Acheson. More than anything else, he yearned for positive action and enthralling 
leadership.171  
Acheson’s liberal political identity was above all shaped by his most important mentors in 
life: Felix Frankfurter and Louis Brandeis. Under Frankfurter’s tutelage at Harvard, Acheson picked 
up an enduring interest in labor law and social justice. Brandeis was the main intellectual force 
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behind Wilson’s progressive agenda for regulating American capitalism. Like his two mentors, 
Acheson looked to the federal government for providing protection to the weak against the strong. 
From Brandeis he also picked up a propensity to see things on a moral plane, even though later he 
would come to detest the public moralizing of that “psalm-singing Presbyterian Wall Street lawyer” 
John Foster Dulles.172  As with many other Progressives after the elections of 1912, Acheson’s 
political allegiance increasingly devolved to Woodrow Wilson and his Democratic Party. Wilson was 
too professorial to be charismatic, but Acheson shared in the progressive aspiration of his New 
Freedom program and was duly impressed with Wilson’s vision of the United States’ international 
role during and after World War I: 
 
Few of the doctrines of the New Freedom were new, and none were glamorous. But if the key was 
lower, the composition was more solid. If the President was austere, there also played around him the 
lightning flashes of insight and inspiration. As the shocks and problems of the war came and gave 
way to the even greater problems of peace, he became a towering figure. If his mistakes were great 
and tragic, […] great also was his understanding of the new role which his country must play in the 
realignment of power which the crumbling of empires and emergence of new forces necessitated.173 
 
Acheson has not written much about Woodrow Wilson. He did not adopt Wilson’s 
universalistic schemes and probably disliked his messianic style; like Dulles, Wilson was after all a 
Presbyterian. Acheson’s liberalism was empirical rather than revelatory; it was not expressed through 
public moralizing, but it was – due to Brandeis’ example and his own Episcopalian upbringing – 
grounded in unspoken moral truths. As so many of his generation, Acheson was disillusioned with 
the League of Nations, and the aversion to blueprints stuck with him throughout his public career. 
He professed to have little faith in the United Nations. “Its presentation to the American people as 
almost holy writ and with the evangelical enthusiasm of a major advertising campaign seemed to me 
to raise popular hopes which could only lead to bitter disappointment,” he recalled. The United 
Nations, to his mind, was of little use in handling European affairs because “the nineteenth-century 
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faith in the perfectibility of man and the advent of universal peace and law […] was dying in Europe 
[…] when it crossed the Atlantic to inspire American idealists, and none more than Woodrow 
Wilson.” 174  Acheson’s reading of history combined with his pragmatic temperament made him 
intolerant of anything that smacked of softhearted liberalism. 
Yet, Acheson was more of a Wilsonian then he let on. It was during the Wilson years that he 
rallied to the liberal cause that regarded government as an instrument for pragmatic reform rather 
than as “but an administrative process, like good bookkeeping.”175 This persuaded Acheson to join 
the Democratic Party in 1920. He was repelled by the Republican Party because of its opposition to 
the League of Nations and the pro-business conservatism, isolationism, and protectionism of 
Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge. Subscribing to the Wilsonian tenet of free trade, Acheson 
believed that the regulation of international capital movements, lower tariffs, and reciprocal trade 
agreements were essential for international peace and prosperity. 176  Though his stint as 
undersecretary of the treasury in the first Roosevelt administration was brief and unhappy – he 
refused to violate the law on behalf of FDR’s gold purchase program – Acheson remained 
supportive of the New Deal throughout the 1930s.177  
Acheson’s lingering Wilsonian sympathies are most clearly indicated by his support for 
Cordell Hull, the chief Wilsonian standard-bearer of the 1930s whose ideas on the world economy 
and the need for international cooperation he shared. Hull was responsible for the Reciprocal Trade 
Act of 1934, which Acheson described as “among the most constructive acts of any government in 
the post war world.” He supported FDR’s reelection in 1936 hoping that “Mr. Hull’s liberalism, 
sanity and patience may increasingly shape the policies of the government.”178 Acheson’s position in 
the late 1930s on foreign affairs thus has been described as “halfway between the orthodox 
Wilsonianism of Hull and the progressive Republican activism of Stimson and Ickes.”179 It was Hull, 
too, who saw to it that Acheson returned to the Roosevelt administration in 1941. While at the State 
Department, Acheson’s sympathy for Hull did not lessen, and after the latter’s resignation in 1944 
they stayed in frequent contact – even developing a friendship. 180  In spite of Acheson’s later 
dismissive attitude of the United Nations, as assistant secretary of state he labored hard for Senate 
approval of the founding Charter in July 1945. This reflected more than just a sense of duty or 
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loyalty to his former boss. In 1944 he privately confessed that he regarded Hull’s efforts on behalf of 
the new organization as “a very great service of the old gentleman to his country.” On other 
occasions, too, Acheson alluded to the importance he attached to organized international 
cooperation.181 In essence, the private Acheson shared more with Hull’s liberal idealism than he 
cared to admit in public. 
The other figure who can be associated with Acheson’s international liberalism is John 
Maynard Keynes, with whom he worked closely during World War II. Throughout the 1930s, 
Acheson had rejected the deficit spending of the New Deal that was attributed to the intellectual 
influence of the British economist. Keynes moreover warned against strict adherence to the principle 
of free trade for its disruptive effects, which probably also did not endear him to the American. 
Acheson was less dogmatic than Hull in his belief that free trade was the key to international peace, 
but he shared the analysis that protectionism was one of the main causes of the Great Depression of 
the 1930s – and thus of the rise of Hitler and World War II. As a result, he was less enchanted with 
Keynesianism than either Frankfurter or Brandeis.182  
However, his personal experience with Keynes during World War II, in particular while 
negotiating the lend-lease assistance in 1941 and the Bretton Woods arrangements in 1944, had a 
lasting influence on him. One result was that Keynes emerges from his memoirs as “not only one 
of the most delightful and engaging men I have ever known but also, in a true sense of the word, 
one of the most brilliant.”183 More importantly, Keynes was instrumental in shaping Acheson’s 
views about the international economy and about postwar international cooperation. It was 
Keynes who persuaded Acheson, after heated exchanges about the preferential treatment which 
Britain gave members of its empire (the “Imperial Preference”), to pursue a gradual – i.e. 
carefully managed – approach to removing international trade barriers instead of the immediate 
elimination of all “discrimination” from trade policy on which Hull insisted. Acheson did not 
abandon his fundamental belief in the importance of free trade. Yet, his realism – and the 
conviction that Keynes’ desire to promote international economic cooperation was earnest – 
made it possible for him to pursue the aim with more flexibility and consideration for the 
economic plight of allies. Later, as secretary of state, it also helped him to overcome his initial 
qualms about the European Coal and Steel Community as “the damndedst cartel I have ever 
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heard in my life.”184 The Europeans and other allies, Acheson believed, should be allowed some 
economic protection as long as they were prepared to work towards trade liberalization and until 
their economies were strong enough to participate in the open trading system favored by the 
United States. Acheson’s experience with Keynes, in sum, taught him how to combine the holy 
principle of free trade with real economic and political interests. “We were embracing the 
Keynesian ideas of an expanding economy,” Acheson explained. “If it needed to be managed, let 
us do it together and not separately.”185 The common understandings reached by Acheson and 
Keynes during the war helped to lay the groundwork for the postwar liberal economic order. 
Acheson’s liberal internationalism also provides clues to his relatively late conversion to a 
hard-line anti-Soviet stance as well as to the swiftness and moral certitude with which it finally 
occurred in early 1947. Whether it was through the influence of Keynes or out of a sense of loyalty 
to Hull and FDR, Acheson was notably reluctant to let go of the One World program.186 This 
reluctance was undoubtedly reinforced by his fervent desire to reach agreement with the Soviet 
Union on an effective regime of international control for all nuclear matters. On August 6, 1945, the 
night the atomic bomb exploded over Hiroshima, Acheson wrote that “if we can’t work out some 
sort of organization of great powers, we shall be gone geese for fair.”187 In the fall of 1945, together 
with Stimson, who was in his last days as Secretary of War, Acheson passionately argued with 
Truman for a direct approach to the Soviet Union on behalf of international control through 
cooperation between the great powers.188 Truman, however, was less prepared than either Stimson 
or Acheson to trust the Soviets and more reluctant to share atomic secrets. He decided to work 
towards international control through the United Nations rather than through direct negotiations 
with the Soviet Union. The Acheson-Lilienthal report of March 1946, which was prepared for this 
purpose, proposed to set up a supranational body to control “all intrinsically dangerous operations” 
using atomic energy. It required the United States to give up its nuclear monopoly for the benefit of 
a system of international control that could ensure the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Acheson-
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Lilienthal report was particularly imaginative because it paired supranational authority with an 
awareness that the system could only work if it was grounded in nationalist reality and national 
governments retained the option to take countermeasures in case of a violation.189 
The Acheson-Lilienthal report served as the basis for the Baruch plan, but not until changes 
were made which reflected Truman’s – and Baruch’s – reluctance to “throw away our gun until we 
are sure the rest of the world can’t arm against us” and which reduced the acceptability of the plan in 
the eyes of the Soviets. After its presentation to the United Nations on June 14, 1946, the Baruch 
plan foundered on mutual distrust within a matter of months. Although J. Robert Oppenheimer has 
been identified as the main intellectual force behind the Acheson-Lilienthal report, Acheson was no 
less responsible for its content: he considered it a “brilliant and profound document” and was very 
disappointed at the failure to reach agreement. 190  By grounding a supranational approach in 
nationalist reality, it could have ushered in, as one observer has noted, “a new approach to 
international relations in the area where such a transformation was almost universally regarded as 
critical.”191 What distinguished Acheson from liberal internationalists of the Wilsonian type was that 
he was guided by the notion that in order for such proposals to work they had to be firmly grounded 
in the less than ideal reality of the day – something Wilson had fatefully ignored in 1919. In this 
sense, he was a pragmatist and a realist. The Acheson-Lilienthal report, however, also showed that 
he was quite capable of relinquishing national control to help solve an international problem and was 
prepared to work on the basis of trust in international affairs. This was the mark of a liberal 
internationalist. 
In early 1947, as the British geopolitical position rapidly declined in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and elsewhere, Acheson could no longer avoid the conclusion that there were only 
two world powers left and that they were in competition. He was also concerned by the strong 
presence of communist parties in Western Europe, particularly in France and Italy. “If the Near East 
and France go communist, I fear very much for this country and for the world,” an exasperated 
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Acheson volunteered to a journalist in February 1947.192 “This was my crisis,” as he later summed up 
his personal disposition during these weeks and months. 193 His agonizing reappraisal of the 
international situation saw Acheson join the ranks of those who favored a tough stance towards the 
Soviet Union.194 Truman’s speech before a joint session of the Congress on March 12, 1947, pitted 
two political beliefs against each other, declaring it incumbent on the United States to “support free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”  
The Truman Doctrine was vintage Acheson, who as undersecretary of state was responsible 
for drafting the speech. Years later he explained its universalism as follows: 
 
The task of a public officer seeking to explain and gain support for a major policy is not that of the 
writer of a doctoral thesis. Qualification must give way to simplicity of statement, nicety and nuance 
to bluntness, almost brutality …. If we made our points clearer than truth we did not differ from 
most other educators and could hardly do otherwise.195 
 
But Truman’s speech was much more than Acheson’s gimmick to get Congressional 
support for a specific measure – military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey – or the 
attention of the public at large. It reflected his general approach to international affairs. By 
transforming a tussle for power into a moral struggle, Acheson reflected the transcendent moralism 
of Brandeis – in his mind one of the greatest educators of all.196 Acheson’s moralism was not 
dogmatic or preachy, which distinguished him from Wilson or, for that matter, John Foster Dulles. 
He was not overly concerned with the unsavory authoritarianism of the Greek government. He had 
few qualms, too, about supporting European allies in colonial matters, to the detriment of the 
freedom of people in the developing world. Acheson’s moral courage consisted of accepting moral 
inconsistency in the interest of the larger struggle.197 Yet, there was a deep personal need to see 
American power enlisted in a struggle defined in moral terms.  
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It is interesting to note that the sweeping universality of the Truman Doctrine confounded 
realist thinkers. “The Truman Doctrine,” Hans Morgenthau wrote in his Politics among Nations (1948), 
“transformed a concrete interest of the United States in a geographically defined part of the world 
into a moral principle of worldwide validity, to be applied regardless of the limits of American 
interest and power.” 198  Kennan supported assisting Greece and Turkey, but was disturbed by 
Truman’s language because it “placed our aid to Greece in the framework of a universal policy 
rather than in that of a specific decision addressed to a specific set of circumstances.” It caused him 
to deplore the “congenital aversion of Americans to taking specific decisions on specific problems, 
and […] their persistent urge to seek universal formulae or doctrines in which to clothe and justify 
particular actions.”199 Few realists were more distressed by the sweeping moralism of the Truman 
Doctrine than Walter Lippmann. He was decidedly in favor of military assistance to Greece, but 
believed the indiscriminateness of Truman’s speech was fraught with danger: “A vague global policy, 
which sounds like the tocsin [sic] of an ideological crusade, has no limits. It cannot be controlled. Its 
effects cannot be predicted.”200  
The reaction of these and other conservative realists helps to point out an important aspect 
of Acheson’s approach to international affairs. By limiting assistance to a specific case while 
proclaiming to strengthen the forces of freedom around the world, the Truman Doctrine effectively 
combined the two main traditions of American foreign policy: liberal idealism and conservative 
realism. Acheson essentially drew from both traditions to formulate one overarching internationalist 
policy which he thought would be most effective in dealing with the situation at hand. It was 
Wilsonian in its inspiring, universal message of freedom, which provided almost instant justification 
for intervention abroad; yet, it was Hamiltonian in its insistence on case-by-case judgment which 
took account of the limited resources at the United States’ disposal and retained a clear view of the 
interests at stake in a specific situation. In the Congressional hearings following Truman’s speech, 
Acheson and other officials went out of their way to explain that the specific request was limited to 
assisting Greece and Turkey and that the new doctrine did not automatically require the United 
States to intervene elsewhere. Regardless of the language of Truman’s speech, this allowed for a 
measure of discrimination in responding to events. “Our resources are not unlimited,” Truman 
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himself told the Inter-American Conference in September 1947. “We must apply them where they 
can serve the most effectively to bring production, freedom, and confidence back to the world.”201 
Acheson’s approach clearly provided ample room for pragmatic considerations, but such 
considerations were set within the framework of a doctrine of universal values. Since there obviously 
would be a margin of error, much would depend on the sound judgment – both morally and 
politically – of the people in charge of American foreign policy. In a way, this judgment revolved 
around their ability to keep liberal and conservative predilections in balance when real decisions on 
where and how to intervene were being made. 
The alliance of force and morality displayed in the Truman Doctrine and subsequently in 
National Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC-68) of April 1950, which called for massive 
increases in military spending, would continue to guide Acheson’s thinking after leaving office in 
1953. In his endeavor to distinguish good from evil, he was undoubtedly helped by the “queer ability 
to untie mental knots and snarls” which he had acquired as a lawyer.202 It enabled Acheson to 
appreciate the “facts” of the situation and fixate his aims in chaotic times. All along he would display 
an ample dose of pragmatism and realism. However, at the core of his outlook lay a moral certitude 
about his American values. Despite his strong attachment to the Anglo-American partnership, it 
would be wrong to cast Acheson as more British than the British. Sir Oliver Franks, for instance, 
denied that Acheson was an “English or British type” and described his mental constitution as 
that of “a pure American type of a rather rare species […], never forgetting and always going 
back to the root from which it all sprang.”203  
Acheson is most often described as a “quintessential American realist.”204 He has also been 
typecast as a “romantic imperialist” 205  or as a “Victorian” and a “lawyer.” 206  All of these 
characterizations capture at least part of Acheson. He was, in some ways, not the obvious 
Establishmentarian. His fierce public criticism of the Eisenhower administration’s foreign and 
defense policy and his visceral dislike of John Foster Dulles made him more partisan than most. His 
inflexible hard-line stance against communism, for instance in his advice to President Kennedy 
during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, also set him somewhat apart. The point made here, however, 
is that he epitomized the Establishment in his ability to blend liberal and conservative beliefs. His 
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values were overwhelmingly shaped by American liberalism, while his methods were those of the 
lawyer and conservative realist with a penchant for power politics. As a result, his liberalism was of a 
particularly muscular type, which sought to express itself in forceful action rather than words. 
 
The Transatlantic Acheson and the Growth of the Atlantic Community 
There is no question that, in the context of the Cold War, strengthening the Atlantic community 
was the central objective of Acheson’s public life ever since the crisis – “my crisis” – of 1947. 
Although an anti-communist hard-liner, he was at heart less concerned with the communist 
threat in Asia than with the Soviet threat in Europe. For Acheson, the most urgent task was to 
knit Europe and the United States – the essential components of the Free World – together. Perhaps, 
as one historian surmised, the absence from his mind of the Europhobia which had affected FDR’s 
postwar designs as well as his relative lack of direct exposure to Europe – between 1938 and 1949 
Acheson did not personally visit the continent – “made him a uniquely appropriate vehicle of the 
U.S. departure from isolationism after 1946.”207 His transatlantic conviction became even stronger 
after he left the State Department in 1953. “The purpose of the coalition must be to strengthen the 
coalition and bind it more closely together – or to weaken an opposing coalition…,” he wrote in 
1954. “This rule must be an ever present guide.”208 His pleas for strengthening the Atlantic 
community moreover became increasingly insistent as the 1950s drew to an end. Acheson led the 
charge against George Kennan’s call in his Reith Lectures in 1957 for superpower disengagement 
from Europe, throwing his frightful debating style into the fray.209 In 1959 he went on to press 
for adding an economic and political dimension to NATO, and then for establishing an entirely 
new supranational institution in which the new Common Market would be joined with Great 
Britain, the United States, and Canada.210 “The essential truth,” he wrote in 1961, “is that the 
hope of the whole free world, developed and undeveloped nations alike, lies in the ever closer 
association and economic growth of Western Europe and North America.”211  
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To an important degree, of course, Acheson’s commitment to the transatlantic link 
reflected that of many who had taken a part in shaping America’s postwar policies. While the 
Truman administration and consecutive administrations were circumspect about concrete 
proposals to establish a “true” Atlantic community, let alone about Clarence Streit’s calls for an 
Atlantic federal union, they did lend credence to the idea that the transatlantic relationship could 
develop into a political community of sorts. In fact, the institutional development of NATO and 
the OECD is difficult to understand without it. The significance of NATO, in particular, was 
interpreted as extending well beyond the defensive purposes defined in the Washington Treaty. 
The sparing language of the Treaty allowed for indulging in alluring vistas of transatlantic 
cooperation. 212  This was encouraged by official statements about the alliance. Acheson’s radio 
address of March 18, 1949, at the publication of the text of the North Atlantic Treaty, for one, was 
Wilsonian in its emphasis on the “settlement of international disputes by peaceful means,” the 
“revival of world trade on a sound and beneficial basis,” and its firmly stated belief that 
“democracies do not and cannot plan aggressive wars.” The United States had put great store by the 
United Nations, but “the system is not working as effectively as we had hoped because one of its 
members has attempted to prevented it from working” – the only reference to the Soviet Union. At 
the same time, Acheson made clear that the new alliance should be regarded as more than a stopgap 
measure. It was the expression of “underlying realities” and rested on “the affinity and natural 
identity of interests of the North Atlantic powers”: 
 
The North Atlantic treaty […] is the product of at least three hundred and fifty years of history, 
perhaps more. There developed on our Atlantic coast a community, which has spread across the 
continent, connected with Western Europe by common institutions and moral and ethical beliefs. 
Similarities of this kind are not superficial, but fundamental. They are the strongest kind of ties, 
because they are based on moral conviction, on acceptance of the same values in life. […] These 
principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law have flourished in this Atlantic 
Community. They have universal validity. […] They are the elements out of which are forged the 
peace and welfare of mankind. Added to this profoundly important basis of understanding is 
another unifying influence – the effect of living on the sea. The sea does not separate people as 
much as it joins them, through trade, travel, mutual understanding and common interests. […] 
North America and Western Europe have formed the two halves of what is in reality one 
community, and have maintained an abiding interest in each other.213 
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This equation of NATO with an evolving Atlantic community was reinforced by the 
remarkable organizational development of the alliance. In a matter of years, particularly after the 
outbreak of the Korean War had heightened fears of a Soviet invasion, an expansive structure was 
built on the treaty’s provisions. “NATO” quickly came to designate both the alliance and the 
Organization.214 This rapid institutionalization of an international treaty obligation was certainly 
unprecedented, and its conception and development involved truly pioneering work. General 
Eisenhower, appointed in the fall of 1950 to become the supreme allied commander in Europe 
(SACEUR) while there was neither an organization to run nor troops to command, remarked in a 
letter to Averell Harriman about the puzzling nature of his task:  
 
One of the most noticeable characteristics of this headquarters is that it is sort of a ‘floating 
island,’ not firmly attached to anything by traditional chains of responsibility, authority, and 
interest. […] While it is true that I am still an American public servant, merely loaned to a rather 
nebulous organization which we call NATO, in a larger sense I have become a modern 
Ishmael.215 
 
As NATO took shape, ideas for further strengthening the transatlantic relationship often 
focused on enlarging its scope. During the early years, for instance, serious consideration was 
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given to broadening its activities to political and economic spheres in elaboration of Article 2 of 
the Treaty.216 Until well into the 1950s there were oft-repeated pleas to give NATO a more 
prominent role in dealing with economic problems, in particular by taking up the task of 
promoting free trade among its members. The report of a committee of ‘Three Wise Men’ in 
1956 more or less ended this discussion within the alliance as it was agreed that most economic 
questions were better left to “other, more appropriate agencies” such as the OEEC. But the same 
committee also recommended that NATO should increasingly provide a framework for foreign 
policy coordination and the development of common strategies. From the late 1950s onwards, in 
part because of the growing problems of containment outside the Atlantic region, the United 
States indeed gave increasing emphasis to enhanced political consultation with its western allies.217 
Interestingly, too, the duration of the Treaty quickly ceased to become an issue even 
though it was initially presented, partly to fend off criticism, as only a temporary expediency 
until the United Nations was able to effectively apply the principle of collective security. After the 
Treaty was ratified, neither 1959, when changes could be made to the Treaty, nor 1969, when a 
member had the right to withdraw entirely, were considered to be important years on the 
American side. When Western Germany joined the alliance in 1955, the United States declared 
that it regarded the Treaty as “of indefinite duration.”218 This was more than merely a reflection 
of the persistence of the Cold War. American officials primarily explained their position from 
NATO’s perceived historic exceptionality. The ‘classical’ alliances of the past had been associations 
of opportunistic and short-lived complexion. NATO, however, was not a traditional alliance. It was 
not ephemeral but, as Acheson had declared, the expression of underlying realities. As 
Undersecretary of State George Ball explained, NATO was not a classical alliance but a “full-
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fledged collective defense arrangement of an unprecedented kind” which defied Pericles’ classical 
notion of the inevitable decay of alliances.219 
Compared to NATO, of course, the institutional development of the OECD was less 
energetic. However, at the time it was considered no less important, in particular because it 
provided an Atlantic framework for the emerging Common Market established by the Treaty of 
Rome of March 1957. As early as 1953, American officials had come to regard the OEEC – the 
OECD’s forerunner – as something that was “becoming an economic organ of the Atlantic 
Community” which furnished “one application of Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty […].”220 
(The OECD indeed grew out of the OEEC when the United States and Canada joined in 1960.) 
The idea to remake the OEEC, when it had largely outlived its purpose of coordinating Marshall 
Plan aid, was born out of a growing fear that the Soviet bloc was on its way to overtaking the 
West in terms of economic growth. By promoting policies of growth, in particular the free flow 
of goods, people, services and capital, the OECD was designed to help reverse this trend. 
Although membership to the organization was left open to countries outside of Europe and 
North America, in particular Japan, the OECD was geared towards mending transatlantic ties in 
the economic field. It would assist in the coordination of economic policies in critical areas such 
as monetary stability, economic growth, development aid and tariff arrangements. However, the 
transformation of the OEEC in a forum for transatlantic economic cooperation was designed, 
too, to assuage growing American concerns that the Common Market would be an inward-
looking entity protected by high tariff walls. It would serve to knit together the Common Market, 
the British-led European Free Trade Area, and the North American economies into one 
economic sphere. The OECD also needed to prove to Americans that the Common Market was 
an asset to the entire free world by providing a forum to engage in a joint development program 
for the developing countries. Even as the OECD never lived up to this promise, even in its early 
days, it was seen as one more mainstay in the institutional development of the Atlantic 
community.221 
In sum, many postwar American policies toward Europe, from the Marshall Plan to the 
establishment of NATO and the OECD, were not only considered imperative in the context of 
the Cold War, but were also supported by a Wilsonian conception of the transatlantic 
relationship. There was an avalanche of American official statements espousing liberal beliefs: 
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that democracies are fundamentally peace-minded, that collective security is to be preferred over 
balance-of-power politics, that NATO is not a traditional alliance, that political and economic 
integration befit a modernizing world, that free trade and economic liberalization are essential to 
achieving prosperity for all, that raising standards of living in the developing world is a task of the 
first order. Liberal internationalism thus added an important program of reform to a transatlantic 
relationship otherwise determined by political, security and economic interests.  
In the course of the 1940s and 1950s, the Atlantic community became a landmark in the 
strategic landscape of the Cold War from the vantage point of the United States. Dean Acheson 
intimately associated with its emergence. In a way, his personal view of the transatlantic 
relationship was that of a romantic. The bonds that tied the two sides of the Atlantic together 
were not those of formal treaty language or economic self-interest, but were organic. They were 
those that tied the constituents of a common civilization. In 1955, Acheson mused: 
 
We are part of something; not something apart. Not gods without, but ganglions within. […] We 
are not an end but an intermediary. For we evoke, we cultivate, we nurture the forces which 
respond to the challenge of our time. We do not create them. They germinate in the common soil 
of our common civilization. We are not architects drawing our own conception on a blank sheet, 
but gardeners […] dealing with material which the life force itself can produce.222 
 
The Western alliance was the garden of which the United States had to be the groundskeeper. In 
his mental geography, the Atlantic Ocean was not a barrier but a link, just as the Mississippi river 
linked New Orleans and Memphis.223  
As an elder statesman, Acheson loomed large over the policies of the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations.224 He had been the driving force in steering the foreign policy agenda of 
the Democratic Party away from the softheaded liberalism of Adlai Stevenson back to the 
“tough-minded, action-oriented, European-dominated, anti-communist foreign policy principles 
of the Truman-Acheson heyday.”225 The “best and brightest” who were in charge of American 
foreign policy during the 1960s – Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and others 
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– considered themselves the heirs of the illustrious generation of the late 1940s, following its 
example of selfless service and tough-minded idealism.226 Much of Acheson’s influence was also 
due to the force of his personality. The combination of clarity of purpose, sharpness of mind and 
acerbity of style made him a fierce figure in councils of decision – in the well-known words of 
Oliver Franks: “a blade of steel.” 227  After Acheson had declined to become ambassador to 
NATO, Kennedy – who frequently referred to Acheson’s “intimidating seniority” – asked him to 
act as his “chief de facto consultant on Atlantic Community affairs.”228 As such, he actively took 
part in shaping the policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, always in support of 
ways to strengthen the transatlantic relationship. “The ultimate goal of the Atlantic nations,” 
Acheson hence recommended in 1961 in a report that would provide the basis for President 
Kennedy’s European policies, “should be to develop a genuine Atlantic commonwealth, in which 
common institutions are increasingly developed to address common problems.”229 Notions such 
as these pervaded the making of American foreign policy at the time, and, as one official recalls, 
“as long as Acheson was pressing them, they were the current doctrine.”230 
The Functions of the Atlantic Community 
An analysis of the notion of the Atlantic community would be incomplete without an 
examination of its diplomatic utility. The idea would not have been so pervasive among 
Americans if it did not further the chief objectives of American foreign policy in the context of 
the Cold War. This it did in at least six ways. 
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Firstly, the perception of a community of likeminded countries in North America and 
Europe served as a justification for the sudden, massive engagement of American power in 
Europe. American foreign policy had for a century and a half tried to steer clear of European 
power politics. Public opinion, which in the United States has a more immediate influence than in 
most other countries, was historically reluctant to engage abroad – and particularly in Europe. 
The Cold War, however, required a sea change in traditional negative attitudes toward Europe. 
The notion of an Atlantic community was important because it gave a more empathic portrayal 
of the transatlantic relationship. As such, as we have seen, it was prevalent in Acheson’s radio 
address of March 1949, which explained the North Atlantic Treaty in terms of natural affinity. 
The justification was also needed for Europe. After particularly difficult talks on German 
rearmament, for instance, Acheson implored with his British and French colleagues that the 
“complete revolution in American foreign policy” under the Truman administration relied on the 
willingness of Europeans to participate in a collective effort: 
 
We were prepared to take steps which were absolutely unprecedented in our history, to place 
substantial forces in Europe, to put these forces in an integrated force for the defense of Europe, 
to agree to a command structure, to agree to a supreme commander, to join in a program for 
integrating European production, to take far reaching steps in the financial field, but all based on 
the expectation that others would do their part….231 
 
American policymakers thus regarded the Atlantic alliance as the peacetime alternative to 
isolationism.232 This was only reinforced by the logic of nuclear deterrence, which raised the 
question whether the United States was prepared to sacrifice New York for Hamburg. Nuclear 
deterrence required that the nuclear guarantee was credible in the eyes of the Soviets; alliance 
cohesion required that it was credible in the eyes of the Europeans. On the American side, the 
atomic age convinced policymakers that a return to isolationism was potentially catastrophic. The 
emphasis on collective action reassured a certain uneasiness in the United States with the 
appearance of American hegemony or empire. Organizing consensus was the very essence of the 
alliance precisely because American leadership wanted to distinguish itself with a consensual 
rather than imperial approach. American exceptionalism created a need to regard the Atlantic 
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alliance, too, as a historical exception. “It seeks not to influence any shifting ‘balance of power,’” 
the State Department declared during the Senate hearings on the Treaty in 1949, “but to 
strengthen the ‘balance of principle’.”233 This allowed Americans to define their engagement in 
Europe against the background of their own history and society. The Atlantic community was 
therefore, in a sense, the American dream writ large and extended to Western Europe. 
Secondly, by presenting the Atlantic alliance as a community rather than as a protectorate, 
American officials were responding to their role as managers – or superintendents – of the 
alliance. As one historian wrote, “Acheson’s legacy was the kind of American entanglement, or 
hegemony, in Europe that the Europeans themselves wanted or were prepared to accept.”234 
Reluctant to impose its will by force, postwar American diplomacy has been marked by a strong 
managerial quality. President Eisenhower explained this approach to leading the alliance by 
recalling a lesson a “very wise commander” once had taught him about the difference between 
“command” and “leadership”: 
 
Put a piece of cooked spaghetti on a platter. Take hold of one end and try to push it in a straight 
line across the plate. You get only a snarled up and knotty thing that resembles nothing on earth. 
Take hold of the other end and gently lead the piece of spaghetti across the plate. Simple!235 
 
In particular during the early years, promoting cohesion between the European countries 
and boosting morale was a day-to-day concern of American officials. Eisenhower, who was 
forewarned by Harriman that his job as SACEUR would be “far more civil than it is military,” 
often found himself reconciling differences between European members of the pact and stressing 
the urgency of the task of building up a collective defense. His letters to Washington underscored 
the importance of “producing and sustaining NATO solidarity” to get the Europeans to take 
their defense efforts more seriously: 
 
All are agreed that morale is the key to this whole problem; success depends upon a unification 
that is built upon a common scale of values, a common appreciation of the risks to those values, 
and a common determination to meet the risks cooperatively. Unless we achieve such unity, all of 
our expenditures on the material side will be in vain. Consequently, we should make a continuing 
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effort in the spiritual field that will match our great expenditures for munitions and for economic 
support.236 
 
American officials grew accustomed to treating the alliance as a division of labor in which 
each country pitched in for the common good. For the alliance to function as such, national 
rivalries and differences between small and large countries necessarily had to fade to the 
background. Encouraging a certain measure of European self-sufficiency within the Atlantic 
community was also important because it kept the prospect of reducing the heavy burden on the 
United States alive. “We cannot be a modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions,” 
Eisenhower believed.237 American troop levels in Europe and European troop levels were seen to 
be communicating vessels. European unification was encouraged in part because it could shift the 
burden of containment toward Europe. This assumed, however, a continuing commonality of 
views between the allies. 
Thirdly, the notion that the alliance represented a community of nations vigorous enough 
to muster the will to collectively defend itself was essential to preventing a European drift into 
neutralism. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Truman administration was deeply concerned 
with an erosion of confidence among Europeans, because this would invariably lead to a 
neutralist or even accommodating stance towards the Soviet Union. The North Atlantic Treaty of 
1949 was designed to prop up European confidence by implicating the United States, but it was 
by itself not enough. Western European governments had actively solicited the American 
commitment to their security. At the same time, however, they were inclined to avoid 
confrontation with the Soviet Union. Struggling to restore living standards destroyed by the war, 
they gave priority to economic and social reconstruction over rearmament. More often than not, 
these governments hinged on weak coalitions or minute parliamentary majorities. Communist 
parties in France, Italy and elsewhere enjoyed popular support because of their wartime role in 
the resistance and argued that the defense effort required by the alliance with the Americans was 
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causing inflation and economic hardship. Meanwhile, in the fall of 1949, the Soviet Union had 
broken the American monopoly of atomic weapons, which until then had compensated for the 
inferior conventional strength of the West. One year later, with Communist China and the 
United States facing each other in the Korean war, a self-confident Moscow seemed to be 
preparing for military confrontation in Europe.238 The United States, on the other hand, appeared 
indecisive, unable to galvanize the nation into harnessing its superior resources. At the outset of 
the 1950s, the North Atlantic alliance was in military terms hardly more than a paper tiger. The 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, warned during a National Security 
Council meeting in Washington in November 1950, that if a global war broke, “we might be in 
danger of losing.” 239  Hence, on its first anniversary, the French journalist Servan-Schreiber 
concluded that the Treaty had not produced a sense of security in Europe, that American 
isolationism and European neutralism still lurked around the corner, and that the alliance was too 
weak to resist a Soviet attack.240  
NSC-68, which set the United States on the course of an ambitious rearmament program, 
was permeated with a fear that European mental weakness would lead to Soviet domination on 
the European continent, thus isolating the United States in its own hemisphere not as a result of 
a “conscious decision” but by “withdrawal under pressure” which “might come from our present 
Allies.” One of the main purposes of NSC-68 was thus to give evidence of American strength 
and willpower in the eyes of Europeans.241 It was also full of sweeping statements, contrasting 
Communist “slave society” with the Free World, which made clear that it was at least as 
important to wage the struggle in ideological terms. Military preparedness was from the outset 
only a part of the effort. “Unless the Treaty becomes much more than a military alliance,” Sena-
tor Arthur Vandenberg cautioned, “it will be at the mercy of the first plausible Soviet peace 
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offensive.”242 The fear of European neutralism jolted the American government into action in 
many areas, transforming Europe into an arena of virtual “cultural combat.” Organizations such 
as the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were 
at the forefront of this effort. A range of cultural and educational activities was initiated to 
provided a counterweight to Soviet propaganda.243 In short, the Cold War could be won only if 
the United States succeeded in drawing the Europeans into the Atlantic community.  
Fourthly, the Atlantic community was required as a framework for European integration 
– both to make it possible and to ensure that it did not work against American interests. From 
the onset of the Cold War, there was a nagging concern on the part of successive governments 
about the country’s limited resources. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy furthermore feared the 
consequences of the United States’ relative decline. In either case, Europe was looked at as part 
of the answer. American support for European integration was strong because it appealed to the 
proponents of aloofness as well as of those of engagement, to conservative as well as liberal 
tendencies in American foreign policy. This duality also explains one of the inner contradictions 
of American postwar policy: the support for Great Britain’s entry into the Common Market even 
though this entry would evidently lead the movement toward European unity away from the 
integration model favored by most American policymakers.  
Support for European integration was overwhelming and discussions on whether it 
served the long-term American interest were abortive. But this is not the same as saying that this 
support was unconditional. “There was always an inarticulate premise to our support for 
European unity …,” Eisenhower’s Undersecretary of State Livingston Merchant explained in 
1963. “Such unity was desirable in our point of view in the framework of an Atlantic community 
to which we belonged. The new Europe we urged and hoped for was to be eventually a desirable 
partner with Canada and the United States, not an economic or political rival.”244 It rested on the 
assumption that it would strengthen rather than divide the Western alliance. When William 
Draper, an American diplomat, asked the State Department in the fall of 1952 whether 
Washington feared an integrated Europe would emerge as a ‘3rd Force’ he was told that “little 
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consideration had been given […] to this possibility.” However, in the light of this new 
development, strengthening Atlantic ties was considered all the more important – almost by way 
of insurance, both to nudge the Europeans further along this path and to ensure that unity was 
reached on terms agreeable to the United States.245 Draper authored a report in May 1953 which 
reflected general support for European integration on these terms “regardless of whether the 
Soviets blow hot or cold.” The United States had engaged in two wars in Europe “to prevent a 
single European power from forcing a political integration of Europe” contrary to American 
interests. The model of European integration that emerged in the late 1940s at least held out the 
promise of resolving the European Question, which had preoccupied American foreign policy 
from the outset, on constructive terms. But the United States needed to watch its guard to 
“minimize the possibility that the power vested in the new European institutions might be 
usurped” and to ensure that “the fabric of common Atlantic interests and outlook should be 
strong enough” so that “European leaders” would not undermine the Western alliance.246  
Fifthly, the Atlantic framework was needed to nurture a westward orientation in German 
political loyalties and to enable the mobilization of German industrial and human resources in the 
Cold War. Germany was without doubt the biggest stake in the Cold War and channeling its 
power – potential or real – was the central issue shaping the postwar European settlement.247 
After the outbreak of the Korean War, there was a growing consensus among American officials 
that German rearmament was the key to erecting an even faintly credible defense in Europe 
against Soviet conventional forces. Until 1955, when Germany finally joined NATO after the 
proposal for a European Defense Community had been defeated in the French parliament, 
American diplomacy was preoccupied with finding a framework which made this possible. This 
essentially came down to reconciling other Europeans to the prospect of a resuscitated Germany. 
Both France and Great Britain made clear at various times that they could only live with a 
rearmed Germany if this would go hand-in-hand with much closer involvement of the United 
States.248 As a result, nothing came of Lippmann’s – and Kennan’s – preference for a neutralized 
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Germany outside the Atlantic community. Germany – or at least the western zones – had to be 
included through co-optation. 
Strengthening Atlantic ties was not only important for resolving the immediate problem 
of rearmament, but also for retaining German political loyalties and preparing for the time in 
which Germany would be removed as the bone of contention between East and West. The 
German mindset became one of the most nerve-racking concerns of postwar American foreign 
policy. At the very least, it required keeping the perspective of reunification alive and avoiding a 
sense of inequality or subjugation in German body politic. In November 1951, after another 
round of difficult discussions with the French and the British about military production in 
Germany, Acheson cabled President Truman to express his view that:  
 
… in the case of Germany as with Japan, […] the best avenue to security is in the framework of a 
positive approach rather than through retention of negative restrictions by legal contract. The 
difficulty with the latter is that they give illusionary protection for an interim period yet become 
unworkable at [the] very moment they might be needed in the future. Our security against 
Germany for the future lies more along the lines of tieing [sic] Germany in every possible way to 
the west through such mechanisms as the Schuman Plan, European defense force and, eventually, 
NATO. I do not […] believe we can successfully attempt to accomplish two contradictory 
programs at the same time, i.e., that of bringing Germany wholeheartedly into the west on a basis 
of equality and that of retaining a distrustful attitude resulting in obvious inequality.249 
 
Given the prevailing distrust of Germany in Europe, the notion of an Atlantic community – by 
implying the permanent presence of the United States and creating a sense of belonging among 
Germans – helped to ease Germany into the west. 
Sixthly, and lastly, there was the expectation that by knitting Europe and North America 
together in close alliance, this would help generate European support for containing communism 
in other parts of the world and instill an attitude among Europeans considered more productive 
by Americans than old-fashioned colonialism. This conception of the transatlantic relationship as 
the hub of the free world is particularly evident in Dean Rusk’s report of a conversation with 
Chancellor Adenauer in June 1962:  
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I emphasized that it was in the fundamental interest and policy of the U.S. that Germany and 
France be intimately associated but that we saw this within the framework of joint leadership and 
a united Europe and in an Atlantic Community with ever closer associations with North America. 
I pointed out that the Atlantic Community is a nexus of interlocking special relationships reaching 
around the globe, including the Inter-American system, the Commonwealth, French associations 
in Africa and the welcome development of German interests outside Europe.250  
 
European support was not only important because many European countries still carried 
clout overseas, but also because the manner in which they were devolving themselves of their 
colonial empires was important to winning the hearts and minds of the developing world. In this 
respect, the American government was continually faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, it 
was clearly averse to European imperialism and favored granting independence to colonies. On 
the other hand, its policies toward the developing world were held hostage by the priority given 
to Europe, the fear that communism would be the main beneficiary of the will to independence 
and Washington’s own reluctance to assume additional burdens. In the context of the Cold War, 
Americans increasingly viewed European colonial possessions as pawns in the worldwide struggle 
against communism. This put Europeans in a position to demand American support for their 
colonial policies. The United States often – though not always, as the case of the Netherlands 
East Indies shows – felt compelled to render that support even if these policies were seen to be 
counterproductive. To solve its dilemma, Washington attached strings to its material support and 
tried to influence European policies. Because most European countries resented meddling in 
their colonial affairs, this approach was hardly effective and led to bitter mutual recrimination. It 
was thus obvious to most American policymakers that the best long-term strategy to containing 
communism in the developing world involved persuading the Europeans to mend their colonial 
ways and adopt a more constructive approach. It was in this sense that an evolving Atlantic 
community was seen as providing the nexus of the free world. 
 
 * * * 
 
For all of these reasons, it would be wrong to treat the idea of an Atlantic community as little 
more than a figure of speech. It was in fact a landmark in the strategic landscape of the early 
decades of the Cold War. It was an integral part of the outlook of a whole generation of 
American policymakers: a kind of ideal, never fully realized or realizable because of its wishful 
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elements, but conditioning thought or action. It conveyed the expectations many Americans 
cherished about the transatlantic relationship after World War II. As a result, this relationship 
became more than a bulwark against communism. It served as evidence of the ‘enlightened’ 
character of postwar American foreign policy. But this also caused the transatlantic relationship 
to become loaded with expectations about its future development. There was always a concern 
that a lack of movement toward the Atlantic community might cause a return to the past. “If 
there was to be peace in Europe and in the world,” Ball argued after the French withdrawal from 
NATO in 1966, “the old national rivalries had to be replaced by something more constructive.”251 
That “something more constructive” hardly resembled the state of affairs in 1966. As a result, the 
old American distrust of Europe could resurface. 
                                                 












Organizing the West: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and de Gaulle’s 
‘Tripartite’ Memorandum Proposal, 1958-1962 
 
 
De Gaulle never lost sight of his aim to restore France’s position of eminence in world politics, 
not even as it teetered on the brink of civil war over Algeria. On September 17, 1958, he threw 
down an unusual gauntlet, merely three months after having resumed the reins of power and 
eleven days before a new constitution was approved by the French people. He wrote a secret 
memorandum to President Dwight Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
proposing a shake-up of the Western alliance. De Gaulle advocated a new “security organization” 
in which the United States, Great Britain, and France would make “joint decisions on political 
questions affecting world security” and draw up “strategic plans of action, notably with regard to 
the employment of nuclear weapons.” De Gaulle was thus in effect demanding a say in America’s 
global policies and a veto over the use of American nuclear weapons. He furthermore suggested 
that the world be carved up among the three nations in “theaters of operations,” which were to 
be “subordinated” to the new organization. The memorandum furthermore issued a veiled threat 
to NATO, since de Gaulle wrote that France “subordinates to it [the new security organization] 
as of now all developments of its present participation in NATO […].”1 In essence, as de Gaulle 
observed in his memoirs, he proposed that “the alliance should henceforth be placed under a 
triple rather than dual direction, failing which France would take no further part in NATO 
developments and would reserve the right […] either to demand its reform or to leave it.”2  
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De Gaulle’s ‘tripartite’ memorandum is well known.3 What is less known is the extent to 
which it preoccupied diplomatic relations between Washington, London, and Paris. For much of 
the 1960s, French diplomats encouraged the notion that the United States had never replied to de 
Gaulle’s memorandum (until the United States Senate set the record straight following France’s 
withdrawal from NATO).4 Eisenhower’s written reply of October 20, 1958, was in fact only the 
beginning of an elaborate correspondence and a prolonged series of diplomatic contacts. While 
the gist of the initial reply was unmistakably negative, Eisenhower recognized that de Gaulle had 
raised fundamental questions about the Western alliance that could not be ignored. He was 
furthermore concerned with the repercussions of a complete rejection for French participation in 
NATO. In the end, Eisenhower failed to come to terms with de Gaulle on the organization of 
the Western alliance. But it was a conclusion arrived at after much private questioning. 
What is less known too is that de Gaulle’s insistence on a tripartite organization did not 
end with Eisenhower’s departure from the White House, for he made a purposeful effort to 
warm the incoming Kennedy administration to his tripartite design for the Western alliance. De 
Gaulle only seems to have truly abandoned this effort in the course of 1962, with the resolution 
of the Algerian conflict in May, Kennedy’s unilateral handling of the Cuban missile crisis in 
October, and the Anglo-American summit meeting at Nassau (on the Bahamas) in December. 
De Gaulle’s ‘memorandum diplomacy’ thus coincided with what is often considered to be the 
first phase of his foreign policy, during which France still pursued its security policies within the 
framework of the Atlantic alliance and, as Edward Kolodziej put it, strove for “big power status 
through cooperation and cooptation.”5 
                                                 
3 Journalist David Schoenbrun was the first to consider de Gaulle’s memorandum proposal, in The Three Lives of 
Charles de Gaulle (New York: Atheneum, 1965), 295-303. John Newhouse is biased towards the ‘Anglo-Saxons,’ but 
his account is well-informed; see De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons, chapter 3. Kohl analyzes the proposal within the 
framework of French nuclear diplomacy. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, 70-81. Kolodziej and Harrison deal with the 
memorandum proposal in their excellent studies on French security policy. Kolodziej, French International Policy Under 
De Gaulle and Pompidou, 71-86; Harrison, The Reluctant Ally, 16-20, 86-101. In particular Harrison’s analysis remains 
one of the most complete and penetrating. Maurice Vaïsse discusses the roots of the memorandum proposal in the 
Fourth Republic in “Aux origines du memorandum de Septembre 1958,” Relations Internationales 58, Summer 1989: 
253-263. Also: “Un dialogue de sourds: les relations nucléaires franco-américaines de 1957 à 1960,” Relations 
Internationales 68, Winter 1991: 407-423. Cerny discusses the memorandum, which he explains from a miscalculation 
on de Gaulle’s part instilled by his long absence from power, yet has no eye for de Gaulle’s subsequent diplomacy. 
Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur, chapter seven. Elizabeth Sherwood devotes a chapter to de Gaulle’s memorandum 
diplomacy in her Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 
95-110. Costigliola discusses de Gaulle’s memorandum proposal and the American response on the basis of a review 
of primary sources, but his discussion is cursive at best. Costigliola, France and the United States, 123-127. Bozo largely 
describes to issue from de Gaulle’s perspective, although he has made use of both American and French primary 
sources. Bozo, Two Strategies For Europe, see chapters 1 and 2. 
4 Eisenhower’s response to de Gaulle’s letter was made public in the summer of 1966 by Senator Henry Jackson, 
then chairman of the Senate subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. 
5 Kolodziej, French International Policy Under De Gaulle and Pompidou, 71-86. 




This chapter will examine the American response to de Gaulle’s memorandum proposal 
and the ensuing diplomacy from 1958 to 1962. Eisenhower’s inability to come to terms with de 
Gaulle set a precedent for later administrations. It set the stage for a political row that would 
come to shake the Western alliance to its very foundations. De Gaulle’s decision in 1966 to 
withdraw France from NATO, which had been foreshadowed in the September 1958 memoran-
dum, at least restated the question whether the United States could not have given his ‘tripartite’ 
proposal more serious consideration. What were the principal reasons for Eisenhower’s and 
Kennedy’s disinclination to go along with de Gaulle’s proposal? What concessions were they 
prepared to make in order to preserve French cooperation within NATO? Could a quid pro quo 
have produced a bilateral understanding on the organization of the Western alliance? Or were de 
Gaulle’s demands simply too high? 
 
Eisenhower, De Gaulle, and the End of the Fourth Republic 
The Fourth Republic’s Acrimonious Colonial Woes 
“For at least two years before he became his country’s president,” Eisenhower wrote in his 
memoirs, “I had often remarked […] that only General de Gaulle’s accession to power could save 
France.”6 Eisenhower had not always looked so favorably upon de Gaulle’s return to politics, as 
we will see, but in 1958 it was greeted in Washington with a degree of relief and even of “relative 
alacrity.”7 This is to be largely explained from the deep concern in Washington with the disarray 
and irascibility of the politics of the Fourth Republic. By 1958, of course, France was deeply 
enmeshed in the war in Algeria. The battle with the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), the 
Algerian rebel movement, had been exacting an increasingly heavy toll since it had begun in the 
mid-1950s; by 1957, the Algerian rebels were expanding the scope of their insurgency to France 
itself. Ominously, the war was also eroding civilian authority over an army thirsting for victory 
after its defeat in French Indochina in 1954 and the humiliating withdrawal from the Suez canal 
under American pressure in December 1956.8 While de Gaulle kept a purposely ambiguous and 
largely taciturn pose, a cabal of faithful Gaullists was working feverishly to nudge the Fourth 
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Republic to its end. As Henri Guillemin noted, “the Gaullist strategy consisted of allowing the 
political class to see the threat of violence and therefore to side with him, and to let the soldiers 
believe he was their man.”9 By May 1958, de Gaulle thus seemed to many – though not all – the 
only alternative to civil war and the only one capable of bringing the French army back into the 
fold.10 
It is important to note that the Fourth Republic’s demise was attended with particular 
acrimony and exasperation in the Franco-American relationship. To some extent this demise was 
even precipitated by developments in this relationship, for the government of Félix Gaillard had 
been brought down in April 1958 in part by his concurrence with an Anglo-American mediating 
mission that was seen by many Frenchmen as yet another Anglo-Saxon attempt to interfere in 
national affairs.11 More generally, few issues had indeed been a more constant source of terse 
disagreement between the United States and the Fourth Republic than how to deal with the world 
beyond Europe. Washington feared in particular that France’s repressive colonial policies in Africa 
and Asia played into the hands of communism. “We have to be spokesman for those wanting 
independence or we will be licked,” John Foster Dulles once remarked. 12  In Indochina, the 
Eisenhower administration had initially backed the French struggle against the Viet Minh while 
pressuring Paris to give Vietnam autonomy. Following the French military defeat at Dien Bien Phu 
and the Geneva Agreements of 1954, however, it had elbowed the French out of the way in order to 
back the anti-French and anti-Communist Diem. “France is creating a vacuum in the world 
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wherever she is,” John Foster Dulles remarked;  the United States “had to fill that vacuum … [or] 
we could lose Europe, Asia and Africa all at once.”13 
The nefarious impact of colonial issues on relationships within the Western alliance 
surfaced even more clearly in the Suez crisis. The debacle of the Franco-British military 
intervention in October-November 1956 to recapture the Suez canal after its nationalization by 
Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, contained particularly harsh lessons for Paris. Eisenhower’s public 
condemnation and the United States’ stance in the United Nations Security Council left the 
French with a defining sense of betrayal. The Suez crisis persuaded many in France that it needed 
to become more independent from the United States and Great Britain.14 Most Frenchmen put the 
blame for their déconfiture on the Americans rather than the British (who had quickly buckled under 
American pressure), the Soviets, or the Egyptians. Following the crisis, one American diplomat 
serving in France recalled, “everywhere we went we were immediately attacked […] about this 
treacherous and stupid policy of ours.” 15  The lack of American support in France’s colonial 
troubles generally engendered ill will towards the idea of building an Atlantic community; or as 
Alfred Grosser has observed, it created “misunderstandings and disputes of such importance that 
the term ‘Atlantic Community’ was pronounced by Frenchmen with rather bitter irony.”16 
As early as 1955, the Eisenhower administration had privately concluded that France 
could not win the war in Algeria.17 It was moreover thoroughly displeased with the ever-growing 
diversion of French troops from NATO to North Africa. By the end of 1957, France’s Algerian 
predicament was beginning to undercut the Cold War alliance in political ways as well. On 
November 14, 1957, after American and British arms deliveries to the newly independent Tunisia 
had become public, Eisenhower recorded in his diary that the Gaillard government threatened 
“the most dire things such as a complete breakup of the Western Alliance.”18 One day earlier he 
had expressed his apprehension about the deterioration in the Franco-American relationship to 
John Foster Dulles in equally dire terms: “it gets thicker and thicker – if the French suddenly 
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drop out of NATO we are out of Europe.”19 “If the French exhaustion occurs,” Dulles observed 
upon the fall of the Gaillard government in April 1958, “there may be a government in France 
which depends upon Communist support and it may be disposed not only to allow North Africa 
to come under Communist domination but to be negative toward NATO and the organizations 
of Western European unity [...].”20 
 
Eisenhower and The Fourth Republic as Europe’s “Weak Sister” 
The Fourth Republic’s wear and tear in the relationship with Washington was not confined to 
colonial issues but it was also evident in the realm of intra-European politics. Historians are wont 
to point out how the Fourth Republic, despite its weak international position and dependence on 
American aid, was able to defend its autonomy in the postwar years and how American attempts 
to forge it into a more cooperative ally were botched by a steady French reluctance to conform.21 
France’s remarkable economic recovery in the decade following the war deserves mention, too, 
causing something of a “reversal of fortune” with Great Britain.22 Yet, notwithstanding these 
assessments of the Fourth Republic’s strength and resilience, the Fourth Republic was more 
typically perceived by American policymakers as a fickle ally within the Cold War alliance– or, as 
Ambassador  Douglas Dillon put it, its “weak sister.”23 
France’s perceived weakness was the more disconcerting because French leadership in 
Europe was considered to be imperative, in particular with regard to European integration and 
Franco-German reconciliation. “The best chance and hope seems to us to be under French 
leadership,” Dean Acheson told Robert Schuman in September 1949. “It doesn’t work for us to 
take the lead. We are too far away.”24 France did take the lead in establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community in 1951 following the Schuman proposals of 1950. But the frenzied politics 
of the French Fourth Republic continued to be a cause for concern in Washington, drawing the 
United States ever further into European politics. “Is the Western alliance doomed because of a 
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rotten core?,” mused Acheson in 1953, shortly after his departure from the State Department.25 
His anxious foreboding only seemed to be confirmed when, in August 1954, the French National 
Assembly rejected the proposal for a European Defense Community – and German rearmament 
with it – despite heavy pressure from the Eisenhower administration. After the votes were 
counted, the Communists in the Assembly jumped up to sing the Marseillaisse, promptly joined by 
the Gaullists in a rare demonstration of unison. 
Eisenhower’s personal assessment of the Fourth Republic was similar in vexation to that 
of most American policymakers. As SACEUR, he had been particularly annoyed with France’s 
fears about German rearmament and its refusal to bring French troops from overseas to Europe. 
He had come to the conclusion, as he wrote to President Truman in February 1952, that:  
 
at the very bottom of all their [the French] ‘backing and filling,’ their seemingly contradictory 
statements and actions, is an instinctive, inbred fear of Germany and the Germans. With a 
growing realization of the severity of their economic crisis, occasioned partly, although not 
wholly, by the Indo-China war, they have to accept a slower rate of military preparation than 
originally planned. This, in turn, makes them fear that in any collective venture in Europe, be it 
political, economic, military, or all three, Germany would completely dominate.26 
 
The practical difficulties which “a badly divided Western Europe” posed for organizing 
an effective defense against the Soviet Union persuaded Eisenhower, first as SACEUR and later 
as president, to support the idea of a European army put forward by the French Prime Minister 
Pleven in the summer of 1951. Initially Eisenhower had thought of the idea as including “every 
kind of obstacle, difficulty, and fantastic notion that misguided humans could put together in one 
package.” He feared the plan would create “more antagonism than friendship” and that its failure 
would finish all attempts to re-establish German military strength, which was indispensable to 
reaching the goal of forty divisions considered necessary for the defense of Western Europe 
against a Soviet attack. But he shifted to a more favorable position in response to the practical 
problems he encountered as SACEUR in organizing European defense. Faced with the problem 
of manning the Norwegian army, he wrote to Secretary of Defense George Marshall in the 
summer of 1951:  
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It is easy to see that if Norway were merely a part of a West European political unit, the 
[manning] problem did not exist. In Italy there are almost 3,000,000 unemployed. Such examples 
are multiplied every day. Because of the great efficiency, economy, and general progress that 
could result from a more effective union of these separate countries, I recently decided to 
intervene in the plan for developing a ‘European army.’ 
 
Such an “amalgamation of European resources and strength,” Eisenhower believed, would 
provide the framework for German rearmament “on a basis acceptable to other European 
countries” and at the same time strengthen support in the United States for NATO.27  
While in Europe to set up NATO, Eisenhower thus became an increasingly adamant and 
impatient supporter of European unification. A United States of Europe, he wrote in his diary in 
November 1951, would “instantly … solve the real and bitter problems of today… So many 
advantages would flow from such a union that it is a tragedy for the whole human race that it is 
not done at once.”28 But Eisenhower also believed that political unity was not a prerequisite for 
the establishment of a European army. He rather believed that the reverse was true: that political 
unification would ultimately follow from a European army. “I am certain that there is going to be 
no real progress towards a greater unification of Europe except through the medium of specific 
programs of this kind,” he had assured Marshall. 29  Yet the European Defense Community 
(EDC), for which Eisenhower “swore, prayed, almost wept,”30 did not come about precisely 
because of the national political realities he was so impatient with. A few months after the EDC’s 
defeat, Eisenhower informed Churchill that he wholeheartedly agreed with his allusion to 
France’s “tyrannical weakness.” He further explained his discomfort to his speechwriter Emmet 
Hughes: “I simply cannot understand why the peoples of Western Europe, and particularly of 
France, do not see that, unless they unite militarily and economically, they are doomed.”31  
In American eyes, France was thus a weak and unreliable ally, a vital but vulnerable link in 
the alliance, unable to govern itself or to come to terms with issues facing it in the wider world. 
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Even as consecutive administrations looked to France to lead the continental allies toward greater 
cooperation and integration, the experiences with the Fourth Republic meant that its endeavors 
to gain recognition as a major power never met the full approval of the United States. This was 
no different for Eisenhower. For even before the fall of Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954, he wrote 
his friend Alfred Gruenther, his successor as SACEUR: 
 
Her [France’s] politics in Europe have been nothing but confusion; starts and stops; advances and 
retreats! She wants still to be considered a world power, but is entirely unready to make the 
sacrifices necessary to sustain such a position. [...] she is bound to be shown up, as in Indo-China, 
as incapable of doing anything important by herself.32 
 
The contrast with the American attitude toward Great Britain was evident. The Suez 
crisis had severed the ‘special relationship,’ but only temporarily. When Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan visited Washington in October 1957, he found Eisenhower and Dulles prepared to 
seek an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 – also known as the McMahon Act – in 
order to aid the British nuclear deterrent (even as the United States discouraged France’s nuclear 
effort).33 Great Britain was furthermore granted a confidential agreement on achieving policy 
coordination between Washington and London. Eisenhower outlined this agreement as follows: 
 
Mr. Macmillan and I nominated our respective Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs to consult 
together and to agree on particular areas of policy or on specific problems of a character that 
cannot be easily dealt with through normal channels. In such cases they were directed to establish 
working groups of American and British officials with the composition varied according to 
subject and including representation from all interested Departments and Agencies of the two 
Governments. The main objective of these working groups will be to facilitate the processing of 
problems where the main responsibilities are Anglo-American in character or where prior concert of 
Anglo-American policy would contribute to the more effective functioning of the multilateral organizations to which 
they both belong. Similarly, there will be occasions when it would be desirable, after Anglo-American 
discussions, to make an approach to particular friendly governments with a view of concerting 
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action with them also.34 [emphasis added] 
  
In addition to being an ardent supporter of European unity, Eisenhower clearly saw NATO and 
the Atlantic community in part as an extension of the Anglo-American partnership. One year 
after the Suez debacle, the atmosphere between Washington and London had become so friendly 
again that the The Times reported that “in terms of the Anglo-American alliance, participants in 
the talks have known nothing like them since the war-time conferences of Cairo and Casa-
blanca.”35  
 
‘Ike’ and De Gaulle 
From mid-1957 onwards, American diplomats gradually became more interested in a return of de 
Gaulle. The American embassy in Paris, distressed with the political instability in France, believed 
his return was becoming increasingly probable and even necessary. Embassy officials therefore 
made sure to keep in touch with the Gaullist camp.36 This is far from saying that de Gaulle’s 
return was doctored in Washington or that it was unambiguously desired. Yet, as the years passed 
and the Fourth Republic’s problems grew larger, de Gaulle was increasingly given the benefit of 
the doubt: the prospect of a headstrong but more stable ally at least seemed more alluring than 
that of a chronically unstable Fourth Republic increasingly given to bouts of anti-Americanism. 
Eisenhower, too, took this view.37 
As allied supreme commander during World War II, Eisenhower had had his share of 
confrontations with de Gaulle. His sharpest clash with the Frenchman occurred in December 
1944, when Eisenhower ordered French troops to withdraw from Strasbourg three weeks after it 
had been liberated and just one day after de Gaulle had paid his first visit there. Eisenhower had 
sound military reasons for his decision: he was concerned about consolidating the long allied 
front after the Germans launched their Ardennes offensive. But de Gaulle, believing that a 
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French retreat from Strasbourg would be nothing less than “a national disaster,” furiously 
disagreed and threatened to remove the French troops from Eisenhower’s command. This in 
turn caused Eisenhower to state that ammunition, food and other supplies for de Gaulle’s forces 
would then be withheld. It ultimately took Winston Churchill’s personal intervention to resolve 
the conflict. At the British prime minister’s urging, Eisenhower backed down and Strasbourg was 
held. But the experience caused him to complain to General George Marshall that “next to the 
weather [the French] have caused me more trouble in this war than any other single factor.”38 
Yet Eisenhower never exhibited the degree of antagonism toward de Gaulle found in 
President Roosevelt and other Americans. He managed to preserve a practical working relations-
hip with him during the war, taking the Frenchman’s intransigence with equanimity and even a 
measure of understanding. When visiting Paris in September 1944, for instance, Eisenhower 
deliberately stopped by de Gaulle’s headquarters first “as a de facto recognition of him as the 
provisional president of France”; de Gaulle, he recalled, never forgot the gesture.39 Eisenhower 
has recalled, too, that “it was my influence, more than anybody else’s, that got the French the 
sector in Germany […].”40 Eisenhower’s  stance toward de Gaulle was, to be sure, induced by the 
“military realities” of the war. These advised him that de Gaulle controlled the French resistance, 
that an allied occupation of France would be a waste of manpower, and that French troops could 
be used in the continuing battle with Nazi Germany.41 But in addition to proving himself to be, 
as Raoul Aglion put it, “a better diplomat than many officials and statesmen” in his relationship 
with de Gaulle, Eisenhower also developed respect for de Gaulle’s force of personality.42 De 
Gaulle in turn extended his sympathy to the “generous-hearted” American commander.43 
While the war experience thus probably encouraged Eisenhower to consider de Gaulle’s 
return to power as a solution to France’s political instability by the mid-1950s (as earlier 
mentioned), it would be wrong to conclude that his opinion of de Gaulle was unambiguously 
positive. On the contrary, the archival record shows that he had not always welcomed the idea of 
de Gaulle’s return to power. In fact, as SACEUR in the early 1950s, Eisenhower repeatedly made 
clear that he did not consider de Gaulle’s reinstatement as the solution to France’s woes. He did 
not like de Gaulle’s criticism of NATO and his opposition to the European Defense Community. 
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In March 1952, Eisenhower wrote President Truman that “if General de Gaulle came to power, 
the government headed by him would presumably be reasonably stable […]” but also that “he 
has so blatantly attacked NATO and American policy and position that […] I don’t know what 
would be the results of such a development.”44 Although he increasingly believed the French 
were in need of “a sort of evangelical uprising, following a Billy Sunday or a Pied Piper,”45 he 
emphatically did not seek to cast de Gaulle in this role. A few months before the EDC’s defeat, 
Eisenhower explained himself to General Gruenther: 
 
I believe the difficulty is largely a matter of spirit; unfortunately there is no one in sight who 
seems to have the capability of reversing the trend toward pessimism, defeatism and dejection. [...] 
The only hope is to produce a new and inspirational leader – and I do not mean one that is 6 feet 
5 and considers himself to be, by some miraculous biological and transmigrative process, the 
offspring of Clemenceau and Jeanne d’Arc.46  
 
By the mid-1950s, however, de Gaulle’s return had nonetheless become an increasingly 
attractive prospect from the perspective of the Eisenhower administration. Although de Gaulle 
reentered the political arena with the reputation of a supporter of an Algérie française, he had told 
the American embassy in May 1956 that assimilation of Algeria with France was in his view no 
longer possible and that a loose federation would be the best possible solution (failing which 
Algerian independence would be inevitable).47 Washington’s growing vexation with the partisan 
politics of the Fourth Republic, in addition, was making de Gaulle’s criticism of the Fourth 
Republic easier to associate with. At age sixty-seven, de Gaulle moreover seemed to have become 
more moderate in his views. His physique had changed with time, “conveying wisdom rather 
than intransigence.” His voice had softened. In personal encounters, he was more genial and 
relaxed.48 As the Paris embassy wrote in June 1958, “there is some evidence that with passing 
years he has mellowed and may take in his stride things which in the past might have created 
troubles between us.”49 
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If the Eisenhower administration greeted de Gaulle’s return to power in May 1958 with a 
benevolent sense of relief, however, it was not without an element of concern. At the State 
Department, in particular, it was feared that de Gaulle would chart an independent course in the 
East-West conflict. “Anybody who considers that he alone can save his country may someday 
decide that he is the only one who can save the world,” one senior State Department official 
estimated. “His old concept of France serving as the ‘bridge’ between East and West may not be 
entirely extinct.”50 It was also anticipated that de Gaulle’s longstanding distrust of the Anglo-
American relationship would lead to a greater insistence on a more significant and formalized 
role for France within the Western alliance. Although he was not expected to “willingly break up 
NATO,” demands for nuclear cooperation and a resumption of “Big Three” meetings were 
clearly seen to be in the offing.51 
The anxiety at the State Department about de Gaulle’s intentions was in part also due to 
his relative silence during the years of seclusion in his country home in eastern France, at 
Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises, where he wrote his War Memoirs (whose three volumes were 
subsequently published in 1954, 1956, and 1959). It was fostered, too, by the presence of self-
appointed and not always reliable spokesmen for the General. How confusing French 
assessments of de Gaulle’s intentions could be was evidenced on May 21, 1958, when two 
conflicting reports reached the State Department. In one report, the French Ambassador Hervé 
Alphand told Dulles that de Gaulle was not anti-American but anti-European and that he would 
leave NATO intact but would try to reverse the process of European integration. In another, 
more accurate preview, a member from de Gaulle’s entourage told the American embassy in Paris 
that de Gaulle strongly favored the movement towards European unity (even though the 
“modalities for achieving this would be different”) but that France would have some suggestions 
to make in the Atlantic alliance and would expect to be heard.52 Predicting de Gaulle was thus 
hazardous business. As Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy, not an admirer of de 
Gaulle, wrote in the margins of one estimate of de Gaulle’s intentions: “I feel that at present 
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there are so many points in de Gaulle’s thinking and purposes about which we can only speculate 
with in some cases little of a solid nature to base an opinion.”53  
But at the highest levels of the American government, de Gaulle’s return to power was 
received with positive excitement. “Everything turned out extremely well,” a keyed up Dulles told 
Alphand, repeating himself several times.54 It was felt that Eisenhower’s wartime bonds with de 
Gaulle could be cultivated to keep the General on board. There is little doubt that Eisenhower 
himself believed he could develop a meaningful relationship with his colleague. There was no one, 
he said after reading a Life editorial by C.D. Jackson on de Gaulle in the late spring of 1958, that 
he had had “more satisfying and revealing conversations” with and that “in view of some of the 
constructive steps he took in North Africa as early as 1943, there may be a great deal of hope that 
he can stabilize relations between France and Algeria [...].”55 As Eisenhower knew all too well 
from personal experience, de Gaulle could be a difficult ally. But as long as he continued to 
“tread the path of statesmanship and conciliation,” Eisenhower wrote to Paul Hoffmann in June 
1958, de Gaulle deserved the full support of the United States.56 
Omens of Dissension – The Summer of 1958 
Regardless of the uncertain anticipation in official Washington, de Gaulle proved remarkably 
expeditious in laying down the fundamentals of his policies regarding the Western alliance. 
Indeed, within the span of four months the contours of his design acquired definition – a feat 
that is all the more remarkable given the challenges posed by the Algerian conundrum and the 
constitutional reform of the French state. These fundamentals did not – or, at least, did not yet – 
include an independent policy of rapprochement towards the Soviet Union or a break with the 
European integration movement, as had been feared. On the contrary, de Gaulle proved firm in 
his approaches toward Khrushchev (especially when the latter precipitated the Berlin crisis in 
November 1958). And in December 1958, the French government ordered the accelerated 
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, despite de Gaulle’s reservations about 
its supranational aspects and the lowering of industrial tariffs. “In this poor world,” de Gaulle 
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explained in his Memoirs of Hope, “which deserves to be handled gently, we had to advance step by 
step, acting as circumstances demanded and respecting the susceptibilities of war.”57 
De Gaulle’s policy toward the Western alliance in the initial years of his presidency 
consisted of three interconnected building blocks. Firstly, de Gaulle accelerated the development 
of an independent French nuclear force, allocating more money and effort to the program. On 
July 22, 1958, de Gaulle signed a resolution setting a target date for the first experimental atomic 
explosion in the first quarter of 1960. As importantly, he gave the French nuclear effort a clear 
political payload by making it a mainstay of his policy of independence vis-à-vis the 
superpowers.58 Meeting with his cabinet on June 17, 1958, the first cabinet meeting devoted to 
defense matters, de Gaulle decided that atomic weapons would only be allowed on French soil 
on the condition that these weapons were under French control and that France was involved in 
their strategic planning. Upon arriving to office, he furthermore put an end to discussions on 
nuclear cooperation with Germany and Italy, which had been commenced in the latter days of 
the Fourth Republic.59 
Secondly, de Gaulle made a bid to orchestrate his European concert of nations. On June 
29, 1958, he declined Prime Minister Macmillan’s urgent pleas to end the stalemate in the 
negotiations to associate the Common Market with a larger European free trade zone. This 
reflected his determination that Great Britain should not be allowed to become a power in 
continental Europe where it would compete with France. De Gaulle’s first meeting with 
Adenauer on September 14 and 15, 1958, conducted at his private residence in Colombey-les-
Deux-Eglises, stood in striking contrast with the Franco-British encounter. The French leader 
succeeded in finding common ground with the chancellor, captivated him personally, and 
established a close relationship from which he aimed to “weave a network of preferential ties 
with Germany.”60 Keeping the British at bay and tying the Germans closer to France, the funda-
mentals seemed thus in place for a ‘European’ Europe, centered around France and ready to 
assert its voice in the councils of decision. 
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And, finally, de Gaulle began to put forward the idea of a tripartite organization of the 
Western alliance. When Macmillan paid a visit to Paris in June 1958, de Gaulle told him that he 
gave much significance to the issue of global policy planning between the three major allies and 
would like to get the Standing Group involved. His conversation with Dulles on July 5, which we 
will review in more detail, served a similar purpose.61 During these early meetings, the September 
1958 memorandum was in fact in gestation.62  
 
If the contours of the Gaullist design emerged soon, the gist of the American response was also 
established early. On June 9, 1958, Eisenhower and Dulles met with Macmillan to discuss their 
attitudes towards the new government in Paris. Stressing that de Gaulle could not be treated as if 
he were “like God” and should not be allowed to endanger “our highly successful relationships,” 
Eisenhower summarized their agreed stance: “We would undertake a tripartite relationship with 
de Gaulle in those areas where there exists an historical basis for it, such as in the Summit 
preparations and the re-unification of Germany. Otherwise, we will deal with the French through 
bilateral arrangements and, when appropriate, through NATO.”63 In other words, there was no 
willingness on the part of the Eisenhower administration to accord France an elevated status 
within the Western alliance just because de Gaulle had resumed the reins of power. 
A few days earlier, on June 4, Eisenhower had instructed Secretary of State Dulles to visit 
Paris in order to establish relations with de Gaulle and probe his views.64 Shortly before his 
departure, on July 3, Dulles conferred with Eisenhower on his upcoming rendezvous. They 
agreed that de Gaulle, being “all that stands between France and chaos, or a popular front at 
least,” was entitled to general support from the United States. But on two important issues 
American support could not be extended. In the nuclear realm, French Ambassador Alphand had 
suggested to Dulles that “it would be very helpful if the Secretary could say [to de Gaulle] that 
cooperation with France in this field would be possible once France demonstrated that she had a 
stable government.”65 Eisenhower told Dulles to convey to de Gaulle a “readiness [...] to see what 
could be done by [a] liberal interpretation of existing authority.” Yet it was clear that the 
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Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) would not permit any substantial 
cooperation with France by amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 within the foreseeable 
future. The president moreover revealed no sympathy with respect to the second question, for he 
discarded as “completely unrealistic” an idea that de Gaulle had raised with SACEUR General 
Lauris Norstad,66 namely that of drawing up “world nuclear plans” in a tripartite organization.67 
In essence, Dulles’ task was to assure that the new leader in Paris supported American strategies; 
or, as a high State Department official wrote in a preparatory note, the meeting would provide “a 
unique opportunity to convince the man who will govern France for the next two years [sic] as to 
the validity of our policies.”68 
 Dulles left Washington later that day. The conditions for his encounter with de Gaulle 
were adverse, in particular because of the concurrence with the signing of the British-American 
agreement on nuclear cooperation (which followed the amendment of the Atomic Energy Act).69 
The French newspaper Combat voiced the opinion of many Frenchmen that the amendment 
embodied “the creation of an Anglo-U.S. atomic directorate” and “can only make more apparent 
and more burdensome the hegemony of the English-speaking peoples at the heart of the Atlantic 
Alliance.”70 Anglo-American preponderance and French dependence thus hung heavy in the air 
when Dulles arrived in the French capital. “I remembered,” wrote André Malraux, “seeing John 
Foster Dulles […] drive through the gates of the Hôtel Matignon in an enormous car, like a 
Roman proconsul entering some city of the east.”71 
It is worthwhile to consider Dulles’ conversation with de Gaulle in some detail, for on 
few occasions were conflicting world views so amicably exchanged as during the first 
conversation between the grim American apostle of freedom and the incarnation of French 
grandeur. Both given to long-winded explanations of the global forces at play, Dulles began with 
an expansive monologue on the universal aspirations of the Soviet Union and the increasingly 
global nature of the Communist threat. The Soviets had proven adept, he said, in exploiting the 
divisions in the world at large, drawing Nasser into their orbit, supporting Algerian rebels, 
inciting unrest in Latin America, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia. From the Kremlin, Dulles argued, 
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ferment was orchestrated around the world. Soviet aggression was real but elusive, putting 
Western attempts to counter it at a disadvantage. Having set ambitious industrial development 
policies, Soviet leaders moreover could command a growing array of human and material resour-
ces. In contrast, the West seemed to have lost its “spiritual fervor.” Dulles: “It was the dynamic 
opposed to the quiescent.”  
 Dulles then addressed issues that the launching of the Sputnik, just nine months earlier, 
had brought to the fore. Emphasizing that the alleged “missile gap” was rapidly being closed, he 
tried to assure de Gaulle that the United States would not hesitate to use its strategic force in the 
defense of the West. To make this commitment apparent to friend and foe, the United States was 
prepared to consider a NATO force equipped with tactical nuclear weapons which could be used 
“without having to depend on a US political decision.” While Dulles was careful not to take issue 
with the French nuclear program, this plan would – pending a French decision – include French 
forces.72  
In conclusion, Dulles effectively forestalled any proposal de Gaulle may have had in mind 
concerning a formalized tripartite directorate. He stressed that the political consultations within 
NATO should be extended in order to preserve allied cohesion and effectiveness in peace time: 
“NATO must [...] evolve into a political association as well as a military alliance.” An upgrade for 
France, however, would be undesirable in the light of the formal egalitarianism in the Western 
alliance. There exists de facto leadership for Great Powers in a coalition, Dulles explained; but their 
leadership should not be formalized since this could break the coalition apart. 
The secretary’s long exposition was followed by de Gaulle’s only slightly more to-the-
point monologue which revealed his fundamental difference in outlook. In response to Dulles’ 
analysis of communist behavior, de Gaulle emphasized the nationalist rather than universalistic 
ambitions of Russian leaders. He perceived a continuous line from the Czars to Khrushchev. De 
Gaulle admitted that the Soviet Union used the artificial separation of Party and Government to 
disclaim responsibility for Soviet actions, “much as you do [with] the American Congress.” But 
he played down Soviet strength in the light of the persistent nationalism in Eastern Europe: 
“Russia had not conquered its satellites.” De Gaulle reiterated his determination to build a natio-
nal nuclear force, even if it might take twenty-five years. Responding to Dulles’ plan for the 
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deployment of NATO tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, de Gaulle professed that France had 
no interest in these weapons if they would be subjected to the control of SACEUR or the United 
States. In such a case, he explained, “the disadvantages of having nuclear weapons on French soil 
were not equalized by France playing a role in their use.” De Gaulle flatly stated that all nuclear 
weapons on French soil, even those stockpiled and assigned to American forces, should fall 
under French control. De Gaulle was equally insistent that France be accorded a greater influence 
in world strategy, otherwise “it would not throw itself enthusiastically into the effort of defending 
the Free World.” He stated his dissatisfaction with NATO, indicating that its area coverage was 
particularly insufficient on the southern Mediterranean flank. “France,” he said, “was currently 
torn between Africa and Europe and this situation was reflected in NATO.” The area of 
coverage, therefore, had to be extended to the Middle East and Africa, and NATO command 
structures consequently had to be revised. 
In their brief ensuing conversation, Dulles did not take issue with de Gaulle but focused 
on the situation in Lebanon where the General had warned against the implications in the Middle 
East of any Western intervention.73 In their private tête-à-tête in the afternoon, responding to de 
Gaulle’s statement that the French would become effete if they did not think of themselves as a 
great power, Dulles said that France could only hope to be seen as a great power once it had 
proven to be stable.74 The gap could not be more clearly exposed: while de Gaulle reasoned that 
France needed to think of itself as a great power in order to achieve political stability, Dulles 
believed that France could only be accorded such status once it had proven its political stability. 
While de Gaulle valued the domestic value of a foreign policy of grandeur, the American 
secretary of state was above all concerned with its impact on the solidity of the Cold War alliance. 
De Gaulle had not explicitly pressed for a formal directorate or for American nuclear assistance, 
but his fundamental difference in outlook on the Western alliance had become well exposed. 
Despite their friendly phrasing, de Gaulle’s words were the most forceful yet coming 
from a European ally. Dulles cabled to Washington that his five hours with de Gaulle revealed 
“no sharpness at any point” despite some “differences of emphasis”; de Gaulle, he emphasized, 
had pressed neither for American nuclear assistance nor for a tripartite directorate.75 But this 
report understated the extent of their differences. “It was an important meeting and Dulles talked 
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to me about it on several occasions,” Ambassador Alphand, a participant in the meeting, 
recorded. “He had told de Gaulle that the world was divided in two blocs, the good Western 
liberals and the wicked Communists. He was astonished when de Gaulle replied that he was quite 
mistaken... .”76 The significance of the meeting was that it revealed fundamental disagreements 
about the transatlantic alliance right at the outset of de Gaulle’s presidency. With regard to the 
tripartite idea, Dulles had tried to close the door before de Gaulle could open it. Back in 
Washington a few days later, Ambassador Alphand disclosed that, prior to the meeting, de Gaulle 
had been “much more legalistic in his concept of the tripartite relationship.”77 The day after, 
however, the General told André Malraux that “either there is a West, with a common policy 
towards the rest of the world or else... But there will be no West.”78 
On nuclear matters, too, it was clear that the United States and France stood far apart. 
On July 9, the State Department informed Alphand that “one explosion would not be enough” 
to qualify France for American assistance under the McMahon Act.79 Washington hoped that the 
enormous expense of developing a nuclear force would eventually persuade the French to abort 
their independent program. Despite de Gaulle’s apparent disinterest in a NATO nuclear force, 
the multilateral nuclear framework that Dulles had outlined was elaborated during the summer of 
1958. “It is conceivable,” wrote Acting Secretary of State Herter to the Chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission John McCone, “that, as the costs and difficulties of a national program 
become more apparent to General de Gaulle, he may wish to discuss such a concept with us.”80 
 
Besides Dulles’ conversation with de Gaulle in July, American decisions in other parts of the 
world in the summer of 1958 did not bode well for the Franco-American relationship either. 
Indeed, they would provide the immediate rationale for de Gaulle’s September memorandum. 
The potential implications for European security of American involvement in remote places were 
at the time clearly manifested in Lebanon and the Formosa Straits. On July 15, ten days after de 
Gaulle had warned against an intervention and Dulles had assured him that the United States had 
no such intention, Eisenhower sent marines into Beirut to support the pro-Western President 
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Camille Chamoun.81 The operation was highly offensive to de Gaulle, since French interests in a 
vital region were wholly ignored. Although Paris had been warned that some action in the region 
would be taken, it had not been consulted.82 In Paris, Dulles had said that French participation in 
case of military action in Lebanon would be undesirable because of French ties with Israel and 
the ongoing Algerian war. But could de Gaulle be expected to accept such a behest? The 
American expedition was moreover closely coordinated with the British, who a few days later 
undertook military action of their own to assist the weakened government of King Hussein in 
Jordan. Given that in their meeting on June 29 Macmillan had agreed with de Gaulle that their 
approach should be coordinated, informal agreements with London or Washington on a 
consultative framework must have appeared insufficient to de Gaulle. 83  It must have 
strengthened his determination to shake the Anglo-Saxon club out of its habit of deciding issues 
of the West without consulting France. 
The handling of the crisis over two tiny islands in the Formosa Straits had a similar effect. 
The crisis over Quemoy had really begun in September 1954 when Communist China shelled this 
offshore island, killing two Americans and raising the threat of an invasion. The Eisenhower 
administration had then debated whether to apply the policy of massive retaliation and bomb the 
mainland of China. Eisenhower decided to let the United Nations deal with it and signed a 
mutual defense treaty with Nationalist China (now known as Taiwan) in December 1954. After 
shelling intensified in early 1955, this time with the inclusion of Matsu, the Senate passed the 
Formosa Resolution which authorized the president to do whatever was necessary to protect 
Formosa and the Pescadores – but not Quemoy and Matsu. Trouble over Quemoy and Matsu 
flared anew in August and September 1958 when the islands were shelled again. The Eisenhower 
administration responded by sending the Seventh Fleet to the area. Dulles even urged 
Eisenhower to seriously consider the use of tactical atomic bombs, but the latter decided against 
it.84 
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The United States’ handling of the crisis in the Formosa Straits was among the clearest 
examples of Dulles’ brinkmanship. To Paris, it underlined that the United States could precipitate 
a nuclear conflict, which could implicate France, over regions where French interests were not 
directly involved. De Gaulle was not alone in casting a doubtful eye on American positioning in 
the Far East. The British, too, mindful of their vulnerable position in Hong Kong, were 
concerned.85 The strife over Quemoy and Matsu showed how American decisionmaking in even 
remote corners of the planet, through the diplomatic use of the nuclear weapons arsenal of the 
United States, could be detrimental to the security interests of its Western allies. According to 
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, de Gaulle’s memorandum proposal was in large part a 
reaction to such “systemic interventionism” by the Americans.86 At the least, American decisions 
in the Near and the Far East during the summer of 1958 would reinforce de Gaulle’s demands 
for a more balanced Western partnership in world politics. 
De Gaulle’s “Tripartite” Proposal 
On September 25, 1958, Ambassador Alphand met with John Foster Dulles to deliver de 
Gaulle’s memorandum to President Eisenhower. (A copy of the memorandum was delivered to 
the British Foreign Office in London for Macmillan.) After a quick reading, Dulles imparted to 
Alphand that the message raised “very major problems.”87 The French ambassador could not 
have agreed more. “The sending of this poulet will not contribute to advancing things,” he had 
just written in his diary.88 The final text, dated September 17, had been handwritten by de Gaulle 
on the basis of longer drafts prepared by his diplomatic counsel Jean-Marc Boegner and Foreign 
Minister Maurice Couve de Murville.89 It read as follows: 
 
Recent events in the Middle East and in the straits of Formosa have contributed to show that the 
present organization of the Western Alliance no longer corresponds to the necessary conditions 
of security as far as the whole of the free world is concerned. The sharing of the risks incurred is 
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not matched by indispensable cooperation on decisions taken and on responsibilities. From this 
the French Government is led to draw conclusions and to make several propositions. 
1. The Atlantic Alliance was conceived and its functioning is prepared with a view to an 
eventual zone of action which no longer corresponds to political and strategic realities. The world 
being as it is, one cannot consider as adapted to its purpose an organization such as NATO, 
which is limited to the security of the North Atlantic, as if what is happening, for example, in the 
Middle East and Africa, did not immediately and directly concern Europe, and as if the indivisible 
responsibilities of France did not extend to Africa, to the Indian Ocean and to the Pacific, in the 
same way as those of Great Britain and the United States. Moreover the radius of action of ships 
and planes and the range of missiles render militarily outdated such a narrow system. It is true 
that at first it was admitted that atomic armament, evidently of capital importance, would remain 
for a long time the monopoly of the United States, a fact which might have appeared to justify 
that decisions on the world level concerning defense would be practically delegated to the 
Washington Government. But on this point, also, it must be recognized that such a fact admitted 
originally no longer is justified by reality. 
2. France could, therefore, no longer consider that NATO in its present form meets the 
conditions of security of the free world and notably its own. It appears necessary to it that on the 
level of world policy and strategy there be set up an organization composed of: the United States, 
Great Britain and France. It would be up to this organization, on the one hand, to take joint 
decisions on political questions affecting world security and on the other, to establish and if 
necessary, to put into effect strategic plans of action, notably with regard to the employment of 
nuclear weapons. It would then be possible to foresee and organize eventual theaters of operati-
ons subordinated to the general organization (such as the Arctic, the Atlantic, the Pacific, the 
Indian Ocean), which could if necessary be subdivided into subordinate theaters. 
3. The French Government considers such a security organization indispensable. It (the 
French Government) subordinates to it as of now all developments of its present participation in 
NATO and proposes, should such appear necessary for reaching agreement, to invoke the 
provision for revising the North Atlantic Treaty in accordance with Article 12. 
4. The French Government suggests that the questions raised in this note be the object 
as soon as possible of consultations among the United States, Great Britain and France. It 
proposes that these consultations take place in Washington and at the outset through the 
Embassies and the Permanent Group.90 
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It would be wrong to seek the reasons for de Gaulle’s tripartite proposal exclusively in his 
personal convictions and experiences. Tripartite designs for the Western alliance were part and 
parcel of the Fourth Republic’s foreign policy, too, reflecting the same desire to be treated as a 
major power with global interests.91  French demands for institutionalized great power status 
within the Western alliance actually go as far back as the negotiations over the North Atlantic 
Treaty. After a hard diplomatic battle, France then gained a place in the potentially powerful 
Standing Group, the executive arm of NATO’s Military Committee that consisted of the 
American, British and French top military officials.92 French officials persistently tried to make 
the Standing Group – rather than the Supreme Allied Headquarters in Europe (SHAPE) – the 
central organization within the alliance for military strategic planning.93 In April 1950, prompted 
by the looming loss of French military dominance over West Germany in the European Defense 
Community, Prime Minister Georges Bidault furthermore pressed for an “Atlantic High Council 
of Peace” within NATO with a secretariat and permanent seats for the United States, Great 
Britain and France.94 In 1951, Prime Minister René Pleven twice raised the matter with Acheson 
arguing for a “three-power consultative body (with Britain) to coordinate policy on a worldwide 
basis.”95 Especially after the Suez debacle in 1956, the government of the Fourth Republic had 
consistently voiced complaints that NATO only covered the North Atlantic region and did not 
serve French interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. 96  Consecutive French 
governments thus strove to strengthen France’s position within the Western alliance by 
formalizing participation in some kind of tripartite formula with the United States and Great 
Britain. As Prime Minister Mendès-France wrote in 1954: “The fate of France is indissolubly tied 
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to that of the Western world; its place is within the Atlantic Alliance. But on equal footing and 
not with an inferior rank.”97  
But no French government had ever put the tripartite idea forward in such forceful and 
candid terms. Firstly, he had explicitly linked French participation in NATO to American and 
British preparedness to accept his proposal, whereas his predecessors had been careful to stay 
within the bounds of the alliance. Secondly, by proposing an organization that would jointly 
decide on political matters that affected the security of the Western alliance and by implying a 
French veto over the American nuclear arsenal, de Gaulle’s memorandum went well beyond 
demanding an extension of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ to France. It would 
completely overhaul the relationships between the Western allies built up since the late 1940s. De 
Gaulle essentially proposed to replace the United States with a tripartite organization as the hub 
of the free world. This would not necessarily preclude a preponderant role for the United States 
given its superior resources, but it would certainly impose substantial limitations on American 
decisionmaking.98 
De Gaulle’s proposal was moreover consistent with his strongly-held belief that nation 
states rather than multilateral institutions were the real actors in international politics, and that 
each nation responded to a calling of its own – France’s calling being to lead continental Europe. 
It is noteworthy that, as late as 1959, he was still putting the finishing touches on the last volume 
of his war memoirs. As leader of the Free French during the war, de Gaulle had found that only 
intransigent opposition or unilateral action could gain France access to vital decisions made by 
the Big Three. Did he want to avoid being in the same dependent position vis-à-vis the United 
States and Great Britain as during the war? This interpretation was certainly encouraged by 
Ambassador Alphand, who told American and British officials that de Gaulle really wanted to 
revive the Big Three relationship by which Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin “had consulted and 
planned on a world-wide basis” – the difference being, of course, that France would replace the 
Soviet Union.99  
De Gaulle’s memorandum obviously raised many questions which could not be answered 
by a close reading. Most importantly, the proposed relationship between the tripartite orga-
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nization and NATO was not entirely clear from the memorandum, which rather emphasized 
arrangements for non-NATO areas. Since de Gaulle had mentioned the Atlantic as one of the 
theaters of operation, he most likely envisioned NATO to be, as Macmillan called it, the 
“European branch” of the tripartite organization. De Gaulle’s dislike of NATO was understood. 
But even as he had emphasized the inadequacies of NATO, he had not made any specific propo-
sals with regard to NATO itself. There was the reference to Article 12, which permitted a 
revision of the North Atlantic Treaty after a period of ten years, but what changes in the treaty – 
if any – he envisioned was left unclear. There was also the veiled threat that continued French 
participation in NATO was contingent on the establishment of the tripartite security organization. 
The choice that de Gaulle seemed to be offering the United States was between persisting in its 
unilateral conduct of foreign affairs or matching American policies with those of France and 
Great Britain. 
Other questions surfaced as well. In connection with the idea of carving up the world in 
“theaters of operation,” would each of the three powers be assigned special responsibility for 
specific areas? What then was the relation of de Gaulle’s proposal to the war in Algeria? Did he 
seek the support of the United States? There was also uncertainty whether de Gaulle’s mention of 
joint “strategic plans of action” indeed meant that he demanded a French veto over the use of 
American – and British – nuclear weapons. Or did de Gaulle implicitly ask for American 
assistance to the French nuclear program? The organizational aspects of de Gaulle’s proposal, 
too, were subject to speculation. Would the tripartite organization have a staff and a secretariat? 
Was it to be part of the existing structures of the Atlantic alliance, for instance by building on the 
existing Standing Group or creating a parallel political standing group? All these matters could be 
discussed, as de Gaulle had proposed, by the representatives of the three powers in Washington. 
But the Eisenhower administration, as we will see, was understandably wary of entering into any 
discussions. 
Eisenhower Responds 
What did de Gaulle precisely have in mind with his proposal? How serious was he? It is fair to 
say that the Eisenhower administration was perplexed by de Gaulle’s maneuver – and in private 
conversations, megalomania was soon named the prime motivation for his demands. 100  The 
proposal for what soon came to be called a world directorate – or directoire – was so extraordinary 
as to render it all but dead upon arrival. The rejection was instinctive because the complications 




were immediately apparent. The American military was reluctant to engage in the military 
planning de Gaulle seemed to want. 101  The other European allies were predictably dead-set 
against any notion of an inner circle that would decide matters. De Gaulle had shown the 
memorandum in strictest confidence to NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak on 
September 24, who then told Dulles three days later that the French plan could usher in “the end 
of NATO.”102  The other allies, who were only familiar with the general contents of the 
memorandum, also found ways to make known their dismay.103 Italy was particularly sensitive 
because of its position in the Mediterranean close to the Near East and Africa, regions which in 
de Gaulle’s plan would presumably fall under French influence. 104  The Dutch, Danes, 
Norwegians and Turks resented the inequality implied in the French proposal. And, perhaps 
most importantly, Chancellor Adenauer was distressed about the French proposal.105 On his trip 
to Bonn, Macmillan found Adenauer feeling betrayed since de Gaulle had made no mention of 
his memorandum during their meeting just days earlier.106 Macmillan himself, like Dulles, believed 
it was highly unfortunate that Paris had allowed either the contents or the existence of the 
proposals to be known.107 Like Dulles, too, he also wondered whether de Gaulle could not be 
persuaded to re-write his proposal so that it would be less offensive. 108  This, however, was 
wishful thinking.109 
Washington and London were thus left to come up with a response. Eisenhower’s and 
Macmillan’s disposition toward the tripartite idea was decidedly cool, but they were also cautious 
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and confused. “The best course to follow [is] to sit quietly and not exaggerate the situation,” the 
American president told Ambassador Manlio Brosio of Italy.110 As far as Macmillan was concer-
ned, the idea of systematic tripartite coordination was certainly not as offensive as it was to 
Eisenhower, for he had no interest in arousing French hostility in view of the Free Trade Area 
negotiations with the Common Market. 111  Although the French had made clear that the 
memorandum was not linked in any way to the Free Trade Area discussions and Washington 
warned London not to mix the two issues, the linkage would remain important in British 
deliberations.112 Believing that some form of informal or symbolic tripartitism would probably 
have to be developed to appease Paris, London thus encouraged Washington to be forthco-
ming.113  
French diplomats in Washington believed that the Eisenhower administration would not 
be prepared to seriously consider de Gaulle’s proposal for a tripartite organization. “We knew 
from the start that he was not interested in the idea,” Charles Lucet of the French embassy said. 
“He never said so frankly and clearly ... said it was necessary to study it, but we had the 
impression he was not really interested.”114 Yet, like de Gaulle, John Foster Dulles had often 
lamented the “inadequate” organization of the free world in dealing with the global communist 
threat. As a private citizen in May 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty was being discussed in 
Congress, he had testified that its limitation to Europe would lead to Soviet aggression in other 
places – and the outbreak of the Korean war barely one year later seemed to confirm this 
analysis.115 As secretary of state, the effectiveness of the Western alliance remained a constant 
concern for Dulles. Throughout the 1950s, in particular against the backdrop of the wars of 
national liberation, there was a widespread belief that political diversity was rendering the West 
inferior in comparison with the more tightly dominated Eastern bloc. The Soviet system also 
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appeared better geared than democratic societies towards harnessing the economy for military 
purposes. Dulles was therefore not averse to adaptations to the Western alliance that in his view 
could make it more effective and cohesive. In May 1956, as secretary of state, he had discussed 
the idea of a “political body” overarching the various organizations in the Atlantic region with 
Eisenhower; the latter, however, made clear that he would rather give priority to European 
political integration, which he hoped would lead to a “genuine third force comparable to the 
United States or to the Soviet Union.”116 And in December 1957, at a NATO ministerial meeting, 
Dulles had suggested that the organization should establish liaisons with other defense groupings 
such as SEATO.117  
Even de Gaulle’s suggestion to have a say in nuclear decisionmaking was not as far-
fetched as is often believed – perhaps not even as far-fetched as he himself might have believed. 
In December 1955, Dulles told Eisenhower that he had come to believe “that atomic power was 
too vast a power to be left for the military use of any one country.” He suggested that the United 
States might consider calling together the forty-two nations with which it had security treaties, 
placing before them a proposal for an international group that would decide “when and how to 
use atomic weapons of defense – always reserving of course the right of the United States, in the 
event that it was directly attacked, to use whatever means it had.” Eisenhower was interested in 
the idea and Dulles developed it in a long memorandum in early 1956. He suggested the 
establishment of regional groups, along the lines of NATO, “to study and plan the means 
whereby nuclear weapons could most effectively be used to deter armed attack and to preserve 
peace in each region.” Although nothing came of the idea, Dulles’ concern did not disappear, as 
he frequently expressed it to Eisenhower.118 
Pressures to improve Western coordination were thus not the exclusive domain of de 
Gaulle. As Dulles said to the British ambassador in Washington, “some positive response” to de 
Gaulle’s initiative had to be found.119 He acknowledged that de Gaulle had put his finger on a 
weakness in the position of the West vis-à-vis the East. But Dulles also professed to be at a loss 
in a letter to NATO secretary general Paul-Henri Spaak: “I doubt that the answer [to the 
worldwide nature of the communist threat] is to be found in General de Gaulle’s suggestion; or 
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in attempting to make NATO into a means of reincarnating Western dominance of the world. I 
do not clearly see how we should move.”120 
Spaak himself, a resourceful politician, tried hard to induce Washington to respond in a 
serious and forthcoming manner to the French proposal. Speaking to the Atlantic Treaty 
Association in Boston on September 27, he addressed the issues that de Gaulle had broached in 
his memorandum (although reasons of secrecy obliged him not to make specific mention of the 
document, which de Gaulle had shown him just a few days earlier). The themes he sounded were 
strikingly similar to those of de Gaulle: 
 
This is the moment to ask a vital question: Is NATO, with its present composition, spirit, and 
machinery, still the right answer to the threat which communism represents for the free world? 
[...] Is it sufficient, at the present time, to construct a solid military barrier along the Elbe, on the 
eastern frontier of the free world, if the free world is to be outflanked politically, militarily, and 
economically in the Middle East and Africa? [...] The concept of a military Atlantic Alliance 
restricted to a specific geographical area, adequate in 1949, is [...] no longer so in 1958. A 
common policy, probably of worldwide scope, must be added to it. And it must be done at 
once.121 
 
Although Spaak’s analysis then diverged from that of the French leader – he argued that 
NATO offered ample potential for the needed adjustments –, the Belgian diplomat perceived 
that de Gaulle’s proposal had to lead to some substantial changes. Spaak’s political instincts and 
temperament advised him to leap forward. In keeping with the recommendations of the Three 
Wise Men in 1956, he argued for a considerable expansion within NATO of political consul-
tations (which in his view could represent an “innovation, even a revolution, in diplomatic 
practice”) and of cooperation on non-military matters. In a letter to de Gaulle a month later, in 
which he declared his opposition to a three-power directorate, Spaak stressed that French 
concerns could be addressed by firmly establishing the principle of prior consultation.122 He 
simultaneously urged the United States to respond to de Gaulle’s memorandum proposal by 
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significantly expanding consultations within NATO on military strategy and on areas outside the 
treaty area.123 
Independently from Spaak, the continental European allies found ways to make clear 
their own objections to a tripartite alliance system in which France would speak for them. In 
particular the protestations of the West German and Italian governments carried weight in 
Washington. They made clear that the establishment of a three-power “directorate” superseding 
NATO would politically demoralize the existing alliance system. The reaction from America’s 
non-European allies to a tripartite management of world affairs or a formal extension of NATO’s 
area of coverage was equally likely to be adverse. The risks of a blunt denial, however, were 
equally daunting. As Eisenhower explained to the Italian ambassador in Washington, he had to 
tread carefully. Preserving French cooperation in the framework of NATO was simply too 
important to justify an extemporaneous rejection, and de Gaulle’s character meant that his threats 
had to be taken seriously.124  
Eisenhower, true to his delegating style, did not closely monitor the process of drafting 
an official response to de Gaulle’s memorandum. This was mainly the responsibility of the State 
Department, which, staying in close touch with the British embassy in Washington, tried to come 
to terms with the ideas contained in the memorandum after a brief preliminary reply had been 
sent to Paris on October 2.125 On October 9, 1958, Dulles received a memorandum from his 
European affairs office whose recommendations he approved the next day. Its basic conclusion 
was that rejection of de Gaulle’s proposal was unavoidable. Given the serious objections from 
the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, none of de Gaulle’s proposals in the 
military field were acceptable; as far as military circles were concerned, bilateral military planning 
with the British was already burdensome. De Gaulle’s preference for a tripartite “political 
standing group” was equally undesirable because of the reaction of other allies, both within and 
outside of NATO. However, as a flat rejection could draw a drastic reaction from de Gaulle, it 
was in “the political field where we must find a counterproposal or counter-suggestion suffi-
ciently substantive to prevent a major explosion on his part with the concomitant loss of French 
active participation in NATO [...].” No suggestions were made and it was estimated that none 
would really satisfy de Gaulle; their principal role would be to “allay the effect of our negative 
reaction.” This was also to be the aim of the initial tripartite discussions in Washington which de 
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Gaulle had suggested. Such informal discussions would be a “much better means of thrashing out 
the problem with the French than [...] a relatively negative written reply”; they would represent a 
step in the French direction, give an opportunity to dilute French objectives in a more general 
survey of world problems, and help condition the French to the Anglo-American view.126 
Hence the only initial concession that Washington was willing to make was to discuss the 
plan. On October 13, Eisenhower decided that lower-level informal talks in Washington, such as 
de Gaulle had requested, should indeed be allowed to take place. But as he made his decision, the 
president stressed the importance of explaining to the allies that these meetings would be “for the 
purpose of discussing the plan and [were] not the beginning of carrying into effect” the French 
proposals. He was also not prepared to conduct talks within the Standing Group.127 As a matter 
of fact, Eisenhower and Dulles remained highly ambivalent about going ahead with preliminary 
talks, and in the week before the response was finally transmitted to Paris they seriously questio-
ned their decision. They were extremely concerned lest a pattern for trilateral consultations would 
be established or de Gaulle’s proposals would receive public exposure; this could cause the 
consternation among the NATO allies they were determined to avoid.128 “By far the best deve-
lopment,” Dulles told Ambassador Caccia on October 17 in a burst of wishful thinking, “would 
be the withdrawal of the de Gaulle letter.” The British ambassador, however, insisted that de 
Gaulle could not be left in the cold. Since the United States and Great Britain could not satisfy de 
Gaulle on the substance of the letter, he argued that they should at least agree to talk about the 
form.129 The result was that a reference to exploratory talks two weeks hence was deleted from 
the draft text submitted by the State Department.  
Eisenhower’s official reply to de Gaulle’s memorandum was transmitted to Paris on 
October 20. De Gaulle considered the response to his proposal evasive, since it ignored the 
French proposal for a new security organization as well as its references to joint nuclear and 
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military-strategic planning.130 What was clear was that it amounted to a rebuttal. Eisenhower’s 
reply left little doubt about Washington’s disinclination to overhauling the Western alliance and 
its reluctance to engage in discussions with Paris on the basis of de Gaulle’s proposal. He 
reasoned that the existing system of alliances and multilateral and bilateral arrangements, which 
obviously centered on the United States as their mainstay, already served the purpose of dealing 
with the “world-wide nature of the threat.” If anything, this system needed strengthening, not 
basic reform. Eisenhower particularly stressed the significance of a growing “habit of consultati-
on” within NATO “over the past two years” (which could be read as a reference to the Three 
Wise Men’s report of 1956 but also to the Suez crisis). He supported a broadening of this 
consultative practice, but the letter made clear that he would not agree to any inner councils: “I 
do not believe that we can afford to lose any of this developing intimacy among all the members 
of NATO and the closer bonds it forges.” (emphasis added) On the contrary, the letter implied 
that adoption of de Gaulle’s tripartite proposal would sap the life out of NATO and the other 
Cold War alliances. “We cannot afford to adopt any system which would give to our other allies, 
or other free world countries, the impression that basic decisions affecting their own vital 
interests are being made without their participation.” In addition, Eisenhower foresaw “very 
serious problems, both within and outside NATO, in any effort to amend the North Atlantic 
Treaty so as to extend its coverage beyond the areas presently covered.”131  
Only with the utmost reluctance and circumspection did the United States agree to enter 
into discussions with the French via a tripartite ambassadorial committee (instead of the Standing 
Group). Eisenhower assigned Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy to the task of 
chairing the upcoming meetings with the French and British ambassadors. Murphy was the third 
highest official in the State Department, a man “who could handle a lot of fires” and who had 
operated a great number of arduous diplomatic missions for Eisenhower and Dulles. He had also 
inherited from the war days a personal rapport with his then British counterpart Harold 
Macmillan. From the French point of view, however, the choice was mainly significant in other 
respects. He was seen as a “diplomatic fixer” rather than a “policy man.” More importantly, 
Murphy was known to de Gaulle as Roosevelt’s man who had maintained relations with the 
Vichy authorities in North Africa. Murphy had prepared the “Darlan deal” which enabled the 
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allies to take Northern Africa without much resistance from French forces. He had also been 
present at the Casablanca conference of 1943, at which the American president persuaded de 
Gaulle to shake the hands of his rival General Giraud. And Murphy had headed the “good offi-
ces” mission in the Franco-Tunisian crisis which contributed to the fall of the Gaillard govern-
ment in early 1958. Among the Americans who appear on the pages of de Gaulle’s War Memoirs, 
Murphy was the one most often portrayed in an unfavorable light. 132  The diplomat’s own 
recollections of de Gaulle, published in 1964, were in kind: 
 
In Algiers [...] I formed an opinion of de Gaulle as an ardent French patriot, but I never regarded 
him as a close friend of my country. I did not find that he then was a great admirer of American 
military and political sagacity. He knew little of the United States or of Americans, and it seemed 
to me that he was cynical in his appraisal of how the United States could be “played” vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union and Europe for the benefit of France. In his references to Britons and Americans, 
de Gaulle termed them “the Anglo-Saxons” which, curiously enough, was Hitler’s terminology.133 
 
If Eisenhower’s slight concession had opened the door for de Gaulle’s memorandum diplomacy, 
the chances of a meeting of minds were practically nil.134 
De Gaulle’s Memorandum Diplomacy under Eisenhower 
Uncertain Beginnings: The Berlin Crisis (Winter of 1958-1959) 
Before the first “exploratory” tripartite meetings were held on December 4 and 10, 1958, the 
parameters for discussing de Gaulle’s memorandum proposal shifted in two important respects. 
Firstly, the Eisenhower administration had thus far assumed that de Gaulle desired an 
amendment of the North Atlantic Treaty in order to widen its area of coverage. The 
impracticality of this proposition had figured prominently in Eisenhower’s official reply and was 
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also brought up as a main concern in discussions with French diplomats.135 Washington was, 
however, soon told that de Gaulle had no intention of extending the geographic responsibility of 
NATO. He merely wanted to establish a tripartite arrangement for areas beyond NATO’s 
confines, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. Hence, in spite of the memorandum’s 
explicit reference to invoking Article 12 of the Treaty, NATO itself would not be directly 
discussed.136 Was de Gaulle scaling down his demands? John Foster Dulles was puzzled and now 
suspected that all the Frenchman wanted was the public restoration of French grandeur. 
“Anything which will bring about this result, he will accept,” he told Murphy. “If we ask him just 
what his program is, he will be hard put to come up with something.”137  
The second shift that would have a bearing on tripartite consultations was not generated 
in either Washington or Paris, but in Moscow. On November 10, Khrushchev announced that 
the Soviet Union intended to sign a peace treaty with East Germany. This, the Soviet leader 
argued, would terminate the rights of the United States, Great Britain and France to maintain a 
military presence in West Berlin – and soon enough Soviet troops were indeed harassing 
American trucks on the autobahn. Khrushchev’s bluster significantly affected tripartite relations. 
For one, it persuaded de Gaulle to moderate his demands on the United States for the time being. 
On December 15, he acknowledged to Dulles that the crisis had significantly altered the situation 
since he had issued his tripartite proposal. “It was ironic,’’ said de Gaulle, “that the Berlin 
situation, in which France felt solidarity with the US, should happen at just the moment that 
various manifestations of US policy were giving displeasure to France.” He assured Dulles that he 
did not want to exploit the Berlin situation in order to force American concurrence with his 
tripartite scheme.138 While he continued to express his misgivings about NATO and his intention 
to “rectify” the situation some day, the crisis over Berlin also compelled him to admit that, as he 
                                                 
135 On October 25, for instance, Dulles explained to Alphand that his principal worry concerned not so much 
NATO reorganization as much as the concept of an extension of the NATO area to the Middle East, Africa, etc. 
Memorandum of conversation, Dulles and Alphand, 25 October 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, vol.VII, part 2, 109-110. 
136. Memorandum of conversation, Dulles and Alphand, 28 October 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, vol.VII, part 2, 113-
115; Memorandum of conversation, Acting Secretary Herter, Joxe and Alphand, 20 November 1958, FRUS 1958-
1960, vol.VII, part 2, 119-121. 
137. Telephone conversation, Dulles and Murphy, 8 November 1958, Memoranda of Telcons – General, Telephone 
Calls Series, JFD Papers, box 9, DDEL. Supplementing a letter of October 20th, Dulles wrote to Chancellor 
Adenauer: “We continue to be perplexed about the de Gaulle proposal. The French Ambassador has just left me and 
has presented the matter somewhat differently than heretofore. He now suggests that the French proposal really 
does not relate to NATO at all, but is designed to establish a relationship between the US, UK and France as regards 
world politics and military plans in non-NATO areas such as Africa, the Middle East and the Far East.” Message, 
Dulles to Adenauer, 31 October 1958, Chronological Series, JFD Papers, box 16, DDEL. 
138. Memorandum of conversation, Dulles and de Gaulle, 15 December 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, vol.VII, part 2, 146-
153.  




wrote Eisenhower in October 1959, “it is not advisable at this time to change the present 
organization of the defense of continental Europe.”139  
At the same time, however, the Berlin Crisis caused the three western allies with special 
rights in the city to consult more often and intensely than they otherwise would have. Moreover, 
Eisenhower’s respect for the French leader grew in the course of dealing with Khrushchev in 
1958 and 1959, as a result of which he became more determined to find some common ground 
with de Gaulle on his tripartite proposal. And while de Gaulle said he did not want to exploit the 
situation, his invariably firm stance during the Berlin Crisis helped him to cement his close 
relationship with Chancellor Adenauer of Germany. In some ways, at least, the Soviet leader had 
unconsciously blown some life into tripartitism. 
Yet the first tripartite meetings in December 1958 showed above all that a meeting of 
minds – if at all possible – was still far away. On December 4, Ambassador Alphand played down 
the organizational implications of “a system of organized consultation with a regular schedule” 
and explained that, in the French view, the existing Standing Group should play a role in this 
respect. Murphy, however, countered that the original French proposal “went far beyond the 
concept of informal consultation”; since it seemed to involve drawing up “common policies and 
common programs of action,” it “would call for a large organization with a large staff.”140 At the 
next meeting, on December 10, Alphand – on de Gaulle’s personal instructions – merely asked 
his American and British counterparts to agree on two “preliminary” questions: 
 
Is it possible or not to establish a program of common action related to world problems […] with 
such a program to be so constructed as to restore the initiative to the West and not let it be or 
appear a prerogative of the East? Is it possible or not on the military level for the three to act 
strategically in common in case of military conflict anywhere in the world? [...] An example would 
be the decision whether or not to use nuclear weapons. 
 
Without agreement on these principles, Alphand maintained, there would be no basis for 
discussing the details of the French proposal. Murphy and Caccia nonetheless kept insisting on 
knowing the details of a tripartite mechanism before agreeing to anything.141 It was clear that 
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Washington was not about to discuss the tripartite proposal on French terms. The talks were 
now effectively stalled.  
Dulles’ subsequent conversation with de Gaulle on December 15 failed to bring the two 
sides any closer. The atmosphere was notably less friendly compared to their first meeting in early 
July. The United States had abstained the day before in a United Nations Security Council vote 
on a resolution calling for Algerian independence. This had greatly angered de Gaulle and 
undoubtedly cast a shadow over his efforts to attain American political support for his Algerian 
policies in the framework of any system of tripartite policy coordination. He told Dulles that 
French participation in NATO would not be increased under his watch, dashing hopes that 
French military units returning from Algeria would in the future be assigned to NATO.142 Less 
than a year after de Gaulle’s return to power had been hailed in Washington, Franco-American 
relations were clearly at a new low. Eisenhower responded to his secretary of state’s dismayed 
report: “It does seem that our friend should cease insisting upon attempting to control the whole 
world, of course with partners, even before he has gotten France itself in good order.”143 A few 
days earlier Eisenhower had told the National Security Council of his conviction that de Gaulle 
was infatuated with prestige and that all he desired was achieving the status of which he was 
deprived in World War II: to be a member of the Big Three.144 In his view, de Gaulle was simply 
asking too much for France and was making his demands largely out of personal reasons. 
The tripartite talks chiefly continued because Dulles was concerned with the French “sit-
down strike on NATO” during the NATO meetings in Paris and hoped that some progress 
would help preserve French cooperation.145 De Gaulle, for his part, did not insist on answers to 
his ‘preliminary’ questions and seemed to be satisfied as long as regular tripartite talks were 
held.146 But the two sides did not get any closer. Ambassador Alphand insisted that the Standing 
Group should discuss strategic plans, including on the use of nuclear weapons. He also stressed 
the importance of military planning with respect to “theaters of operation” (particularly in the 
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Middle East and North Africa): “Who will be the commander? How will the forces be divided? 
Should the wartime commander be the inspector in time of peace? How would planning for 
these areas be connected to NATO planning?” 147  Yet the State Department continued to 
effectively stall any progress. As Murphy assured the United States’ Joint Chiefs of Staff: “the 
United States had not agreed to military talks with the French on any other than ad hoc basis and 
[...] the [State] Department was trying to eliminate any strategic discussions from the talks, trying 
especially to ensure that the talks did not proceed in a NATO context.”148 The question was 
above all whether de Gaulle would resign himself to the infeasibility of his tripartite proposal. 
The State Department’s strategy to this effect seemed to be working, for de Gaulle did not return 
to his tripartite proposal during his last meeting with Dulles before the latter’s death in May.149 
Nothing, however, could have been further from the truth. 
 
Reprisal against NATO (Spring and Summer of 1959) 
On March 6, 1959, Paris informed Washington that the French Mediterranean Fleet would be 
withdrawn from NATO. The French decision had been anticipated and its military implications 
were not significant. Yet, as Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter complained to Alphand, its 
psychological and political repercussions were harmful, in particular given that allied unity was 
still being tested in Berlin.150 Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, who informed the American 
embassy in Paris of the decision, emphasized that it was entirely connected with the Algerian 
situation.151 French diplomats similarly refuted claims that de Gaulle’s decision, which was taken 
against the counsel of his political and military advisers, was tied to American reluctance to 
discuss his tripartite proposal. Yet de Gaulle himself confided to NATO Secretary-General Spaak 
that the two issues were clearly linked. Because no progress had been made in the tripartite talks 
in Washington, he explained, “it was necessary to take the questions directly to NATO.”152 
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Any remaining doubts as to whether the issues were linked would be dispelled on May 1 
by Michel Debré in a blunt exchange with Secretary of State Herter. The French prime minister 
made clear that the French refusal to permit the deployment of nuclear warheads for nine 
American air force squadrons based in France, a question considered particularly urgent in the 
context of the Berlin crisis since NATO was on a high state of readiness, was connected to lack 
of progress with regard to the tripartite memorandum. In addition, Debré declared that “atomic 
cooperation” was of “extreme importance” to France and that it sought cooperation with the 
United States “both in the field of the peaceful uses and military uses of atomic energy.” The 
exchange was significant, too, because Debré linked the tripartite proposal to American political 
support in the Algerian war. Debré: 
 
Whether we like it or not, France has as much a future in Algeria and the Mediterranean as in 
Europe. […] France must square her responsibilities in Europe with those in Africa. The events 
of May, 1958 in Algeria were caused in large part by the feeling of frustration in Algeria regarding 
lack of understanding on the part of France’s allies, and the lack of a common Western policy for 
Algeria. [...] it [is] difficult to imagine either French military or civilian authorities giving strong 
support to the Atlantic Alliance unless that organization and its principal members gave support 
to French interests in the Mediterranean and Africa. 
 
When Herter deplored the fact that these issues were all linked in the French view, Debré 
“frankly” replied that “these problems are linked because they are all related to the French 
national security.”153 
Debré’s unusually candid exposition thoroughly displeased Herter and Eisenhower, the 
more so since the French prime minister had emphasized he had discussed his message at length 
with de Gaulle beforehand. In a long and important handwritten letter to Eisenhower on May 25, 
de Gaulle further clarified the “spirit and the substance” of his decisions. The significance of this 
letter, which echoed many of the themes of the September 1958 memorandum, was that – like 
Debré –  de Gaulle connected the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean fleet and the refusal 
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to authorize NATO’s atomic stockpile on French soil to the unaccommodating American 
response to his tripartite proposal. In addition, the letter made clear that de Gaulle had in fact 
unilaterally set out to implement parts of his design. De Gaulle explained that, following the 
withdrawal of the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO, he was setting up “a French 
command of the Mediterranean, having as its area of responsibility the whole of that Sea as well 
as North Africa” and that he would be prepared to discuss with “either Washington and London 
or with NATO […] the conditions under which we could cooperate in this area … .” Likewise, 
another French command would be charged with “the defense of Black Africa” – and de Gaulle 
declared himself to be quite willing to cooperate along the same lines in the Indian Ocean and the 
Pacific as well. De Gaulle moreover made clear that his demand for a veto over the American 
nuclear arsenal had been serious, linking it to the United States’ refusal to assist France in its own 
nuclear effort as well as to France’s refusal to authorize the presence of American nuclear 
weapons on French soil: 
 
Obviously the question would appear quite differently if you had made it possible for us to take 
advantage of your own achievements. But America intends to keep her secrets, vis-à-vis France. 
This compels us to discover them ourselves and at tremendous cost. On this point, however, we 
have nothing other to express than regret. This is not the case insofar as America reserves to 
herself the total decision to use or not to use the nuclear weapons which she has. [...] If there 
were no alliance between us, I would agree that your monopoly on the opening of atomic war 
would be justified, but you and I are tied together to such a point that the opening of this type of 
hostilities either by you or against you would automatically expose France to total and immediate 
destruction. She obviously cannot entirely entrust her life or her death to any other state whatsoe-
ver, even the most friendly. For this reason, France feels it is essential that she participate, if the 
case were to arise, in any decision which might be taken by her allies to use atomic missiles or to 
launch them against certain places at certain times. Until she has been able to conclude with the 
United States and with Great Britain the agreements which seem necessary to her on this subject, 
she cannot consent to such projectiles being stored on her territory and used from there unless 
she herself has complete and permanent control over them.154 
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The overriding concern with the stand-off with the Soviet Union over Berlin imposed on 
the United States a posture of “calm but cold dignity” toward de Gaulle’s conduct.155 But priva-
tely Eisenhower examined the deadlock of the tripartite affair with growing uncertainty. During 
the spring and summer of 1959, the potential implications of de Gaulle’s intransigence were 
much on his mind. “We may be witnessing a beginning of a crumbling of NATO,” he observed 
during one of his meetings with his advisers on the French problem.156 He was gravely concerned, 
as he explained at another, that “other NATO nations will finally become weary with de Gaulle’s 
attitude and lose enthusiasm for the organization.”157 Since Eisenhower was persuaded that “the 
people dealing with de Gaulle [...] were not sufficiently acquainted with his temperament,”158 he 
began musing about his own wartime relationship with the Frenchman looking for clues. On 
several occasions he recalled the “Strasbourg incident” of December 1944, during which he had 
clashed with de Gaulle. But Eisenhower realized the circumstances were different in 1959. 
“Unless we are prepared to deal with him this way, on a matter in which he is in a disadvantage,” 
he said to Macmillan shortly after the French announced the withdrawal of their Mediterranean 
fleet from NATO, “there is no point in trying to be tough with him.”159 Eisenhower moreover 
cherished little hope of influencing a man whom he imputed with a “Messiah complex,” viewing 
himself as “a cross between Napoleon and Joan of Arc,” and thinking only in terms of “Glory, 
Honor, France.” Sensing that de Gaulle was going to cause “great difficulties” for the Western 
alliance, “the question we must face is whether we can accommodate to those difficulties suffi-
ciently to sustain the NATO concept.”160 
Could de Gaulle be accommodated? On August 18, 1959, Eisenhower discussed his 
options in an extensive review of American policy toward France. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had 
recommended that support could be given to France in Algeria in order to gain French 
cooperation in NATO. This option, however, did not appeal to Eisenhower whatsoever.  
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How could we say that we support the French and still not damage our interests? The whole of 
our history [...] is anti-colonial, and the French action in Algeria is interpreted by the rest of the 
world as militant colonialism. To support the French would be counter to everything we have 
done in the past. [...] To stand up with the colonial powers would be to cut ourselves from our 
own moorings… 
 
The president equated de Gaulle’s behavior with that of Khrushchev on Berlin. Both were trying 
to force concessions from the United States, but, added Eisenhower, “we were not going to be 
blackmailed [...] by de Gaulle or anyone else.”161 
On only one issue was Eisenhower willing to be more forthcoming. On former occasions 
he had already expressed sympathy for the French decision to build a nuclear force. “In fairness 
to de Gaulle,” Eisenhower had confessed to Lauris Norstad in June 1959, “we would react very 
much like de Gaulle if the shoe were on the other foot.”162 He felt that the rigid legislation on 
nuclear assistance, for which he felt contempt, had “handcuffed” the White House in maintaining 
good relations with America’s allies.163 On August 18, he spoke along similar lines: “It was as if 
we had been fighting wars with bows and arrows and then acquired pistols. Then we refused to 
give pistols to the people who were our allies even though the common enemy already had 
them.” But Eisenhower could do little to satisfy French needs in this respect. He could complain 
about the Congress and its watchdog, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, but he could not 
force a change in legislation. In the absence of a better option, Eisenhower therefore requested 
the urgent development of a multilateral approach to the nuclear affairs of the Western alliance 
that could help accommodate the French as well as carry congressional approval.164 
On de Gaulle’s tripartite proposal the American position remained the same. 
Eisenhower’s correspondence with de Gaulle in March and June had carefully evaded the issue, 
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postponing discussions on the subject to his planned trip to Europe in the autumn.165 The tripar-
tite exchanges in April, which focused on African affairs, followed the fruitless pattern of earlier 
meetings; Alphand’s pleas for joint contingency planning were again fended off.166 A proposal by 
Spaak to expand consultation procedures by establishing a NATO machinery for developing 
common action programs toward other areas was also dismissed because of “greatly varying 
degrees of interest of NATO countries in these areas and because of effect in other areas of 
common NATO programs.”167 Yet the end of de Gaulle’s memorandum diplomacy was not yet 
in sight. 
 
Extending the ‘Special Relationship’ to France (August 1959 to May 1960) 
Although de Gaulle’s bluff had not succeeded in bringing a fundamental change in the American 
attitude, the crisis of the spring of 1959 did bring home to Washington that more had to be done 
to pacify de Gaulle. Indeed, Eisenhower would use the occasion of his consultations in Europe 
prior to Khrushchev’s American visit at the end of September to propose an extension of the 
‘special relationship’ between the United States and Great Britain. In his meeting with de Gaulle 
on September 2, he declared his willingness to accord all its attributes to France: consultation 
prior to the use of American nuclear weapons (except in the case of a surprise attack on 
American territory); a study of problems of world strategy with the intention of fostering agree-
ment on decisions; a direct telephone line with Paris (there already existed one with London); ad 
hoc tripartite committees to discuss specific problems arising outside the NATO area. The condi-
tions were that France would not insist on a formalization of these informal arrangements and 
that any tripartite arrangements would not concern the affairs of NATO, “on which an 
established machinery exists.” In addition, Eisenhower had to tell de Gaulle that, to his regret, 
Congress barred him from furnishing assistance to the French nuclear weapons program.168  
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This surely was as serious an approach as could be imagined under the circumstances. 
Eisenhower’s earnestness is evident, too, from his decision to inform both Adenauer and 
Macmillan beforehand of his move.169 The meeting at Rambouillet castle certainly helped to 
solidify the personal relationship between Eisenhower and de Gaulle. The American president 
had been welcomed to France by large crowds. De Gaulle furthermore made several gestures 
which gratified him. The Frenchman explained, “in great confidence,” that “if occasionally sharp 
words were spoken or strident voices were raised” these should be judged from France’s difficult 
adjustment to the fact that she was a nation in decline.170 Eisenhower was also the first foreigner 
to whom de Gaulle outlined his plan for offering self-determination to the Algerian people (two 
weeks before he appraised the public). And just before Eisenhower’s departure, while standing 
on the lawn of Rambouillet, de Gaulle confided to the American president that France would test 
its first nuclear device in March 1960 in the Sahara desert and that a preliminary explosion had 
already been successful.171 
Yet a meeting of minds on the tripartite issue did not occur. When Eisenhower referred 
to the congressional laws that prohibited a transfer of American nuclear materiel and knowledge 
to France, de Gaulle replied: “The McMahon Law! I changed the Constitution of France when I 
found it was no longer valid.”172 They also had expressed their widely divergent views of military 
integration under NATO. After the meeting, the tripartite consultations in Washington continued 
as usual – without any noticeable impetus coming from the September meeting of the heads of 
state.173 Eisenhower’s overture obviously fell short of the French proposal of the previous year, 
but tactical considerations may also explain de Gaulle’s non-responsive attitude. He may in 
particular have decided to wait for the first French nuclear explosion to bolster his position. This 
would at least explain why, on October 6, he wrote to Eisenhower that with regard to his demand 
for joint decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons “...there is reason to expect that the 
successful development by France of French atomic armament in the fairly near future will facili-
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tate matters for us.”174 Or perhaps the preparations for a summit with Khrushchev convinced 
him not to press the issue, for in the same letter to Eisenhower he admitted that “it is not 
advisable at this time to change the present organization of the defense of continental Europe.”175 
In the same vein, he notified Herter that, for the time being, “France would neither add nor 
subtract from its present effort and attitude” with regard to NATO.176 Despite Eisenhower’s 
attempt at rapprochement, the tripartite issue nonetheless continued to hang like the sword of 
Damocles over the Western alliance. 
In addition, the fundamental differences of view between them also became more 
apparent during this time. De Gaulle first of all angered Eisenhower by putting the United States 
on the same moral plane as the Soviet Union in a press conference on November 10:  
 
Who can say [...] whether some sudden advance in development – particularly in the field of space 
rockets – will not provide one of the two camps with such an advantage that its peaceful 
inclinations will not hold out? Who can say whether, in the future, if basic political facts should 
change completely, as has already occurred on the earth, the two powers that would have a mono-
poly on nuclear weapons might not make a deal with each other to divide the world between 
them. Who can say whether, should the occasion arise – while each side might follow a policy of 
not hurling its devices at the principal adversary, so as not to be threatened by it – who can say 
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whether the two rivals might not crush others? One can very well imagine, for example, that on 
such a terrible occasion, Western Europe might be destroyed from Moscow and Central Europe 
from Washington. And who even can say whether the two rivals, as a result of some unforeseea-
ble political and social upheaval, will not come to the point of uniting? In truth, France, by 
equipping herself with nuclear armaments, is rendering a service to the equilibrium of the 
world.177 
 
Eisenhower’s reaction on November 17 was indignant and he demanded a reassurance from the 
French president that he did not consider the United States as operating on such a “low moral 
plane.” De Gaulle, however, reiterated his basic argument and pointed out the belated entries of 
the United States in two world wars.178  
Secondly, the rather philosophical debate between Eisenhower and de Gaulle on the 
implications of military integration under NATO was stirred up by the latter’s well-known 
address at the École Militaire on November 3. Eisenhower had already discussed the issue in some 
depth during his visit with de Gaulle in September. He had then contended that NATO was 
precisely geared towards balancing national political needs and esprit with the military need for 
centralized command in wartime. “I believe the American forces in Europe,” he had moreover 
argued in a subsequent letter, “while serving in their own national uniforms and under their own 
flag, feel also a considerable – and a growing – attachment to their collective force and to the 
North Atlantic Community.”179 This, predictably, failed to impress de Gaulle.180 As he explained 
to the cadets of the École Militaire, “integration” under NATO undermined national and military 
morale and had outlived its day.181 
De Gaulle’s public remarks again proved to Eisenhower that the tripartite issue had to be 
addressed in order to preserve French cooperation in NATO. During the summit meeting of 
Western leaders at Château Rambouillet on December 20, 1959, he tried to break the impasse for 
a second time. In his conversations with de Gaulle and Macmillan, Eisenhower put forward the 
idea of a machinery in one of the three capitals – preferably London – provided that this 
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happened on a “clandestine basis” and that there was “no connection to NATO.” Each country, 
Eisenhower suggested, should contribute one or two “competent” men of “good judgment” and 
“reasonably high rank.” In addition, there would be some personnel to handle political, military 
and economic matters. Both de Gaulle and Macmillan expressed their satisfaction with this 
suggestion.182 However, like Eisenhower’s suggestions in September, the implementation of his 
offer to institutionalize tripartite talks at a higher level stranded on the different conceptions 
entertained in Paris and Washington about the scope and the form of a tripartite coordinating 
mechanism.183 “I am quite astonished at the atmosphere of formality with which the French seem 
to view the matter and the difficulties they see of putting the simple plan into action,” 
Eisenhower wrote Macmillan on February 18, 1960. “Just where it jumped the track I do not 
know.”184 
France’s first explosion of an atomic device in the Saharan Desert one week earlier – and 
a second a month and a half later – also failed to bring the hoped-for change in the official 
American attitude toward the French nuclear deterrent. On the eve of the first explosion, 
Eisenhower actually heightened French expectations of a policy change by publicly airing his 
frustration with the restrictions imposed by Congress. The JCAE, however, quickly responded 
that the Atomic Energy Act would be upheld in spite of the evident progress the French were 
making. When Foreign Minister Couve de Murville and Ambassador Alphand asked Herter on 
April 15 “whether France with its two atomic explosions and industrial capabilities could not be 
considered to be qualified within the terms of the [American] law,” the latter thus replied that 
Congress would not consider France qualified in spite of Eisenhower’s displeasure with the 
situation.185 
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Unexpected Impulse and Sudden Death (The Summit of May 1960 and After) 
Ironically, it was not de Gaulle’s extensive visit to the United States, from April 22 to 29, 1960,186 
but the failure of the summit with Khrushchev one month later that brought France and the 
United States somewhat closer on the tripartite issue. Immediately after Khrushchev’s intransi-
gent stance on the U2 spy-plane affair (he demanded a public apology from the American 
president), de Gaulle greatly impressed Eisenhower by assuring him that “no matter what hap-
pens, France as your ally will stand with you all the way.”187 Eisenhower also greatly appreciated 
the Frenchman’s skillful handling of an extremely awkward situation.188 Was it this sentiment of 
union in the hour of confrontation that prompted Eisenhower to say that he favored closer 
cooperation between the three Western powers at the “top governmental level”? At any rate, 
Eisenhower’s desire to have more frequent tripartite meetings seemed genuine enough for de 
Gaulle to finally seize on the moment. He recalled his memorandum of September 1958 and 
reviewed the unsatisfactory tripartite arrangements established to date; he forcefully argued that 
two years ago crises had occurred in the Middle East, before that at Suez, and today in Berlin, 
that tomorrow another crisis could erupt, and that all the while there was no organizational 
machinery in the Western alliance to respond effectively. Soon, therefore, he would submit 
“specific proposals” to Eisenhower and Macmillan, in the “spirit” of his 1958 memorandum but 
developed with “greater precision.”189 
It was, interestingly, Macmillan who first followed up on the seeming revival of interest in 
tripartitism with specific proposals. During the meeting in Paris, the prime minister had been 
notably more responsive than Eisenhower to de Gaulle’s exhortations. 190  Macmillan’s 
responsiveness was inspired at least in part by his growing conviction that Britain’s sliding 
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position in the world made a rapprochement with Paris – and, in particular, the European 
Economic Community – unavoidable. On May 25, he preempted anything de Gaulle might have 
had in mind by proposing a system of tripartite consultations that was in essence an elaboration 
of Eisenhower’s earlier suggestions. Macmillan suggested that the foreign ministers of the three 
countries should meet regularly – “about every two or three months” – and that each would 
designate a trusted official to prepare the agenda “with the approval of the Heads of 
Governments.” Eisenhower’s response was supportive and he immediately assigned 
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant to the task of preparing triparti-
te consultations between the foreign ministers. 191  In de Gaulle’s view, however, Macmillan’s 
proposals fell short of his aims. Although he expressed satisfaction at the procedures for political 
consultation, he emphasized that basic French demands regarding joint strategic decisions and 
military planning were still not incorporated and, as usual, suggested that the members of the 
Standing Group lay the groundwork for arrangements in this field. 192  Macmillan’s proposal 
moreover breathed the same informality – and hence noncommittal nature – of Eisenhower’s 
earlier proposals. The British prime minister had made clear he did not want to establish a 
“formal Secretariat” and emphasized that tripartite meetings should not “upset the susceptibilities 
of other Governments.”193 
De Gaulle’s memorandum diplomacy had now arrived at an important crossroads. He 
had been offered all that could be offered without provoking a reaction from the other allies that 
would undermine NATO in a different way.194 The question was now whether de Gaulle could 
be given meaningful satisfaction in the strategic field without a major dislocation of NATO, too. 
De Gaulle’s reply to Macmillan’s bid made clear that his demands had not changed since his 
original memorandum proposal, causing a high State Department official to admit that “...frankly 
we were puzzled as to how to proceed on our French problem.”195 Eisenhower, however, was 
not yet ready to abandon his efforts to accommodate de Gaulle. His determination to give the 
French requests in the strategic field careful scrutiny opened up the last cycle of his effort to 
come to terms with de Gaulle’s tripartite proposal. He had not shed his reservations on 
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implicating NATO institutions, such as the Standing Group, in tripartite strategic consultations, 
out of fear of seeming to endorse an “inner directorate.”196 Eisenhower was nonetheless ponde-
ring hard if he could find “some way [by which] we could really get outside of this standing group 
into a real tripartite discussion of strategic and military questions in return for which de Gaulle 
would get on with NATO.”197 On June 30, Eisenhower inquired with Macmillan whether military 
talks could not be staged in Washington to which the French could assign their representative to 
the Standing Group while they would delegate another high military official. “This may not be 
the organized strategic planning on a global scale, including the question of the use of nuclear 
weapons anywhere, which he [de Gaulle] appears to want,” wrote Eisenhower. “It is, however, a 
definite move forward in the field of military consultation which may in the end strengthen our 
alliance.”198 
On August 2, 1960, Eisenhower indeed made these concessions in a letter to de Gaulle. 
For the first time, he agreed to tripartite discussions on military-strategic issues.199 The American 
president was as close as he ever came to accepting de Gaulle’s tripartite design. De Gaulle, 
meanwhile, believed the time was ripe for a passionate reiteration of his original tripartite propo-
sal. Was he perhaps contemplating the unfavorable implications of a change of rule in 
Washington after the presidential elections later that year? At any rate, writing to London and 
Washington on August 9, he made an urgent appeal to convene in September in order to agree 
on the tripartite plan he had set forth nearly two years ago. To Eisenhower: 
 
My dear Mr. President, my dear friend, I feel that we – you, Mr. Macmillan, and I – hold in our 
hands an opportunity, which is at the same time a definite opportunity and a very temporary one, 
to organize a true political and strategic cooperation of our West in the face of the numerous and 
dangerous threats that confront us. We can do this all the better because, with respect to the basis 
of the problems, our views and our intentions are still quite close. If we three together were to 
confront this problem shoulder to shoulder, it seems to me that we could work out a joint plan 
for organizing our united action on world problems and for reorganizing the Alliance.200 
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It seems that de Gaulle indeed cherished some hope that this time he could reach an 
understanding with the American president. He strongly urged Macmillan to persuade 
Eisenhower to agree to a meeting in September.201 Be that as it may, de Gaulle’s move was not 
received well in Washington, for as Secretary of State Herter said in a conversation with 
Eisenhower, “it always comes down to de Gaulle never agreeing with anyone else but wanting 
everybody to agree with him.” 202  Eisenhower’s own reaction was indecisive and he did not 
respond until nearly a month later. “In talking to me,” he laid down in a memorandum, “he 
[President de Gaulle] had always been so hazy in propounding his theories that apparently I have 
never been able to respond adequately.” Eisenhower seemed to realize that he could not 
accommodate de Gaulle as long he was not prepared to honor the latter’s demand for joint 
political and military decisions. De Gaulle truly envisaged a tripartite organization – not the 
United States or NATO – to act on behalf of the West. Such an organization would not only 
undermine the loyalty to NATO of the other allies, most importantly of West Germany, in 
Eisenhower’s view a system by which the French and the British would be able to veto American 
policies would also amount to “a committee for inaction rather than for action.”203 
In mid-August, Livingston Merchant traveled to London to confer with Macmillan on de 
Gaulle’s proposal. He conveyed Eisenhower’s impression that the possibilities for 
accommodating de Gaulle were now exhausted. The American president had not yet decided on 
how to respond to de Gaulle’s letter, but an impulsively organized summit meeting in September, 
as de Gaulle had suggested, would surely upset the other European allies. In addition, it could 
unnecessarily provoke the Soviet Union, especially since the meeting would inevitably be 
interpreted in connection with the delicate problem of Berlin. Merchant and Macmillan hence 
agreed to bargain for time with de Gaulle by playing up the importance of a meeting of the 
foreign ministers on September 23 (which had already been planned).204  
This was indeed Eisenhower’s position when he finally replied to de Gaulle on August 30: 
he agreed in principle to convene with Macmillan and de Gaulle but final decisions were to be 
postponed until after the meeting of the foreign ministers, at which occasion de Gaulle would 
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also be invited to submit the memorandum he had promised at the Paris Summit. It was, 
however, the remainder of his lengthy letter that was most significant, for in it Eisenhower placed 
himself irrevocably opposite to de Gaulle. In fact, in a far more outright and candid manner than 
in his first reply of October 1958, Eisenhower rejected the thrust of de Gaulle’s views and 
forcefully argued the primacy of NATO in American foreign policy.  
Eisenhower first of all explained that NATO should be considered as the expression as 
well as the precondition of the “historic shift” in the American attitude towards Europe after 
World War II. The United States had not sought to dominate Europe, but had rather responded 
to urgent pleas from European countries to commit itself to their security. While NATO had 
thus become the cornerstone of American foreign policy, de Gaulle’s public criticism of 
America’s domineering ways and his equally public skepticism of its nuclear security guarantee 
could ultimately usher in a revival of American isolationism. As in his original reply of October 
1958, Eisenhower moreover extolled the virtues of the alliance system in dealing with a global 
menace, emphasized the political sensitivity of the other allies, and pointed at American efforts to 
expand liaisons between the various defense groupings as a way of improving coordination in the 
global contest. 
 
Given the facts of the situation today I must confess that I cannot see how the three of us can so 
organize, as you suggest, a “real political and military cooperation” if that cooperation implies 
lessening or subordinating of America’s close working relationship with other nations and other 
alliances or if it implies a reorganization of NATO whose effect would be to remove American 
forces from Europe. 
 
Eisenhower then proceeded to rebuff de Gaulle’s thesis on the obsolescence of military 
integration and the inherent national nature of defense. 
 
I frankly must confess that I cannot understand completely your reasoning. It seems to me that to 
return to a prewar system of alliances, that is to say, a coalition of powers whose military efforts 
are not closely joined together, would diminish greatly the effectiveness of a Western alliance. The 
revolution in military strategy and military technology makes it more, not less, essential that 
nations integrate their military efforts. National forces fulfilling national missions each on its own 
soil could well result in a completely ineffective defense force. [...] any such policy would compel 
the return of American troops to this hemisphere. 
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In the same vein, the American president revealed his private distress over the withdrawal 
of the French Mediterranean Fleet in the spring of 1959, since it caused “a major breach in the 
NATO wall of solidarity” – and he noted that in many other areas France had also withheld its 
cooperation. He felt strongly that the French government – since it had publicly as well as 
privately stressed the need for reforms – bore a responsibility towards the members of NATO to 
come up with concrete proposals: “Otherwise, does not the continual stress on the supposed 
inadequacies of NATO merely weaken it further?” Eisenhower also refuted the alleged lack of 
‘unison’ in Western policies on the Congo to which de Gaulle had referred in his letter of August 
9. Arguing that intensive consultation had indeed taken place, he wrote: “If despite this process 
our positions remained somewhat apart, I doubt that any more formal or elaborate tripartite 
arrangements at whatever level could have altered this.” Then, in closing, the American president 
adroitly pointed at a basic contradiction in de Gaulle’s memorandum diplomacy and posed 
searching questions: 
 
I must confess, dear General, that I cannot quite understand the basic philosophy of France 
today. On one hand, France rejects the concept of close union needed to make effective the 
alliance’s defensive forces, stating that such action takes from France the essential attribute of 
national identity. At the same time France proposes a close union of itself, the U.K. and the U.S. 
to work out common plans and policies with all the implications of the veto and of imposition of 
decisions on others which this suggestion holds. These two proposals appear to me incompatible. 
Additionally, I am sure our NATO partners would find them unacceptable. 
The role which France would want to play in a special tripartite relationship is also 
unclear to me. Do you envisage France speaking in this forum for the other continental members 
of the Alliance?  Do you believe that it would be wise to diminish the close relationship of my 
government with that of Chancellor Adenauer, a relationship which has since the war served to 
draw the Federal Republic firmly to the West?  These questions puzzle me.205 
 
Eisenhower’s letter of August 30, 1960, marked the true end of his efforts to 
accommodate de Gaulle’s demand for tripartite management of the Western alliance. A summit 
meeting of the three leaders, as had been proposed by de Gaulle, never occurred. De Gaulle did 
not respond in writing to Eisenhower’s rebuttal of his arguments but chose to underline his 
differences with the United States in public. In a press conference on September 5, 1960, he 




spoke again of the need for reforming an alliance in which the United States was the dominator 
and, as in his original memorandum proposal of September 1958, referred explicitly to Article 12 
of the North Atlantic Treaty. Stressing the inherent national nature of defense, he defended his 
decisions – taken over a year ago – on the French Mediterranean fleet and NATO’s atomic 
stockpile on French soil. He even partially unveiled his tripartite proposal as he urged the three 
Western powers to cooperate on a political and strategic level in the world.206 The Franco-Ameri-
can stalemate on the organization of the West was complete.207 
On September 27, Eisenhower indicated to the British prime minister, who had come to 
New York to address the United Nations and found the president “rather ill and tired,” that his 
ideas on improving relations with Paris were exhausted; on every approach from his side, “de 
Gaulle simply clams up.”208 The sole area where Eisenhower still cherished hopes of finding 
common ground with de Gaulle lay in the development of a multilateral nuclear scheme in which 
France could benefit from American advanced nuclear technology and know-how. Eisenhower 
was still resentful of the congressional restrictions imposed on his authority. The last stretch of 
his public career was therefore in considerable part devoted to making a “friendly gesture” to de 
Gaulle in this area and leaving a well-defined policy behind for the next administration to 
pursue.209 Yet there is little doubt that Eisenhower had reached the end of the road in his efforts 
to come to terms with de Gaulle shortly before his departure from power. If his personal rapport 
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with the General – going back to World War II and, despite their differences, enhanced during 
the two and a half years of their presidential overlap – had served to attenuate fundamental 
differences, John F. Kennedy’s election to presidency would soon only widen the gap. But even 
Kennedy’s arrival did not denote the definitive end of de Gaulle’s memorandum diplomacy. 
Memorandum Diplomacy under Kennedy (January 1961 to December 1962) 
Even in the Cold War era of bipartisan foreign policy, many policies were substantially modified 
when one administration made way for another. These modifications were bound to be more 
marked if the change-over was between a largely conservative administration and a largely liberal 
one, when an entire cohort of policymakers at the top- and mid-level was replaced. The new 
policy crowd had lingered for years in the margins of power, where it could develop a range of 
alternatives to the policies of the administration-in-office. While the new crowd obviously 
inherited the policies from the old one, it was usually also driven by a different set of concerns 
and predisposed to use dissimilar methods. As new policies were being introduced and 
international relationships were being reassessed, established policies inevitably got lost in the 
transfer. 
De Gaulle undoubtedly realized that the discussions between Washington, London and 
Paris on his tripartite proposal could easily fall by the wayside with the advent of the Kennedy 
administration in January 1961. This fate was only made more likely by their informal and 
guarded nature, which made it easy to overlook their significance for the future of French 
participation in NATO. The prospect of a transition of power in Washington may indeed have 
motivated de Gaulle to press Eisenhower and Macmillan for a hastily convened summit 
conference in September. An agreement between the three heads of state about some kind of 
tripartite arrangement would have established a clear marker, which the next administration 
would not be able to ignore. 
Given Eisenhower’s refutation in his letter of August 30, it is noteworthy that de Gaulle 
did not abandon his diplomacy for acceptance of his tripartite design when Kennedy came to 
office. In February, Prime Minister Debré invited an American embassy official over for dinner 
“to impress on us his strong feeling of [the] need for [a] coordinated US-UK-French position on 
international problems” and that such an arrangement would “tend to mitigate strains within 
NATO.” Debré showed himself flexible on how tripartitism was to be achieved: “the important 
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factor was that we had consultation and agreed positions.”210 Likewise, Ambassador Alphand was 
instructed to impress the importance of tripartite policy coordination upon the new 
administration.211  
Most importantly, in March 1961, de Gaulle sent his confidant Jacques Chaban-Delmas, 
then president of the French National Assembly, as his emissary to Washington to press the 
tripartite issue. Chaban-Delmas, who had seen de Gaulle shortly before he left and had been fully 
expected by the American side to carry a message from the Elysée, put the idea before Kennedy 
in forceful terms. Since de Gaulle had “put the French political house in order” and “a vigorous 
administration” had taken office in Washington, he argued, the circumstances were now 
favorable for agreeing on an effective policy coordination mechanism between the Big Three of 
the Western alliance. Apart from parts of Africa and Asia, Chaban-Delmas implied that in any 
tripartite arrangement France would expect to bear particular responsibility for Western Europe, 
since it actively supported the goal of a united Europe and thus could serve as “a natural channel 
for the coordination of policies on the continent in the same way in which the United States and 
the United Kingdom are the natural channels for the coordination of policies in other 
geographical areas.” Chaban-Delmas underscored that a failure to come to an agreement along 
these lines would, in the French view, set the West irreparably on the road to losing the Cold War. 
“Four or eight years from now it may be too late to proceed with such changes in methods, and 
thus to reverse the flow of events which, according to General de Gaulle, has been consistently 
favoring the Communists during the last eight or ten years,” said Chaban-Delmas. What was 
required of the new administration was a genuine commitment to grant influence to its most 
important European allies, and thus to resist the “temptation” instilled by the predominant 
position of the United States within the Western alliance that “major decisions belong to the 
United States alone.”  
Chaban-Delmas even twice impressed on Kennedy the importance of his personal 
commitment to consultation and that the choice was his – as if determined to leave an indelible 
impression on the new incumbent. Interestingly, however, like Debré and Alphand before him, 
he played down the institutional formality that had been characteristic of de Gaulle’s original 
proposal. He did not talk of a new security organization. Nor did he spell out de Gaulle’s 
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disapproval of NATO or issue warnings about reducing France’s contribution to the alliance. 
“President de Gaulle,” assured Chaban-Delmas, “is not against any channel of policy or any 
organization, and the President will find him a partner very easy to get along with, once a policy of 
consultations is inaugurated.” (emphasis added) In the same vein, he underlined that “consultations 
should be carried out without irritating the sensitivities of the other Western nations and 
therefore on an informal basis.” Nor did he restate de Gaulle’s demand for a veto over the 
American nuclear arsenal or ask for American assistance to the French nuclear force. What 
mattered, Chaban-Delmas emphasized, was the coordination of policies when they are being 
conceived – and “not belatedly at the level of their implementation.” Hence what de Gaulle 
seemed to be asking for through his emissary was what Eisenhower had already seemed prepared 
to offer: an extension of the informal strategic partnership between the United States and Great 
Britain. Did de Gaulle lower his demands to make them more palatable to the incoming 
administration?212 
One month later, in April 1961, de Gaulle again called attention to his tripartite proposal 
when Dean Acheson stopped by in Paris. Upon Kennedy’s request, the elder American 
statesman had undertaken a tour of European capitals in order to explain the policies of the new 
administration. De Gaulle’s discussion with Acheson, however, must have confirmed to the 
Frenchman that Chaban-Delmas’ mission to revive the tripartite proposal under the new 
administration had been in vain. Acheson stressed that the Kennedy administration strongly 
believed the political consultation process within NATO should be intensified and extended to 
geographical areas beyond the treaty’s territory; multilateral approaches, he added later in the 
conversation, were more efficient in harmonizing policies than bilateral ones. To this, de Gaulle 
responded that he did not think NATO – being a military alliance – was the appropriate forum 
and that it would be more important for the three major western powers to intensify their 
consultation. Revealing the chasm that separated him from his American interlocutor, de Gaulle 
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went on to observe that the United States had “the curious tendency to wish always to act as a 
member of some sort of group, whereas a state must have its own policy and [...] the purpose of 
diplomacy was to bring divergent views of states into accord.”213 
The truth was that the Kennedy administration was even less inclined than its 
predecessor to accommodate de Gaulle’s tripartite demands. Merely days after Kennedy’s 
inauguration ceremony in January, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Foy Kohler 
informed Dean Rusk of the Eisenhower administration’s handling of de Gaulle’s tripartite 
proposal and suggested that, since the regular tripartite discussions held at the ambassadorial level 
had obviously not satisfied de Gaulle’s demands, “perhaps these discussions might be 
terminated.” Kohler expressed many of the same concerns that had helped to determine 
Eisenhower’s response to the tripartite idea: the potentially fierce reaction among the other 
NATO allies to what would seem a tripartite ‘directorate’ governing their affairs; the 
incompatibility of any formal tripartite mechanism with the network of multilateral alliances that 
the United States had woven around the world; and the adverse implications for America’s 
standing in Africa and Asia of what could easily be construed as some revamped colonialism.214 
Because French Ambassador Alphand emphasized to Rusk the importance de Gaulle attached to 
enhancing the tripartite discussions on the basis of his September 1958 memorandum, Rusk 
reluctantly declared himself willing to continue with the tripartite talks in Washington. But his 
response to Alphand’s insistence also made clear that the Kennedy administration would not 
accord these discussions the priority considered necessary in Paris.215  
It was above all the overall gist of the Kennedy administration’s foreign and security 
policies that made it even less prepared than its precursor to accommodate de Gaulle. The 
Kennedy administration, as we will see more clearly in later chapters, was uncommonly 
apprehensive about a resurgence of German nationalism, which encouraged it to reinforce the 
formal egalitarianism of the alliance, to downgrade the special relationship with Great Britain and 
to disclaim French aspirations to speak for Europe. The State Department moreover became 
peopled with influential adherents to Jean Monnet’s idea of European federal unity. These 
‘Europeanists’ regarded de Gaulle as their principal adversary. They fervently believed that the 
United States should prod the European allies along the way towards political integration. In yet 
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another way, the Kennedy administration developed policies that were sharply at odds with de 
Gaulle’s tripartite proposal. Fearing the loss of strategic control in the event of a war with the 
Soviet Union (or the threat thereof), it introduced  a strategy of managed escalation and centra-
lized control. There was virtually no sympathy within the Kennedy administration for the French 
nuclear effort and, in April 1962, Kennedy reaffirmed the American policy not to provide nuclear 
assistance to France.216 
The Kennedy administration’s initial approach to the tripartite issue was based on the 
assumption that de Gaulle “sees grandeur in very personal terms” and that his diplomacy was 
chiefly designed to achieve equality with Great Britain. In preparation of Kennedy’s visit to Paris 
in late May and early June 1961, the State Department thus counseled that the new president 
extend “the same intimate relation [...] in formulating world-wide policy” to France and 
“convince the General that he was getting the same opportunity to influence U.S. world-wide use 
of nuclear weapons as he believes the British have.” (emphasis added) It was understood that de 
Gaulle would not give up his independent nuclear policy, yet the State Department hoped that 
“...the more of the special British status we can chop away, the less power the General may be 
disposed to invest in his own program.”217 
While the newly arrived Kennedy administration was assuming a notably reluctant stance 
towards de Gaulle’s tripartite demands and the French nuclear program, Macmillan was moving 
in the exact opposite direction. He had been mulling over strategies to counter the seemingly 
deteriorating position on all fronts of the West vis-à-vis Soviet-led Communism and, in particular, 
to re-position Great Britain – and the European Free Trade Area of which it was the principal 
member – in relation to the thriving Common Market. In the summer of 1960, after much 
agonizing, his cabinet had already decided to apply for British membership of the Common 
Market, but the road was still littered with snags. During the Christmas holidays, he arrived at 
conclusions which would guide him throughout 1961 and which, taken together, he would half-
jokingly call his ‘grand design.’ 218 In order to advance the British bid, Macmillan believed that the 
only way to assuage French opposition was by giving France great power status, which meant 
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“putting real life into Tripartitism” and persuading the United States “to give the French some 
help in their nuclear plans.”219 In December 1960, Macmillan pondered in a memorandum for his 
ministers: 
 
Can what we want and what de Gaulle wants be brought into harmony? Is there a basis for a 
deal? Britain wants to join the European concern. France wants to join the Anglo-American 
concern. Can terms be arranged? […]Are there offers which we could afford to make? And could 
we persuade the Americans to agree? [underlining in the original]220 
 
Realizing that Great Britain had little to offer on its own account and was therefore highly 
dependent on the Kennedy administration, Macmillan tried to draw in Kennedy and act as an 
intermediary between Paris and Washington to bring about the deal he had in mind. In January 
1961, the British prime minister first paid a visit to de Gaulle at Rambouillet. In his diary, 
Macmillan recorded that de Gaulle, whom he had found “relaxed” and “friendly” during their six 
hours of private conversations, had seemed “genuinely attracted by my themes – Europe to be 
united, politically and economically; but France and Great Britain to be something more than 
European Powers, and to be so recognised by the United States… .” 221  Back in London, 
Macmillan proceeded to update Kennedy in rather optimistic terms, noting that the Frenchman 
ultimately had agreed on “exploratory Anglo-French discussions […] to see if a plan could be 
agreed.”222  
The next building block in achieving Macmillan’s ‘grand design’ was his visit in early April 
to Key West and Washington to meet with Kennedy, his first encounter with the new president. 
Macmillan informed Kennedy of his government’s decision to apply for British membership of 
the Common Market, which Kennedy did not hesitate to support. But he also impressed on the 
Americans that “a partnership in the nuclear field” would be necessary to maintain the unity of 
the Atlantic alliance – and he did not fail to report to de Gaulle that Kennedy had shown some 
interest.223 Macmillan followed up his visit to the United States with a detailed exposition of his 
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‘grand design’ in a letter to Kennedy at the end of April. He reasoned that British admission to 
the Common Market was important to the Western alliance as a whole since “further political 
and economic division in Europe [between the EFTA and the EEC] will weaken the cohesion of 
the Atlantic Community, which must be the core of Western unity.” Macmillan argued strongly 
that influencing de Gaulle was the key to British membership and that he and Kennedy “should 
be ready to go a long way to meet de Gaulle in certain fields of interest to him.” This, Macmillan 
wrote, would entail a reform of NATO and a readiness to engage more seriously in tripartite 
consultations. In addition, he daringly proposed that Great Britain provide assistance to the 
French nuclear program, “whether by provision of technical information and ‘know how’ or by 
provision of war-heads,” provided that the French nuclear force would not be independent but a 
“contribution to a joint Western deterrent.”224 
Whether tripartitism indeed had a future now depended above all on Kennedy’s visit to Paris 
from May 31 to June 2 (prior to his encounter with Khrushchev in Vienna). By that time, 
Washington had already made clear to London that it would remain opposed to providing 
assistance to the French nuclear program.225 Meanwhile, de Gaulle had remained sceptical both of 
the American willingness to share power within the Western alliance and of the profundity of 
Great Britain’s desire to become part of the European project. Despite the new administration’s 
lip-service to intensifying consultation with its allies, Kennedy’s first months in office did not 
bode well. The first serious exchange of letters between Kennedy and de Gaulle had above all 
revealed their different perceptions on the situation in Congo. 226  In April, Kennedy – “still 
somewhat fumbling and over-eager,” as de Gaulle wryly commented in his memoirs – had 
endorsed an ill-advised invasion of Fidel Castro’s Cuba by Cuban exiles supported by the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Even in the opinion of Kennedy’s favorite wise man Robert Lovett, the ‘Bay 
of Pigs’ invasion was a “shocking example of what not to do as well as how not to do it” and 
“one of the worst disasters – not necessarily in scale but in the completeness of its failure.”227 
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What is more, Kennedy had not bothered to inform either Macmillan or de Gaulle of his 
intentions.228 
Kennedy’s visit to Paris and his discussions with de Gaulle will be further examined in the 
next chapter. What is important here is that, beyond the pressing problem of Berlin, they differed 
on a range of issues. De Gaulle bore out his fundamental misgivings about NATO. “France will 
not tear down or demolish NATO now in an international crisis,” he said. “But NATO cannot 
go on as it is indefinitely and France wants to reaffirm this.”229 He strongly cautioned Kennedy 
about the dangers of intervening – albeit with “military advisors” – in Laos or Vietnam.230 De 
Gaulle said that no French soldier would ever again set foot in Southeast Asia; it is “a bad terrain 
militarily, politically and psychologically to fight a war.” And to Kennedy: “I predict that you will 
sink step by step into a bottomless military and political quagmire, however much you spend in 
men and money. […] I tell you this in the name of the West.” And on Congo, too, their views 
continued to differ (in particular on the question whether the United Nations could play an 
effective role in resolving the crisis, as Kennedy believed).  The Americans, de Gaulle concluded 
in his memoirs, “could not conceive of their policy ceasing to be predominant or of ours 
diverging from it. Basically, what Kennedy offered me in every case was a share in his projects.” 
De Gaulle realized that “having taken stock of one another, we continued on our road, each 
carrying his burden and marching towards his own destiny.”231 
 The two presidents also discussed the tripartite issue at some length. Although neither 
Chaban-Delmas nor Debré or Alphand had emphasized the nuclear aspect of the French 
memorandum proposal in their contacts with the Kennedy administration, de Gaulle began by 
highlighting the need for coordinating the use of nuclear weapons “by the three countries in the 
West who would have them.” De Gaulle: 
 
These weapons are of a world-wide scope and might be used in the off-shore islands, in the Far 
East or even Cuba. It was not the affair of NATO to decide the use of nuclear weapons but a 
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tripartite affair […]. One day there should be a tripartite plan in this sense. 232 
 
Kennedy proved himself to be as forthcoming on tripartite consultations as Eisenhower 
had been when he had offered an extension of the special relationship.233 French Ambassador 
Alphand had made clear during discussions in Washington in preparation of the meeting that de 
Gaulle hoped his American counterpart would prove to be susceptible to his ideas.234 Kennedy 
also had been given word on the eve of the visit that de Gaulle was primarily interested in the 
“problem of consultation and joint decision” and that the Frenchman expected Kennedy to 
come forward with proposals.235 Kennedy indeed extended to France the guarantees Eisenhower 
had given the British on consultations regarding “the use anywhere in the world of nuclear 
weapons, unless an attack were so imminent that our survival was at stake.”236 He also proposed 
that Secretary of State Dean Rusk work out a mechanism for tripartite consultations and a 
“common mil[i]t[ary] gr[ou]p to study such quest[io]ns as B[erli]n, Laos, Cuba.”237 De Gaulle 
responded favorably to Kennedy’s willingness to enhance tripartite consultations and Alphand 
has recalled that “great hopes were raised at the time that this problem of tripartite cooperation 
could be solved.” 238  But Kennedy had stopped short of going along with tripartite nuclear 
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planning. His accommodating pose proved to be too non-committal to give de Gaulle much to 
hope for in the follow-up.239 
The discussions between Kennedy and de Gaulle in Paris thus did not bring Macmillan’s 
‘grand design’ closer to reality. De Gaulle had explained to Kennedy that he refrained from 
asking the United States for assistance to the French nuclear effort, since “no one believes that 
any country will place its atomic weapons in the hands of others.”240 In addition, de Gaulle 
underscored to Kennedy his abiding reservations regarding British membership of the Common 
Market. While London strove for membership of the Common Market, the Frenchman argued, it 
had not at heart chosen to be “part of the European reality.” De Gaulle made it clear that he 
considered this ambivalent attitude insufficient for accession; for Great Britain, de Gaulle 
stipulated, it was “either/or, either full, or none.” Adding insult to injury, de Gaulle further 
chipped away at Macmillan’s efforts to strike a comprehensive deal with his observation that the 
British “always try to play the part of a broker within any group within which they participate – 
even at times between the U.S. and the French.”241 
Despite Kennedy’s concurrence with enhanced tripartite consultations, very little came of 
it.242 General James Gavin, the American ambassador in Paris who frequently found himself at 
odds with the State Department, deplored the corrosion of the tripartite relationship. “To use a 
simile,” he cabled to Kennedy, “what was at first in the form of an equilateral triangle has now 
distorted its shape to an isosceles triangle with de Gaulle away out at the apex with indications 
that he will continue to go further out unless drawn back in by the initiative of the US.”243 Gavin 
urged Kennedy to restore the balance lest de Gaulle decided to break free. His urging, however, 
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was not heeded in Washington. De Gaulle’s last correspondence to recall his tripartite proposals 
occurred in January 1962.244 To this, Kennedy did not respond. 
 Yet it was Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 and his summit 
meeting two months later with Harold Macmillan on the Bahamas that probably put a definitive 
end to de Gaulle’s memorandum diplomacy. Kennedy’s deft handling of the missile crisis has 
won him praise from most quarters and is still seen as his crowning foreign policy achievement. 
The president had risen to the occasion and had proven that, in spite of his young age, “at the 
moment of supreme danger [...] a man of superior character and intelligence was at the helm.”245 
It had redeemed Kennedy after the utter failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion and his first meeting 
with Khrushchev in Vienna in 1961. But Kennedy’s handling of the crisis also showed the 
hollowness of assurances that the United States would consult the European allies during an 
international crisis. The need to consult the allies on a matter that could deeply affect their 
security was little more than an afterthought in the frantic deliberations in the White House. 
Roger Hilsman, the State Department’s director of the Bureau of Research and Intelligence, put 
it this way:  
 
We were able to bring it off in Washington which was a near miracle, if we had tried to introduce 
several other capitals with all the punishing and pulling hostilities in those capitals, it’s hard 
enough to get an effective coherent policy between our hawks and doves and everything else in 
the American government; if you had the French government and the British government with all 
their hang ups and de Gaulle’s hang ups we would never have done it, it’s as simple as that.246 
 
 It was Dean Acheson who pointed out to Kennedy that, since the allies had not been 
consulted on the course of action, they should at least be informed “in an impressive way.” The 
colorful story of Acheson’s subsequent visit to Europe and, in particular, of his furtive meeting 
with de Gaulle is well-known. “Have you come from the President to inform me of some 
decision taken by your President – or have you come to consult me about a decision which he 
should take,” de Gaulle asked the veteran diplomat upon his arrival. Acheson admitted that he 
had come to inform de Gaulle of a decision which Kennedy had already taken. After a brief 
discussion of the situation and having poured over the aerial photographs of the missile sites 
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Acheson had brought along with the eye of a soldier, de Gaulle then said: “You may tell your 
President that France will support him in every way in this crisis.”247 Following Acheson’s furtive 
visit to the Élysée, Ambassador Bohlen therefore had reason to report that “there is nothing […] 
that we could complain about in regard to the attitude of the French government.”248 
De Gaulle’s loyal stance during the Cuban missile crisis appears to have been premeditated. 
It had been foreshadowed, for instance, in a conversation he had had with Bohlen’s predecessor 
James Gavin during the Berlin crisis in September 1961. “If the state of affairs turns from bad to 
worse we will enter a catastrophe,” de Gaulle had then said. “If such a catastrophe occurs, France 
will enter it together with the United States [...]. I say this on behalf of France, and I can vouch 
for France.”249 Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban missile crisis, however, above all underscored to 
him that the United States were inclined to act unilaterally when the chips were down. Most 
Europeans, in fact, felt uncomfortable with the idea that their security was at stake over the 
presence of Soviet missiles on an island in the Caribbean, while this presence acknowledgedly did 
not alter the strategic balance. They also sensed that the Cuban missile crisis was moreover in 
part caused by Kennedy’s obsession with Fidel Castro’s regime.250 Robert Kennedy’s secretly 
negotiated deal with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to remove American Jupiter missiles from 
Turkey and Italy furthermore caused concern that European security was being traded off for 
American security.251 The lack of any serious consultation with the European allies on all of these 
aspects seemed to support the appropriateness of de Gaulle’s insistence on a formal mechanism. 
On November 15, the embassy in Paris reported that de Gaulle had imparted to Prime Minister 
Macmillan that the Cuban crisis “had made him even more convinced of the correctness of the 
proposal he made in September 1958 to establish a directorate in NATO.”252 But the crisis must 
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also have convinced de Gaulle once again of the futility of trying to persuade the Americans to 
accept his proposal, as he did not return to the issue again. 
 In addition, Kennedy’s summit meeting with Macmillan in Nassau, on the Bahamas, from 
December 18 to 21 – which we will examine in further detail in chapter six – underlined to de 
Gaulle that he had not been able to break into the ‘special relationship’ with his tripartite 
proposal. During this meeting, Macmillan accepted Kennedy’s offer to provide Polaris missiles 
for a future British nuclear force which, together with equivalent American units, would be 
merged into a multilateral NATO nuclear force. This outcome was the result of a rare act of 
improvisation in international diplomacy, prompted by McNamara’s abrupt decision to 
discontinue the Skybolt air-to-ground missile program on which the future British nuclear force 
depended. Intent on bailing Macmillan out of a politically dire situation at home, Kennedy 
offered to jointly build submarines armed with Polaris missiles. He also granted the British prime 
minister that – in a time of “supreme peril” – Great Britain would still be able to use its nuclear 
weapons unilaterally, thus leaving intact the notion of an independent British nuclear deterrent. 
While Macmillan left the Bahamas much relieved, the deal took de Gaulle, as well as other 
European leaders (such as Adenauer), by surprise. 
 Kennedy’s subsequent offer to assist the French nuclear force in the same way – a makeshift 
attempt to mollify de Gaulle after the Anglo-American showing of unison – is well-known. Less 
well known is that, in the aftermath of the Nassau meeting, the Kennedy administration also 
considered the establishment of a ‘NATO Executive Committee,’ consisting of the United States, 
Great Britain, France, Germany and one smaller country on a rotational basis. The idea, which 
was drawn up by Walt Rostow, was that this committee would be charged with “political crisis 
management before hostilities.” Rostow surmised that de Gaulle would be interested in such a 
mechanism, since the Frenchman had often expressed his concern with finding better ways to 
coordinate the policies of the Western alliance. He also thought that, in the wake of the Cuban 
missile crisis, such a proposal would be generally welcomed by the European allies and that an 
executive committee would be a necessary addendum to the projected NATO multilateral 
nuclear force (MLF).253 Kennedy indeed included the proposal in a letter to Konrad Adenauer on 
January 12, 1963. The establishment of “some executive mechanism,” he argued to the German 
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chancellor, would facilitate “swift consultation in times of crisis” and “make it possible to concert 
our views in regions beyond the NATO area.”254 
 In some respects, the idea of a NATO Executive Committee came close to de Gaulle’s 
original tripartite proposal, but there were important differences which made an agreement along 
these lines with Paris highly unlikely. First of all, of course, membership of the executive 
committee would not be restricted to the United States, Great Britain and France, the only 
countries that in de Gaulle’s view could claim to have – as Kennedy’s letter to Adenauer put it – 
“major world-wide interests and capabilities” as well as the only states within the Western alliance 
with a nuclear capability. Secondly, the arrangement would not involve the coordination of the 
use of American nuclear weapons. And thirdly, decisionmaking would clearly remain the privilege 
of the North Atlantic Council in the American proposal.  
 The Kennedy administration never seriously put the idea forward in its communications 
with Paris and there is no record of it being proposed in NATO. The record thus suggests that 
Washington considered it at best a ploy to mitigate the negative reactions to the Nassau 
Agreement and to establish a dialogue with France. In this latter regard, despite the allied 
solidarity manifested by de Gaulle in the Cuban missile crisis, the breach between Washington 
and Paris had already become too deep to bridge. A few days after the Nassau meeting, French 
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had told the American embassy that it was “now too late for 
de Gaulle’s idea [of] tripartitism.”255 
 The end of de Gaulle’s memorandum diplomacy came, then, in 1962. The end of the 
Algerian war with the signing of the Evian Accords (in April); Kennedy’s unilateral 
decisionmaking in the Cuban missile crisis in October; the Anglo-American meeting at Nassau in 
December; all these developments ushered in a more assertive phase in Gaullist foreign policy. 
De Gaulle shifted away from the triumvirate proposal toward a bilateral defense relationship with 
West Germany, leading to the signing of the Treaty of Reconciliation in January 1963. He 
shipwrecked Macmillan’s grand design by vetoing British membership. When asked in 1963 whe-
ther he was interested in reviving his memorandum proposal, de Gaulle therefore replied that 
since the United States had preserved its “freedom of action,” France had chosen to do the 
same.256 
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In some respects, Franco-American relations during the early years of the Fifth Republic rested in 
an état de grâce. The new stability of French politics, de Gaulle’s personal stature, the fact that 
French policy towards Algeria was in flux, and the robust performance of the French economy 
had caused a remarkable improvement in American public opinion of France.257 De Gaulle’s 
jubilant tour of American cities in April 1960 was the most agreeable journey of his life, he 
volunteered to the mayor of San Francisco.258 
Yet de Gaulle’s popularity in the United States was at an artificial zenith, since his dissent 
was still largely hidden from the public eye. De Gaulle’s tripartite memorandum of September 
1958 confronted the Eisenhower administration with a formidable dilemma: both outright 
rejection and unqualified acceptance would have endangered NATO. On the one hand, de 
Gaulle made it clear that rejection would compel him to ultimately withdraw France from the 
military organization of the alliance. On the other hand, if Eisenhower had accepted de Gaulle’s 
memorandum proposal, he would have concurred with a complete overhaul of the Western 
alliance – and this would have implied dismantling NATO as well. As the memorandum’s 
reference to Article XII suggests, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 would probably have to be 
revised in order to extend its geographic scope to much of the non-communist world. In order to 
establish a “triple rather than a dual direction” of the Western alliance,259 such a revision would 
also be needed to establish the tripartite organization.260 This organization would by implication 
supersede or perhaps even replace the North Atlantic Council. In addition, at the military-
strategic level, the Standing Group rather than the American-dominated SHAPE would be the 
nucleus of the system. This group – composed of American, British and French officers – would 
draw up joint plans for the employment of nuclear weapons, thus substantially firming up the 
American nuclear security guarantee to Europe and the more flexible mutual defense 
arrangement in Article V of the Treaty as well as reducing the potential for unilateral American 
action elsewhere in the world which could adversely affect European security. In de Gaulle’s view, 
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in this alliance organized on a tripartite rather than a multilateral – if American-dominated – 
alignment, France would obviously represent the interests of continental Western Europe. As the 
main military and political power in Western Europe, it would virtually be on a par with the 
superpowers; its nuclear weapons would give it a guaranteed edge over Western Germany. While 
Great Britain could presumably assume responsibility for the security of Northern Europe, the 
United States would be re-positioned in a more distant role as an ally of ultimate recourse.261 
The idea of full American acceptance seems so fictitious that the case is often overlooked. 
When Secretary of State Dean Rusk explained to Chancellor Adenauer in June 1962  that he saw 
the Atlantic community as “a nexus of interlocking special relationships reaching around the 
globe, including the Inter-American system, the Commonwealth, French associations in Africa 
and the welcome development of German interests outside Europe,” this conception did not 
seem on the face of it all that different from de Gaulle’s proposal to coordinate Western policies 
based on traditional spheres of influence, except that it involved no tripartite directorate and 
allowed a German role in it.262 Acceptance of the tripartite design would have offered the United 
States at least one important benefit: the costs and responsibilities of the global containment of 
communism might have been shared more evenly. As France and Great Britain would have 
assumed principal responsibilities in designated parts of the world, it would presumably have 
allowed a reduction in expenditures for the United States. Eisenhower’s overriding concern with 
balancing costs and commitments would thus have been addressed. America’s overextended 
political commitments, too, could perhaps have been prevented or its implications have been 
attenuated. What, for instance, would have happened in South Vietnam if the problem had been 
dealt with on a trilateral basis and if de Gaulle’s ideas for a neutralization of the area were 
incorporated? 
The sheer audacity of de Gaulle’s proposal for reorganizing the Western alliance and his 
unwillingness to compromise his vision nonetheless made it exceedingly difficult for Washington 
to come to terms with the demands contained in it. Compelled to preserve French cooperation in 
NATO, Eisenhower tried to find a middle ground where France, like Great Britain, could find 
some pride in being regarded as a major power in the West without uprooting the multilateral 
alliance system. “I really did try to meet his desire and need for some kind of world position and 
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prestige,” he reminisced in 1964. “I was offering him everything it was possible to offer […].”263 
Eisenhower’s search for a middle ground continued up to the end of his tenure and preoccupied 
him more than is commonly understood. Kennedy, too, gave ample attention to the tripartite 
issue during his first year in office, even as the gist of his policies ran counter to de Gaulle’s 
vision. But a middle ground did not exist. 
Although the United States thus never came close to agreement with de Gaulle on his 
proposal, it would be wrong to conclude that it was wholly unresponsive. In particular, 
Eisenhower took the threat to NATO seriously enough to struggle to come to terms with his 
wartime comrade. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy ended up extending the ‘special relationship’ 
with Great Britain to France. Macmillan also encouraged Washington to be responsive to de 
Gaulle’s proposal, hoping that this would mollify the latter’s opposition to British membership of 
the European Economic Community. The United States was not prepared to engage in any 
substantive tripartite coordination of global security and strategic issues, least of all with regard to 
the employment of nuclear weapons. A French veto over the use of American nuclear weapons 
was out of the question. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy were, however, prepared to extend to 
France assurances that had been given to Great Britain: that Washington would consult Paris 
prior to the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world “unless an attack were so imminent 
that our survival was at stake.”  
With regard to coordinating policies vis-à-vis areas beyond the NATO treaty area, 
Washington was prepared to engage in a series of informal discussions at the ambassadorial level, 
although their inconclusiveness understandably did not satisfy de Gaulle. More importantly, 
Eisenhower and Kennedy were prepared to extend the attributes of the ‘special relationship’ to 
France on an informal basis. Their offers in this area were not without substance and they would 
have required some organizational arrangements. To be sure, Washington was not prepared to 
accord joint decisionmaking authority to any tripartite formula, nor was it prepared to lend 
unqualified support to French policies in Algeria as part of a tripartite deal as was suggested by 
some French spokesmen (in particular Debré). It should also be noted that the American 
overtures to de Gaulle fell short of the ‘special relationship’ with Great Britain in at least one 
important respect: the United States was not prepared to provide the nuclear assistance to France 
that it provided to Great Britain. Eisenhower would have had no qualms about providing nuclear 
assistance to an independent French nuclear force but much to his chagrin found Congress in his 
way; Kennedy, as we will see, was firmly opposed to any such assistance. Moreover, since French 
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views were bound to be less in accord with the United States as those of Great Britain, the 
benefits of informal consultation were of less value to de Gaulle. If anything, the unilateral 
behavior of the United States in a range of crises – from Lebanon and Quemoy and Matsu in the 
spring of 1958 to Cuba in the fall 1962 – undoubtedly confirmed to de Gaulle the inadequateness 
of informal arrangements in order to influence American policies. Only with regard to Berlin, 
where formal treaties guaranteeing the position of France existed, was there a working tripartite 
relationship. One of the ironies of this history is that the management of the Berlin stand-off 
persuaded Eisenhower to become more accommodating toward de Gaulle while it caused de 
Gaulle to lay his tripartite demands to rest. Another is that while de Gaulle tried to break into the 
Anglo-American combine, Washington was increasingly given to downgrading its special 
relationship with Great Britain and to urging it to join the continental European movement. Yet 
another is that when de Gaulle seemed to be lowering his demands to make them more 
acceptable to the incoming Kennedy administration, this administration was even less inclined 
than its predecessors to go along with any tripartite designs. The unanswered question, of course, 
is whether Paris and Washington would have been able to come to agreement if Richard Nixon 
had won the election of 1960. 
Apart from extending the ‘special relationship’ to France, the United States put much 
stock in enhancing the process of consultation within NATO in order to accommodate the 
growing restiveness of European allies. The problem with this approach in responding to de 
Gaulle’s tripartite memorandum was that enhancing consultation was never a credible alternative 
to power-sharing. In particular the Kennedy years showed that power-sharing could not be 
achieved through an agreed set of arrangements. These years provided plenty of evidence that 
Washington, particularly in times of crisis, viewed consultation as too cumbersome or at best as 
an instrument to mobilize allied support for American positions. The obvious lesson was that 
power-sharing could only occur in the context of a diffusion of power away from the United 
States. This diffusion would not be the result of American policies, but of the relative decline of 
the United States and the growing assertiveness of its allies. This diffusion of power is what de 
Gaulle, who obviously did not care to participate in the fiction of consultation within NATO, 
tried to achieve with his unilateral policy of independence. If anything, the United States’ 
unilateral conduct during the Cuban missile crisis as well as the permanence of the Anglo-
American special relationship evidenced by the Nassau meeting shortly thereafter, probably 
finally persuaded de Gaulle that his tripartite proposal was leading nowhere. 
 




What principal reasons caused Eisenhower not to accept de Gaulle’s memorandum proposal? 
The so-called “Algerian interpretation” of the tripartite memorandum – namely that it was mostly 
intended to garner American support for France’s Algerian policies – should be discounted as 
having influenced the American response in any important way. 264  Even though the 
memorandum proposal was considered among French elites as an instrument to compel Anglo-
American support for French policies in North Africa, an interpretation that was instilled in 
particular by Prime Minister Debré and General Ely, there is no evidence that such an interpreta-
tion was prevalent in Washington. It certainly had little impact on Eisenhower’s – or Dulles’ – 
assessment of de Gaulle’s proposal. It is true, as we have seen, that in August 1959 Eisenhower 
rejected the recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support France in Algeria in order 
to gain French cooperation in NATO. This decision, however, was not connected to 
Eisenhower’s rejection of the memorandum proposal. On the contrary, Paris was generally insis-
tent that Algeria was an internal affair and would not tolerate any foreign interference. The 
Eisenhower administration had moreover understood that the proposal was linked to much 
broader issues than the Algerian conflict. 
The principal reason for rejecting de Gaulle’s tripartite proposal was that it threatened to 
disrupt an alliance system to which the United States had devoted considerable resources and 
political prestige. This system had served American interests well, since it allowed for American 
predomination while spreading the defense burden over more shoulders and upholding the 
egalitarian veil of a coalition. De Gaulle’s tripartite conception of the Western alliance did not 
correspond with American notions about the Atlantic community as a scaled-down world 
community. The reactions from other European capitals – in particular Bonn and Rome – made 
clear that the Atlantic alliance would have faced serious internal unrest if the United States would 
have gone along with de Gaulle’s tripartitism. Would Konrad Adenauer’s policy to integrate 
Germany into the Western alliance remain the guideline for German foreign policy? NATO 
Secretary General Spaak’s warnings that West Germany and Italy would never agree to de 
Gaulle’s tripartite proposal were daunting enough. “Rather than submit to a global directorate 
from which they would be excluded, they would reclaim their total political independence,” he 
noted.265 In the predominant American view, too, the political unity of the Western bloc might 
well have been dissolved rather than achieved through de Gaulle’s tripartite proposal. Moreover, 
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at a time when the East-West standoff in Berlin already strained allied unity, could one expect the 
United States to add further to uncertainty? Stability and unity of purpose in the Western camp 
were a natural concern for the hegemon. Furthermore, the drawing up of strategic plans, 
determining when and where and by whom nuclear weapons would be fired, would have 
hampered the strategic flexibility that is necessary in preserving an essential range of choices for 
national decisionmakers. 
In explaining the American response one also does well to consider Eisenhower’s and 
Dulles’ personal commitment to NATO. Eisenhower, it is true, felt that the European 
dependency on the United States should come to an end sooner rather than later. He insisted in 
December 1958 that, 
 
we will not always be the permanent foundation stone of the whole NATO alliance. Our original 
contribution of divisions and other forces to NATO was supposed to be temporary in character. 
Now we seem stuck with it permanently. We should ask when the hell these other people are 
going to do their duty. We have to get tougher with them [...]. These other NATO powers cannot 
go on forever riding our coattails.266  
 
But Eisenhower’s adhesion to the principles underlying NATO was unwavering. As the first 
SACEUR, he had played a vital role in the establishment of the organization in the early 1950s 
and he kept in close contact with his successors and friends Alfred Gruenther and Lauris Norstad. 
As a military expert, he was moreover persuaded, in contrast to de Gaulle, that modern tech-
nology had made old forms of military cooperation inadequate. The range of new weapons, the 
speed with which they could travel, and their immense destructive power made the integration of 
military forces under a central command in wartime necessary.267 
Other considerations, to be sure, contributed to Eisenhower’s aversion to the tripartite 
idea. Particularly concerning the so-called Third World, where he saw much at stake, he had 
developed very little confidence in the sagacity of the European colonial powers. They failed in 
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his view to adjust their attitude to the movement toward national independence. “Should we try 
to dam it [this movement] up completely,” Eisenhower wrote Winston Churchill in 1954 in a 
particularly forceful attempt to persuade the British prime minister, “it would, like a mighty river, 
burst through barriers and could create havoc. But again, like a river, if we are intelligent enough 
to make constructive use of this force, then the result far from being disastrous, could rebound 
greatly to our advantage, particularly in our struggle against the Kremlin’s power.”268 Eisenhower 
believed strongly that the American tradition was anti-colonialist and that the United States 
should sympathize with the drive for independence on the part of “dependent peoples.” At a 
time when the United States was attempting to forge alliances of a different kind with the new 
states, de Gaulle’s plan was hardly opportune. What, for instance, would be the reaction of the 
African and Asian countries to a Franco-British-American organization where Western policies 
and strategic plans for the Third World were decided? Would such an organization not be open 
to charges of neo-colonialism? As Eisenhower noted in one of many letters on the subject of 
Asia: 
 
This administration has been arguing that no Western power can go to Asia militarily, except as 
one of a concert of powers, which concert must include local Asiatic peoples. To contemplate 
anything else is to lay ourselves open to the charge of imperialism and colonialism or – at the very 
least – of  objectionable paternalism.269 
 
Evidently, de Gaulle’s global tripartitism was not in keeping with Eisenhower’s circumspect 
approach to building relations with the Third World. 
The obvious excessiveness of de Gaulle’s demands was a further disincentive for a 
positive American reaction; de Gaulle as much as admitted it himself. Despite de Gaulle’s public 
assertions that France was reborn, it had mostly the characteristics of a nation in decline rather 
than of one experiencing rebirth. In the early 1960s, France was still deeply enmeshed in the 
Algerian conflict, prone to civil war and coup d’états. At various times, the General himself 
narrowly escaped death. In addition, the force de dissuasion, on the basis of which de Gaulle justified 
many of his claims, was still in its infancy; not until March 1960 would France explode the first 
atomic device and it would take many years before a substantial strike force was built. Given the 
legacy of defeat in World War II and the weak reputation of the Fourth Republic, how could 
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French requests to be treated as a major power truthfully be acknowledged? Eisenhower’s earlier 
cited cable to Dulles in December 1958, in which he remarked “that our friend should cease 
insisting upon attempting to control the whole world […] even before he has gotten France itself 
in good order,” makes clear that this was inconceivable.270 “I was willing to recognize de Gaulle 
as an important world figure,” Eisenhower later explained, “but he didn’t have any means of 
exercising real world power.”271 
Finally, of course, the United States was hardly prepared to cede control over the Western 
alliance. “The trouble with de Gaulle was that he always returned to his September 1958 letter on 
the directoire,” Douglas Dillon once said. “On this, de Gaulle really wanted the form and not the 
substance... .”272 However, American jibes that de Gaulle was most of all interested in the appea-
rance of influence – that he, as Eisenhower put it, solely thought in terms of “Glory, Honor, 
France” – were missing the point.273 The reverse is probably closer to the truth: that the United 
States was only prepared to give France the appearance of influence while keeping the substance 
to itself. In the straightforward wording of one National Security Council document, American 
policies with regard to France generally amounted to “seek[ing] maximum French support for 
U.S. positions and objectives.”274 The tripartite meetings of the ambassadorial group in Washing-
ton, too, were mainly viewed as helpful in conditioning the French to American views – not as 
venues for tripartite coordination.275 The United States’ prime concern was thus to gain greater 
control over French policies rather than to concede any control over American policies. 
Could a quid pro quo have produced an understanding between Washington and Paris on 
the organization of the West? Certainly Eisenhower had no qualms about aiding the French 
nuclear force. He was, however, paralyzed by Congressional opposition to any agreements that 
might have ensued in the nuclear field. “I could have reached a satisfactory agreement with de 
Gaulle on the atom thing except for the law,” Eisenhower complained in retrospect.276 It is 
moreover doubtful whether de Gaulle, given his determination to preserve the independence of 
the French nuclear force, would have attenuated his demands as part of a trade-off involving 
American assistance to the French nuclear program. In contrast to his willingness to help out in 
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the nuclear realm, Eisenhower was not prepared to give France a blank check on Algeria in 
return for French cooperation in NATO. As we have seen, his anti-colonialism and keen 
sensitivity to public opinion in the Third World impeded a deal of this kind. The truth of the 
matter is that Eisenhower was unable to strike a deal that could have satisfied both leaders to a 
sufficient degree. De Gaulle was not interested in anything but the accord he had proposed: a 
revamping of the Western alliance along tripartite lines in return for a more cooperative attitude 
within a sustained – albeit reformed – NATO. “It was all or nothing with him,” Eisenhower 
concluded in 1964; “he wanted it at the top, all the way like Cicero and Pompey and Caesar.”277 
Yet Eisenhower could only offer informal arrangements in response. 
De Gaulle’s rigidity has reinforced an impression that he was never actually interested in 
achieving the proposed reforms, and that he staged this coup de théâtre to set him free to execute 
his first priority – to withdraw France from NATO. John Newhouse, for instance, believed that 
de Gaulle purposefully sabotaged any chances of acceptance by showing the memorandum to 
Secretary General Spaak and leaking the contents to the other allies.278 Wilfrid Kohl, too, argues 
that the proposal was “in essence a tactical ploy.” 279  Elizabeth Sherwood draws a similar 
conclusion and quotes Couve de Murville who told her that “we never expected the United States 
to accept” the proposal.280 Others have argued that de Gaulle’s memorandum diplomacy must be 
accorded legitimacy on its own terms. Clear answers will possibly never be furnished, but with 
some justification the memorandum can be seen as more than a tactical ploy. Acceptance of 
tripartitism would have realized the Gaullist design in important ways: it would have gained 
France recognition from its allies as a nuclear power and as the supreme power in Western 
Europe, one whose vested global interests had to be taken into account. In spite of his rigidity, by 
making his proposal in secrecy, Philip Cerny has noted, de Gaulle indicated that “the negotiated 
result and not the memorandum itself, was meant to provide the symbolic reference point.”281 De 
Gaulle realized his demands were hard to swallow for Washington, but his memorandum 
diplomacy from 1958 to 1962 suggests that he held out some hope that the United States would 
eventually come around to his view. De Gaulle’s passionate plea with Eisenhower and Macmillan 
in August 1960 and his overtures to the Kennedy administration as it took office suggest that he 
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did not preclude the possibility of a positive outcome. All in all, Michael Harrison probably gave 
the most accurate description by presenting de Gaulle’s memorandum diplomacy as the General’s 
search for the “easy route to grandeur.”282 
“Our biggest argument as presidents came out of this idea […] to have a publicly 
proclaimed triumvirate,” Eisenhower said upon retirement about his relationship with de Gaulle. 
New York Times journalist Robert Kleiman judged that the United States should have been more 
receptive to de Gaulle’s proposal and thus bore at least partial responsibility for de Gaulle’s later 
intransigence. However, it is hard to conceive that either Eisenhower or Kennedy could have 
gone along with such fundamental changes within the Western alliance. This alliance had been 
developed for almost a decade with a great infusion of American resources and political capital 
and served American interests in the context of the Cold War rather well; the disadvantages 
connected with a sudden change of policy – specifically, the effects on America’s stature with 
most of its other allies in the world – would almost certainly have outweighed the potential bene-
fits. Eisenhower could moreover hardly have agreed to a design that would have conditioned 
American power to the visions of de Gaulle, the leader of a country that appeared weak and 
unstable and commanded relatively few resources of its own. If de Gaulle was indeed “asking for 
the moon”283 with this tripartite proposal, it was also because he was asking too much for France. 
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Chapter Four 
Of Arms and Men: Kennedy, De Gaulle, and Military-Strategic 
Reform, 1961-1962 
 
Kennedy was, as one observer noted, “the first president who had to design policies for an 
America on the decline.”1 The United States, many Americans believed, had been forced on the 
defensive in the Eisenhower years. In Europe, USIA polls showed, American prestige was also 
waning.2 In his inaugural address, Kennedy hence did not devote one word to domestic affairs. 
Instead, he summoned all Americans to sacrifice for the United States at this, “its hour of 
maximum danger,” exhorting them not to ask “what your country can do for you – ask what you 
can do for your country.”3  
Kennedy’s determination to regain the initiative in the Cold War through the reassertion of 
American leadership had farreaching implications for the European allies. One of his most 
important reforms in this regard occurred in the realm of military strategy. Kennedy sought to 
make NATO’s strategy more responsive to American security needs. More specifically, he was 
determined to escape from the automatic nuclear confrontation that Eisenhower’s massive 
retaliation strategy had imposed on the American president. Kennedy’s introduction of the 
strategy of flexible response was therefore designed to reduce the alliance’s reliance on the 
nuclear deterrent by strengthening its conventional capabilities. It furthermore presupposed 
central control over the entire nuclear arsenal of the West. In both respects, implementation of 
this new strategy relied on the preparedness of the allies to follow suit. 
De Gaulle, however, had little reason to support Kennedy’s military reform effort. He 
had long been persuaded that France ought to have nuclear weapons of its own. Upon his return 
to power, he had accelerated the development of a national nuclear force and in the course of his 
tenure reduced spending on conventional forces. In addition, he had charged the French 
deterrent with political meaning by making it a symbol of his policy of independence vis-à-vis the 
superpowers. The American nuclear guarantee, de Gaulle reasoned, had been credible as long as 
Washington could consider a Soviet attack on Western Europe as one on the United States, 
warranting the use of nuclear weapons, without risking an attack on the American homeland. The 
                                                 
1 Richard J. Barnet, The Alliance: America, Europe, Japan: Makers of the Postwar World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1983), 199-200. 
2 In 1960, a large majority of British (81%), French (74%) and Germans (53%) believed that the technological, 
scientific and economic supremacy of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was ending. Pells, Not Like Us, 87. 
3 The text of Kennedy’s inaugural address can be found on the website of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library 
(http://www.jfklibrary.org). 




changes in the strategic environment, in particular the fact that the Soviet Union by the late 1950s 
had acquired the capability to strike at the American homeland with nuclear weapons, implied 
that Western Europe’s security could no longer be assumed to be safe in American hands.  
Differences over the military strategy required for waging the Cold War were at the heart 
of the strained Franco-American relationship during the Kennedy years. This chapter will 
examine the development of these differences in the course of 1961 and 1962, which helped to 
set the stage for the crisis of 1963 (that will be described later). How could the Europeans be 
persuaded of the wisdom of the new strategic mindset in Washington? Could they be swayed 
sufficiently to invest in their conventional force posture? Could this be done without 
undermining the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee? And would the United States be 
able to abort the French nuclear program as well as bring the existing British nuclear force under 
its control? Or should the United States be prepared to provide at least some nuclear assistance 
to the French in order to tie it more closely to the overall strategic deterrent? France was not the 
only ally nor was it arguably the most important one, yet French concurrence would be pivotal to 
the attainment of Kennedy’s strategic reform. This concurrence was, however, from the outset 
unlikely to be forthcoming. 
The Sources of Kennedy’s Strategic Revisionism 
“You have been a Captain in this climactic struggle, and I am newly arrived upon the field,” 
Kennedy wrote in his first letter to de Gaulle.4 Eisenhower left the White House at the age of 
seventy; at that time, Macmillan and Khrushchev were in their late sixties, de Gaulle was in his 
early seventies and Adenauer well into his eighties. The dashing senator from Massachusetts, 
aged 43, indeed could not boast of much experience. European leaders observed the transition, 
on a cold winter day in January 1961, in a mood of ambivalent anticipation, if not of trepidation. 
De Gaulle was no exception. “Tell me what that young man is like,” he asked Jacques Chaban-
Delmas as he was about to leave for Washington to revive his tripartite proposal.5 Kennedy, de 
Gaulle judged in his memoirs, was “enjoying the advantages of youth, but suffering the 
drawbacks of a novice.” He would come to look upon his American counterpart with a measure 
of sympathy, but he would continue to regard him as still only an apprentice of power who “had 
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it not been for the crime which killed him, might have had the time to leave his mark on our age.”6 
(Italics added.) 
Kennedy was highly conscious of the generation gap which separated him from other world 
leaders.7 However, the gap also provided him with an opportunity to display a spirited self-
assurance and paint a contrast with the ‘staid’ Eisenhower. Kennedy consciously styled himself as 
the torchbearer of a new generation, born in the twentieth century, confident of its abilities and 
anxious to prove its mettle. On the campaign trail he had incessantly attacked Eisenhower’s 
foreign and defense policies as too “soft” and passive. Courage, which he had extolled in 1956 as 
“the most admirable of human virtues,” was indispensable in the face of a relentless adversary.8 
The transition from Eisenhower did not herald a fundamental reorientation of American foreign 
policy, but it did signal, as Walt W. Rostow observed, “a shift from defensive reaction to initiative 
[...].”9 Kennedy’s rise to power initialed a new era of liberal internationalism – or interventionism 
– in American history, one in which foreign policy tended to be driven by a cult of toughness and 
bold activism to ‘get the country moving again.’ 
This shift in Washington’s political psyche was well-attuned to the prevailing mood among 
Americans at the time. There was a restive feeling that the global position of the United States 
had declined since the end of World War II.10 In the military-strategic realm, too, the balance of 
power had been shifting in Moscow’s favor. By 1953, Soviet scientists had developed a 
thermonuclear bomb and in October 1957 they launched the first earth satellite, the Sputnik. The 
Soviet Union was rapidly acquiring the means to wreak destruction on the American homeland, 
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giving birth to the – erroneous – notion that the United States had fallen behind in space 
technology and weaponry. In his campaign speeches, Kennedy had denounced the Eisenhower 
administration for having allowed a “missile gap” and giving the Soviet Union the edge in the 
balance of terror. Upon his arrival in office, he soon was to find out that the Eisenhower 
administration’s denials had been justified, but the notion that the United States was experiencing 
a relative decline remained. Americans had begun to believe that the Soviets under the boastful 
Khrushchev really were ‘ten feet tall.’ In January 1961, Khrushchev delivered a rousing speech 
offering support to “wars of national liberation” – a message to the developing world that was 
perceived as a serious threat by the incoming administration. A few months later, in April 1961, 
the Soviet Union sent Yuri Gagarin as the first human around the earth in a spaceship. The tide 
of the Cold War appeared to be running against the United States. 
Eisenhower’s New Look strategy, presented in 1954, had relied on the United States’ nuclear 
superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and revolved around the threat of an asymmetrical 
response: the threat to an aggressor that he will suffer disproportionately from his aggression and 
therefore cannot count on retaining the initiative. This strategy thus became known as one of 
massive nuclear retaliation. By emphasizing the United States’ readiness to use nuclear weapons, 
including in response to what could be considered as a minor aggression, it maximized the 
deterrent value of these weapons. In addition, it was motivated by Eisenhower’s strong belief in 
economic health as vital for national security. He was genuinely concerned that high levels of 
defense spending, giving free rein to what he later labeled the ‘military-industrial complex,’ would 
transform American society into a ‘garrison state.’ The heavy reliance on nuclear weapons 
allowed for a decrease in defense spending and a substantial reduction of conventional forces 
while maximizing the deterrent posture of the West (“a bigger bang for the buck”).  
Eisenhower’s views on nuclear weapons were not immobile. During his first term in 
office Eisenhower still thought of nuclear war as militarily feasible and he saw, in particular, a use 
for tactical nuclear weapons in peripheral wars. However, with the development of 
thermonuclear weapons in the mid-1950s, whose destructive power far surpassed earlier 
generations of nuclear weapons, he became increasingly convinced that the superpowers would 
avoid taking actions which could escalate into a war. This did not, to his mind, diminish the value 
of the nuclear deterrent. On the contrary, Eisenhower equated defense with nuclear deterrence to 
a greater extent than before. He rejected the idea, which among political scientists became known 
as the ‘stability-instability paradox’, that the Soviet Union would be inclined to engage in small-
scale aggressions under the ‘umbrella’ of strategic mutual deterrence. He argued that particularly 




in areas where the United States and the Soviet Union had vital geopolitical interests, such as in 
Europe, the chance of any armed conflict remaining conventional was nil – and that Soviet 
leaders were well aware of this. Eisenhower therefore saw no need to strengthen American 
conventional forces. Such measures would be senseless given the Soviets’ overwhelming 
conventional superiority in Europe, or even be harmful since it would undermine the credibility 
of the American nuclear security guarantee. Eisenhower was moreover concerned of the effects 
of strengthening American conventional forces on the financial health of the United States and 
on his balanced budget policy. Hence, Eisenhower never wavered on the predominance to be 
assigned to nuclear weapons in the military strategy of the West. In the course of his two 
presidential terms the basis for the deterrent value of American nuclear weapons had only shifted 
from the premise of United States’ superiority to the horrendous prospect of mutual annihilation. 
Toward the end of his presidency, even as he became more oppressed by the specter of a nuclear 
apocalypse, Eisenhower still concluded that “all other military matters must remain secondary to 
the overriding importance of deterrence.”11 
This was bound to change as Kennedy assumed the presidency. Throughout the 1950s 
prominent Democrats had engaged in fierce criticism of Eisenhower’s New Look strategy. Dean 
Acheson was the most outspoken and the former secretary of state may well have been the most 
influential. Throughout the Eisenhower years, Acheson continued to adhere to the tenets of the 
Truman administration’s comprehensive review of national security policy contained in NSC-68, 
which had recommended a significant increase in defense spending. He believed Eisenhower’s 
“obsessive” and “reckless” reliance on nuclear weapons and preoccupation with national 
economic health dangerously undermined the credibility of the American security guarantee to 
Europe. “This administration,” he charged in 1956, “has been playing Russian roulette with an 
atomic pistol.” Acheson believed the Soviet Union could be brought to its knees by applying 
unrelenting pressure through the strengthening of American military capabilities and of NATO. 
In contrast to Eisenhower, he believed the United States should not shy from incurring 
government deficits for this overriding purpose. Acheson even argued that higher military 
spending would benefit the American economy. 
The Truman years had left Dean Acheson with an unenviable reputation as “the man 
who lost China.” Yet, he was able to gradually overtake the Democrat’s foreign policy platform 
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during the latter half of the Eisenhower years. The lawyer-diplomat, a formidable man by many 
accounts, was the driving force behind most foreign policy statements of the Democratic 
Advisory Council (DAC), which was established in November 1956 to develop a coordinated 
party policy for the 1960 presidential elections. Aided by kindred spirits such as Paul Nitze, 
Acheson effectively used the DAC to marginalize Adlai Stevenson’s liberal school of thought 
which gave priority to arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, economic aid to the 
underdeveloped world, the expansion of world trade and the development of friendly relations 
with the non-aligned countries. The DAC strongly influenced the foreign policy positions of 
aspiring Democratic nominees for the presidential elections of 1960. Two of them, Senator Stuart 
Symington from Missouri and Senator John Kennedy, joined the DAC in 1959.12 
By the late 1950s Acheson cum suis were riding the tide of public opinion. This was in part 
the result of the coincidence, in late 1957, of technological developments in the Soviet Union and 
a report of a special committee appointed by Eisenhower and chaired by H. Rowan Gaither on 
defense against missile attacks. The impact on the American public debate of the surprise Soviet 
launch in October 1957 of the first earth satellite Sputnik was arguably rivaled only by Pearl 
Harbor (1941) and Korea (1950).13 The Soviet Union appeared to suddenly have leapt into the 
missile age years ahead of the United States, an impression which was actively encouraged by 
Khrushchev. As a result, the territory of the United States seemed likely to be held at risk within 
a matter of years. In the frantic mood caused by Sputnik, the Gaither Report, submitted to 
Eisenhower in November 1957, effectively put the Republican administration on the defensive 
for the remainder of its tenure. The Gaither Committee called for ambitious measures to offset 
America’s supposed vulnerability, including an acceleration of missile programs, the development 
of a second-strike capability, the deployment of short-range missiles in Western Europe and, last 
but not least, the strengthening of conventional forces to fight limited wars. It acknowledged that 
the implementation of its recommendations would require a substantial increase of the defense 
budget and would necessitate deficit spending for at least a number of years. Eisenhower’s 
reaction to these recommendations was lukewarm. But it was clear from their public reception 
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that any successor would feel the imperative to eliminate the “missile gap” and to redesign 
defense policies on the assumption of full nuclear parity with the Soviet Union.14 
Apart from Sputnik and the Gaither Report, Eisenhower’s handling of Cold War crises, 
too, had generated unease with his heavy reliance on nuclear weapons. When Communist China 
began an artillery bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu in the late summer of 1958, after Chang 
Kai-Shek had provocatively deployed large numbers of troops onto these islands off the coast of 
the Chinese mainland, the Eisenhower administration responded by threatening the use of 
nuclear weapons in case of a Chinese invasion. Although it is doubtful that Eisenhower would 
have authorized their use,15 the idea that the United States was prepared to risk a nuclear war for 
the defense of two uninhabited islands located within visibility of the Chinese coast seemed 
reckless to many. The European allies, in particular, who thought of the crisis as yet another 
episode in the Chinese civil war, feared that Washington’s unrelenting stance would drag them 
into a war with China which could ultimately escalate into a nuclear exchange with the Soviet 
Union.  
Eisenhower’s response in the crisis over the apple of discord between East and West – 
Berlin – just a few months later, caused similar concerns. Khrushchev ignited the first in a series 
of conflicts over the city in November 1958 by declaring his intention to sign a peace treaty with 
East Germany, which would remove the basis for the presence of allied troops in Berlin. This 
political move was commonly perceived as a clever attempt to test the United States now that the 
Soviet Union seemed to be achieving nuclear parity. Throughout the crisis Eisenhower continued 
to rely on the nuclear deterrent to defend the status quo. He denied the requests of the Supreme 
Allied Commander in Europe, General Lauris Norstad, for troop reinforcements in order to 
respond more effectively to any Soviet military move. This denial opened the Eisenhower 
administration up to widespread accusations that it was not militarily prepared to meet the 
challenge. In a remarkable revelation of his innermost thoughts, Acheson even reasoned that “the 
right final choice might be to accept defeat, and the loss of West Berlin, if the only remaining 
alternative were to start a nuclear war.”16 He viewed defeat in a conventional war over Berlin as 
ultimately acceptable, assuming that such a war would have forced - “in the interests of simple 
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survival” - the unification of Western Europe and the strengthening of the Atlantic community.17 
Army Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor equally chafed at the absence of conventional military 
options in the Berlin crisis, which inspired him to write The Uncertain Trumpet soon after his early 
retirement. In this influential book he recommended replacing Eisenhower’s strategy with a 
“strategy of flexible response.”18  
Senator John F. Kennedy had been one voice in the Democratic chorus which criticized 
Eisenhower’s heavy reliance on nuclear weapons.19 During the presidential election campaign he 
had leaned heavily on the foreign policy positions of the DAC. By the time of his victory, the 
combined experiences of Sputnik and the crises over Quemoy and Matsu and Berlin meant that 
nuclear war, as Gaddis has noted, “had come to be seen in Washington as a threat in itself, 
greater in magnitude than most provocations that could conceivably have justified resort to it.”20 
Escaping the Suicide or Surrender Scenario 
After eight years of Republican presidential rule, the old hands from the Truman years as well as 
young, brilliant academicians from Kennedy’s Massachusetts entourage were itching to assume 
the reins of American foreign and military policy. Not surprisingly, the president-elect recruited 
people who were convinced that the military posture of the United States urgently needed 
strengthening as well as diversification. Nearly a third of the DAC’s 275 members found its way 
to the new administration.21 Robert McNamara was brought in as secretary of defense for his 
reputation as an effective and analytically gifted corporate manager. Acheson’s friend Paul Nitze 
joined as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. Maxwell Taylor was 
appointed as Kennedy’s military adviser and later became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Analysts from the California-based RAND Corporation, which had been of valuable assistance 
during Kennedy’s campaign, soon also settled on the banks of the Potomac. 
These appointees shared a determination to escape the “suicide or surrender”-scenario 
they felt Eisenhower’s strategy of massive retaliation had imposed on them. McGeorge Bundy, in 
one of his first acts as national security advisor, pointedly observed to Kennedy that he had 
inherited a situation “in which a subordinate commander faced with a substantial Russian military 
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action could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach you... .” 
“The most urgent need,” the former dean of Harvard University advised, “is for a review of basic 
military policy.”22 It was clear from the outset that, in order to put the president in full control of 
the levers of atomic power, such a review would necessarily have to eliminate the automaticity of 
nuclear retaliation and introduce a wider range of military options. Khrushchev’s January 1961 
appeal for Soviet support for “wars of national liberation,” a new challenge which the barely 
inaugurated administration took very seriously, only served to confirm this basic approach.23 
It was Acheson, as the most authoritative voice on foreign policy within the Democratic 
Party, who was called upon to forge these general ideas into a policy. Less than a fortnight after 
his inauguration, Kennedy asked the former secretary of state to chair a group of officials to 
prepare recommendations on political, military and economic issues in the North Atlantic region. 
The results of the review, contained in the so-called Acheson Report, were presented only a few 
weeks later to the new incumbent and approved by him on April 21, 1961.  
Rather than developing new ideas, the report brought them together in a coherent 
framework, stating that “the political nexus between North America and Western Europe – i.e. 
the Atlantic Community – is and must continue to be the foundation of U.S. foreign policy.” It 
predictably called for a “pragmatic doctrine” in which “first priority be given[...] to preparing for 
the more likely contingencies, i.e., those short of nuclear or massive non-nuclear attack.” 
Strengthening NATO’s conventional capabilities would therefore have to receive the highest 
priority. Not only would Eisenhower’s intention to reduce the number of American troops in 
Europe have to be reversed, the Acheson Report stated that European allies should be dissuaded 
from developing their own nuclear forces so as not to divert much needed resources. Apart from 
strongly advising against assisting the French nuclear program, it even reasoned that “over the 
long run, it would be desirable if the British decided to phase out of the nuclear deterrent 
business” and that instead the prospect of a “multilaterally owned and controlled NATO sea 
borne missile force” was to be held out to Europeans. From the report it was also clear that the 
new administration would be determined to establish ultimate control over decisions of war and 
peace. Whereas the United States should retain control of its own strategic force and only those 
American nuclear forces that were stationed on European soil were to be subject to a European 
veto on their use, it considered it to be “most important [...] that use of nuclear weapons by the 
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forces of other powers in Europe should be subject to U.S. veto and control.” As Kennedy 
discussed these recommendations with his most senior advisors, ominous clouds thus gathered 
over London’s as well as Paris’ nuclear aspirations.24 
Kennedy’s approval of the Acheson Report bestowed a presidential blessing on the 
introduction of the flexible response strategy in NATO and on a gradual rise in American 
defense spending. McNamara’s discovery within weeks that Eisenhower had been justified in 
denying the existence of a ‘missile gap’ and that, in fact, the United States still enjoyed strategic 
superiority over the Soviet Union, did not significantly alter the course. The Kennedy 
administration’s military policies would be preoccupied with strengthening this strategic 
superiority through the accelerated build-up of nuclear missile programs and of a second-strike 
capability; revising doctrines for nuclear warfare and establishing control over the entire nuclear 
deterrent of the West; and expanding and diversifying conventional capabilities to allow for a 
graduated response to acts of aggression. As such it set out to revamp the military strategy of the 
Western alliance. 
Explaining the New Policy to Europe 
From the vantage point of Europe these shifts in American strategic thinking were rather 
unsettling. As Raymond Aron observed in The Great Debate (1965), even the European foreign 
and defense ministries had hardly been aware of the “theoretical spadework” done in Washington 
and by early 1961 were just beginning to realize their purport.25 This did not alter the fact that 
Europeans, often perplexed by the mood swings on the other side of the Atlantic, had perceived 
a change in American behavior after Sputnik: Uncle Sam had turned from being ‘trigger-happy’ to 
being ‘trigger-shy.’ The first reactions to the Kennedy administration’s strategic innovations were 
therefore shaped by lingering doubts about the American nuclear security guarantee. In the 
words of Aron, “Europeans discovered that their security was no longer based on an automatic 
American nuclear response to any Soviet violation of the military line of demarcation but rather 
on the Russians’ uncertainty about United States reaction to an aggressive move on their part.”26 
Was the American nuclear guarantee still ‘credible’ enough to deter Soviet aggression in Europe? 
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The new gospel announced in Washington primarily confirmed suspicions that it was determined 
to reduce the risks for American territory. 
In reality, Sputnik had merely magnified the problems caused by Europe’s heavy reliance 
on the American nuclear arsenal. What alarmed most Europeans about the new strategic thinking 
was that it seriously considered the possibility of a conventional or even a nuclear war on 
European soil while allowing the United States to stay out of harm’s way. This went to the heart 
of European anxieties about the nuclear security guarantee. NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri 
Spaak voiced these anxieties during his first visit to Kennedy in February 1961. Reminding 
Kennedy that ever since 1954 the alliance had relied on tactical and strategic nuclear weapons to 
balance the conventional superiority of the Soviet Union, the august Belgian politician pointedly 
solicited a confirmation of this policy. If the new administration intended to change this policy, 
Spaak warned, “the entire problem [of defending Europe] has to be rethought.” He also hinted at 
the potential political effects of the changes now contemplated in Washington; they would 
“strengthen the case of politicians like de Gaulle who argued that the American nuclear security 
guarantee could not be counted upon.”27 
Kennedy did not heed Spaak’s warnings, but he understood that it was imperative to 
overcome the deeply skeptical attitude of the European allies. Their support was required for the 
implementation of the new strategy in at least three ways. Firstly, the European allies would have 
to augment their conventional forces in order to achieve a broader range of military options. This 
would require an increase of their defense expenditures. In relative terms this increase would 
probably have to be more significant than the one Kennedy had decided upon for the United 
States itself. Secondly, the European allies would be required to submit to the principle of 
centralized – i.e. American – control during crises. Both in the nuclear and the conventional field 
this control was indispensable for the Kennedy’s administration’s strategy of carefully calibrated 
responses in a scenario of gradual escalation. Thirdly, European allies would have to relinquish 
their real or imagined yearnings for a nuclear status since the development of national nuclear 
forces would render unachievable both the desired increase of conventional capabilities and 
centralized control. How could the Kennedy administration persuade the European governments 
that its strategic review would enhance, rather than undermine, their security interests? During 
the policy deliberations in Washington, Dean Acheson had frequently pressed the point that the 
new administration would have to take political consultations with its allies a lot more seriously. 
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By the end of Eisenhower’s presidency the lackluster in this area of the alliance was widely 
lamented; the new administration would be looked at to put new life into these consultations. It 
was understood that this would be in its own interests as well. The European allies would only go 
along with revamping the strategy of the alliance if there was the firm sense that the United States 
and Western Europe inherently belonged to one security and political community, in which every 
member played its role and any division of labor was merely a technical affair. For this, a 
reinvigoration of Atlantic ideals was needed.  
In early April Kennedy asked Acheson, as the elderly statesman who commanded respect 
in European capitals, to put the administration’s new thinking before the Europeans. During his 
month-long trip he held talks with the political leaderships of France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Belgium. Acheson cabled Washington that he generally received a sympathetic 
hearing, in particular with Chancellor Adenauer, who had been particularly concerned about the 
direction of the new administration’s policies but volunteered at the end of a long conversation 
that Acheson had “lifted a stone from my heart.”28 Yet, Acheson’s European trip was not terribly 
effective in changing basic European attitudes. He was certainly not able to change the mind of 
the most intractable political leader of all: General de Gaulle. Although de Gaulle did not express 
any objections to Acheson’s presentation, he could scarcely hide that it failed to persuade him.29  
Though de Gaulle was undoubtedly the hardest nut for Acheson to crack, his 
reservations were by no means extraordinary. A month later, Thomas K. Finletter, the 
ambassador at NATO, informed Kennedy of the widespread resistance in Europe to the ideas 
coming from Washington: “Most of the countries are satisfied with the military arrangements as 
they are, and are not convinced that changes - especially those which would increase their 
national budgets - are necessary.” Since the European allies believed “the most important military 
goal is not to have a war,” Finletter wrote, they placed a high premium on deterrence. In 
particular allies neighboring the Iron Curtain feared that the new strategy would tempt the 
Russians “to walk over them with conventional forces” with impunity. But other countries had 
equally strong reservations. Not even America’s trusted ally Great Britain, which had just 
                                                 
28 Embtel 1632 (Bonn), Acheson to President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk, 10 April 1961, in: FRUS, 1961-1963: 
Volume XIII - West Europe and Canada, #97. Acheson’s European trip is described in: Brinkley, Dean Acheson, 126-134; 
Chace, Acheson, 386-389. 
29 Embtel 4522 (Paris), Acheson to President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk, 22 April 1961, France-General, CS, NSF, 
box 70, JFKL. 




eliminated military conscription and wanted to avoid new demands on manpower and scarce 
financial means, stood sympathetic.30 
These European doubts did not alter the perspective in Washington, in spite of the 
importance attached to the harmonizing process of political consultation. In fact, these doubts 
had been anticipated. They fit the perception American policy makers had of Europe. Even 
Acheson returned from his European trip with “a reluctant feeling that we perhaps are the only 
nation in the world which is capable of having a broad outlook on the world” and advised that 
“we must not be too delicate about being vigorous in our leadership.”31  
There was, in particular, a sense that Europeans needed to be educated rather than 
consulted about strategy in the nuclear age. It is important to note that the allies in at least one 
way fundamentally diverged in their appreciation of conventional and nuclear weaponry, a 
divergence which was perhaps best explained by McGeorge Bundy in a letter to Walter 
Lippmann at the height of the Cuban missile crisis. Responding to Lippmann’s contention that 
Europeans should bear the “burden” of conventional defense, Kennedy’s national security 
adviser observed that American policy makers rather thought of nuclear weapons as a burden. He 
argued that, instead of a burden, conventional forces “are in the most intimate psychological 
terms a means of escape from the nuclear confrontation.” In short, McGeorge Bundy 
acknowledged that the United States was determined to strengthen its conventional forces in 
order to escape the nuclear predicament. Meanwhile, Europeans, who associated conventional 
weapons with two world wars, seemed to “find comfort and escape in tidy little nuclear forces 
that will never be used.”32 Although Bundy’s letter was written at a particularly dramatic moment 
during the Cold War, it revealed a common attitude among American policymakers. They 
discussed their policies as if they were imposed by the “facts” of the nuclear era.33 
Twisting European Arms 
As early as the spring of 1961, the Kennedy administration began to prod the European allies 
towards acceptance of its views. It urged the expedient and full implementation of the force goals 
                                                 
30 Letter, Finletter to President Kennedy, 29 May 1961, in: FRUS, 1961-1963: Volume XIII - West Europe and Canada, 
#106. Finletter reported that only Norway and Denmark had responded favorably to the American ideas. 
31 Chace, Acheson, 389. 
32 Letter, McGeorge Bundy to Walter Lippmann, 13 November 1962, France-General, CS, NSF, box 71a, JFKL. 
The letter contains Bundy’s comments on the draft of a speech Lippmann planned to give in Paris. 
33 Earlier, for instance, Secretary Rusk had said to de Gaulle that “far from being able to act independently, we find 
that with the possession of nuclear weapons we have less freedom of action than ever before.” Telegram, Rusk to 
the Department of State, 20 June 1962, in: FRUS, 1961-1963: Volume XIII - West Europe and Canada, #255. 




already approved by NATO in 1958 (in a Military Committee document called MC 70). Both the 
United States and the European allies had fallen far short of these force goals. Their 
implementation would at least give NATO a standing force of thirty combat-ready divisions, 
enough, Acheson had told de Gaulle during his visit in April, “to stop Soviet forces now 
stationed in Eastern Germany plus such reserve strength as could be quickly added.” By the end 
of 1961, at the urging of the United States, NATO also had begun the revision of its 1956 
strategic concept (MC 14/2). This strategic concept had been based on the notion of massive 
nuclear retaliation. The new concept, to be enshrined in MC 100/1, would naturally have to 
reflect the updated strategic body of thought in Washington and would be mirrored in NATO’s 
force goals for 1970. The early drafts of the new strategic concept included a range of options at 
the conventional as well as the tactical and strategic nuclear levels, and spelled a much reduced 
reliance on nuclear weapons in cases of limited aggression. They explicitly rejected the trip-wire 
strategy and called for a “forward strategy” to quickly identify the nature of an aggression, to 
enable an immediate response as near the Iron Curtain as possible and to counter limited 
aggression “without escalation to strategic nuclear warfare.” The discussions between the allies 
focused on the level of aggression required before the use of nuclear weapons would be 
contemplated and on the context of their use (i.e. tactically or strategically). On both accounts the 
early drafts put the ball squarely in the European court. The level of aggression which would 
justify the use of nuclear weapons would “largely depend on the effectiveness and the size of 
conventional forces which NATO nations are prepared to raise and equip.” When in the course 
of the battle conventional means would prove insufficient to halt the aggression and the use of 
nuclear weapons had become necessary, NATO would have to be prepared to first initiate the 
“restrained use” of tactical nuclear weapons.34 
The Kennedy administration’s wariness of nuclear proliferation, too, soon made itself felt 
with the European allies as its approach represented a clear break with its predecessor. During 
most of the 1950s Washington’s stance on nuclear proliferation had been ambiguous, which had 
been a reflection of the opposing views of President Eisenhower and the powerful Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). Whereas the JCAE had jealously guarded strict 
observance of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which prohibited the transfer of any nuclear 
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information or material to another nation, Eisenhower was quite prepared to furnish nuclear 
assistance to European allies. Feeling that they could not be denied weapons which the Soviet 
Union already possessed, Eisenhower used the consternation following the launch of Sputnik to 
issue a “Declaration of Common Purpose” with Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, in which he 
pledged to seek a change of the Atomic Energy Act to enable closer nuclear cooperation with 
Great Britain and “other friendly countries.” The amended Atomic Energy Act of July 1958 had 
the effect of making an exception only for Great Britain on the grounds that it had achieved 
already “substantial progress” in its nuclear program. Eisenhower, however, had been prepared 
to assist the French as well.35  
There is also evidence that after July 1958 the Eisenhower administration was prepared to 
provide any nuclear assistance to France not strictly forbidden by congressional legislation (see 
also the previous chapter). A few days after the Atomic Energy Act had been amended, it 
proposed to help France build a nuclear submarine – only to see the proposal voted down by the 
JCAE.36 Though the issue of aiding the French nuclear program was never off the agenda, the 
JCAE effectively blocked the development of a cooperative relationship with France in atomic 
affairs.37 At various times Eisenhower expressed his dismay at this state of affairs. “Congress has 
reserved for itself, as far back as 1947, certain prerogatives which should belong in the executive 
branch,” he told Paul-Henri Spaak in October 1960.38 In December 1960 he told the president-
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elect that he saw “no need for the continuance of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy” and 
that the United States should aim to work more closely with its European allies on nuclear 
matters. 39  Eisenhower eventually came to believe that he “could have reached a satisfactory 
agreement with de Gaulle on the atom thing” if it had not been for congressional constraint.40 
Kennedy, however, rejected the advice of his predecessor whom he found shallow and ill-
prepared during their transition meeting. 41  In fact, his administration looked upon the 
amendment of the McMahon Act in 1958 and the assistance it allowed to Great Britain as a 
mistake. It would certainly not be prepared to circumvent congressional opposition in order to 
provide the same type of assistance to France. There would have to be a definite answer to the 
question whether the spread of nuclear strike forces is good or bad. 
Kennedy’s campaign against European nuclear forces would be built upon two tenets, 
each of which were developed and cultivated at different places in the American bureaucracy. At 
the Pentagon the aversion against European nuclear forces was principally fed by a 
preoccupation with the new strategy of flexible response and its requirement for centralized 
command and control. The clearest public exposition of this attitude appeared in an article by 
Albert Wohlstetter in Foreign Affairs (April 1961), which in fact should be read as a rigorous 
attempt to dissuade existing or aspiring nuclear powers in the Western alliance. Wohlstetter 
contended that national nuclear forces risked weakening the American nuclear security guarantee 
“without putting anything of substance in its place.” They promoted strategic instability and 
inhibited effective crisis management. Their presence in the absence of centralized control, 
Wohlstetter argued, increased the likelihood of a nuclear inferno, whether by purpose or by 
accident. From the nature of Wohlstetter’s comments it was clear that he took particular aim at 
the French nuclear program. He rejected the proposition of General Gallois, the foremost 
French nuclear strategic thinker, that a relatively small nuclear force would be a sufficient 
deterrent for a relatively small country. Making the distinction between first and second strike 
capabilities, he argued that a “small strike force [...] could inflict, not proportionally small damage, 
but possibly no damage at all.” If anything, a small nuclear force would invite a major nuclear 
power to launch a preemptive full-scale attack. Wohlstetter also dwelt on the immense costs 
involved in building and keeping up to date even a small nuclear force. In short, Wohlstetter 
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stated, “it is worth pointing out to the responsible prospective Nth powers in the NATO 
community that the undertaking is not merely arduous; it is unlikely to pay off.”42 
The State Department argued against the proliferation of national nuclear forces from a 
different, more political angle. At Foggy Bottom the prospect of a West German nuclear force 
was the overriding concern. West Germany’s possession of nuclear weapons would, of course, 
open a gamut of problems. It would gravely threaten NATO’s political cohesion, have serious 
implications for East-West relations, strengthen Eastern European ties to the Soviet Union, 
increase the risk that a conventional clash in Central Europe would quickly escalate into nuclear 
war, and raise new obstacles for arms control. Even though the German constitution had been 
changed in 1955 to ensure that Germany would at least not manufacture nuclear weapons of its 
own, there was a persistent awareness that this limitation could be swept aside by the tide of 
history. Washington was above all perturbed by the influence of the boisterous German defense 
minister from 1956 to 1962, Franz-Josef Strauss, who openly stated that Germany must have a 
nuclear weapons capability and who rejected any discrimination of the German military. The first 
prerequisite for American policy was therefore that Germany should not be given cause to feel 
that it was in the second rank. A sense of discrimination, it was feared, could provide the matrix 
for a nationalist revival similar to the one which three decades earlier had sounded the death knell 
for the Weimar Republic. 
The State Department’s preoccupation with Germany had obvious implications for the 
other allies. Above all, a fearful eye was cast upon the nuclear aspirations of France. On March 31, 
1958, Strauss had signed an agreement with his French counterpart, Chaban-Delmas, on 
cooperation in “basic scientific and technological weapons research”, which was thought to 
extend to the nuclear field. Although de Gaulle resolutely put an end to this cooperation when he 
came to power, the specter of a German nuclear force built with the help of the French would 
remain.43 Moreover, Washington assessed that the establishment of a French nuclear force per se 
was bound to inspire similar aspirations across the Rhine. In May 1961 Secretary Rusk cabled 
Ambassador  James Gavin in Paris that the central concern of the United States was the possible 
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impact of a French nuclear force “on German aspirations.”44 This stood in the way of any assis-
tance to France which was remotely related to its nuclear program, as became clear when the 
Kennedy administration refused to provide ballistic missile technology because this “might well 
trigger greater German interest in matters nuclear.” Apart from discouraging the French to 
“pursue the present path in the post de Gaulle period,” the high costs and the delays imposed on 
France in the absence of American aid were also thought to discourage the Germans to travel the 
same road.45  
The French insistence on a national nuclear force was considered to be particularly 
dangerous because of its nationalist motivations. In 1960, for instance, Adenauer had warned that 
de Gaulle’s rhetoric was resuscitating nationalist sentiments in German politics. The old 
chancellor doubted, ominously, that “after his death [there] would be a successor strong enough 
to oppose the creation in Germany of a national atomic force. [...] And Germany could do that 
better and sooner than France!”46 Such warnings convinced American diplomats of the need for 
an urgent and effective approach: “We can best settle the German issue in Adenauer’s, not 
Strauss’, time.”47 In the eyes of American policy makers, de Gaulle’s nationalism also disqualified 
France for an agreement which would commit its nuclear capabilities to NATO in exchange for 
American aid. “The plain fact is that committing a nationally owned and manned French nuclear 
capability to NATO would be largely an act of symbolic significance,” one memorandum stated. 
“[de Gaulle’s] behavior in the past suggests that he would not hesitate to use or withhold France’s 
NATO-committed nuclear force for national reasons, however great the resulting damage to a 
controlled Allied nuclear response.”48 
Kennedy accepted both the Pentagon’s preoccupation with centralized control and the 
State Department’s preoccupation with Germany’s sense of uncertainty. 49  Since there was a 
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strong consensus among his most important advisers on the nuclear issue, he was rarely exposed 
to a different perspective. His conversation with Raymond Aron on May 22, 1961, one week 
before Kennedy’s state visit to France, may have been the exception. The independent French 
commentator strongly doubted that the thesis that aiding the French nuclear program would lead 
to similar German aspirations “will cut much ice with de Gaulle.” Aron was far from persuaded 
himself. He pointed out that Germany would have to violate commitments to the West and 
would risk provoking the Soviet Union into retaliatory action in Berlin if it decided to acquire 
nuclear weapons. He also discerned huge practical obstacles for any German nuclear program, 
such as the absence of testing grounds under German jurisdiction. Bonn, Aron therefore believed, 
“will much prefer the provision of tactical atomic weapons from the US to the political and 
diplomatic difficulties involved in the building of its own strategic nuclear arsenal.”50 
Kennedy, however, was more regularly fed by reports from Germany which contradicted 
Aron’s view. The State Department analysis of Germany’s unstable frame of mind was reinforced 
by prominent outsider experts, such as by the German-born Harvard professor Henry A. 
Kissinger. Having visited Germany in the spring of 1961, Kissinger shared his impressions with 
Kennedy:  
 
A country which has lost two world wars, undergone three revolutions, committed the crimes of 
the Nazi era and which has seen its national wealth wiped out twice in a generation is bound to 
suffer from deep psychological scars. There is an atmosphere of hysteria, a tendency towards 
unbalanced actions. A German friend [...] said to me once that Germany alone of the major 
countries of Europe suffered no visible psychic shock after the war. It sublimated its problems in 
the frenzied effort to rebuild economically. But it remains a candidate for a nervous breakdown.51 
 
As early as Kennedy’s first spring in office it was obvious that the nuclear issue and the progress 
towards European unity would be closely intertwined, and that the Kennedy’s administrations 
preoccupation with Germany was in particular imposing limitations on Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan’s game plan for entering Europe. Macmillan had informed Kennedy in early April 
1961 that Great Britain had decided to apply for membership of the Common Market. Realizing 
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that the road to Brussels led through Paris, the British prime minister was intent on putting 
together a deal that could sway De Gaulle. Perhaps encouraged by Kennedy’s immediate strong 
support for Great Britain’s bid and anticipating the young president’s meeting with the General, 
Macmillan tried to bring the “special relationship” with the United States into play. What de 
Gaulle wanted, in his analysis, was “something on Tripartitism and something on the nuclear 
[issue]” in order to buttress his ambition for a great power status.52 In both cases, however, he 
depended entirely on Washington’s agreement. In a secret letter to Kennedy on April 28, 1961, 
Macmillan urged his American counterpart to “be ready to go a long way to meet de Gaulle in 
certain fields of interest to him.” He proposed that Great Britain would “give France such 
assistance [...], whether by provision of technical information and ‘know how’ or by provision of 
warheads.” Such a course, Macmillan suggested, would make it unnecessary for the French to 
continue their program of nuclear tests and would avoid the “special difficulties of United States 
legislation.” Persuading the United States to grant France nuclear power status had thus become 
the centerpiece of the European strategy of the British prime minister.53 
However, Kennedy was not prepared to go along with Macmillan’s game plan even 
though the United States strongly favored Great Britain’s membership of the Common Market. 
In his response to Macmillan of May 8, 1961, he rejected the notion of providing nuclear 
assistance to France out of hand. The consideration uppermost in his mind was that such 
assistance “could not fail to have a major effect on German attitudes”:  
 
The fact that the Germans are not now tempted to join or imitate the French program is due, in 
no small part, to U.S. opposition to Nth country programs and to the uncertain prospects of the 
French (or any other) program in the absence of U.S. aid. 
 
Kennedy’s response made clear that he was not prepared to grant France the attributes of a great 
power.54 He rather hoped that Great Britain could in due time be persuaded to surrender its own. 
Instead of giving France nuclear aid, Kennedy proposed to Macmillan that they should look for a 
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method “to respond to some of the concerns underlying the French program.” One such 
method would arise by “giving our allies an opportunity to share in the control of this [nuclear] 
capability [...].”55 
Kennedy and the Idea of Nuclear Sharing 
Kennedy had inherited the idea of nuclear sharing from the Eisenhower administration. The 
concept of multilateralizing a part of the Western deterrent had grown out of studies 
commissioned by SACEUR General Lauris Norstad in the late 1950s, in response to European 
concerns about the American nuclear security guarantee in Sputnik’s aftermath. These studies 
envisaged American mobile intermediate-range missiles – the so-called Jupiter missiles – on 
European soil under SACEUR’s command. They were to be operated under a ‘dual-key system’: 
European soldiers would man and operate the missiles while the warheads remained under 
American custody. This would provide evidence of the continuing American security 
commitment to Western Europe as well as a method to involve Europeans with the operation of 
the nuclear deterrent.  
Eisenhower had firmly supported Norstad’s idea. He was concerned that the transatlantic 
disparity between the nuclear haves and have-nots would seriously weaken the alliance in the 
missile age, perhaps even lead to its dissolution. However, this particular concept foundered on a 
mixed reception in Europe. Imagined host countries feared the presence of missiles on their 
territory would make them obvious targets whereas they would lack complete control over these 
weapons. They therefore continued to attach priority to disarmament talks. Norstad’s concept 
was definitively sidetracked when France, the first candidate to benefit from the arrangement, 
demanded that all missiles and warheads stationed on its territory be placed under the full control 
of the French government led by de Gaulle. 
Norstad also advocated the establishment of a NATO atomic stockpile, by removing 
nuclear weapons in Europe from American custody and placing them under the control of 
SACEUR. It would make NATO, Norstad argued, into a “fourth nuclear power.” This idea, too, 
was endorsed by Eisenhower, in spite of legal difficulties and the firm opposition of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. A multilaterally managed atomic stockpile was seen as a way to respond to 
France’s nuclear ambitions, although Eisenhower stopped short of relinquishing control over the 
use of these weapons. This proposal, however, was similarly shunt onto a siding with the arrival of 
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a new brand of leadership in France. De Gaulle obviously had no interest in transforming NATO 
into a fourth nuclear power and noted that, after all is said and done, SACEUR was still an 
American general.56 
Norstad’s efforts nonetheless gave birth to a follow-up. In 1960 a study group at the State 
Department headed by Harvard professor Robert Bowie drew up an alternative proposal for a 
force of Polaris missile submarines to be jointly owned, operated, and manned by NATO 
members, and which could be used by SACEUR under guidelines established by the North 
Atlantic Council.57 Such a force avoided many of the problems involved with deploying land-
based missiles. Like its land-based precursors, Bowie’s sea-based concept aroused the genuine 
interest of Eisenhower, who told his subordinates he hoped that it would “help to bridge the 
differences with de Gaulle” and “raise the morale of NATO members.” 58  He authorized 
Secretary of State Christian Herter to present the idea to the North Atlantic Council in December 
1960 and to offer “as an initial step” five American submarines, equipped with Polaris missiles, to 
NATO before the end of 1963. In its last breath the Eisenhower administration thus laid the 
basis for what would turn out to be a long, tortuous diplomatic existence.59 
To the incoming Kennedy administration the idea of a NATO nuclear force appeared 
primarily attractive in the light of its belief that nothing good could come from separate 
European nuclear capabilities. It was both a means to organize the nuclear capability of the West 
under centralized control and a useful tool to channel potential German aspirations. In 1961, 
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however, the Kennedy administration was not yet prepared to give the idea more than cautious 
support; it was content with leaving the ball in the European court. Washington was simply too 
preoccupied with persuading the allies to meet their conventional force goals. It was only 
prepared to go ahead if the allies independently could agree upon the details of a multilateral 
nuclear force.60  
The idea was useful as a luring perspective, a decoy to distract certain European allies 
from the development of national nuclear forces. It could, in particular, help to undermine de 
Gaulle’s nuclear program. A State Department memorandum, prepared for Kennedy’s state visit 
to France and outlining a “new approach,” revealed this thrust. Though the authors considered it 
“highly doubtful” that a multilateral nuclear force would ever materialize, the “long-term 
prospect and possibility of such development would [...] strengthen the hand of those Frenchmen 
who oppose a national force de frappe, even if it had little appeal to the General himself.”61 More 
than anything, the “new approach” crafted at the State Department helps to explain why, in spite 
of de Gaulle’s rebuffs of Norstad’s early proposals for multilateralizing the deterrent, Kennedy, a 
few days later, suggested to Macmillan that France might be asked to “take the lead [...] in 
devising specific proposals to this end.”62  
France as the Indispensable Ally 
While American strategic reform was critically received throughout Western Europe, De Gaulle’s 
critique was the most fundamental and persistent. The pertinence of the French - rather than the 
British or the German - position for the achievement of reform itself needs emphasis. French 
concurrence was indispensable for at least two reasons. Firstly, the conflict in Algeria and the 
expensive nuclear program were consuming resources much needed for the conventional defense 
of Europe. Since Great Britain had ended conscription, the reinforcement of the conventional 
posture of the alliance depended to a large extent on the redeployment of French troops from 
Algeria. As de Gaulle continued his parlous quest for a political solution to the conflict, 
                                                 
60 President Kennedy disclosed these priorities as he paid a half-hearted tribute in a speech before the Canadian 
Parliament in May 1961. He proclaimed that he was sympathetic to “the possibility of eventually establishing a 
NATO seaborne force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and 
found feasible by our allies, once NATO’s non-nuclear goals have been achieved.” Address before the Canadian 
Parliament in Ottawa on May 17, 1961, in: Public Papers, 1961, 385.See also Dean Rusk’s remarks to this effect at a 
press conference on November 17, 1961. Rusk also assumed this position at the December 1961 NATO ministerial 
meeting. “Rusk and McNamara at NATO Ministerial Meeting,” 12/14/1961. In: Paper, “Early history of the MLF,” 
11. 
61  Memorandum, “A New Approach to France,” 3 May 1961, France-General, CS, NSF, box 70, JFKL. The 
memorandum was prepared by Henry Owen and Henry Rowan, with suggestions from Walt W. Rostow and others. 
62 Letter, Kennedy to Macmillan, 8 May 1961, PRO, PREM 11/3311, #9259. 




Washington hoped these troops would be assigned to NATO despite the General’s well-known 
aversion against the treaty organization. Without this, Acheson impressed on him during his visit 
to Paris, the MC-70 force goals simply could not be attained. French spending on nuclear forces, 
which would hover around 25 percent of the defense budget throughout the 1960s,63 was clearly 
also at odds with these priorities. In short, what Kennedy wanted – and needed – from de Gaulle 
was the re-allocation of the French resources spent on Algeria and the force de dissuasion to the 
United States’ strategic aims. 
Secondly, quite apart from the resources it devoured, the French nuclear program upset 
the Kennedy administration’s military doctrine almost from the outset. While the decision to 
pursue a national nuclear force had been made during the Fourth Republic, this pursuit had been 
intensified immediately upon de Gaulle’s return to power. De Gaulle endowed the French 
nuclear program with a heavy political connotation vis-à-vis the superpowers and used it as 
leverage for more influence within the Western alliance. He justified it with proclamations of the 
American nuclear security guarantee’s inherent lack of credibility and the presumption that 
France, if it was to resume its rightful place in the world, had to have the bomb. Unlike Great 
Britain’s nuclear force, de Gaulle’s force de dissuasion, from the vantage point of Washington, thus 
posed an obvious political challenge. In addition, it posed a potential strategic challenge – a point 
which is often overlooked. Although de Gaulle was not deeply interested in strategic doctrines to 
underpin his nuclear program – for him the bomb was a symbol of French independence and 
evidence of being in the vanguard of military technology –, he did encourage the development of 
an autonomous French body of strategic thought. “The possible use of such a force must be an 
essential object of your studies and work,” he drove home with the aspiring officers at the École 
Militaire in November 1959.64 
French strategic thought, in its various forms, was fundamentally at variance with the 
Kennedy administration’s doctrine of graduated and deliberate escalation. It generally assessed 
the value of the force de dissuasion in the framework of a strategy of massive retaliation. This meant 
that French nuclear weapons were not considered useful in a battlefield environment, but only 
for their capacity to hold the population centers of an aggressor at risk. Unlike Wohlstetter and 
other American strategists, French strategists were therefore guided by a countercity rather than a 
counterforce strategy. This, to be sure, was the only feasible basis for a national deterrence 
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strategy: for the foreseeable future, France would lack a nuclear force of sufficient size for a 
strategy of graduated response. Escalation schemes were a luxury only afforded to the powers 
who presided over huge nuclear arsenals. 
All French strategists, in one way or another, struggled with the question how a modestly 
sized country with a small nuclear arsenal could still have a credible deterrent vis-à-vis much 
larger nuclear states. General Pierre Gallois, an associate of de Gaulle as well as probably the 
most influential strategist, argued this was possible as long as such a country could inflict 
intolerable damage upon an aggressor. He contended that the “weak” can deter the “strong” by 
ensuring that, in the mind of an agressor, the potential price of aggression will outweigh the 
anticipated benefits. Gallois’ doctrine of ‘proportional’ deterrence clearly had the sympathy of de 
Gaulle, who once explained to Spaak it was enough for France to have a force able to “drop one 
bomb on a Soviet city, and have ‘some in reserve if [the] Soviets did not desist.’”65 
Another line of French strategic thought, one which was particularly disconcerting from 
Washington’s standpoint, was developed some years later by General André Beaufre and was 
ineptly called the doctrine of ‘multilateral’ deterrence. Beaufre argued the French deterrent was 
effective because it had the potential of triggering the strategic force of the United States and, by 
having created more centers of atomic decision, complicated the calculations of the Soviet Union. 
Hence, in a paradoxical way, the force de dissuasion, whose development de Gaulle justified on the 
ground that America’s nuclear security guarantee lacked credibility, would serve to increase this 
credibility by putting the all-important American strategic deterrent at the service of Europe, 
whatever American policy might be in the matter. This presumption was, of course, at 
loggerheads with McNamara’s doctrine of graduated response and its inherent need for 
maximum centralized control. It was disturbing because it implied that the French force de 
dissuasion undermined the United States’ autonomy over its own nuclear weapons, regardless of its 
determination to reserve full control over them.66 
Although it would still take many years for the force de dissuasion to take shape, French 
strategic thinking had by itself a potential seductiveness which constituted a serious challenge to 
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American doctrine. It capitalized on the pervasive doubts in Europe about the American 
willingness to risk nuclear destruction at home and seemed to make Western Europe more the 
master of its own fate. It also had those advantages of Eisenhower’s massive retaliation strategy 
important for Europeans, such as maximizing the chance of avoiding destruction in Europe. 
Many Europeans believed that a conventional war in Europe would be as disastrous for them as 
a nuclear one, which generally led them to emphasize deterrence, with all the risks of all-or-
nothing responses in the event of a crisis, and to fear not only limited war in itself but the 
potential effects of a doctrine of limited war on Soviet intentions. French military doctrine, by 
placing emphasis on nuclear deterrence, also encouraged other European NATO allies not to 
bother with the conventional buildup called for by Washington. Since the inclination to augment 
conventional forces was, in many cases, already weak, French thinking provided a convenient 
excuse for not doing so. In the worst case, it could even convince these allies, notably Germany, 
that they had to have a bomb of their own. 
For these reasons, i.e. the requirement that French resources be spent on conventional 
defense as well as the challenges posed by French strategic thinking, it was essential for the 
Kennedy administration to convince France of the need for strategic reform. But how could De 
Gaulle be brought in line? In early May 1961, in anticipation of Kennedy’s state visit to Paris, a 
“new approach” was devised at the State Department to “re-enlist French energies in NATO” 
and “to prevent France’s nuclear program from opening the door to nuclear proliferation, 
particularly across the Rhine.” Rather than trying to come to terms with the French ideas, this 
approach was based on a fairly superficial assessment of de Gaulle: it only played upon his much 
alleged desire for prestige by granting France the illusion of influence. De Gaulle had to be 
convinced that “he was getting the same opportunity to influence U.S. world-wide use of nuclear 
weapons as he believes the British have.” The authors, however, also reasoned that “...the more 
of the special British status we can chop away, the less power the General may be disposed to 
invest in his own program.” In this respect, they recommended that the prospect of a NATO 
nuclear force, to which Great Britain, too, would have to commit its nuclear capabilities, be held 
out to de Gaulle. They hoped that the “next French government” would then further clip the 
wings of the future force de dissuasion by giving up on the delivery of nuclear warheads by missiles: 
“A French nuclear capability based on aircraft delivery alone will be wasting asset of sufficiently 
limited military significance as probably not to tempt Germany to follow in France’s footsteps.” 
The authors thus balanced on a very tight rope: 
 




Our posture toward de Gaulle should [...] be one of trying to help him achieve the greater 
influence over world-wide policy and over use of NATO nuclear weapons that he seeks, without 
aiding him in the nuclear program which he is mounting, partly to secure that influence and 
participation.67  
 
This “new approach” suffered from obvious internal contradictions and was bound to be 
unsuccessful. As Kennedy left for Paris on May 31, 1961, he had nothing on offer that could 
arouse the interest of the General. 
The brilliance of the state visit, enhanced by the presence of the French-speaking 
Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy which made the young American president and his elegant wife, 
even in de Gaulle’s forbidding eyes, a “remarkably attractive couple,”68 has become historical, in 
particular when contrasted with Kennedy’s brutal showdown with Soviet leader Khrushchev a 
few days later in Vienna. However, the conversations between Kennedy and de Gaulle were 
primarily important because they revealed their differences in a polite but no less candid form. 
From the accounts of these conversations it is clear that Kennedy fairly faithfully followed the 
new approach drafted by the State Department. He assured his French host that his 
administration was determined to involve France more intimately in deciding the affairs of the 
West. He also argued that the soundness of NATO’s military strategy, while it continued to hinge 
on America’s nuclear security guarantee, required that the United States maintain its conventional 
troop levels in Europe and that the European allies place priority on reinforcing their own. As he 
had announced to Macmillan a few weeks earlier, Kennedy furthermore proposed that France 
take the lead in working out the details of a multilateral nuclear arrangement. 
De Gaulle was hardly in a mood to be persuaded by his younger counterpart. He told 
Kennedy he disapproved of a strategy of gradual escalation, since the potential result of such a 
strategy was that “Western and Central Europe would be laid waste by Soviet and American 
tactical nuclear weapons respectively, while both Russia and the U.S. remain unscathed.” Neither 
did he have an interest in a multilateral nuclear force. When Kennedy observed that the 
American security guarantee was still credible because he regarded the security of Western 
Europe and North America as indivisible, he responded: 
 
‘Since you say so, Mr. President, I believe you,’ but still can one be certain? At what moment will 
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the U.S. consider that the situation calls for the use of atomic weapons? One hears that the 
United States intends to raise the threshold for the use of atomic weapons. This must mean that 
the United States has decided that such weapons will not be used in all cases. When are they 
going to be used? 69 
 
De Gaulle argued that nobody really knew and “if he were in the President’s place, he would not 
know that either.” At Kennedy’s observation that the same could be said of a French nuclear 
force, he answered that “the Rhine is much narrower than the Atlantic and, therefore, France 
might feel more intimately tied to German defense than we [the US] might feel tied to French 
defense.” The American nuclear arsenal was only useful as a “last resort.” The defense of Europe, 
de Gaulle stated, “should be assured by the European countries, not without the U.S., of course, 
but not exclusively through the U.S.” 
De Gaulle, as Aron had predicted, also did not share Kennedy’s fear for German nuclear 
aspirations. Besides the legal obstacles to a German nuclear force, World War II had left 
Germany in his view with a “‘broken back’ as a nation because of [the] moral condemnation 
under which she still lives.” Bonn would not strive for nuclear weapons because it realized that 
the disadvantages would far outweigh the advantages. De Gaulle assured Kennedy that, at any 
rate, France would not be disposed to give Germany a nuclear capability; and since “no one 
believes that any country will place its atomic weapons in the hands of others,” France would 
also not ask the United States for any nuclear assistance to itself. 
Casting his shadow almost five years ahead, de Gaulle said he did not want to weaken 
NATO “at this moment” because of the East-West tensions over Berlin. But he did repeat his 
fundamental objections to the alliance organization. The importance of having a national defense, 
as opposed to “an integrated defense under U.S. command,” had been restated, he explained to 
Kennedy, by the attempted putsch against him only one month earlier: 
 
The causes of the mentality of the generals who disobeyed their Government may be due to the 
fact that defense had become denationalized and since the generals did not have the responsibility 
for French national defense (being under international command) they did not see fit to obey a 
Government to which they were no longer used to be directly answerable. 
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Rather than being militarily integrated in NATO, the major powers would therefore have to 
coordinate their military responsibilities, “Germany being the vanguard, France the second line of 
defense, Britain covering the northern flank and insuring communication by sea, and Italy 
covering the southeast in the Alps.” In this system of defense, the United States would play a 
reserve role - “committed fully but not at the first moment” - and be, as de Gaulle cited 
Roosevelt, the “arsenal of democracy.” In de Gaulle’s conception of European security each 
country would play its part “within the system of its own national defense.”70 
Kennedy thus failed to persuade de Gaulle in their first and, as it turned out, last personal 
encounter. France continued its nuclear weapons program on its own account. De Gaulle also 
did not assign the troops returning from Algeria in 1961 and 1962 to NATO, even though 
France gave a minimal contribution to NATO’s conventional posture. “He had not pulled his 
army out of the Algerian djebels in order to turn them into sacrificial pawns in a coalition 
directed at Washington’s discretion,” as his biographer Jean Lacouture noted. Moreover, unlike 
Germany and Italy, France refused to buy American-made conventional equipment in response 
to American pressure for balance of payments support.71 Most importantly, the splendor of the 
meeting could not bridge the fundamental divergence of views. To be sure, de Gaulle’s own 
account bears some traces of Kennedy’s “new approach” since he believed his conversations 
with the young president had made clear that Washington no longer “insisted on regarding Paris 
as just another of its protégés” and “acknowledged our independence and dealt with us directly 
and specially.” Yet, the Americans, he concluded, “could not conceive of their policy ceasing to 
be predominant or of ours diverging from it. Basically, what Kennedy offered me in every case 
was a share in his projects.” De Gaulle realized that “having taken stock of one another, we 
continued on our road, each carrying his burden and marching towards his own destiny.”72 
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Aiding the French Nuclear Program? 
Although the Kennedy administration was from the outset averse to assisting the French nuclear 
program, in sofar as this would have been possible at all within the limits of congressional 
legislation, a policy of denial and denunciation was still not a foregone conclusion in 1961. In 
reality, United States’ policy toward the force de dissuasion was still the subject of a heated debate 
within the administration until the spring of 1962. The official policy still allowed for some 
ambiguity, in particular on the question whether the United States would be prepared to furnish 
aid which could not be construed as direct assistance to the French nuclear program and, in a 
strict interpretation, did not contravene congressional legislation. Such aid could concern, for 
instance, the development of ballistic missiles, nuclear submarine propulsion and equipment and 
technical information not directly related to the development of nuclear weapons. 
Some within the administration, such as NATO Ambassador Thomas Finletter, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze and Kennedy’s military adviser 
Maxwell Taylor, were counseling that American policy be modified to allow some assistance to 
the French nuclear effort or to its missile development, believing that this would help to mollify  
de Gaulle and encourage French spending on conventional forces. They were convinced that de 
Gaulle could not be talked out of the force de dissuasion and argued that excommunicating the 
French thus would make no political sense. But they usually ran into powerful opposition from 
the State Department, supported by SACEUR General Norstad and influential outsiders as Dean 
Acheson, and the JCAE. Such was, for instance, the case in May 1961 when the JCS advocated 
the supply to France of nuclear propulsion systems for submarines, which was blocked by the 
State Department (“one thing merely leads to another”) and JCAE (“the French really cannot 
keep secrets”).73 
From the outside, NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak, mindful of the possible 
implications of de Gaulle’s policy of independence for the alliance, also repeatedly urged the 
Kennedy administration to change its attitude towards the French nuclear program. He believed 
that Washington was underestimating the General’s perseverance at its own risk and that the 
United States should grant France the same assistance as Great Britain.74 “Only by some concrete 
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offer of assistance,” he positioned, “was there any great hope of getting de Gaulle to understand 
we wished to work with French within NATO.”75 
But the most persistent advocate in favor of assistance to the French nuclear program 
was General James M. Gavin, whom Kennedy had appointed as his ambassador in Paris. Gavin, 
who was an expert in military technology, realized that de Gaulle was ready to build a nuclear 
force at any cost and believed that it would be foolish to try to keep him from doing it. On the 
contrary, the United States would in his opinion gain rather than lose from providing nuclear aid 
to France. It would help to structurally improve the relationship with an important ally in Europe 
and, as a result, induce it to be more cooperative within NATO. It would enable France to spend 
resources on conventional forces which in the absence of American aid had to be spent on the 
French nuclear program. In addition, the sale to France of expensive American nuclear material 
and technology would go a long way in alleviating the balance of payments situation. 
It was Gavin who brought the matter to a head in November 1961. In a letter to 
President Kennedy he urged the approval of the sale of enriched uranium (U-235) to France for 
military purposes. Gavin pointed out that highly enriched uranium for military purposes was 
already being sold to Great Britain. Its provision to France would save it the huge costs, 
estimated at $700 million, of building a gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte. Although similar 
earlier requests had been declined, Gavin argued that France had now made “substantial 
progress” in the development of nuclear weapons to justify such a dramatic change of policy on 
the basis of the amended McMahon Act. Only by aiding the French, he wrote Kennedy, do “we 
have [a] chance to tie [the] French nuclear effort to our own and perhaps to [a] future NATO-
controlled program” and “avoid [the] anarchic development of national nuclear programs or [a] 
situation where France and Germany might combine their efforts in [a] direction away from [the] 
U.S. and away from NATO.”76 
Gavin’s proposal ran into immediate opposition in Washington, in particular at the State 
Department. General Norstad was also firmly opposed; he cabled the Pentagon from Paris that 
any aid to the French program would “undermine, if not destroy, a sense of common interest and 
common purpose within the NATO family” and “lack both moral and military justification.”77 
The record shows that the opponents of a flexible attitude again had the upperhand. On Novem-
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ber 29, Gavin was instructed, with Kennedy’s explicit approval, that the United States would not 
furnish enriched uranium to France. The Kennedy administration did not believe such assistance 
would turn France into a more cooperative ally, but rather be the upstart to additional French 
requests. Moreover, it feared the reaction in Bonn: “we are profoundly convinced that not only 
would [such] assistance [...] confirm and encourage the presently independent course followed by 
France but [it] would lead to increased pressure in Germany and elsewhere for national nuclear 
programs.”78 
However, Gavin was undeterred. Throughout the spring of 1962 he continued to look 
for ways in which the United States could help the French nuclear program within the limits of 
congressional legislation, probably inspired to do so by the fact that Washington’s persistent 
refusal noticeably soured its relations with Paris. In spite of de Gaulle’s profession to Kennedy 
that he did not seek American nuclear aid because he would not expect such aid to be 
forthcoming, French officials tried at various times to acquire enriched uranium as well as 
important components and technological know-how for France’s nuclear and ballistic missile 
program.79 During the Eisenhower period such requests had often been favorably considered as 
long as congressional legislation was not contravened. But ever since Kennedy had entered the 
White House they were usually quickly denied. Prime Minister Debré openly expressed French 
bitterness about the stringent attitude of the Kennedy administration in February 1962, as he 
recognized the limits of the McMahon Act but would have expected aid on missile technology 
and other related matters.80 
In March, Gavin made another attempt to change Washington’s stance. In a personal 
meeting with Kennedy in Washington, he harshly criticized the Pentagon’s refusal to sell 
compressors to France for the plant in Pierrelatte and pointed out that the sale could help to 
correct the American balance of payments.81 Further exposing his dissent from official policy, he 
followed this up with a letter to Kennedy on March 9, 1962, enclosing a list of French requests 
for American aid in the nuclear realm.82 At around the same time the issue was brought to a head 
by a visit of a French military procurement team under General Gaston Lavaud. The team came 
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to the United States to purchase components needed for the French nuclear program. From the 
American perspective, however, the emphasis of the visit was on finding “ways the French can 
assist in offsetting US military outlays in France.”83 Lavaud’s visit brought the division with the 
Kennedy administration to the surface. Assistant Secretary for Defense Paul Nitze, Lavaud’s 
most important American interlocutor, favored selling the requested components to France. Yet, 
he was overruled by the State Department and the White House as his French guest wandered 
through Washington’s corridors. The French requests were turned down. Instead, Lavaud’s 
American counterparts tried to sell him conventional equipment. “You do not want to sell us 
what we want to buy,” Lavaud exclaimed in a meeting.84 He returned to France empty-handed. 
President Kennedy could no longer ignore the ambiguity still allowed for by official 
policy. There is reason to believe that he privately wrestled with the issue of granting nuclear 
assistance to France. On the one hand, according to Theodore Sorenson, he was genuinely 
concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the prospect of a German nuclear 
capability; he also believed the United States should not be in the position of having another 
country trigger a nuclear exchange in which it would be forced to respond, and he doubted that 
the final decisionmaking on the use of nuclear weapons could be distributed or delegated.85 On 
the other hand, a public denunciation of the French nuclear effort would certainly damage his 
already precarious relations with de Gaulle. Kennedy often mused how he could establish a 
cooperative relationship.86 Gavin’s persistent references to the American balance of payments 
situation are likely to have also struck a chord. 
After several weeks of intense interagency debate, Kennedy concurred with those who 
advised against giving nuclear aid to France. On April 18, 1962, he decided against seeking a 
change in the official non-proliferation policy and reiterated the refusal to assist the French 
military nuclear program. To remove any ambiguity, National Security Action Memorandum 148 
stated that “members of the Executive Branch are not to discuss with French officials any 
possible U.S. assistance to the French MRBM or nuclear program.”87 
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It is hard to say which argument was decisive in settling the matter. Kennedy may have 
been influenced by the nearly certain prospect that the powerful Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy would have obstructed a change of policy, just like it had resisted Eisenhower’s earlier 
attempts to loosen up the McMahon Act. He may also have expected, as some of his advisers 
clearly did, that the magnitude of the financial sacrifice required to independently build a nuclear 
force would eventually drain the French nuclear program of its political and financial resources, 
or that de Gaulle would sooner rather than later be replaced by a less determined leader. There 
was a general feeling that Paris seriously underestimated the costs involved. McNamara told his 
French colleague Pierre Messmer, for instance, that the funds allotted to the construction of the 
plant at Pierrelatte had to be multiplied by the “factor Pi” (3,14).88 The French nuclear program 
was indeed complicated by huge and rising costs, which in the end amounted to approximately 25 
percent of the overall defense spending of France throughout the 1960s and for part of the 
decade – from 1965 to 1968 – to approximately half of military equipment spending.89 After the 
Algerian conflict had been resolved in 1962 and African opposition to tests in the Sahara desert 
became stronger, France was furthermore faced with the difficulty of finding new test sites. In 
addition, French engineers and scientists still had to overcome numerous technical problems.90  
Politics, however, seemed to have been decisive in Kennedy’s deliberations. France was 
seen by Washington as a political liability. The failed attempt by disgruntled French generals to 
seize power only a year earlier was still fresh on Kennedy’s mind. He was also known to be 
concerned with the prospect of an election victory of the Communist Party in France.91 Most 
importantly, those who argued that nuclear assistance would mollify de Gaulle were unable to 
persuade him. “The finally persuasive argument [against assisting the French nuclear program] 
was that it would not bend General de Gaulle to our purpose but only strengthen him in his,” 
one memorandum stated.92 The political connotations which de Gaulle had given the force de 
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dissuasion clearly distinguished the French nuclear program from the British. “The unstated 
condition of aid to Britain,” Michael Harrison has noted, “was that its nuclear weapons would 
never be truly independent of the United States and would conform to American strategy and 
targeting doctrines.”93 When it came down to making a decision Kennedy simply understood that 
de Gaulle would not have accepted any restraints on his policy of independence in return for 
nuclear aid.  
This was also the purport of a letter written by McGeorge Bundy to Raymond Aron not 
long after the decision. Kennedy’s national security adviser explained that de Gaulle’s policy of 
independence had disqualified France in comparison with Great Britain: 
 
British policy has aimed at intimacy with the United States, with an advisory relation to the safety-
catch. Is it wholly unfair to say that French policy aims, by contrast, at increasing independence 
from the United States and immediate control of the trigger? [...] I wonder whether, in the context 
of these national differences between British and French policy, your argument that what is given 
to Britain must in decency be given to France is not open to some question. [...] What limitations 
on freedom of action and what commitments to common defense would France regard as 
unreasonable?94 
 
Bundy obviously failed to convince Aron, for the latter wrote only a few months later that “the 
Kennedy administration, like the preceding Eisenhower administration, has refused to face up to 
a major truth: that neither General de Gaulle nor any other French leader can admit the official 
Washington thesis according to which the dissemination of atomic weapons becomes dangerous 
when these weapons cross the Channel, but not when they cross the Atlantic.”95 
Conclusion 
The outcome of the policy debate in Washington in the spring of 1962 was that the Kennedy 
administration embarked on a virtual campaign against European nuclear forces. McNamara 
argued the case against these forces in blunt terms at a meeting of NATO’s foreign and defense 
ministers in Athens on May 4. On June 16, he appraised a wider audience in a speech at the 
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University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. Employing Albert Wohlstetter’s argument to the full, 
McNamara said: 
 
In particular, relatively weak national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not likely 
to be sufficient to perform even the function of deterrence. If they are small, and perhaps 
vulnerable on the ground or in the air, or inaccurate, a major antagonist can take a variety of 
measures to counter them. Indeed, if a major antagonist came to believe there was a substantial 
likelihood of its being used independently, this force would be inviting a pre-emptive first strike 
against it. In the event of war, the use of such a force against cities of a major nuclear power 
would be tantamount to suicide, whereas its employment against significant military targets would 
have a negligible effect on the outcome of the conflict. Meanwhile the creation of a single 
additional national nuclear force encourages the proliferation of nuclear power with all of its 
attendant dangers. 
  In short, then, limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, 
expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent.96 
 
McNamara’s Ann Arbor speech caused considerable consternation in Europe, not the 
least within the Macmillan government. In London, the debate centered on the question whether 
McNamara’s slights had also been aimed against the British nuclear force. The opposition Labour 
Party instantly seized on the speech to put the conservative Macmillan government on the 
defensive. The consternation only abated after McNamara had publicly clarified that he had not 
taken aim at the British nuclear status, but merely at ‘independent’ national nuclear forces.97 
McNamara’s public denial, however, exposed even more clearly than before that Washington was 
targetting the budding French nuclear force and a hypothetical German one.  
As part of this campaign, the Kennedy administration also gave renewed attention to the 
idea of a multilateral nuclear force (MLF). On April 18, Kennedy ruled that the MLF should be 
given more staff work and that the United States “should indicate its willingness to join its allies, 
if they wish,” in the development of the force.98 At the Athens meeting of May 4, McNamara 
furthermore announced that the United States was prepared to commit five nuclear-powered 
submarines with eighty Polaris missiles, each equipped with a nuclear warhead, to the operational 
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command of NATO. De Gaulle, however, had no interest whatsoever in a proposal that was 
designed to bring the French force de frappe under American control. By the spring of 1962, 
Washington and Paris had reached a standoff in the nuclear realm. The differences between 
Kennedy and de Gaulle on the military strategy of the Atlantic alliance also had come out in the 
open, for Kennedy created the impression, in a press conference on June 27, that he considered 
the French nuclear deterrent to be “inimical” to American interests.99  
France may not have been America’s most important European ally, but its contribution 
was indispensable for achieving the goals of Kennedy’s military and strategic reform within the 
Western alliance. French troops, first of all, were needed to boost the overall conventional 
posture of the European allies, without which there would be no flexible response options in 
practice; the development of the French nuclear program was thus a diversion of scarce 
resources that, in the American view, were better spent elsewhere. In addition, the development 
of the French nuclear force in support of de Gaulle’s policy of independence undermined the 
Kennedy administration’s aspiration to centralize control over the alliance’s nuclear forces. As 
importantly, there was an almost obsessive apprehension in Washington that the coming into 
existence of the force de dissuasion risked creating a similar demand in Germany. The decision not 
to furnish aid to the French nuclear program hence became a key element of Kennedy’s policies 
with regard to Europe. French concurrence in the shift in American strategic thinking was from 
the outset unlikely to be forthcoming. De Gaulle was determined to establish the French nuclear 
force while he was still in power.100 He never left any room for doubt. On April 19, 1963, he 
declared:  
 
To turn us from this path we hear raised, as always, the simultaneous voices of immobilism and 
demagogy. ‘It’s futile!’ says the first. “It’s too expensive!’ says the other. France has listened to 
these voices in the past, and sometimes to her misfortune, above all on the eve of both world 
wars. ‘No heavy artillery!’ they clamored in concert until 1914 was upon us. ‘No tank regiments!’, 
‘No strike aircraft!’ they cried in unison before 1939, these same cretins and madmen. But this 
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time we shall not permit the sluggards and the self-deluders to summon the invaders into our 
land. 
 
 The deterioration in the Franco-American relationship under Kennedy cannot, however, be 
explained only from de Gaulle’s ‘intransigence.’ In particular, the indiscriminate effort by the 
Kennedy administration to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons was bound to cause friction 
– and even open conflict – with France. This effort was central to the Franco-American quarrel 
about the alliance’s strategy. It was more important than the differences over strengthening the 
conventional force posture. Kennedy, for one, was more adamant about resisting nuclear 
proliferation than about pressing the need for strengthening Europe’s conventional forces. In a 
meeting with McNamara and Rusk on December 10, 1962, for instance, “he [Kennedy] 
wondered whether, absent of the problem of Berlin, there would really be a need for large-scale 
conventional forces along the main lines dividing Europe. He suggested that after all, any 
incursion across this line would in fact lead promptly to nuclear warfare, and that for that reason 
the nuclear deterrent would be effective.” Upon McNamara’s reply that even without Berlin 
additional conventional forces would be needed, “the President did not seem persuaded [...].”101 
 In particular the differences in the nuclear field moreover bore a relationship to the 
question of Great Britain’s membership of the Common Market. As British diplomatic channels 
reported on a brief conversation between Walter Lippmann and de Gaulle in May 1962 (shortly 
prior to McNamara’s speech at Ann Arbor): 
 
The main reason which he [de Gaulle] gave for thinking that there would be difficulty over UK 
entry to the Community was that the UK had a special relation with the United States, above all 
in questions of atomic energy. He made clear that he would not agree to the UK becoming a 
member of the Community if this special relationship was to continue unchanged.102 
  
McNamara’s handling of the consternation caused by his speech could only have confirmed de 
Gaulle’s suspicion that this relationship continued regardless of Washington’s added emphasis on 
non-proliferation policy. Realizing the impact of American campaign against national nuclear 
forces on de Gaulle’s willingness to consider Great Britain’s membership of the Common Market, 
an exasperated Prime Minister Macmillan wrote to his foreign minister, Lord Home, on June 24, 
                                                 
101 “Last Conversation w/President before NATO meeting of December 1962", 13 December 1962, 12/62, Skybolt-
Nassau Conference, folder 3, Richard E. Neustadt Papers, box 19, JFKL. 
102 PRO, PREM 11/3775. ‘Europe,’ Mr. France to Sir Frank Lee (Foreign Office) 15.5.62. 




1962: “If we cannot persuade the Americans to keep quiet about the Common Market, I would 
hope that we could at least impress on Rusk the importance of leaving the nuclear question, and 
indeed the re-organisation of NATO, over until our negotiations with the Six have come to a 
head. In the nuclear field we have an independent deterrent and the French are going to get one; 
these are facts that the Americans cannot alter.”103 
 
 
                                                 
103 PRO, PREM 11/3715, H. Macmillan to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 24.6.62. 
 
Chapter Five 
Whose Kind of ‘Europe’? Kennedy’s Tug of War With de Gaulle 
About the Common Market, 1961-1962 
 
  
The demise of the European Defense Community (EDC) in August 1954 was a severe setback 
for the cause of European integration, but it was not its downfall. The American supporters of 
European integration, too, continued to support its advancement in other areas; as Eisenhower 
wrote to his friend Walter Bedell Smith in September 1954: “We cannot sit down in black despair 
and admit defeat.”1 
 By January 1961, when John F. Kennedy assumed the American presidency, the European 
integration movement had reinvented itself around the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), which had become operational in 1953. In the wake of the EDC’s rejection in the 
French national assembly, most supporters of European integration had understood that it first 
had to be pursued in the economic realm; economic integration, they had judged, might then – 
through some kind of bottom-up process – pave the way for political and possibly military 
integration. The integration movement had been rekindled at the Messina conference in June 
1955 by the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxemburg, despite an atmosphere of gloom. It had reached a new milestone with the Treaty of 
Rome in March 1957, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and European 
Atomic Energy Agency (EURATOM). Importantly, the ‘Six’ had also confirmed the political 
aspiration of their cooperation, as the Rome Treaty had declared their determination “to lay the 
foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.” 2  By contrast, the rival 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) of seven other European countries (often referred to 
as the “outer Seven”), established in January 1960 at the initiative of the British government, had 
never been able to take on a life of its own.3 In fact, as Kennedy entered the White House, Prime 
                                                 
1 Letter, President Eisenhower to Walter Bedell Smith, 3 September 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 5, 1145. 
2 The Rome Treaty called for the implementation in stages of a “common market” with common external tariffs for 
industrial and agricultural goods. It anticipated that the ECSC, the EEC and EURATOM would ultimately be unified 
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led efforts to create a European free trade zone which would dilute the Common Market. By 1966, EFTA had 
abolished tariffs and trade restrictions among its members. Today, only Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland are members of EFTA, which is headquartered in Geneva. 




Minister Harold Macmillan was already actively preparing the grounds for British membership of 
the Common Market.4 
 There is little doubt that the support of consecutive American administrations was vital to 
the European integration movement; this support was also actively solicited by its leading 
proponents (the likes of Jean Monnet and Paul-Henri Spaak). From the standpoint of its 
immediate self-interest, the United States might have been expected to prefer dealing with 
divided European governments that could be played off against another. Instead, a more 
enlightened concept of self-interest prevailed in Washington. In the reigning liberal mood of the 
age, the United States stood out in the eyes of both European and American supporters of 
European integration as a model for the advantages of federal union; it was no coincidence that 
Jean Monnet named his high-level lobby group for European integration the “Action Committee 
for the United States of Europe.” 
 However, it is equally important to realize that, as Kennedy took office, the Common 
Market’s future development was still very much undecided (in spite of the detailed provisions of 
the Rome Treaty). Would its economic policies be influenced more by free market liberalism or 
by state-led economic planning (as in the French tradition of dirigisme)? Would the Common 
Market be open to trade with the United States and other nations and be a beacon for free trade, 
or would it develop into a protectionist block impermeable to outsiders? Moreover, by choosing 
the formula of an “ever closer union,” the Rome Treaty had presented integration as an unending 
process. Would the Six extend their cooperation into the political and military realm? If so, what 
would be the orientation of the resulting entity in world politics and, in particular, vis-à-vis the 
United States and the Soviet Union? Would ‘Europe’ be a more effective partner alongside the 
United States, as most Americans hoped, or would it manifest itself as a ‘third force’ given to 
political neutralism in the Cold War? American attitudes with respect to the movement toward 
European unity would clearly be determined by the answers to these questions. 
 Both Kennedy and de Gaulle entertained serious reservations about the Common Market, 
albeit for entirely different reasons. Both made their designs to shape its development into 
touchstones of their foreign policies. In fact, the Common Market became the main trophy in 
their tug of war about the future of ‘Europe’ – and its very political and economic development 
would depend at least in part on the outcome of this tug of war. While their conflict focused on 
Great Britain’s bid for membership of the Common Market and on trade liberalization, it took 
place in the context of sharply differing conceptions of Europe. Together with their disagreement 
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over military-strategic reform (see the previous chapter), these differing conceptions were the 
main reasons for the crisis of January 1963 (which will be the subject of the next chapter). This 
chapter will analyze how, in the face of de Gaulle’s European conception, the Kennedy 
administration tried to influence the development of the Common Market prior to de Gaulle’s 
resonating denunciation of Kennedy’s Grand Design in January 1963.5 It argues that, in addition 
to Jean Monnet’s remarkable influence on American policymakers at the time, Kennedy’s policies 
toward Europe cannot be understood without considering their interrelationship with de Gaulle’s 
plans for Europe. In addition to averting American decline, Kennedy’s notion of an Atlantic 
‘partnership’ was designed to nip de Gaulle’s aim of a ‘European’ Europe in the bud. 
The European State of Play in 1961 
Macmillan and the Common Market 
By the summer of 1960, as we have already noted, the Macmillan government had come to the 
agonizing conclusion that Great Britain had little choice but to begin negotiating to join the 
Common Market. We have seen, too, that Macmillan, pursuing a ‘grand design’ of his own, tried 
to act as an intermediary between Washington and Paris in order to facilitate British membership, 
and that Kennedy gave his support without hesitation during their first personal encounter in 
April 1961 (the background to which will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter).6 Four 
                                                 
5 Joseph Kraft, an American journalist close to the Kennedy administration, has earned credit for popularizing 
Kennedy’s European policies with his book The Grand Design: From Common Market to Atlantic Partnership (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1962). The Belgian historian Pascaline Winand has probably rendered the most complete and 
detailed account of American policies vis-à-vis European integration in the Eisenhower and Kennedy years in 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe. Erin R. Mahan, a historian at the State Department, emphasizes the 
links between security, economics, and politics in the Kennedy-de Gaulle relationship, using American, French, 
German and British primary sources; see Kennedy, De Gaulle and Western Europe. Oliver Bange, a German professor, 
takes issue with the predominant “Anglo-American” perspective that holds de Gaulle “solely” responsible for the 
crisis of 1963 and suggests that British and American moves at the end of 1962 forced the crisis by attempting to 
politically isolate de Gaulle, in: The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, De Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict (London: 
Macmillan Press, 2000). Of the autobiographies written by Kennedy’s people, George W. Ball’s is of particular 
interest: The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1982). Biographies on Ball also 
contain a wealth of material; see, in particular, Bill, George Ball. Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths have edited 
a helpful volume of articles on Kennedy’s European policies, entitled Kennedy and Europe. The same can be said of the 
volume edited by Thomas Paterson, although its scope is wider and its gist decidedly revisionist: Kennedy’s Quest for 
Victory. For American supporters of Monnet and his goal of European unity, see: Hackett, ed., Monnet and the 
Americans. Denise Artaud is critical of Jean Monnet for acting as the European go-between for the Americans in “Le 
Grand Dessein de J.F. Kennedy: Proposition Mystique ou Occasion Manquée?” Revue D’Histoire Moderne et 
Contemporaine 29 (1982): 235-66. Frank Costigliola takes a revisionist – and therefore highly critical – view of 
Kennedy’s Grand Design, in “The Failed Design: Kennedy, De Gaulle, and the Struggle for Europe,” Diplomatic 
History 8, Summer 1984: 227-251. Frédéric Bozo pays relatively little attention to Kennedy’s conflict with de Gaulle 
over the Common Market, blaming the failure of the Fouchet Plan largely on the United States; Two Strategies for 
Europe, 77-84. Other works of interest include: Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration; Grosser, The Western Alliance, 
chapter 7.  
6 See chapter three. 




months later, on August 10, 1961, Great Britain finally gave formal notification of its wish to join 
the EEC. Reluctance was still evident in the announcement of the British government that its 
negotiators would need to take account of “the special Commonwealth relationship,” “the 
essential interests of British agriculture” and “the other members of EFTA.” Macmillan 
moreover publicly emphasized the economic motivations for joining the Common Market, 
thereby willfully disregarding the political implications of membership. In essence, he wanted 
Great Britain to join the Common Market without subscribing to the Rome Treaty’s goal of 
“ever closer union”; in addition, he was determined to defend British economic interests to the 
bone. A British delegation led by Edward Heath arrived in Brussels in November to begin 
negotiations on Britain’s entry. They were bound to be exceedingly difficult, but at last they had 
begun. 
 The road toward Great Britain’s application for membership had been tortuous and painful, 
as is well known.7 Notwithstanding Winston Churchill’s stirring orations for a united Europe – 
even for a “United States of Europe”8 – in the aftermath of World War II, London had from the 
outset stayed aloof from the European integration movement. Victory in World War II had set it 
psychologically apart from the continental European states as a nation vindicated, possessed with 
a vibrant national personality, and ensnared by global rather than regional interests. The 
experience of emerging victoriously from the war “was the defining experience, at different levels 
of consciousness, of every British leader for half a century,” 9 and it pervaded decisionmaking in 
London for decades to come. It is also important to recall that in the early 1950s, the relative 
decline of the British economy in the postwar decades had yet to make itself felt. Between 1947 
and 1950, for instance, British exports rose some sixty percent in volume; in 1953, the British 
economy was still exporting more than twice as many manufactured goods as France and fifty 
percent more than West Germany.10  
 As a result, the British government was in some ways strangely disconnected from 
developments on the European continent. British officials had been surprised and dismayed by 
the French-led proposal for the ECSC in May 1950 (the ‘Schuman Plan’), which merged France’s 
                                                 
7 The story of Macmillan’s agonizing over Europe is well-told by Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from 
Churchill to Blair (London: Macmillan/Papermac, 1999), 99-145. Young is particularly critical of the half-hearted 
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8 In a speech in Zurich on September 19, 1946. See Young, This Blessed Plot, 16-17. 
9 Young, This Blessed Plot, 5. 
10  Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe: Contemporary Economies, Part I (Glasgow: 
Collins/Fontana Books, 1976), 156, 164. 




and Germany’s coal and steel resources – the raw materials of industrial economies and war – 
into one pool. London continued to keep a distance from the ECSC despite its success, which – 
as British diplomat Oliver Franks once wrote – “cost us the leadership of Europe which we had 
enjoyed from the end of the war until May 1950.”11 Great Britain also did not participate in the 
EDC plan (named the ‘Pleven plan’ after the incumbent French prime minister), which would 
have created a single European army with a single executive and a European defense minister 
answerable to a common assembly to be shared with the ECSC; this time it was only spared from 
exclusion by the French national assembly’s rejection of the plan. For the longest time, the 
British Foreign Office did not think the Rome Treaty was going to happen. After it had been 
signed in March 1957, it continued to treat it largely as a trade issue to be left to the Treasury. 
The event had all but escaped the attention of Macmillan, who made no mention of it in his 
diaries.12 And in his first meeting with de Gaulle after the latter’s return to power, on June 29, 
1958, Macmillan – perhaps hoping that de Gaulle’s own antipathy to European integration would 
play in his favor – exclaimed that: 
 
the Common Market is the Continental System all over again. Britain cannot accept it. I beg you 
to give it up. Otherwise, we shall be embarking on a war which will doubtless be economic at first 
but which runs the risk of gradually spreading into other fields.13 
 
 But when the permanence of European integration had become obvious in the late 1950s 
and the twinges of British decline were increasingly making themselves felt, Macmillan had been 
compelled to seek some kind of association with the Common Market. His initial plan to dissolve 
the Common Market into a much larger free trade area – much like ‘a lump of sugar in an 
English cup of tea’ – dissipated in late 1958.14 The subsequent creation of EFTA was hardly more 
successful. By 1960, in spite of serious reservations, Macmillan was moving towards a negotiated 
                                                 
11 Britain declined two opportunities of joining the ECSC in its formative stage. The first opportunity arose in 1950-
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entry into the Common Market. While the British government initially believed that its economy 
could hugely benefit from EFTA by importing cheap goods from the Commonwealth and then 
selling them freely within the EFTA area, the realization soon sank in that the Common Market 
was more successful economically and that Great Britain itself traded more with the Common 
Market countries than with the EFTA countries. By 1961, the British gross national product had 
already fallen much behind West Germany’s, and West Germany had replaced Great Britain as 
the United States’ main European trading partner.  
 The British shift toward the Common Market had been caused, too, by the deeply ambiva-
lent and increasingly deprecatory attitude of the United States toward the ‘special relationship.’ In 
1958 and 1959, the British government had tried to have the United States bring pressure on 
France in particular in favor of the EFTA. However, British diplomats ran into a fundamental 
lack of sympathy in Washington for its hesitancy towards European integration: “They blame us 
for standing aside.”15 President Eisenhower was strongly supportive of the Common Market and, 
in a meeting with advisers in April 1960, labeled the EFTA as “nothing but a counter-irritant to 
the Common Market.” He regarded a “U.S. of Europe to be the possible salvation of the world 
and requested that we explore encouraging the Common Market to take in additional countries.” 
Eisenhower thus urged the Macmillan government to join the Common Market, warning that “if 
a strong U.S. of Europe should emerge along with a strong U.S. of America, the British would be 
left out in the cold.”16 London thus had every reason to fear that a united Europe, or perhaps 
even West Germany, would usurp the privilege of being Washington’s first ally. As Macmillan 
noted in his diary in July 1960:  
 
Shall we be caught between a hostile (or at least less friendly) America and a boastful, powerful 
‘Empire de Charlemagne’ – now under French, but later bound to come under German control? 
Is this the real reason for ‘joining’ the Common Market (if we are acceptable) and for abandoning 
(a) the Seven (b) British agriculture (c) the Commonwealth? It’s a grim choice.17 
 
The choice was gradually forcing itself upon Macmillan and his government. But Great 
Britain’s chances of being accepted as member of the Common Market ultimately depended on 
France – and hence on de Gaulle – rather than on the United States.  
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De Gaulle and the Common Market 
When de Gaulle resumed the levers of power in the spring of 1958, most supporters of 
European integration feared that he would disengage France from the Rome Treaty, for none of 
the moves toward European unity of the Fourth Republic had met with his approval.18 The 
notion of ceding state sovereignty to supranational institutions was clearly at odds with de 
Gaulle’s article of faith that states were the only realities and the sole legitimate depositories of 
political and moral authority. This belief was central to his entire political philosophy, together 
with his conception of France and its international role.19 It had been the main inspiration for his 
opposition to the ECSC, the EDC, the EEC and EURATOM; the Europe of the Communities 
obviously had no place in his vision on European unity, which would be based on the 
cooperation between nation-states and not on their integration in some kind of supranational 
entity. As he never tired of belittling the Rome Treaty in conversations with its proponents as 
“your little treaty of commerce,”20 his intrinsically hostile views of European integration would 
hang like a sword of Damocles over the Common Market’s head as long as he was president of 
France. His Memoirs of Hope, too, published after his resignation from the presidency in 1969, 
attest to his unrelenting distaste for the “doctrine of supra-nationalism” as “France’s submission 
to a law that was not her own.” Its pages bristle with disparaging remarks of the community’s 
institutions and its supporters, deriding the latter as “myth mongers” and “so-called executives 
installed at the head of common institutions by virtue of the delusions of integration” and 
“surrounded by all the trappings of sovereignty” yet “helpless when it came to making and 
enforcing decisions.” Somewhat paradoxically, they also make clear that he continued to view the 
Europe of the Communities – an “artificial motherland, the brainchild of the technocrats” which 
“carried all the hopes and illusions of the supra-national school” – as an acute threat to French 
sovereignty. He argued that French negotiators – “caught up in the dream of a supra-national 
Europe” – had already sold out the nation’s interests to foreigners when they helped to establish 
the ECSC, EURATOM and the EEC. With regard to the latter, the French agricultural interest 
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had been particularly neglected.21 “It would, therefore, be necessary to obtain it en route, or to 
liquidate the Common Market,” he stated bluntly. Moreover, “while the Community was taking 
shape, I was obliged on several occasions to intervene in order to repel the threats which 
overshadowed our cause.”22  
De Gaulle nonetheless accepted the Common Market upon returning to power. In spite of 
his critique that French economic interests had been sold out by the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle 
recognized that the Common Market was in reality quite beneficial to the French economy. In his 
Memoirs of Hope, he particularly valued the modernizing influence of the Common Market:  
 
I was concerned with international competition, for this was the lever which could activate our 
business world, compel it to increase productivity, encourage it to merge, persuade it to do battle 
abroad; hence my determination to [practice] the Common Market, which as yet existed only on 
paper, to support the abolition of tariffs between the Six, to liberalize appreciably our overseas 
trade.23  
 
Although this reading suggests that he supported trade liberalization, the fact that the guidelines 
for establishing the common external tariff encouraged high tariffs probably spoke in favor of the 
Common Market as well; de Gaulle was not driven by any strong desire to fully expose the 
French economy to the rigors of the open world market. French overseas dependencies 
furthermore profited handsomely from the creation of a European development fund. In other 
ways, too, such as in the area of social policy, France retained important privileges. Despite de 
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had agreed to concentrate on industrial products and the opening of the French market to German industrial goods 
in return for the promise that Germany would later agree to a common agricultural policy and open its markets to 
French agricultural products. The agricultural component of the Common Market was of capital importance to 
France. Twenty-seven percent of its population was still employed in the agricultural sector, producing a surplus 
despite a relatively low efficiency. The French farm economy, which produced at the cheapest prices in Europe, 
would gain the most from such a policy. Given de Gaulle’s antipathy towards the Common Market, Robert Marjolin 
posed the tantalizing hypothetical question: “if General de Gaulle had come to power two years earlier, in 1956, 
when the Rome Treaty negotiations were only beginning, would they have led to the outcome we know or would 
they have taken a different course?” Marjolin tentative response: “assuming the best, […] it is almost certain […] that 
the treaty would have been different in a number of important respects. The principle of unanimity would have been 
asserted without any limitation of duration. The Commission’s role would have been reduced; it probably would 
have become merely a secretariat of the Council of Ministers. It is unlikely that France would have been content with 
the few articles in the treaty that laid the foundations of a common agricultural policy […]. Would the other five 
countries have agreed to France’s demands on these different points? No one can tell.” Marjolin, “What Type of 
Europe?” in: Brinkley and Hackett, eds., Jean Monnet, 164. 
22 De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, 169, 181-184, passim. Paris nevertheless sent top-flight officials and administrators to 
man and to dominate the EEC headquarters in Brussels. The staff of the Commission was French in organization, 
outlook and management technique. It represented the French bureaucratic tradition which looked upon the state as 
the centralizing agent of modernization and progress. 




Gaulle’s objections to supranational institutions, he was sufficiently pragmatic to accept the 
Commission’s proposals as his own so long as they promoted French economic interests.24 In 
addition, by gradually forcing acceptance of a common agricultural policy among the Six, he 
could hope to make France – not Kansas – the granary of Europe. In sum, his government 
pressed harder and more successfully for the internal progress of the Common Market than any 
other member country.25  
But de Gaulle had powerful political reasons, too, for leaving the Rome Treaty intact. 
Domestically, he had – for the time being – a clear interest in avoiding open conflict with 
supporters of European integration as long as France was still torn by the Algerian conflict and 
the Fifth Republic’s constitution had not been fully accepted. His pragmatic approach to the 
Common Market helped to lay many minds to rest, whereas his larger view of European unity – 
and of France taking a lead role – held out great attraction to many parts of French society. 
Practical acceptance of the Common Market, based on a strict interpretation of treaty obligations 
and a narrow conception of the Commission’s political authority, was thus fully compatible with 
his program of fostering domestic political unity. 
As importantly, in the foreign policy realm, de Gaulle recognized that the Six provided a 
promising jumping board for realizing his encompassing vision of European political unity and 
for buttressing France’s policy of grandeur. For all his talk of independence and his willingness to 
go it alone, de Gaulle understood that France, given its size, would need the concurrence of other 
states with its international vision in order to play a role of international consequence and acclaim. 
He was therefore determined to use the composition of the Common Market bequeathed by the 
Rome Treaty in order to achieve his larger goal of reinstating France as a world power and of a 
‘united’ Europe as an independent ‘voice’ vis-à-vis the superpowers. One important difference 
with Europeans of a federalist persuasion, the likes of Jean Monnet, was that de Gaulle wanted to 
build European unity by making the nation-state the basic entity of an expanding confederation 
of like-minded and interested states through a process of “systematic rapprochement” – and hence 
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not by transcending the nation-state through a process of ongoing integration. 26  Another 
difference was that he charged the movement toward European unity with a rather different 
political vocation. Whereas integrationists were generally pro-American in the sense that they 
looked to the United States for political inspiration, military protection and financial nourishment, 
de Gaulle introduced the vague but pervasive notion of ‘Europeanism’ – in essence, acceptance 
of the French view of ‘Europe’ as independent from both superpowers – as the French litmus 
test for all aspirants to the Common Market’s membership. 
At the onset of the 1960s, political – and indeed military – cooperation between the Six 
could still be made to fit the consuming aim expressed in de Gaulle’s war memoirs of persuading 
“the states along the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees to form a political, economic, and 
strategic bloc” and “to establish this organization as one of the three world powers.”27 While the 
Cold War dictated an alliance with the United States for the foreseeable future, there was no 
question that the cooperation between European states he had in mind could ultimately replace 
the Atlantic alliance as the guarantor of peace on the European continent. France’s aim, he 
reiterated in May 1960, was:  
 
to contribute to building Western Europe into a political, economic, cultural and human group, 
organized for action, progress and defense…[…] If the Atlantic Alliance is necessary at present for 
the security of France and the other free peoples of our continent, they must, behind this shield, 
organize to achieve their joint power and development.28 [emphasis added] 
 
De Gaulle, Adenauer, and the Fouchet Plan 
de Gaulle also accepted the Common Market with an eye on Germany. Paris and Bonn would, in 
his view, have to form the critical axis around which the other continental European states would 
revolve. Germany thus had to be tied to France for political as well as economic reasons, on 
terms favorable to France. The Common Market was the answer, because it established a 
grouping of continental European states in which France could have the upper hand. Moreover, 
the Common Market could function as an obstacle for any independent German rapprochement 
with the East. Without the Common Market, de Gaulle feared that at some point Russia – not 
France – would provide Germany with cheap agricultural products in exchange for German 
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industrial equipment. “As long as Adenauer is in control there,” de Gaulle reasoned in early 1961, 
“there will be no deal between the Germans and the Russians. But later – I don’t know. I am not 
so sure. There are important factors pushing the Germans toward Russia and the Russians 
toward Germany. [...] That is why we must have a strong Common Market.”29 
 One cannot discuss Franco-German relations in the early 1960s without recognizing the 
pivotal importance of de Gaulle’s personal relationship with Adenauer. 30  His renowned first 
encounter with the German chancellor, at his tranquil country home in Colombey-les-deux-
Églises on September 14 and 15, 1958, had laid the basis for their extraordinary personal 
rapport.31 “Ich bin dahin gefahren mit sehr schwerem Herzen,” Adenauer later explained to a 
political associate; “Ich habe da erkannt, dass er wirklich ein ganz anderer Mann ist, als wir uns 
vorgestellt hatten.”32 Much has been made of the shared influence of their Catholic milieus, 
Adenauer’s Rhineland predilection for things French and his mistrust of the British, the bonding 
outlook inured by old age (Adenauer was 82 years old), and so on. Without this genuine rapport 
at the personal level, de Gaulle certainly would not have been able to weave the “network of 
preferential ties with Germany” that would culminate in the Franco-German Treaty of 
Reconciliation of January 22, 1963. (It also helps to explain why, after Adenauer’s hand-over to 
Ludwig Erhard in the fall of 1963, Franco-German relations took a turn for the worse.)  
 However, it is equally important to understand that this first meeting between the ‘General’ 
and ‘der Alte’ had the character of a political transaction from which each gained his due. De 
Gaulle – “with what magnanimity!” – was wholeheartedly prepared to mend fences with France’s 
“erstwhile aggressor,” thus going a long way in satisfying Germany’s psychological hunger for 
international respectability. “Diese Stunde war das Ende einer alten französischen politischen 
Tradition, das Ende des […] In-Schach-Haltens, das heisst der Schwächung Deutschlands mit 
Hilfe verschiedener Methoden…”33 In addition, he recognized Germany’s right to reunification 
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and – at least for the time being – respected Adenauer’s fealty to the Atlantic alliance given the 
Soviet threat and the vital importance to Germany of the American nuclear security guarantee. In 
return, de Gaulle asked of Adenauer, as he put it succinctly in his memoirs, “acceptance of 
existing frontiers, an attitude of goodwill in relations with the East, complete renunciation of 
atomic armaments, and unremitting patience as regards reunification.”34 De Gaulle thus gained 
Adenauer’s general acceptance of four elements of his vision designed to ensure French military 
and political hegemony in Western Europe and to lay the groundwork – to be pursued later – for 
a détente with the Communist bloc prior to German unification. In addition, de Gaulle 
assiduously sought to garner Adenauer’s support for his view of European cooperation. France 
would implement the Rome Treaty, de Gaulle assured him, but French requirements on 
agriculture would still need to be accommodated and any British advances to the Common 
Market “must be turned down as long as Britain remained economically and politically what she 
was.” 35  De Gaulle’s exposition also foreshadowed his initiative two-and-half years later to 
supplant the Common Market with an intergovernmental system of political cooperation 
between the Six. Adenauer, in turn, made clear that “Germany on the whole is unfavorable to the 
agricultural Common Market and anxious to give satisfaction to Great Britain,” but he qualified 
this – no doubt to his host’s satisfaction – by stating that “nothing is more important than that 
the union of the Six should succeed… .” And while Germany “had drawn distinct advantages 
from the mystique of integration,” Adenauer concurred with de Gaulle that “there could be no 
question of submerging the identity of our two nations in some stateless construction.”36 
 De Gaulle had thus succeeded in seeing eye to eye with Adenauer early on. He would 
continue to cultivate their close personal as well as political relationship to great effect 
throughout the latter’s chancellorship.37 From 1958 to 1962, de Gaulle would furthermore exploit 
the Cold War crises over Berlin to further cement this relationship and to gain Adenauer’s 
support for his European policies. From the outset of the crisis, in November 1958, de Gaulle 
made sure that he appeared to be a more dependable ally than the Americans or the British. Paris 
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had immediately assumed a hard line with the Soviet Union, which helped to calm down 
Adenauer’s anxieties about deals being made over his head and contrasted in particular with 
Macmillan’s eagerness to negotiate; in return for de Gaulle’s firmness, Adenauer agreed to end 
negotiations with Great Britain on Macmillan’s free trade zone at the end of 1958.38 In early 1961, 
de Gaulle also scored high marks in Bonn for his continuing firmness amidst considerable anxiety 
about the direction that the newly arrived Kennedy administration would take with regard to 
Germany.39 After the East German regime had begun sealing off the eastern sector of Berlin by 
building a wall in August 1961 de Gaulle called on the West not to yield to Soviet pressure,40 and 
in his end-of-the-year message he publicly criticized American and British contacts with Moscow. 
To Adenauer, de Gaulle’s stance contrasted favorably with the Kennedy administration’s 
considerably more muted response. 41  There is reason to believe that this stance persuaded 
Adenauer, in the course of his visit to France in July 1962, to consent to de Gaulle’s insistence on 
drafting a bilateral Franco-German treaty of cooperation designed to bring his conception of 
European unity closer to reality.42 
But de Gaulle first tried to advance his plan for European unity on a wider base than his 
relationship with Adenauer. The swift pace by which the tariff cuts of the Rome Treaty were 
being implemented in 1958 and 1959 and the impending resolution of the Algerian question had 
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opened the avenue for de Gaulle to come forward with proposals for European political unity.43 
He first discussed his ideas generally with Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani in June 1959,44 
but the drive for creating a ‘European’ Europe out of the Six truly began in earnest in the 
summer of 1960 – in other words, just when the Macmillan government was coming around to 
the idea of British membership of the Common Market.45  Between July and September, de 
Gaulle invited the government leaders of the Six – one by one, Adenauer first – to Paris, “so that 
France could present her proposals in a setting commensurate with the subject.”46 On September 
5, 1960, de Gaulle apprised the public of his concept of European political unity in one of his 
majestic press conferences. He first set himself apart from the ruling doctrine of European 
integration and the community organizations, which lacked political legitimacy and efficacy and 
worked “on the basis of [supranational] dreams,” declaring that Europe could only be built on 
the basis of the “reality” of the nation-state. Then he went on to outline his own proposal for 
achieving European unity: 
 
To arrange for the regular cooperation of the States of Western Europe in the political, economic 
and cultural spheres, as well as that of defense, is an aim that France deems desirable, possible 
and practical. […] It will entail organized, regular consultations between the governments 
concerned and the work of specialist bodies in each of the common domains, subordinated to 
those governments. It will entail periodic deliberations by an assembly made up of delegates of 
the national parliaments. It must also, in my view, entail as soon as possible a solemn European 
referendum, in order to give this new departure for Europe the popular backing which is essential 
to it. If we set out on this road […]  links will be forged, habits will be developed, and, as time 
does its work, it is possible that we will come to take further steps towards European unity.47 
 
De Gaulle thus introduced a novel political instrumentality for regional cooperation and an 
alternative avenue for the future development of European cooperation. Such organized 
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cooperation between European governments would be qualitatively different from the still 
predominant federalist idea of progressive integration between the Six through the establishment 
of supranational institutions. However, this system of organized consultation would not be free 
of commitment: withdrawal was not an act to be taken lightly, nor were third states to be placed 
on an equal plane with those within it. The diplomacy of the participating states would be 
disciplined to search for a common position of the confederation relative to third parties.48 
When de Gaulle presented his ideas to the other government leaders of the Six, their 
responses were prejudiced by concerns about the implications for their ties with the United States 
and by a preference to involve Great Britain in the discussions about a political union. In 
particular the Dutch and the Belgians, de Gaulle wrote disdainfully in his memoirs, had been 
“orientated far less towards the Continent than towards America and England, and above all 
anxious to see the latter join the Six on no matter what terms.”49 The truth of the matter was that 
they had little desire, too, to subordinate their views to those of Paris in a political union that was 
bound to be dominated by France, in particular if Adenauer’s Germany allied itself with it.50 This 
is also why they rushed to the defense of the communitarian method as the preferred way to 
political unity.  
So when, on February 10 and 11, 1961, only weeks after Kennedy’s presidential inauguration, 
the heads of government and foreign ministers of the Six met in Paris, France’s proposals for a 
confederation ran into strong opposition, in particular from the Dutch led by their Foreign 
Minister Joseph Luns. This meeting only produced a commission, chaired by the Frenchman 
Christian Fouchet,  which was charged with developing proposals for a union of states. On July 
18, 1961, reconvening in Bonn, the heads of government of the Six nonetheless agreed on a 
system of regular political consultation and cooperation, and the Fouchet commission was now 
requested to prepare a draft treaty for a European political union. In the process of negotiation, 
de Gaulle had conceded important language ensuring the primacy of the Atlantic alliance and 
guaranteeing the authority of the communities on the basis of the Rome Treaty. Yet, by the fall 
of 1961, he had made important headway in achieving his plan for a ‘European’ Europe. 
Meanwhile, the Macmillan government had notified its wish to join the Common Market. 
De Gaulle’s biographer Jean Lacouture has wryly suggested that Harold Macmillan’s outcry in his 
                                                 
48 Kolodziej, French International Policy Under De Gaulle and Pompidou, 245. 
49 De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, 194. In fact, the Italian government was deeply reluctant to go along with de Gaulle’s 
plan as well. 
50 See Albert Kersten’s biographical sketch of Joseph Luns, the Dutch foreign minister, in: Duco Hellema, Bert 
Zeeman, Bert van der Zwam, eds., De Nederlandse ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken in de twintigste eeuw (Den Haag: SDU 




encounter with de Gaulle in June 1958 helped to convince the Frenchman of the political 
advantages of the Common Market, for “if his British neighbours were so very much alarmed by 
it, it must be of benefit to the Continent.”51 While de Gaulle was careful enough not to reject 
British membership out of hand, he was extremely reluctant, preferring to keep the British at bay. 
The Belgian historian Pascaline Winand stated that “de Gaulle’s veto of British entry into the 
Common Market was very much in the cards as early as 1961”;52 his memoirs suggest that his 
concurrence with British membership was never in the cards. De Gaulle never left much room 
for doubt that, in addition to finding economic terms acceptable to France, British membership 
hinged on London’s willingness to share his conception of a ‘European’ Europe. This implied, 
too, that London would have to abandon its ‘special relationship’ with Washington. 
Monnet on the Potomac 
Kennedy’s European Inheritance 
Upon taking office, the Kennedy administration inherited a strong legacy of support for 
European integration from previous administrations – a legacy that goes at least as far back as 
World War II. “Like the little girl in the nursery rhyme, a European union, from the point of 
view of our long-run economic interests, can be either very, very good, or horrid,” concluded one 
State Department analysis in the fall of 1943. 53  American planning for the postwar period, 
however, generally looked favorably on the idea of economic unification of Europe, which was 
thought to help restore markets for American products and to contribute to the hallowed goal of 
trade liberalization. Early on during World War II, American postwar planners envisaged a 
Europe-wide customs union regulated by a single regional authority strong enough to withstand 
demands from national governments and to serve as the single interlocutor for non-European 
states, including the United States and the Soviet Union, on economic issues; they also made 
ambitious plans for monetary unification and for agricultural reform. The resurgence of 
European economic nationalism was also dreaded for its political implications. American postwar 
planners believed that European economic and political cooperation – or even, as John Foster 
Dulles put it in 1941, “the political reorganization of continental Europe as a federated 
commonwealth” – was necessary to forestall the resurgence of nationalism and to integrate 
Germany in a stable pan-European framework. While official support for European unification 
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remained more muted for the time being, in part because Roosevelt did not want to alienate the 
Soviet Union and Secretary of State Cordell Hull prized worldwide trade liberalization as the 
panacea above all, the ground for the United States’ postwar record of support for European 
integration was prepared during the war years. 54  
In the immediate aftermath of the war, grand schemes of European integration were on the 
backburner of American diplomacy. But in 1947, as economic reconstruction in Western Europe 
became bogged down in a reluctance among Europeans to allow Germany to regain its industrial 
strength and the Soviet Union tightened its iron grip on Eastern Europe, American policymakers 
felt compelled to re-launch their search for the “creative peace” that would transcend nationalism 
in Europe. Looking for ways to make more efficient use of Western Europe’s economic 
resources, their willingness to try supranational approaches grew. The notion that Europe’s 
economic and political integration was in the United States’ strategic interests became part and 
parcel of American policy planning. It was harnessed by a favorable body of opinion voiced in 
leading newspapers and by politicians from both parties. Washington was, in addition, 
increasingly prepared to give American diplomacy an activist role in prodding the Europeans, 
who were reluctant to cede national sovereignty, to adopt the new approaches that were seen to 
be required to lift the European economies out of the “morass of bilateralism and 
restrictionism.”55 The European Recovery Plan – popularly known as the Marshall Plan – was 
engineered to enforce cooperation between the countries receiving American aid. It provided, in 
the words of a Dutch participant in the negotiations, “the first stimulus to European integration 
and cooperation,” eventually leading to the establishment of the Organization of European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948. 56  Continuing American pressure on the European 
capitals to forge a “single market” and liquidate tariffs also led to the creation in 1950 of the 
European Payments Union, as a first step toward free intra-European trade and monetary 
cooperation. 57  On a wider plane, the Marshall Plan must be regarded as spearheading an 
unparalleled drive on the part of the United States to transform the political, economic and even 
social make-up of Europe in the context of the Cold War. The economic and political integration 
of Europe was not only perceived as being in agreement with the strategic interests of the United 
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States, it was also befitting the enlightened character of the United States’ postwar policies and 
seemed to extend the American model based on federal institutions and the modernizing concept 
of “growth.”58 This mindset, both munificent and self-aggrandizing, helped to overcome the 
United States’ initial reservations with regard to the ECSC and support its creation in 1949 as 
well as the follow-on plan for an EDC. The EDC failed; however, “the least one can report,” 
wrote the New York Times in 1956 “is that a permanent-looking layer of American customs has 
spread itself across the old Continent in the last ten years, to the consternation of the elite, the 
delight of the masses and the solid satisfaction of the vendors.”59 Upon the signing of the Rome 
Treaty, Acheson voiced the cheerful consensus within the American foreign policy establishment 
that “the success of the movement toward unity in the West of Europe is no longer in doubt,” 
adding that “only the rate of progress is undecided.”60 
 Given this heritage, the Kennedy administration was bound to be supportive of the 
European integration movement. In fact, many of Kennedy’s European policies found their 
origin in the closing years of the Eisenhower administration. The Bowie Report, prepared for 
Secretary of State Christian Herter in 1960 by a group of officials gathered by Robert Bowie from 
all corners of the administration, deserves particular mention.61 This report sought to develop 
answers to the wide range of political, economic and military issues that were expected to hassle 
the Atlantic community in the 1960s. It is best known for its development of the idea of a 
multilateral nuclear force, but its scope was considerably wider than that. It foretold many of the 
economic and trade policies of the Kennedy administration. Fearing that the Soviet bloc would 
surpass the West in terms of economic strength by 1970, for instance, the report pressed for 
much closer transatlantic coordination of economic and trade policies in the framework of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), established in 1960 as a 
follow-up to the OEEC, and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). In addition, 
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it took a positive view of the overall economic implications of the Common Market, provided 
that the Six would be prepared to “reduce the common external tariff on a multilateral non-
discriminatory basis” (foreshadowing, in fact, the Trade Expansion Act); the report made clear 
that, in order to secure American economic interests and continuing political support for 
European integration, the Common Market needed to be seen as a step towards free trade, at 
least across the Atlantic, not as a step away from it.  
 The Bowie Report also displayed the almost instinctive preference among Americans for the 
communitarian approach to European integration, both for political reasons – integration was 
thought to reduce the potential for a European return to nationalism – and for reasons of 
efficiency. At the same time, it expressed strong encouragement of Great Britain’s membership 
of the Common Market, at a time when the Macmillan government was only just beginning to 
seriously consider this prospect; EFTA was sadly devoid of political content and British 
adherence to it, Bowie feared, could weaken the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance. While Bowie 
considered an Atlantic confederation or union with common institutions as out of reach for the 
time being, he kept it in view as “an ultimate goal” of American foreign policy. 62  More 
importantly, however, his report marked the emergence of the idea of a “partnership of equals” 
between the United States and the emerging Common Market. The partnership idea took 
account of the success of the Common Market in the late 1950s, the impracticality of urgent calls 
for an Atlantic “Union” by people like Clarence Streit, and the desire to influence the direction of 
the European integration movement. It offered the perspective of a more balanced transatlantic 
relationship, too, for without European integration, “equal influence on common policy is out of 
the question, whatever the forms or fictions.”63 In sum, the Bowie Report underlined that the 
European integration movement was viewed in Washington in the 1950s and the beginning of 
the 1960s as a largely congenial contribution to transatlantic policy coordination and the 
Common Market as a constituent part of growing and significant promise within the Atlantic 
community. 
 The Bowie Report was given an attentive reading in official Washington and its 
recommendations resonated in reports prepared for the incoming Kennedy administration. The 
influential Stevenson Report, for instance, which was in reality prepared by a task force 
assembled by George Ball, reiterated the need for breaking down transatlantic trade barriers and 
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for the establishment of an Atlantic partnership.64 In a follow-on report on foreign economic 
policy, Ball stressed the positive contribution of the Common Market, where “beyond economic 
unity lies the long-term prospect of political union on the continent.”65 The earlier discussed 
Acheson Report, submitted to Kennedy in March 1961, did not explicitly endorse Bowie’s idea of 
a partnership of equals, speaking rather of “an Atlantic commonwealth, in which common 
institutions would increasingly be developed to meet common problems.” However, Acheson did 
express strong support for European integration as a step toward a “genuine” Atlantic 
community, “in which common institutions are increasingly developed to address common 
problems.” With regard to British membership, moreover, he found that “the U.K. should not be 
encouraged to oppose or stay apart from that movement by doubts as to the U.S. attitude or by 
hopes of a ‘special’ relation with the U.S.” and that “over time, the U.K. might become 
convinced that its position apart from the continent did not constitute a promising base of power 
– particularly if the U.S. was dealing ever more closely with growing strength on the continent.” 
The Acheson Report moreover adopted 1970 – the year when, according to Bowie, the Soviet 
economy would surpass that of the West – as the year by which “a more tightly knit Atlantic 
commonwealth” must be achieved.66 
 
The Americans and Jean Monnet —The Other Special Relationship 
The Kennedy administration’s support of European integration would take on fresh intensity and 
focus not just as a result of the abovementioned policy reports but also because of those who 
were chosen to serve on it. Kennedy’s European policies would in particular be shaped by a 
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generation of mid- and high-level officials at the State Department who felt a strong personal 
commitment to the European integration movement and were determined to use their time at the 
helm to further its cause. The history of the so-called Europeanists in the Kennedy 
administration stands out as an example of the overriding influence that a relatively limited 
number of officials, equipped with energy, ability and sense of purpose, can exert on an 
administration’s policy. Operating, according to one of its exponents, J. Robert Schaetzel, as a 
“loosely knit group, allied in its support of European union, sensitive to Europe’s objectives and 
problems, and tied by close friendship to the Europeans involved,” they were to become the 
driving force behind Kennedy’s vision of an Atlantic partnership.67 The Europeanists differed in 
particular with those, like Adlai Stevenson and Chester Bowles, who sought to shift the focus of 
American foreign policy toward the underdeveloped world. They distinguished themselves from 
others who continued to view Europe as the single most important area of interest and foreign 
policy activity for the United States by the wholeheartedness of their dedication to the European 
integration process and the precedence they gave to building up the Common Market. 
The Belgian historian Pascaline Winand has emphasized the differences within the 
Kennedy administration between, on the one hand, the Europeanists (devotees to the cause of 
European integration) and, on the other hand, the Atlanticists and the Internationalists (both of 
whom sought to dilute European integration within an Atlantic or an international framework). 
While this distinction is helpful, it is important to stress that there was broad support within the 
Kennedy administration for European integration as well as broad agreement that European 
unification should take place within an Atlantic framework. As Winand readily concedes, “most 
Europeanists agreed with Atlanticists in the field of defense, where Atlantic integration was still 
the preferred approach.”68 But in other areas, too, the goals of European and Atlantic unity were 
seen to be compatible. As George Ball made clear to French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville 
in May 1962, the United States was prepared “to develop the Atlantic institutions as rapidly as 
possible to make it practicable for Europe speaking with one voice and America to work [...] 
toward the achievement of common goals.”69 Ball was thinking in particular of remaking the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) from “a body that could 
collect statistics, make studies, and formulate ground rules for cooperation” into “an effective 
                                                 
67 J. Robert Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliance: American and the European Community (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 
46. 
68 Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe, 201. 
69 Memorandum of conversation, Couve de Murville, Ball and Gavin, 21 May 1962, France-General, CS, NSF, box 
71a, JFKL. 




machine for common transatlantic decision and action... .” 70  In addition, he and other 
Europeanists consistently advocated the establishment of an Atlantic parliament.71 
 The European vision of a whole generation of American policymakers cannot be understood 
without the extraordinary personal influence of the ‘founding father’ of the European integration 
movement: Jean Monnet. The story of Monnet’s influence on Washington policymakers and his 
ability to associate influential Americans with his epoch-making European project remains unique. 
So great was Monnet’s influence in Washington, that, in the words of Ernst van der Beugel, “the 
history of American policy toward the process of European unification cannot [...] be explained 
without recognition of Monnet’s influence... .”72 
 From an early age, as a scion of a relatively well-to-do brandy-making family from Cognac 
and an investment banker, Monnet had developed an extraordinary personal network of 
international connections. These connections, it is fair to say, were particularly strong within the 
Anglo-Saxon world. This was in part the result of the practical, internationalist outlook common 
among the inhabitants of the Cognac region. As Monnet explained in his memoirs, “the people 
of Cognac were not nationalist at a time when France was.” And:  
 
The power of Great Britain was universally respected and very impressive to a young Frenchman 
who was ready to regard that country and its Empire as the natural place for him to work. 
Between Cognac and London, there were direct links that by-passed Paris. […] At Cognac, one 
was on equal terms with the British: in Paris one was somewhat under their influence.73 
 
In 1905, at age sixteen, Monnet’s father had sent him off to work with a wine merchant in the 
city of London for two years in order to learn the English language and way of life. He went on, 
at age eighteen, to travel extensively throughout North America to visit clients and to develop a 
retail network. His first encounter with the United States was a transformational experience 
which produced lessons for a lifetime. The young Monnet was instinctively drawn by the 
optimism and the level of mutual trust between people on the frontier and was struck by “the 
dynamism of a world on the move,” which stood “in contrast to the static balance of the old 
Europe.” He observed little order in American society, but it did not put him off as was the case 
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with many other European travellers: “I became convinced that there could be no progress 
without a certain disorder, or at least without disorder on the surface.” His American experience 
also taught him that resistance to change led nowhere: “Where change was accepted, expansion 
was ensured.” As importantly, he learned to understand the value of the distinctively American 
skill of managing change. “The United States had retained the dynamism of the Western 
pioneers,” he wrote in his memoirs. “But to that they had added organization. To organize 
change – that, I saw, was necessary, and it could be done.”74  
 Monnet’s association with the Anglo-Saxon world was reinforced in the remainder of his 
business career. In the mid-1920s, he was recruited by the American investment bank Blair and 
Company to work for its French subsidiary; in 1936, he moved to New York as an investment 
banker. As international banker, Monnet negotiated loans to aid the recovery of Poland, Romania, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in what John McCloy later termed “the forerunner of the Marshall 
Plan.”75 His links expanded into the political realm mostly as a result of his various appointments 
as government envoy during the war. In 1914, still only in his mid-twenties, he persuaded French 
Prime Minister René Viviani that France and Britain needed to coordinate their war effort much 
more closely, and was consequently sent off to London to put words into action. Throughout 
World War I, he worked energetically to establish joint organizations such as a Conference of 
Ministers of Commerce, an Allied Wheat Executive and an Allied Military Transport Committee 
– all of which prefigured the establishment of the ECSC more than four decades later. In 1938, 
after the Munich conference had raised the prospect of a new war with Germany, French Prime 
Minister Edouard Daladier sent him on a secret mission to President Roosevelt to ask for 
American aircraft for France. In 1939, Monnet went on to resume his World War I task of 
coordinating supplies as the chairman of the Anglo-French Coordinating Committee, a position 
which he had defined as that of an “Allied official” with “an Allied rather than a national point of 
view.”76 In 1940, in a last-minute attempt to keep France in the war, he persuaded Churchill to 
propose a political union between Great Britain and France to the government of Prime Minister 
Paul Reynaud. When this failed, Monnet placed himself at the disposal of the British government. 
He was sent to Washington as a British official to help pave the way for the Lend-Lease Act of 
March 1941, which effectively ended the neutrality of the United States.77 Monnet’s role during 
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World War II in eliciting aid from Washington, both for Great Britain and for France, was so 
crucial that Lord Halifax, the British ambassador to the United States, called him “one of the real 
architects of our victory,” and John Maynard Keynes guessed that his efforts shortened the war 
by a year. After the war, he masterminded the modernization of the French economy during the 
difficult reconstruction years as the head of the Commissariat-général du plan. With its emphasis on 
growth, productivity, and statistical analysis, the ‘Plan Monnet’ in essence sought to emulate the 
economic dynamism of the United States.78 “The French,” he reasoned, must adopt “the psychology 
of the Americans,” which entailed “the disposition to change constantly.”79 Monnet earned his place 
in history as the founding father of the ECSC; what is less well-known is how strenuously he tried 
to convince the British government to join it.80 His Anglo-Saxon orientation is clear, too, from 
his decision to name his high-level lobby group for European integration, established in 1955 to 
re-launch the European movement following the EDC’s downfall, the ‘Action Committee for the 
United States of Europe.’81 It is fair to say, as historian John Gillingham has done, that “the 
United States was both the most decisive influence on Monnet’s life and the main source of his 
power.”82 
 There is no doubt that Monnet had his own ‘special relationship’ with the bipartisan 
policymaking establishment in Washington that shaped American foreign policy after World War 
II.83 Some of his most important and intimate friendships, such as the one with John McCloy, 
originated as far back as to his banking days in the 1920s or even, as in the case of John Foster 
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Dulles, to the days immediately following World War I, when Woodrow Wilson came to Europe 
to garner support for his League of Nations.84 In the crucible of World War II, these friendships 
deepened and he developed new ones to boot. Power brokers such as Harry Hopkins, Henry 
Stimson, Felix Frankfurter, Robert Lovett, Averell Harriman and journalists including Walter 
Lippmann, James Reston and the Alsop brothers: they all became part of Monnet’s web of 
influence and regularly consulted Monnet about organizing the war effort or about the political 
situation in France.85 During these years, Monnet developed a close working relationship with 
Dean Acheson, too, which later on turned out to be instrumental in overcoming Acheson’s initial 
qualms about the ECSC as “the damndedst cartel I have ever heard in my life.”86 After the war, 
he was able to develop similar ties with Eisenhower.87 Moreover, a whole group of mid-level 
American policymakers – Robert Bowie, J. Robert Schaetzel, David Bruce, and others – became 
intimately involved through Monnet with his European projects.88  
 Monnet’s special relationship with the American foreign policy establishment cannot be 
explained solely from his effortless command of the English language or his affable demeanor. 
Monnet was very much his own man, a far cry from the archetypical French bureaucrat. He 
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cherished a positive view of the United States throughout and, in many respects, operated on 
similar wavelengths with his American counterparts; for this reason, too, “it was in the United 
States that he found his closest friends and his most important relationships… .”89 Monnet was 
both intensely pragmatic and visionary, which enabled him to view crises as practical 
opportunities to shape the course of events; “in his life and spirit,” Jacques Van Helmont has 
observed, “change was inscribed as the supreme law” and “he accepted the disorder that 
followed.”90 Monnet’s optimism and dedication to action, Henry Owen – yet another American 
friend – found, “were in a way more American than European.”91 As is more common in the 
United States than in Europe, he operated on the boundary between business and government, 
bringing a can-do mentality and managerial quality to government affairs. Although he had had 
“neither the help nor the limitations of university or a grand école,” 92  he very much fit the 
professional and personal mold of many of his Ivy League-bred friends from New York’s 
business community and Washington’s law firms. As he wrote in his memoirs, he visited them 
regularly because he wanted to base his judgment on “the wisdom of practical men” who “cannot 
afford to make mistakes – bankers, industrialists, lawyers, newspapermen.” 93  To the many 
Americans who befriended him, Monnet was the European of the new mold who responded to 
their own hopes and aspirations: he was practical, forward-looking, pro-American, self-effacing, 
and, above all, capable of rising above the narrow historical and mental framework of the 
European nation-state. In their eyes, Monnet was the embodiment of the ‘good’ European. His 
integration movement seemed to provide a coherent and forward-looking method to resolving 
the European Question that had befuddled American diplomacy for so long. It provided an 
opportunity to reconstruct Europe – or, at least, its western part – in ways consistent with 
America’s fundamental interests and beliefs. Monnet saw himself as a “citizen of the Western 
world,” one of his closest European collaborators stated; “he could not conceive that Europe and 
the United States could develop divergent futures… .”94 A few years before his death in 1979, the 
European Council declared him ‘Honorary Citizen of Europe.’ Yet there is some justification, too, 
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in seeing him as a first citizen – along with the likes of Dean Acheson, John McCloy, Walter 
Lippmann, and Clarence Streit – of the Atlantic community. 
 It is important to note that Monnet’s circle of American friends was limited in one important 
respect. He was particularly well connected with those Americans who were both internationalist 
and liberally inclined (regardless of whether they were Republican or Democrat) and who were 
orientated towards Europe, many of them representatives of the East Coast Establishment. They 
– like Monnet – felt most strongly that the European nation-state had discredited itself as a result 
of two world conflagrations. Throughout his life, Monnet pioneered supranational solutions to 
solve supranational problems, which tied in neatly with the “one world” program of Wilsonians 
and later – in the context of the Cold War – with building up the Atlantic community. Although 
he has been ascribed the traits of a French peasant,95 Monnet was cosmopolitan in the true sense 
of the word: not bound by local or national prejudices and at home in all countries and places. As 
Van Helmont observed, “he saw the future globally.”96 As a young man working for the League 
of Nations, he had lamented that those who had drawn up the League Convenant had been 
“careful to avoid setting up a genuine authority independent of the member states, or even a first 
nucleus of autonomous international power.” 97  In the early stages of World War II, when 
Monnet’s relentless pressure on Washington officials to dramatically increase the United States’ 
military production raised suspicions in some quarters, in particular with Secretary of the 
Treasury Henry Morgenthau, McCloy rushed to the defense of his long-time friend: “As for 
[Monnet’s] national loyalties, they are unimportant whatever they are. I know you can depend on 
his loyalty to the main task.”98 Given the war-torn and divided state of Europe, uniting Western 
Europe through the pooling of resources and markets became Monnet’s abiding goal after World 
War II – and lasting legacy. But the scope of his vision was considerably larger than that of 
merely promoting the Europe of the communities. “European unity is the most important event 
in the West since the war,” wrote Monnet once, “not because it is a new great power, but because 
the new institutional method it introduces is permanently modifying relations between nations 
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and men.”99 If nothing else, the closing words of his memoirs reveal Monnet as a true believer in 
the world community:  
 
Have I said clearly enough that the Community we have created is not an end in itself? It is a 
process of change, continuing that same process which in an earlier period of history produced 
our national forms of life. […] The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solver the 
problems of the present: they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future. And 
the Community itself is only a stage on the way to the organized world of tomorrow.100 
 
The Frenchman was, in many ways, as his British-Swiss co-worker and biographer François 
Duchêne put it, truly the “first statesman of interdependence.”101 
Given Monnet’s near symbiotic relationship with the American foreign policy establishment, 
it is hardly surprising that when he came to Washington in March 1961, “he found a president 
surrounded by a battalion of his friends.”102 Monnet had already been consulted by Robert Bowie 
in 1960 as he was preparing his influential policy report. Together with his Dutch collaborator 
Max Kohnstamm, he also contributed his views about an Atlantic partnership to the Stevenson 
Report prepared for the presidential candidate by Ball.103 Monnet was also quick to dust off his 
old friendship with Acheson once it became clear that Kennedy was seeking the elder statesman’s 
advice, and he assiduously tried to make his influence felt in the drafting of the Acheson 
Report. 104  But the weight of Monnet’s influence with the new administration was not just 
determined by his acquaintances at the top level. It was perhaps even more important, as The 
Economist observed at the time, “that in the lower levels of the administration, where cables are 
drafted and commanded, there are enthusiasts for the pure milk of M. Monnet’s doctrine who 
make even Mr. Ball – and perhaps even M. Monnet himself – appear as moderating 
influences.”105  
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There is no question that the Europeanists within the Kennedy administration were 
spearheaded by George Ball, first as the vigorous undersecretary of state for economic affairs and 
then, after Bowles left his post in November 1961, the department’s number two. 106  Ball’s 
influence within the Kennedy administration is often perceived as one consequence of Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk’s hands-off management. It is true that Rusk allowed Ball to wield his scepter 
over the European offices of the State Department with remarkable independence, which caused 
Ball to characterize Rusk in his memoirs as “my self-contained leader.”107 But it is equally true 
that Ball and the other Europeanists would not have been given such leeway if most American 
policymakers had not been inclined to encourage the integration movement in Western Europe. 
To the great majority of them, the American example underscored the validity of the federal 
approach, the importance of the rule of law, and the benefits of free trade, a large single market, 
and private enterprise. The predominant reading of European history was one laced with 
internecine warfare, narrow-minded nationalism and mercantilism – and the integration 
movement seemed to provide an escape from this sorrowful history. In addition, many American 
policymakers took it as self-evident that there could be no fundamental conflict of interest with a 
unified Europe even as there undoubtedly would be differences of view. As Schaetzel made clear, 
“partnership as a goal was not in dispute; it was only a matter of whether the Europeans could 
make sufficient progress to convert the objective of partnership into reality.”108 
 Monnet’s personal influence on George Ball is well documented. Their collaboration became 
particularly important when Ball joined the State Department; indeed, many of the Kennedy 
administration’s European policies cannot be understood without Ball’s connection with the 
Frenchman. Ball had befriended Monnet during World War II. He then became a close 
collaborator of the Frenchman in the 1940s and 1950s, when his law firm, whose European 
offices he had set up in Paris, represented the interests of the ECSC. (Ball edited a journal, France 
Actuelle, devoted to promoting American investments in France.) Ball deeply admired Monnet for 
                                                 
106  Apart from Ball and Schaetzel, other names commonly associated with the Europeanist ‘gang’ at the State 
Department include those of John Tuthill (the American representative to the OECD and the European 
Communities), David Bruce (Kennedy’s ambassador to Great Britain), John Leddy (from 1962 ambassador to the 
OECD and from 1965 assistant secretary of state for European affairs) and Henry Owen (deputy chairman of the 
Policy Planning Council from November 1962). According to Ball’s biographer James Bill, “beyond the secretariat, 
two dozen Ball boys were involved in substantive policymaking.” Bill, George Ball, 69. For more detailed discussions 
of the views and careers of the Europeanists, see in particular: Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of 
Europe, 139-153; DiLeo, “George Ball and the Europeanists in the State Department, 1961-1963,” in: Brinkley and 
Griffiths, Kennedy and Europe, 263-280. 
107 Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, 168-169. On Rusk and Ball, see also: Bill, George Ball, 72-74. 
108 Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliance, 41. Schaetzel adds that “Dean Acheson, who endorsed both European unity and 
the general goals of partnership, […] gagged on the adjective ‘equal’; his experience as a lawyer led him to insist that 
he had seen and been engaged in many partnerships, but never one that was equal.” 




his grasp of modernity – he described Monnet as the “preeminently modern man” – and for his 
ability to view crises as opportunities to affect change in the desired direction. Like Monnet, Ball 
appreciated the value of personal networks. Most importantly, Monnet had turned Ball into an 
ardent advocate of the European integration movement, to which he would devote a large part of 
his considerable energy as a public servant. “Though hacking our way through the trees by 
different paths,” Ball explained about his association with Monnet, “we usually came out at the 
same clearing in the forest, and on one point we were unanimous – that the logic of European 
integration was inescapable.”109 
 Monnet’s other personal relationship that carried much weight with the Kennedy 
administration was the one with Dean Acheson. Acheson had remained a staunch supporter of 
European integration after his State Department years. Like Monnet, Acheson anticipated that 
the ECSC, EURATOM and the Common Market would eventually be supplanted by a political 
community which in turn could serve as a building block for the wider Atlantic community.110 
Although their correspondence had languished during the Eisenhower years, Monnet lost no 
time rekindling their old friendship once Acheson had been appointed the most senior foreign 
policy adviser to the incoming Kennedy administration. As we will see, they would cooperate 
closely during the Kennedy years to promote the idea of an Atlantic partnership.111  
 In general, the Europeanists in the Kennedy administration operated on Monnet’s 
wavelength in a number of important ways. First, they embraced Monnet’s view that European 
integration was an inexorable process; they tended to agree in particular with what Walt Rostow 
once called the “Monnet sequence,” which presupposed that economic integration would 
eventually be followed by political union and a resolution of the nuclear question.112 Second, they 
shared Monnet’s aversion to ‘intergovernmental debating societies’ and his belief in the 
conditioning power of institutions. His community method of integration, they felt, held out the 
promise of replacing traditional notions about national sovereignty and political legitimacy. It 
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moreover tied in to the notion prevalent at the time that “the European nation state as presently 
constituted is too small economically, too weak militarily and too ineffective politically for the 
modern world.”113 One Policy Planning Council memorandum early in the Kennedy presidency, 
for instance, proposed that the United States should try to convince de Gaulle that “Europe has 
no future as a congeries of archaic nation-states compared to what it might have as an integrated 
power complex,” and that Washington would welcome “a quasi-independent Europe on these 
terms.”114 Third, they believed that Great Britain had to join the Common Market sooner rather 
than later. Fourth, they believed that a unified Europe should be accommodated within a 
transatlantic framework. In addition, the Europeanists believed that considerable responsibility 
rested upon the United States to urge Europeans toward the goal of unity. Their historical task 
was to further the cause of European integration and the wider Atlantic community. “To a 
visitor,” David Howell, a British journalist of the Daily Telegraph, observed during these years, 
“the Washington administration gives the impression of being prepared to go to almost any 
lengths to see Europe united, with Britain included, and speaking with one voice, economically, 
politically and militarily. [...] It struck me as being [...] like Rome at the time of Diocletian, the first 
emperor to realise that the Empire was too unwieldy to be ruled from Italy and that a separate 
although allied centre of power must be created in the East to keep the edifice together.”115 
 
Monnet vs. De Gaulle 
If, in the eyes of the Europeanists, Monnet stood symbol for the “good” European, de Gaulle 
was his antithesis. Monnet’s personal relationship with de Gaulle was hampered, too, by a 
fundamental incompatibility of views and personalities, an incompatibility which was only 
moderated by their ability to act pragmatically in the face of great challenges. Monnet’s views 
were shaped by his experiences in international business; de Gaulle was groomed in the army’s 
conservative cult of nationhood. For Monnet, the state was a passing phenomenon ill-equipped 
to deal with the pressures of globalisation; for de Gaulle, it was the alpha and omega of political 
life. Whereas Monnet spent much of his energy in World War I and II on coordinating the allied 
war effort in the most efficient way possible, de Gaulle was above all concerned with protecting 
national self-determination against his more powerful allies. “If one were to try to list all the 
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divergences in the thinking and action of the two men, one would never finish,” Marjolin once 
declared.116 While they shared a complete devotion to their lifelong causes, each man – one a man 
of influence, the other of power – was on a mission of his own. 
 Their most important differences revolved around two questions: first, the relationship 
between the nation-state and the movement towards European unity and, second, the 
relationship of a unified Europe to the United States. Their differing views on these two 
questions would to an important degree shape the debate in the 1950s and 1960s about European 
unification, so much so that, as Marjolin stated, Monnet and de Gaulle came to embody “two 
great currents of thinking” about Europe.117 
 To be sure, neither de Gaulle nor Monnet could afford to ignore the other – and they had 
proven at times to be sufficiently pragmatic to combine forces, both against the background of 
France’s near-mortal crisis in the mid-twentieth century and in order to further their respective 
long-term goals. Initially, the pressures of war forced them into collusion, in particular after the 
Torch landings in North Africa in 1942 made it increasingly urgent for the Allies to sort out 
which Frenchman should be considered to the spokesman for his country. Harry Hopkins had 
persuaded President Roosevelt to send Monnet to Algiers as a political adviser to General Henri 
Giraud. Monnet’s contribution to easing Giraud into transferring control to de Gaulle’s Free 
French in the Comité Français de Libération Nationale (CFLN) in June 1943 – often overlooked – 
was crucial.118 Monnet also carefully worked his contacts within the Roosevelt administration in 
order to secure American recognition for the CFLN and for de Gaulle’s follow-on provisional 
government, established in May 1944 (only weeks in advance of D-Day), as the de facto 
government of France. 119  This was anything but easy: if he was able to bring most of the 
government machine around, President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State Cordell Hull – to 
Monnet’s growing exasperation – persisted in their anti-de Gaulle attitude and their reluctance to 
cede control over France’s civil administration until the reality on the ground in the wake of the 
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liberation decided matters.120 During this confusing time, in the spring and summer of 1944, 
Monnet served on de Gaulle’s provisional government (GPRF) as minister responsible for 
supplies – the only government position he ever held. Monnet’s collaboration with de Gaulle was 
extended to the immediate aftermath of the war, as they sought to deal with the daunting task of 
postwar reconstruction. Visiting the United States in August 1945, de Gaulle – greatly impressed 
with the signs of prosperity and industrial prowess around him – asked Monnet to engineer the 
modernization of the French economy with the infusion of American dollars, a request that led 
to the Monnet Plan.121 In sum, de Gaulle’s and Monnet’s ability to work together during the war 
and its immediate aftermath in spite of their differences was vital to the national resurrection of 
France. 
 De Gaulle, although he owed Monnet a great deal, nonetheless continued to suspect him as 
an “inspirer” and “the mouthpiece of the foreigner” who worked for American rather than 
French interests.122 The jibes in de Gaulle’s Memoirs of Hope against the “myth mongers” who 
spread the “supra-national doctrine” and the “so-called executives installed at the head of 
common institutions by virtue of the delusions of integration” were clearly aimed at Monnet and 
his sympathizers. There is reason to believe that de Gaulle viewed Monnet’s Action Committee 
for the United States of Europe, financed in part by the Ford Foundation, as “almost a 
subversive organization.” 123  “Il fait un très bon cognac,” de Gaulle was prepared to say to 
Monnet’s credit in a conversation with Eisenhower in 1962. “Malheureusement, cette occupation 
ne lui suffit pas!”124 As for Monnet, his dogmatic pragmatism, his disinclination to engage in 
personal attacks, and his self-chosen role of acting as a broker of ideas among those who held 
power caused him to be less open in his denunciations of de Gaulle. Yet, as a representative of 
the democratic or ‘republican’ tradition in France, Monnet was naturally wary of the ventures of 
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military men into politics; as René Pleven stated, he “had made up his mind that the General 
would never share power with anyone.”125 
 Monnet’s influence undoubtedly colored American perceptions of de Gaulle. Since he knew 
how to operate within the French bureaucracy, he was the preferred conduit of American 
officials for influencing official French positions. “When things were pretty sticky with the 
French,” one American top official recalled, “we’d go talk to Jean Monnet and somehow they’d 
ease up a little bit after that.”126 He was also often the chosen interlocutor when Washington tried 
to make sense of French politics, which naturally included explanations of de Gaulle’s behavior. 
During World War II, Acheson for instance professed, “Monnet gave me fascinating glimpses 
into General de Gaulle, who was as yet only a controversial mystery to me.”127 After the war, too, 
he often relied on Monnet for advice on how to overcome the nationalist stubbornness of de 
Gaulle.128 Monnet’s view about working around the imperviousness of the General was indeed 
similar to the attitude of in particular the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. “You do not 
negotiate with de Gaulle,” Monnet once pressed on the journalist Don Cook. “What you must do 
is to arrange conditions, set up hard facts, realities that he must take into account in making 
decisions.”129 Perhaps most importantly, the mere presence of Monnet as an exemplar of the 
‘new’ Europe emphasized to Americans that de Gaulle still stood for the ‘old’ Europe. With 
some exceptions, as a traditional statesman de Gaulle never earned more than grudging respect 
among American officials, whereas Monnet was genuinely admired as a leader for being in the 
vanguard of modernity. 
 George Ball would develop a particularly adversarial relationship with de Gaulle, whom he 
habitually censured for belonging to the era of Louis XIV (the Sun King).130 The notion that de 
Gaulle was an agent of Europe’s atavistic nationalist past was prevalent in official Washington. 
National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy was “the only fellow that had some independent 
views,” Ball himself recalls. “I always suspected and used to accuse him of being a Gaullist, and 
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he had a different appraisal of the General from mine.”131 Yet Ball’s antagonism towards de 
Gaulle was particularly vehement. According to Dean Rusk, Ball “considered de Gaulle a major 
obstacle to everything he stood for.”132 This antagonism was instilled in part by his intellectual 
affiliation with Monnet. In his memoirs, Ball left no doubt about how he divided his sympathies: 
“I have no doubt that, of the two, Jean Monnet was the greater.” Whereas Ball praised Monnet as 
a “superlative architect” with a durable vision of Europe, de Gaulle was merely a “superb actor” 
leaving “only legends and transient playbills – nothing permanent that affects the lives or 
sensibilities of future generations.” To those who admired de Gaulle for being unusually 
clairvoyant, Ball retorted that the French leader’s “great weakness” was that he “habitually faces 
backwards, seeing the centuries that are past, not the future that is to come.” 
 
I saw de Gaulle as a twentieth-century Don Quixote, seeking to preserve old forms and restore 
old patterns, always trying to push a modest-sized nation into the front rank alongside 
superpowers organized on a continent-wide basis – in total disregard of this century’s 
requirements of scope and scale. […]  His whole life was dedicated to prove that a ‘leader’s 
genius,’ when combined with ‘the people’s virtue,’ could somehow ‘reverse the verdict of number’ 
– that he could somehow make France a superpower in spite of itself. […] Monnet never 
indulged in such whimsical fantasy; he was a twentieth-century man, in contrast to de Gaulle, the 
brilliant anachronism who disrupted Europe by undertaking a tour de force beyond the reach of his 
extraordinary abilities. 133 
 
Given the sweeping character of his condemnation of de Gaulle, Ball’s personal conversations 
with the Frenchman during his State Department years were surprisingly civilized and well-
humored. In the mid-1960s, Ball moreover would find himself largely in agreement with de 
Gaulle’s analysis of the war in Vietnam.134 Yet their fundamental disagreement about Europe was 
sufficiently clear to both that de Gaulle once greeted his American interlocutor in the corridors 
of the Elysée palace exclaiming: “Monsieur Ball. Not you again!”135 
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Washington and the Fouchet Plan 
Given Monnet’s sway over American perceptions of European unification and of de Gaulle, it is 
not surprising that many State Department officials were distrustful of de Gaulle’s proposal for a 
political union laid out in the fall of 1960, during the American presidential elections, and then 
discussed among the Six at the Paris summit meeting of February 1961, as the Kennedy 
administration was moving into office.  
 The State Department’s concern was both fanned and laid to rest through the machinations 
of likeminded allies. Prior to the Paris summit meeting, Dutch Ambassador Jan Herman van 
Roijen in Washington warned Secretary of State Dean Rusk that de Gaulle’s proposal for a 
political union risked splitting NATO. De Gaulle’s plan, Van Roijen explained, was to ultimately 
establish an “inner grouping” under French leadership that would “develop common policies in 
advance of NATO meetings, which would then be communicated to NATO.” The Dutch 
government was particularly concerned that “Adenauer would accept the French view” and 
believed that a statement by the incoming American administration on the fundamental 
importance of NATO would help to bring the Germans to roost.136 Rusk subsequently sounded 
out German Ambassador  Wilhelm Grewe, who responded that a number of developments, 
“particularly recent actions by President de Gaulle,” had made the situation “ripe for such open 
and strong [American] leadership.” The German ambassador even suggested, on a strictly 
personal basis, that Dean Acheson be put forward as successor to Paul Henri Spaak, who had 
announced his resignation as NATO’s secretary general. 137  Shortly thereafter, the State 
Department instructed its ambassador in Bonn to impress Adenauer – “prior to his departure to 
Paris” – with President Kennedy’s commitment to NATO and to announce that the new 
administration intended “to move vigorously to sustain and improve the unity, safety and well-
being of the Atlantic Community, making full use of all available instruments.”138 As for Dean 
Acheson, while political custom prevented that, as an American, he would be eligible for the post 
of NATO’s secretary general, Kennedy did ask him to prepare a policy report – the Acheson 
Report – on strengthening the Atlantic community; in April, after its recommendations had been 
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approved, Kennedy moreover dispatched the elder statesman as his personal envoy to Europe – 
and to Germany in particular – in order to underscore his determination to revitalize NATO.139 
 In sum, there is little doubt that the Kennedy administration’s early activism was in part 
prompted by de Gaulle’s proposal for a European political union and the perceived need to 
influence its fate. A broad outline for intergovernmental cooperation was accepted by the Six and 
the Fouchet commission was charged with developing concrete proposals. But de Gaulle’s 
proposal for a confederation had been far from accepted at the Paris summit; “the doubts and 
misgivings were considerable,” de Gaulle wrote in his memoirs, and “they all had to do with 
America and England.”140 After the Paris summit meeting, the State Department hence assessed 
that  
 
… [the] evolution of de Gaulle’s proposals for political consultation has been healthy and that 
[the] other five countries, through their vigorous reaction to possible less desirable features, have 
been able to divert essentials into constructive channels. This development is one which should 
be judged intrinsically and independently of de Gaulle’s possible motives as to [the] role France 
might play, since [the] other five can clearly be relied upon in their own interest to achieve [a] 
relative balance among the Six.141 
 
This position also reflected Jean Monnet’s characteristically pragmatic attitude toward de 
Gaulle’s proposal. When French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville first outlined the proposal 
to him in the summer of 1960, Monnet was pleasantly surprised that de Gaulle had decided to 
come forward with anything of the sort and ignored his continuing jibes at the communities. 
“What mattered, in my opinion, was that he had taken a political initiative, and given it some 
solemnity,” Monnet judged. “I only hoped that it would not turn into a great dispute.”142 For the 
remainder of the year, he thus sought to seize on the momentum caused by the French initiative 
and to develop common ground with de Gaulle. In November 1960, Monnet tried to generate 
support within his Action Committee for his design to use the idea of a European confederation 
proposed by de Gaulle as a stepping stone toward federation. In this context, he proposed 
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regular meetings of a council of heads of state as well as of councils of foreign, defense, and 
education ministers. He envisaged these meetings would be prepared by “permanent 
organizations”; given NATO’s primacy in the defense realm, the defense council would have to 
be limited to “defense cooperation in its technical and logistic aspects.”143 Monnet clearly refused 
to be a prisoner of a formula, agreeing with Ball that it “was a matter of letting the thing evolve” 
in the right direction – even if de Gaulle was the author of the initial movement.144 
Towards the end of 1961, as the draft treaty was being negotiated by the Fouchet 
committee and most countries – with the exception of the Dutch – appeared to be in favor, the 
official attitude of the United States was still largely supportive. In early November, the State 
Department instructed its European diplomatic missions that it would favor any effort “to 
maintain momentum toward integration” and it was not opposed “in principle” to efforts by the 
Six “to develop common policies and closer ties in [the] defense field.”145 As the negotiations 
progressed, the concerns grew. In late November, for instance, Spaak informed American 
diplomats of his view that the draft treaty was “retrogressive” in comparison with the Rome 
Treaty because it did not offer the prospect of political integration.146 Yet an agreement among 
the Six that was acceptable to the United States still seemed possible at the end of the year. 
The second official draft, circulated in January 1962 by Fouchet, finally exposed the rift 
between federalists and confederalists, between Atlanticists and Gaullists. This draft bore the 
marks of de Gaulle’s personal intervention. It was rid of its references to the Atlantic alliance. It 
called for a subordination of all economic and defense policies to the Union of States. The 
establishment of community organizations was not guaranteed as in earlier drafts, nor was a 
clause for a revision of the political treaty after three years – on which federalists had pinned their 
hopes – maintained. The new draft stipulated that membership in the communities would not 
necessarily entail membership in the Union of States, hence providing an instrument for keeping 
Great Britain at bay. De Gaulle had rescinded on concessions made earlier by the Quai d’Orsay. 
“The big question is ideology,” he explained to Cy Sulzberger of The New York Times in early 1962. 
“States make the decisions, not supranational commissions with their fictions. States are the 
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reality; the rest is fiction.”147 In the end, de Gaulle clearly did not want to settle for a negotiated 
solution that would have substantially compromised his European vision.148 
De Gaulle’s sudden reversal to old positions sharply raised concerns in Washington and 
elsewhere about the course of the negotiations about the treaty. After a conversation at the 
Elysée in early 1962, the American ambassador to France, James Gavin, surmised that de Gaulle 
wanted to transform the Six into a “strong military bloc” in which France would have the leading 
role. Fearing that Adenauer was being lured into the Gaullist camp, Gavin alerted Washington 
with his recommendation that “our relations with Germany should be such [...] that whenever 
she is confronted with a choice between aligning herself with France or the US, she should 
choose the US.”149 De Gaulle’s interference in the negotiations alarmed the British government, 
too. Upon the presentation of the second draft, Edward Heath, the British negotiator for 
membership of the Common Market, aired his concern that a European foreign and defense 
policy would not be consonant with the Atlantic alliance and suggested that Great Britain be 
involved in discussions on the political future of Europe prior to being admitted to the Common 
Market. Although Heath also came out in favor of the intergovernmental model proposed by de 
Gaulle, his pronunciations further galvanized Dutch and Belgian resistance to de Gaulle’s 
European political union. On April 17, 1962, the foreign ministers of the Six convened in Paris to 
discuss a compromise draft submitted by France, Germany and Italy. The meeting ended in 
disagreement when Foreign Ministers Luns of the Netherlands and Spaak of Belgium made clear 
that their governments would not sign a European political treaty until Britain could participate 
in the negotiations as member of the Common Market.150 The Fouchet talks thus came to an end.  
 De Gaulle came to blame the British for making a resolution among the Six impossible. He 
was wont to point out, too, the internal contradiction in the Dutch and Belgian desire for British 
membership as well as a supranational Europe. Their position, however, was rather 
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straightforward: either Great Britain joined the Common Market, in which case The Hague and 
Brussels were prepared to accept something less than supranational integration, or Great Britain 
did not join, in which case they would continue to insist on the supranational method in order to 
protect their interests against Franco-German domination. And in the background there was 
always the United States, which was strongly supportive of Monnet’s federalist approach and 
always watchful to protect the transatlantic link (or, in the parlance of the time, the Atlantic 
community). As Rusk told Ambassador Alphand in May 1962, the Gaullist idea that Europe 
should act as a third force independent from the superpowers touched a “very sensitive nerve” in 
the United States.151 In a press conference on May 15, de Gaulle reiterated his view that states – 
not supranational organizations – were the sole viable building blocs for European unity. 
Integration meant that Europe would have no policy of its own and could “be subjected to the 
power of some outside force.” Europe was condemned to “a kind of hybrid” in the absence of a 
country powerful enough to federate the continent under its aegis. “Such a federating country 
might exist,” he added, “but it would not be European.”152 
Persuading Kennedy, 1961 
Kennedy’s Scepticism 
John F. Kennedy had reached the presidency without deeply-held views of European integration 
or the future of the Common Market. If anything, as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. has observed, 
Kennedy “felt that Europe would work toward unity in its own way. As for the character of this 
unity, he did not think nationalism altogether a bad thing. He knew that the United States would 
not lightly renounce its own sovereignty; this made him a bit skeptical of rigid supranational 
institutions in Europe. […] he was not tied to Monnet’s formula’s – or to those of anyone 
else.”153  
 As the son of Joseph P. Kennedy, a multimillionaire Irish-American businessman who had 
served FDR as ambassador in London from 1938 to 1940, Kennedy had had quite a bit of 
personal exposure to Europe – and in particular to the electrifying life of British aristocracy in 
London (which he enjoyed to the fullest). In the summer of 1937, he had also followed in the 
footsteps of other scions of America’s wealthy by taking a grand tour of Europe. While in 
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Europe during these prewar years, he had developed an active interest in foreign affairs and a 
feeling for the different ‘personalities’ of nations. There is no doubt that the charged political 
atmosphere on the war’s eve had caught his imagination. During his father’s stint as ambassador, 
he had been granted privileged treatment from American diplomatic missions on his numerous 
trips throughout Europe. This had given him the opportunity to talk about the gathering storm in 
Europe with diplomats like William Bullitt in Paris, Anthony Biddle in Warsaw, and Charles 
Bohlen in Moscow. When the war finally broke out in September 1939, his father had sent him to 
Glasgow to handle the more than two hundred American citizens whose British cruise ship had 
been torpedoed by a German submarine. As a result of such experiences, at age twenty-two, 
Kennedy could give a firsthand account of how Europe had spiraled into war. Upon the end of 
the war in 1945, Kennedy, still only in his late twenties, had made a trip to Germany, visiting 
Hitler’s Adlernest near Berchtesgaden. The breathtaking beauty of the place, mounted high in the 
Bavarian Alps, impressed him so that it even instilled a measure of awe for its reviled former 
inhabitant: “He has the stuff of which legends are made.”154 For the young and impressionable 
Kennedy, Europe was a riveting scene of political drama, national cultures and engrossing 
personalities. It had whetted his appetite for international diplomacy and had introduced a dose 
of foreign policy realism.155 
 Upon his return to Harvard University in 1939, Kennedy had turned his European 
experiences and his privileged position as ambassador’s son into a thesis on Neville 
Chamberlain’s appeasement policy at the Munich Conference, which was subsequently published 
as Why England Slept (1940). It can be – and has been – read as a defense of his father’s support 
for Chamberlain’s policy of appeasing Hitler.156 Yet, with his fascination for the conduct of 
foreign affairs and having matured as a politician in the early years of the Cold War, Kennedy had 
escaped his father’s isolationist leanings. He unambiguously embraced the United States’ 
international commitments in order to ward off communism.  
 As senator, however, his attention had become directed towards the underdeveloped world 
rather than towards Europe. He had felt that the perspective of the American foreign policy 
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establishment was far too Europeanist.157 In The Strategy of Peace (1960), a compilation of his 
speeches on international affairs, Kennedy situated the majority of the “areas of trial” in Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. As senator, he had displayed much more active interest 
in Africa and Asia than in Europe. His most notable senatorial speech on foreign policy was the 
one in July 1957, in which he censured American official support for France’s Algerian policies 
and called for Algerian independence – and for which he earned the condemnation of Dean 
Acheson and others for undermining an important European ally. “The strongest force in the 
world is the desire for national independence,” President Kennedy once explained. “That is why I 
am eager that the United States back nationalist movements, even though it embroils us with our 
friends in Europe.”158 On the enduring power of nationalism, his basic view was hence closer to 
that of de Gaulle than of Monnet. The fate of European integration had not occupied his mind, 
nor had he ever talked of a creating an Atlantic partnership. 
 Kennedy’s view of the Common Market, however, was influenced not by his political views 
but rather by his acute sensitivity to the economic and financial computations of power – and in 
this area he would often echo his father’s conservative opinions.159 The United States was still by 
far the most economically potent nation in the world, but its relative position was seen to be in 
decline in the early 1960s. In his first State of the Union address, Kennedy offered a bleak picture:  
 
We take office in the wake of seven months of recession, three and one-half years of slack, seven 
years of diminished economic growth, and nine years of falling farm income. Business 
bankruptcies have reached their highest level since the Great Depression. Since 1951 farm income 
has been squeezed down by 25 percent. Save for a brief period in 1958, insured unemployment is 
at the highest peak in our history. […] Nearly one-eighth of those who are without jobs live 
almost without hope in nearly one hundred especially depressed and troubled areas. The rest 
include new school graduates unable to use their talents, farmers forced to give up their part time 
jobs which helped balance their family budgets, skilled and unskilled workers laid off in such 
important industries as metals, machinery, automobiles and apparel. […] 
In short, the American economy is in trouble. The most resourceful industrialized 
country on earth ranks among the last in the rate of economic growth. Since last spring our 
economic growth rate has actually receded. Business investment is in a decline. Profits have fallen 
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below predicted levels. Construction is off. A million unsold automobiles are in inventory. Fewer 
people are working – and the average work week has shrunk well below 40 hours. Yet prices have 
continued to rise – so that now too many Americans have less to spend for items that cost more 
to buy.160 
 
 Kennedy viewed the Common Market above all against the background of America’s 
economic problems. He was particularly concerned – to the point of being obsessed – with the 
deteriorating American balance of payments. “Next to the nuclear problem,” Walt Rostow 
recalled, “the balance of payments [...] worried him more than anything.”161 And if others in his 
administration tried to mute his concern, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon would be 
there to remind him that “we simply cannot ignore the basic disciplines of the balance of 
payments except at our own peril.”162 The international economic system at the time hinged on a 
fixed dollar-gold exchange rate of $35 per ounce and the American pledge to redeem foreign 
dollar holdings with gold (as agreed in 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference). This system 
extended enormous benefits to the United States because it had turned the dollar into a reserve 
currency. But it had an obvious Achilles’ heel: it was dependent on the continued credibility of 
the American capacity to convert dollars into gold. It had been feasible only because, after World 
War II, the United States owned the bulk of the world’s gold stock and ran a huge trade surplus. 
So when the American gold stock dwindled from $22 billion in 1950 to $17 billion in 1960, the 
value of the dollar came increasingly under pressure. In November 1960, less than a month 
before the presidential elections, these developments had forced a rise in the price of gold in the 
private market to $40 per ounce. Moreover, in spite of a continuing trade surplus, the annual 
American balance of payments deficit had turned sharply upward from $1.2 billion in the early 
1950s to $3.4 billion by the end of decade. Since this deficit was in considerable part caused by 
foreign military expenditures and foreign aid, the United States was, in the provocative words of 
David Calleo, beginning to feel the pinch of its “imperial burden.”163 
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 To any observer at the time, the deterioration of the American economic position obviously 
contrasted with the remarkable economic resurgence of Western Europe, epitomized by the 
German Wirtschaftswunder. Throughout the 1950s, growth rates in West Europe of more than five 
or six percent compared favorably with the 3.5 percent growth rate of the American economy; 
gross domestic product per capita grew even twice as fast in Europe. By 1960, Western European 
countries were managing growing balance of payments surpluses and expanding gold stocks, and 
were well on their way to collectively exporting as much as the United States.164 One result of 
Europe’s economic recovery was that American policymakers increasingly looked to the 
Common Market to solve the United States’ monetary woes.165 This was further encouraged by 
the belief that European economic growth was to a considerable degree made possible by 
American leniency. European economic growth, Walter Heller (chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers) explained to Kennedy in the spring of 1961, had been made possible by an 
“aggressive development of export markets,” low defense expenditures and easy access to 
American technology and management expertise.166 Given the protectionist leanings of some 
members of the Common Market, especially France and Italy, and the protectionist nature of the 
Common Agricultural Policy that was being devised, there was a real concern in some circles in 
Washington of a commercial ‘Fortress Europe.’ If high tariff walls were indeed erected around 
the expanding European market, American multinationals might even increasingly be tempted to 
move plants into Europe rather than keep their production in the United States. 
 Upon entering office, Kennedy’s support of European integration was thus not firm. It was 
certainly much less solid than either Eisenhower’s or Dulles’ support had been. That his 
administration would nonetheless come out strongly in support of the Common Market and 
propose an Atlantic partnership was due to George Ball’s formidable position at the State 
Department and the informal influence on the administration of Dean Acheson and Jean Monnet. 
Despite his former affiliation to Adlai Stevenson, Ball was able to develop an effective 
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relationship with Kennedy. As presidential candidate, Kennedy had been impressed with Ball’s 
economic foreign policy advice in the Stevenson Report. It was Ball who consistently advised 
Kennedy to support the emergence of an economically and politically competent Common 
Market as part of a program to counteract America’s economic woes. The disadvantages of the 
Common Market’s common external tariff for the American economy, he argued, would be more 
than offset by the increased volume of trade across the Atlantic and by negotiating lower tariffs. 
The economic relationship between the United States and Western Europe, said Ball in one of 
his first appearances on Capitol Hill, was “no longer a relationship of the weak to the strong, of 
the followers to the leader,” but rather “something far healthier – the relationship of the strong 
to the stronger.”167 Ball was remarkably effective in overcoming the skepticism of the president. 
Kennedy learned to appreciate him as a man who “gets things done” and gradually came to rely 
on Ball for most economic and trade matters.168 
 Ball, on the other hand, did not have as high an opinion of the president. Initially, this was in 
no small measure due to his intense dislike of Joe Kennedy, whom Ball despised as a “rabid 
isolationist” and “capitulationist” whose “isolationist frog-croaking” had been a “debilitating 
influence when our civilization was fighting for its life.” A close reading of Kennedy’s foreign 
policy statements had somewhat reduced this unease after the election, but Ball continued to 
consider Kennedy’s concept of America’s world role “muddy.” As president, too, he did not 
consider Kennedy “profound in his analyses or his judgment.” Ball rather thought of Kennedy as 
“intensely pragmatic” – which, in this case, was not a compliment – and, to his disappointment, 
found it “very hard to keep a discussion going within the framework of any large policy.”169 Ball 
was, in addition, seriously concerned with Kennedy’s “obsession” with the balance of payments, 
fearing the residual influence of the older Kennedy. “Those of us struggling to keep the problem 
in perspective were apprehensive whenever the President was planning to go to Hyannisport for 
a weekend,” and when Kennedy returned “we braced ourselves for a sermon on gold and the 
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hellfire awaiting us.” Ball was particularly fearful that Kennedy’s preoccupation with the 
American balance of payments would cause a shift in commercial policies “toward restrictions 
and protectionism.”170 Kennedy certainly was not as doctrinaire a free trader as Ball, and he was 
certain to adjust uncomfortably to the mainstream liberal consensus in support of free trade since 
Woodrow Wilson.171 
 As part of his effort to get Kennedy’s support for his ideas about free trade and European 
integration, Ball carefully orchestrated meetings for the newly elected president with members of 
his personal network. The most important of these was Jean Monnet, with whom he continued 
to consult on major policy initiatives while at the State Department. When Monnet came to 
Washington in March 1961, Ball arranged meetings for the Frenchman with key members of the 
new administration and with the president himself. Monnet’s schedule is testimony to the 
informal influence he wielded in American foreign policy circles, even after the change of 
administrations. In one afternoon, he met separately with Dean Acheson, Walter Lippmann, 
McGeorge Bundy, Joseph Alsop, and Ted Sorenson. Monnet’s informal get-together with 
Kennedy early in his presidency appears to have been highly effective. The American president 
took a genuine liking to the Frenchman and gained admiration for his European project. 
Importantly, he began to take interest in the notion of an Atlantic partnership between the 
United States and the Europe of the Communities.172 
 The concept of an Atlantic partnership, François Duchêne wrote, was “a licence [for Ball 
and Monnet] to develop the Community in cohabitation with America.”173 The partnership was 
also designed to ensure that the Common Market would follow a transatlantic rather than a 
Gaullist course. In order to persuade Kennedy to continue the enlightened policies of his 
predecessors in support of European integration, they would at a minimum have to ensure that 
European economic integration would work to America’s economic advantage as well. In the 
military realm, moreover, the cooperation of the Six could only be supported if it would not 
interfere with the objective of centralizing strategic control within NATO. In the final analysis, 
Ball was only able to enlist Kennedy’s support for an Atlantic partnership with a united Europe 
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because he had provided an attractive, action-oriented foreign policy vision with which Kennedy 
could manage America’s relative decline. Kennedy – and Rusk – gave Ball and the Europeanists 
at the State Department considerable leeway to expound their beliefs and to turn them into 
policy. Kennedy would also be prepared to lend his voice to the supporters of European 
integration. “In the sequence that began with de Gaulle’s return to power in 1958,” Walt Rostow 
observed, “the brief period of Kennedy’s presidency was for Monnet an interval of hope, 
touched with a strand of magic.”174 Although Kennedy would never be as much on board as 
Eisenhower had been, his administration was poised to nudge the Europeans toward greater 
unity within the transatlantic framework. 
 
Squaring the Atlantic Circle 
While the prospect of an Atlantic partnership was alluring and soon graced with the epithet of 
being Kennedy’s Grand Design for Europe, its achievement required a highly complicated 
balancing act on the part of the new administration in the international as well as the national 
realm. For one, it banked on the emergence – not the actual existence – of a politically unified 
and pro-American Europe. Its achievement therefore depended in large measure on the 
willingness of the European countries to move towards the same objectives. The partnership idea 
also assumed a readiness in Washington to cede power to Europe in the process of rebalancing 
relationships within the Atlantic community. Moreover, in order to avoid upsetting the politics of 
engineering the Atlantic partnership, Washington needed to display an unusual diplomatic 
aptitude to steer clear of the hazards of intra-European politics and an extraordinary sensitivity to 
changing moods and positions in the European capitals. The Kennedy administration had to 
tread carefully within the European political landscape in order not to offend a traditional 
apprehension in certain circles to American interference. And if this were not enough, the 
administration also needed to persuade its critics in the U.S. Congress that it was not selling out 
American political and economic interests in pursuit of a chimera. 
 The sine qua non of Kennedy’s Atlantic partnership program was Great Britain’s prospective 
membership of the Common Market. At his first meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan, on 
April 4, 1961, Kennedy had unhesitatingly expressed support for Great Britain’s intention to 
apply for membership of the Common Market.175 While Macmillan – as we have seen – had been 
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anxious to extract Kennedy’s assurance, it is hard to see how Kennedy could have withheld that 
support. He had merely followed in the footsteps of his predecessor and acted in accordance 
with the unanimous advice of Ball, Acheson, Monnet, Bowie, and others. Moreover, de Gaulle 
had already accepted Macmillan’s plea for exploratory discussions in February. At the same time, 
however, the Kennedy administration’s support for British membership would take on an added 
significance since it was charged with turning the Atlantic partnership into reality. Above all, as 
Dean Rusk explained, “we hoped that if Britain joined the Common Market, it would take into 
Europe that special relationship with the United States.”176 Kennedy thus had done more than to 
assure Macmillan; he had actually heightened Washington’s stakes in a successful British 
application. Britain’s presence in the Common Market was expected to offset the potentially 
‘anti-American flavor’ of the movement toward European unity as a result of de Gaulle’s 
European policies and his skillful strengthening of his political rapport with Adenauer’s Germany. 
In addition, Macmillan’s logic that Great Britain’s membership of the Common Market would 
strengthen the Atlantic community as a whole strongly resonated in Washington. “We cannot 
hope to succeed in drawing the Western countries more closely together [in an Atlantic 
community] if in Europe there’s a continuing dichotomy between the Six and the Seven,” the 
British prime minister posited in an important letter to Kennedy on April 28.177 This logic was 
indeed similar to Ball’s – and Monnet’s – belief that striving for European unity served Atlantic 
unity as well. 
 While de Gaulle – and Adenauer – repeatedly raised their concern that British entry would 
weaken the political cohesion that a continental grouping could muster, Ball argued that British 
membership would actually make it easier for a political Europe to act in unison. “So long as the 
United Kingdom remained outside the Common Market,” Ball reasoned, “it was like a giant 
lodestone exerting uneven degrees of attraction on individual member states of the Six, and even 
on individual factions within those member states.” 178  Dutch and Belgian resistance to de 
Gaulle’s plans for political cooperation among the Six indeed provided a case in point. Ball also 
argued that France would not on its own be able to keep Germany strapped to the Common 
Market for ever. A post-Adenauer Germany, he believed, would at some point be tempted to 
independently seek a deal with the Soviet Union on its reunification. “If Britain remained aloof,” 
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Ball hypothesized to Edward Heath in March 1961, “such men as Erhard and Strauss [...] might 
exploit the ‘division of Europe’ as an excuse for breaking free from the Six, but if the British 
should wholeheartedly join the Six, the Community could furnish the glue to bind Germany 
irrevocably to the West.”179 It was probably in this vein, too, that Kennedy wrote to Macmillan: 
“Although the success of the Six has been striking, we doubt if the weights and balances will be 
right without your great influence at the center.”180 
 To make the Grand Design for an Atlantic partnership between the United States and the 
Europe of the communities come together, the Kennedy administration had to reconcile the 
array of political forces in Europe and the United States on at least three accounts. 
First, there was an obvious need to reconcile de Gaulle – and, in his wake, Adenauer – to the 
implications of British membership, both for the continental European economy and for de 
Gaulle’s plan to build a European political entity that would take a more independent stance vis-
à-vis the superpowers. Rather than going along with Macmillan’s plan of offering de Gaulle 
nuclear aid and tripartite policy coordination (see chapter three), Washington hoped to facilitate 
French acquiescence by urging London to fully accept the Rome Treaty, including its political 
provisions, and to enter negotiations without posing conditions. American officials showed little 
patience for understandable British concerns about severing economic ties with the 
Commonwealth and the EFTA. They often did little to hide their annoyance about what they 
perceived as British feet dragging. “The pleasure at our decision [to apply for membership],” 
British ambassador in Washington, David Ormsby-Gore, thus reported, “is not [...] accompanied 
by any enthusiasm for smoothing our path into the Common Market by bringing pressure on the 
Six in regard to the interests of the Commonwealth and the EFTA countries.”181 Indeed, as 
Kennedy wrote to Macmillan on May 22: “We [the United States] cannot help thinking that if you 
are once safely and strongly in the Common Market, you will be in a very good position to 
protect all of the interests which so legitimately give you concern at present.”182  
More problematic from the American perspective was how to assuage de Gaulle’s 
apprehension about the political implications of British membership of the Common Market for 
his plans for European political cooperation in the areas of foreign policy and defense. The 
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reason, of course, was that American support for British membership was precisely motivated by 
the – often implicit – aim of ensuring that any future European political entity would take the 
transatlantic alliance as its main point of reference. We have already noted that de Gaulle 
informed Kennedy, during one of their meetings in Paris in early June, of his continuing 
reservations regarding Great Britain’s membership of the Common Market as long as it refused 
to be part of “the European reality,” a mental change which he did not expect to occur anytime 
soon.183 Adenauer, too, remained extremely skeptical about the authenticity of Great Britain’s 
change of heart with regard to European cooperation. When, in May 1961, Ball tried to persuade 
him that the Macmillan government was prepared to reverse “several hundred years of policy 
toward the Continent,” the German chancellor “vigorously” retorted that Churchill and Eden 
had said exactly the same to him in the early 1950s, after which they established the Western 
European Union “which has been in a state of rigor mortis ever since.” According to Adenauer, 
“Macmillan will never join in any serious move toward European unity” and “he and de Gaulle 
had [therefore] decided that they could not wait for the British.”184 There was not much the 
Kennedy administration could do to take away the impression that Great Britain would act as an 
agent for American views and interests in a united Europe, as it contained a kernel of truth. 
Second, there was a clear incongruity between, on the one hand, support for Great Britain’s 
membership of the Common Market and, on the other hand, the longstanding American 
commitment to the federalist approach towards European unity. Ball and other American 
officials consistently put pressure on London to fully accept the provisions of the Rome 
Treaty.185 When American officials impressed on their British counterparts that London had to 
accept the political implications of membership, they therefore did not mean to argue – as de 
Gaulle did – that Great Britain had to loosen its ties to the United States but that it had to accept 
the integration method enshrined in the Rome Treaty. Yet the Kennedy administration could not 
ignore the edge that Great Britain’s entry into the Common Market would give to the 
confederalist camp. In his letter to Kennedy of April 28, 1961, Macmillan left no doubt about his 
predilection for the intergovernmental method. He even suggested that his government’s volte face 
with regard to the Common Market was induced by the diminishing of the federalist tide. “At 
one time the federalists seemed to have won the day and we did not feel able to go along with 
them,” he explained. “Then with de Gaulle’s return to power it looked as if the confederalists 
                                                 
183 Memorandum of conversation, President Kennedy and General de Gaulle, 2 June 1961, in: FRUS, vol. XIII, #11, 
24-25. See chapter three. 
184 Telegram from the mission at Geneva to the Department of State, 24 May 1961, in: FRUS, vol. XIII, #10, 21-23. 
185 Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe, 267. 




were in the ascendant and that is much better for us.”186 Kennedy’s reply underlined that he was 
only prepared to deal with the “significant” economic disadvantages of Britain’s membership if it 
produced the political upshot of strengthening European and Atlantic unity. “A customs union 
alone would be a source of economic difficulty for us, without compensating political advantage, 
and we should be most reluctant to see such a result.”187 The dilution of European integration in 
the short term as a result of British membership was considered a price worth paying only in the 
belief that Monnet’s inexorable European logic would again take hold in the long term.188 
American support for the ostensibly contradictory aims of European political integration and 
British membership of the Common Market was one of the paradoxes that characterized the 
postwar bipartisan foreign policy synthesis between liberalism and conservatism. 
 Third, there was the imperative – felt strongly not only by Kennedy, but by parts of the 
administration and in Congress as well – to reconcile British membership of the Common 
Market to the interests of the American economy. Kennedy’s residual ambivalence about 
supporting the European project was undoubtedly deepened by the economist John Kenneth 
Galbraith, who had been one of his tutors at Harvard University and with whom he kept up an 
animated correspondence after he had appointed Galbraith as his ambassador to India. In one of 
his letters to Kennedy, in July 1961, Galbraith seriously questioned the wisdom of American 
support for European unity: 
 
There is another possible view which is that modern industry with its ever increasing scale 
requires larger and larger trading areas. And access to markets is now more important than 
protection from competitors. Social security and modern fiscal policy provide the cushioning 
effect on national economies which were once provided much more imperfectly by tariffs. [...] 
market access is now the thing. This the Common Market provides for Europeans. So viewed the 
ECE [sic] is not a unique act of political creation. It is an accommodation to the facts of modern 
economic and industrial life. [...] It is a reflection of a trend and Europeans are on the trend and 
we are not. They are developing market access at our expense. [...] Still we say fine. Let us get 
Britain and the rest of Europe in. Thus we build up Europe against the Bolshevists. In fact we are 
building up Europe, which is already economically powerful, against the United States. 
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 Adding that he had “never been worried about the Pope running the government” but that 
he was “genuinely bothered about St. Francis,” Galbraith urged Kennedy to defend American 
interests and “to find a tolerable association with the Common Market”:  
 
Ahead and required will be some hard and clear-headed trading with our allies. We cannot 
continue to think first of Europe and forswear any steps that might upset the present equilibrium 
or de Gaulle.189 
 
Aroused by such alternative advice (and by conversations with his father), Kennedy 
pointedly expressed his unease about sacrificing American economic interests on the political 
altar of European unity to the State Department. On August 21, following the Macmillan 
government’s formal membership application, he asked Ball in a National Security Action 
Memorandum for a “realistic” study of the economic implications for the United States. “If it 
[the expansion of the Common Market] should have an extremely adverse effect upon us a good 
deal of responsibility would be laid upon our doorstep.”190 In typical fashion, Ball responded to 
Kennedy’s concern with a detailed memorandum merely two days later, explaining that the 
“situation is well in hand” and that American commercial interests were being protected. State 
Department studies, he pointed out, had shown that the “net effect” of further European 
integration and the expansion of the Common Market would be “to expand rather than diminish 
United States industrial exports,” primarily because of the higher economic growth rates they 
would engender. The implications for American agricultural exports were less clear, since the 
common agricultural policy was still being negotiated among the Six; however, “British adherence 
[to the Common Market] should tend to reduce the level of protection – and hence of 
discrimination – since Britain is committed to low food prices for its consumers.” The real pinch 
to American trade interests, clarified Ball, would occur if Great Britain succeeded in extending its 
preferential ties with Commonwealth countries to the Common Market. For this reason, Ball 
assured, American diplomats were making their opposition to such extension abundantly clear to 
the Europeans. “From the long-range point of view,” Ball concluded, “there is only one 
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appropriate course for the United States to follow – that is to work toward bringing about a 
progressive reduction in the level of the common external tariff of the Common Market.” Such 
trade liberalization, he moreover believed, had to be pursued on a worldwide basis, not by 
forming a “cabal of the industrialized countries against the rest of the world.” Ball: 
 
The proper road to the defense – and, indeed, the advancement – of our trading interests is to 
pursue liberal trade policies ourselves and to insist that the Common Market do likewise. This 
means that we must be in a position to reduce our own tariffs on a reciprocal basis.191 
 
 In responding to Kennedy’s anxiety about the Common Market in the summer of 1961, Ball 
was hence anticipating the presentation to Congress in January 1962 of the Trade Expansion Act 
(TEA), which had already been foreshadowed in the Bowie Report and, in 1964 and 1965, would 
make possible a new round of multilateral tariff negotiations (known as the Kennedy Round). In 
doing so, he was making full use of a unique window of opportunity: the fact that the 1934 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was due to expire in the summer of 1962. The expiration of 
this act was already posing the question to American policymakers whether they should seek to 
amend it or introduce a new one. Ball was clearly in favor of a new approach. The Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act had made it extremely difficult to realize substantial tariff reductions, 
primarily because it had forced American trade negotiators to engage in a convoluted process of 
item-by-item haggling. The new bill, Ball felt, would have to facilitate a far more robust approach 
to trade liberalization, one which would also offset the negative implications of the emergence of 
the Common Market for the American economy. It would in particular have to lend the 
president the authority in negotiations with the Common Market to lower tariffs by fifty percent 
across the board and even to eliminate tariffs on products where the United States and the 
Common Market accounted for more than eighty percent of world trade. 
 George Ball used the remainder of 1961 to convince Kennedy to face down the predictable 
resistance to his free trade revolution in Congress and among industrial and agricultural interest 
groups. Ball also carefully crafted the Trade Expansion Act so that it would encourage British 
accession.192 More than anyone else, he deserves the credit for converting Kennedy to trade 
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liberalization as the answer to America’s economic decline and the Common Market’s emergence. 
The Kennedy Round remains significant in the history of tariff-cutting diplomacy because for the 
first time tariffs were reduced across the board on a linear method. It was also the first round in 
which the European Economic Community negotiated as a single actor. “My task, as I saw it, was 
to stand like Horatio at the bridge and forestall any British deal that would either seriously dilute 
the political significance of the Community or discriminate against America,” Ball wrote in his 
memoirs.193 And in the background there were always the likes of Acheson or the indefatigable 
Monnet – the “inspirer” as de Gaulle aptly called him – in order to help move things forward on 
both sides of the Atlantic. As Miriam Camps wrote, “there was a ‘Monnet effect’ on Ball and 
then a ‘Ball effect’ on Kennedy and then a ‘Kennedy effect’ on Macmillan.”194 
 Kennedy’s concern for the effects of the Common Market on the American economy thus 
made the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 of pivotal importance to the Atlantic partnership 
program. It was considered of great importance, too, in order to prevent the Common Market 
from developing into a protectionist bulwark under French leadership. The multilateral tariff 
negotiations that would ensue would furthermore provide an opportunity for the European 
community institutions to strengthen their position, as they would lead the negotiations on behalf 
of the membership countries. Last but not least, the Trade Expansion Act was designed to 
accommodate the emergence of the Common Market within the larger framework of the Atlantic 
community. As Ball stated in one congressional hearing, the new bill would “constitute a 
necessary instrument for strengthening the bonds between the two sides of the Atlantic.”195 And 
when Kennedy presented the new bill in January 1962, he could rightfully say: “As NATO was 
unprecedented in military history, this measure is unprecedented in economic history.”196  
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The Atlantic Partnership on the Rise 
The Interdependence Speech, July 4, 1962 
1962 was the year in which Kennedy stepped onto the European center stage. The grand 
introduction of the TEA in January, the failure in April of de Gaulle’s plan for a political union 
along intergovernmental lines, lack of progress in Great Britain’s negotiations with the Common 
Market, the ebbing away of the Berlin crisis of 1961 – all of these factors encouraged the 
Kennedy administration to take initiative in shaping the European debate about the Common 
Market’s future. While in 1961 the Kennedy administration had been careful not to upset the 
European political process by imposing itself, in 1962 it increasingly felt that American leadership 
was necessary to prod the Europeans down the road of political integration. 
 The administration’s Grand Design for the Atlantic community culminated on July 4, 1962 – 
American Independence Day. Speaking at Philadelphia’s Independence Hall, Kennedy used the 
occasion to insert his vision of an Atlantic partnership into the political debate. The choice of 
time and location was significant – and the words spoken would have an exceptional resonance in 
the history of the transatlantic relationship. Kennedy had expressly wanted to steer clear of the 
humdrum patriotic quality of Independence Day speeches.197 Instead, he had wanted to respond 
to the forces of globalization and talk about the transatlantic relationship and the Common 
Market. Kennedy therefore presented the “effort for interdependence” as the wave of the future, an 
effort which, said Kennedy, already had inspired the American Constitution and which was now 
“transforming the world about us.” Then he turned to the movement towards European unity in 
what was the main message of the speech: 
 
That spirit [of the effort for interdependence] is today most clearly seen across the Atlantic 
Ocean. The nations of Western Europe, long divided by feuds far more bitter than any which 
existed among the 13 colonies, are today joining together, seeking, as our forefathers sought, to 
find freedom in diversity and in unity, strength. 
The United States looks on this vast new enterprise with hope and admiration. We do 
not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. To aid its progress has been the 
basic object of our foreign policy for 17 years. We believe that a united Europe will be capable of 
playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of 
poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving 
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problems of commerce, commodities, and currency, and developing coordinated policies in all 
economic, political, and diplomatic areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we can 
deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a 
community of free nations. 
It would be premature at this time to do more than indicate the high regard with which 
we view the formation of this partnership. The first order of business is for our European friends 
to go forward in forming the more perfect union which will someday make this partnership 
possible. 
A great new edifice is not built overnight. It was 11 years from the Declaration of 
Independence to the writing of the Constitution. The construction of workable federal 
institutions required still another generation. The greatest works of our Nation’s founders lay not 
in documents and in declarations, but in creative, determined action. The building of the new 
house of Europe has followed the same practical, purposeful course. Building the Atlantic 
partnership now will not be easily or cheaply finished. 
But I will say here and now, on this Day of Independence, that the United States will be 
ready for a Declaration of Interdependence, that we will be prepared to discuss with a united 
Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial 
partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union 
founded here 175 years ago. All this will not be completed in a year, but let the world know it is 
our goal. 
In urging the adoption of the United States Constitution, Alexander Hamilton told his 
fellow New Yorkers “to think continentally.” Today Americans must learn to think 
intercontinentally.198 
 
 Kennedy’s Philadelphia speech hence followed up on Robert Bowie’s advice in the fall of 
1960 to strive for a “partnership of equals” between the United States and the emerging 
Common Market. It turned Acheson’s counsel in the spring of 1961 – to seize every opportunity 
to move toward “a genuine Atlantic commonwealth” – into something akin to a foreign policy 
program. The speech spelled out, at the highest political level,199 the route towards “progressively 
closer association” within the Atlantic community: first the Europeans would have to make 
decisive progress toward unity, and then the United States would be prepared to engage in a 
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“concrete” Atlantic partnership between “equals.” With its emphasis on “interdependence” and 
on cautioning the eventual Atlantic partnership “not [to] look inward only, preoccupied with its 
own welfare and advancement” but “to cooperate with all nations” and “serve as a nucleus for 
the eventual union of all free men – those who are now free and those who are vowing that some 
day they will be free,” it came as close as any presidential speech to expounding the liberals’ 
vision of the Atlantic community as a scaled-down world community.200 And although it fell 
short of calls for a “true Atlantic community” with common institutions, issued by Clarence 
Streit’s Atlantic Union committee during its Paris conference in January 1962, Kennedy’s 
readiness to project the example of the American Constitution onto Europe and his call on 
Americans “to think intercontinentally” could be taken as a step in that direction. 
 Kennedy’s Philadelphia speech carefully avoided taking sides in the European debate 
between federalists and confederalists, reflecting Kennedy’s own pragmatism on the issue. In fact, 
in its opening phrases, the speech skillfully weaved the themes of national independence and 
interdependence together in one fabric of historic evolution. In a reference to the massive drive 
for decolonization after World War II and to the nations behind the Iron Curtain whose 
independence was still suppressed, Kennedy also stated that the “doctrine of national 
independence […] remains the most powerful force in the world today.” This part of the speech 
could also be read as a helpful nod to de Gaulle’s political philosophy and as an affirmation of 
the Evian agreement on Algerian independence signed in March 1962. Yet, Kennedy above all 
stressed that any struggle for national independence would have to be amplified by a political 
effort that recognized the inherent interdependence of nations in an era of globalization. Most 
importantly, Kennedy unabashedly held up the federal model enshrined in the American 
Constitution as a beckoning example to Europe.  
 In fact, both the prominence of the Atlantic partnership idea and the example of federal 
union in the Philadelphia speech were testimony to Jean Monnet’s extraordinary influence on the 
administration’s European policies. In April, Monnet had paid a three-week visit to Washington 
during which he, together with Acheson, put together an Action Committee resolution which 
was subsequently handed to Ball, Rostow, Owen, and Schaetzel, and which had a great impact on 
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Kennedy’s Philadelphia speech.201 Eight days before the speech, on June 26, Monnet tried to 
shape the response in Europe to Kennedy’s proposal in advance, issuing a statement that his 
Action Committee for the United States of Europe, “which groups the vast majority of political 
parties in our six countries, as well as the free and Christian trade unions representing ten million 
workers, considers that only through the economic and political unification of Europe, including 
the United Kingdom, and the establishment of a partnership between equals of Europe and the 
United States can the West be strengthened and the conditions created for peace between East 
and West.” The statement furthermore predictably favored the community approach as the “new 
method of collective action” and appeared to jab at de Gaulle’s nationalism by declaring that “any 
other course would involve our separate countries in profitless adventures and preserve that spirit 
of superiority and domination which not so long ago led Europe to the brink of 
destruction… .”202 It is therefore easy to see how the Philadelphia speech, only three months 
after the failure of Fouchet Plan, had to be interpreted by de Gaulle as tugging Europe away from 
his vision of a ‘European’ entity freed of America’s tutelage and consisting of independent nation 
states.203 Kennedy’s suggestion that the United States and a politically integrated Europe could 
develop “coordinated policies in all economic, political, and diplomatic areas” was a far cry, too, 
from de Gaulle’s September 1958 memorandum proposal for tripartite policy coordination. “In 
retrospect,” François Duchêne concluded, “Kennedy’s partnership speech was the high-water 
mark of the ideology of integration.”204 
 While Kennedy laid out a vision for the Atlantic community which could only be realized in 
a more distant future, the Philadelphia speech could not of course be detached from the political 
requirements of the day. For one, the allure of an Atlantic partnership certainly helped to garner 
support in the Congress for the Trade Expansion Act put forward by the administration.205 More 
importantly, the Philadelphia speech had to advance a key component of the Grand Design: 
British membership of the Common Market. It impressed on London that the United States was 
indeed transferring its special relationship with Great Britain to a progressively more unified 
Europe, thus encouraging the Macmillan government to join the Common Market without much 
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ado. It furthermore had to convince a reluctant de Gaulle that the United States favored a strong 
Europe, with which it would be prepared to cooperate on the basis of full equality – in other 
words, that British membership was not favored by Washington as a Machiavellian ruse to keep 
Europe under America’s wing. 
The negotiations between Great Britain and the Six were reaching a difficult and sensitive 
stage in the summer of 1962. They had not really begun until early 1962, primarily because 
France had refused to discuss agricultural matters with Great Britain until the Six had reached 
agreement on a common agricultural policy.206 In February, France had furthermore opposed 
Heath’s proposal that Great Britain be given a four-year exemption from this policy. The 
negotiations about Great Britain’s preferential ties with Commonwealth countries, which London 
wanted to keep in place as much as possible, proved similarly difficult. The key concern for de 
Gaulle and Adenauer, however, was the effect British membership would have on the political 
identity and cohesiveness of the Six, a concern which was only exacerbated by the possibility of 
more EFTA countries joining once Great Britain was admitted. De Gaulle’s opposition to British 
membership was not categorical, but his priority lay with building a ‘European’ Europe – which 
could be much better achieved in tandem with Adenauer – and he did not think the British 
would be ready to join in such a venture (and hence would try to block it). Meeting Macmillan in 
late November 1961 at Birch Grove, de Gaulle had emphasized the obstacles on the road to 
British membership. “It is the timing that seems to worry him most,” British Ambassador Sir 
Pierson-Dixon to France concluded after this discussion. “He would rather that we had come in 
earlier or left it till later. [...] our inclusion will dilute the purely European conception which de 
Gaulle would prefer. King Alfred does not easily fit in with de Gaulle and Charlemagne.”207 
In the course of 1962, Macmillan was growing increasingly pessimistic about de Gaulle’s 
disposition. 208  He also felt strongly that Kennedy’s and McNamara’s campaign against 
independent national nuclear forces, and in particular the French force de frappe, was in effect 
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undercutting the British membership bid, because it upset de Gaulle and reduced the possibility 
of a deal in the nuclear realm with which de Gaulle could be enticed. In early June, in an 
important meeting at Château de Champs, Macmillan appears to have offered British-French 
nuclear collaboration as part of “some European deterrent” in an utmost attempt to persuade de 
Gaulle of his ‘European’ credentials.209 After de Gaulle had said that he gave priority to Franco-
German rapprochement and that “even with the best will in the world on your part and no 
matter what promises you make, you are just going to change things in our little club,” Macmillan 
also had argued that de Gaulle’s understanding with Bonn could only be “ephemeral”:  
 
This depends on the continued life of a very old gentleman in Bonn [...]. And if he were not here 
tomorrow, goodness knows what might happen to your Franco-Teutonic alliance. Goodness 
knows what bypass the German people might take in their effort to reunify East and West 
Germany. Maybe that effort will take the form of some kind of alliance with the East. I say to you 
that the real guarantee of the continuation of the Franco-Teutonic alliance, of the new Franco-
Teutonic friendship, the real guarantee against German adventures to the East, the real guarantee 
of the progress of the Common Market and of continental Europe, economically and politically, 
is to accept us, Great Britain, as part of your political and economic complex, a real part and not 
just something that is aside but friendly.210 
 
 This was essentially the argument that George Ball had been making earlier to Edward 
Heath in March 1961. Macmillan had succeeded in making an impression on his French 
counterparts. “La Grande-Bretagne est décidée à tout faire pour entrer dans le Marché commun,” 
Couve de Murville reported in the French cabinet on June 6. De Gaulle, too, appeared to 
recognize the change in Great Britain’s attitude vis-à-vis Europe since the 1950s. “L’Angleterre 
de Kipling est morte,” he said to Alain Peyrefitte.211 As for Macmillan, he appeared to indeed 
have felt that it was now or never: either the West would unite or it would falter. As he confided 
“with great intensity” to C.D. Jackson:  
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I am 68 years. De Gaulle is over 70. Adenauer is over 80. We three old men must make this work 
because if we three don’t make it work, the next generation of politicians and leaders will not 
succeed because they have not been through what we have been through and cannot possibly 
appreciate the full and total importance and urgency of this whole question.212 
 
 De Gaulle’s disposition towards Great Britain’s membership application nonetheless 
remained negative. He did not believe that Macmillan was sufficiently ready to assert Great 
Britain’s independence from the United States and continued to dislike the inevitable changes 
that would occur in the power relationships within the Six if Britain were to join.213  Yet he had 
not made up his mind and also indicated that the British probably would have to be admitted to 
the Common Market at some point. In spite of Macmillan’s privately growing pessimism, there 
was hence still room for optimism in mid-1962. Progress seemed to be made in negotiating the 
agricultural and the Commonwealth issues. Macmillan, too, still seeking for common ground 
between Paris and Washington, reported to Kennedy that his meeting with de Gaulle at Château 
de Champs had yielded “fairly satisfactory discussions” (he did not mention his overture in the 
nuclear realm, if indeed he had made one, perhaps dissuaded by McNamara’s Athens speech a 
few weeks earlier).214 On the French side, too, there was a feeling that substantial progress was 
being made.215 
 From the vantage point of Washington, the political situation in Europe looked manageable 
with some tactful diplomacy and seemed to be moving step by step in the right direction. In June 
1961, after his visit to Paris, Kennedy had told congressional leaders of his doubt that de Gaulle 
wanted the British in the Common Market: “He appears to believe that they will not make the 
necessary political commitment, and in any case de Gaulle prefers the present situation in which 
he is the dominant figure.”216 By July 4, 1962, however, de Gaulle had lost the initiative within 
Europe with the failure of the Fouchet Plan and buoyancy about the prospects of British 
membership and the future relationship with the Common Market had taken over in Washington. 
Two weeks before the Philadelphia speech, on June 18, Secretary of State Rusk left for Europe to 
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assess the political situation in the major capitals. His briefing papers stressed that de Gaulle’s 
policies presented the “principal current obstacle to our objectives” in Europe, but also that the 
French leader highly depended on his ability to continue to “seduce” Adenauer into supporting 
him: “Chancellor Adenauer is the key to the situation.”217 Rusk’s reports of his meetings with 
European leaders must have contributed to the air of confidence in Washington about the 
feasibility of the administration’s Grand Design for an Atlantic partnership. After having had his 
meetings in Paris, Rusk confidently cabled to Kennedy that “France will not offer any overriding 
political objection” to British membership of the Common Market, even as there was a sense of 
regret that “the presence of Anglo-Saxon Islanders” would modify the European project.218 As 
for the German chancellor, Rusk added in another cable, he “repeated the view I have heard in 
Paris that the entry of Britain, Norway, Denmark and Ireland into the Common Market would 
change the entire character of Europe”; Rusk nevertheless concluded that there was “general 
support in Bonn for UK accession and the confident expectation that the present negotiations 
will succeed... .”219 And in London, the American secretary of state found Great Britain’s chief 
European negotiator Heath “confident that negotiations are in good course and will be 
successfully concluded within [a] reasonable time period.”220  
 The way thus seemed open for a positive speech about Europe by the American president 
on Independence Day. Five days after Kennedy had delivered his riveting speech, Walt Rostow 
reported after a trip to Europe that Jean Monnet had “not been more cheerful or in better form 
for a long while” and that he was convinced that de Gaulle and Adenauer had accepted British 
membership. Moreover, Monnet had said, de Gaulle had pulled him aside at a reception for 
Adenauer, telling his French antagonist that the views expressed in Monnet’s Action Committee’s 
statement of June 26 and his views were “not far apart.” 221  After the Philadelphia speech, 
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Kennedy’s – and Monnet’s – conception of an Atlantic partnership thus clearly seemed on the 
rise. However, America’s chief diplomats underestimated de Gaulle’s political audacity – his 
preparedness to go against the grain – as well as the tenacity with which he would hold on to his 
European vision, in which there was no place for the United States except as an ally of last resort. 
Enthused in no small measure by Monnet’s activism, they also had no clear view of the effect of 
American policies and pronouncements on key European leaders. In addition, they had not 
resolved the tension between the call for an equal Atlantic partnership and the campaign against 
national nuclear forces. As a result, they unknowingly put at risk what they wanted to achieve. 
 
After the Interdependence Speech 
In the summer and fall of 1962, Kennedy seemed to get a grip on his foreign policy and make 
important progress in his European policies. After a series of congressional hearings and a 
number of concessions to the textile industry, the Trade Expansion Act passed the Senate on 
September 19, 1962, giving the president authority to decide on a comprehensive reduction of 
tariffs with the Common Market.222 It was celebrated as an important victory for the Kennedy 
administration, which hailed the TEA as “the most important piece of legislation affecting 
economics since the Marshall Plan.”223 Looking back on those years, Dean Rusk still called it “a 
revolutionary act, the most far-reaching act since about 1933.”224 With the TEA in place and 
European integration on track, the way indeed seemed open for a more balanced economic 
transatlantic relationship – one in which European growth would act as an engine for the 
American economy and thereby help remedy the balance of payments problem that concerned 
Kennedy so. 
 The launching of the Atlantic partnership initiative also changed the context of the 
American campaign against national nuclear forces in one crucial respect: it increased Kennedy’s 
willingness to consider relinquishing American control over a future European nuclear force. 
More specifically, it cast the earlier discussed proposal for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) in a 
new light. In the context of the Atlantic partnership program, the MLF proposal thus became 
charged with the added motive of encouraging European political integration. 
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 Prior to his appointment as ambassador to France, Charles Bohlen had discussed the MLF 
proposal with Kennedy several times, telling the president that “the whole scheme was somewhat 
a fraudulent one” unless the United States showed a greater willingness to cede control over it “if 
and when there was a European authority.”225 There is reason to believe that Kennedy had taken 
Bohlen’s observation to heart and that it was on his mind as he spoke about an “equal” Atlantic 
partnership with a “united Europe […] capable of playing a greater role in the common defense.” 
226  The July 4 speech was understandably opaque about the defense aspects of an Atlantic 
partnership, let alone the nuclear aspects of defense. However, in a press conference one day 
later Kennedy clarified that “a European nuclear force […] is a matter that Europe should 
consider carefully” and that the United States would “be responsive to any alternate arrangement 
they wish to make.”227 Although Kennedy hastened to add that no European proposals had been 
forthcoming, Ambassador James Gavin encouragingly reported from Paris on July 6 that “there 
[are] certainly many in France who are beginning to think along these lines.”228 
 On September 27, 1962, with Kennedy’s approval, McGeorge Bundy indeed took the notion 
that the MLF could one day develop into a truly European force one step further in a speech in 
Copenhagen (entitled ‘Building the Atlantic Partnership’). Referring to the Kennedy 
administration’s campaign against national nuclear forces, which had been shifted into higher 
gear by McNamara at the May 1962 NATO meeting in Athens, Kennedy’s national security 
adviser added: “It would be wrong to suppose that the reluctance we feel with respect to 
individual, ineffective, and unintegrated forces would be extended automatically to a European 
force, genuinely unified, and multilateral, and effectively integrated with our own necessarily 
predominant strength in the whole nuclear defense of the alliance.” And: “If it should turn out 
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that a genuinely multilateral European deterrent, integrated with ours in NATO, is what is 
needed and wanted, it will not be a veto from the United States which stands in its way.”229  
 Bundy’s Copenhagen speech was a significant add-on to the Atlantic partnership program, 
since it added specificity to the still rather vague partnership concept and dealt with the ultimate 
question of nuclear weapons. His remarks were also significant because they appeared designed 
to lead the Europeans down the road of political integration by putting a reward on their 
achieving “full” political unity. It was soon clear to European capitals that the Kennedy 
administration was serious about this element of the Atlantic partnership, for George Ball 
reiterated the points Bundy had made in Copenhagen at a NATO Parliamentarians Conference in 
November. 230  In addition, an American briefing team led by Gerard Smith of the State 
Department and Admiral John S. Lee of the Pentagon “convinced many allies that we were now 
in earnest about the MLF,” presenting elaborate studies on the project to the North Atlantic 
Council in the fall of 1962.231  
 In 1962, with Kennedy’s Atlantic partnership speech, the enactment of the Trade Expansion 
Act, and the reworking of the MLF proposal, the United States was once again urging the 
Europeans to integrate after the demise of the European Defense Community in 1954. As a 
result, the administration was setting itself up for a similar disappointment once the unwillingness 
of European leaders to relinquish national sovereignty would surface. The Kennedy 
administration was careful enough not to engage in Dulles-type warnings of ‘agonizing 
reappraisals.’ With regard to the MLF, it stressed that the United States did not consider the 
matter urgent – since the American nuclear security guarantee provided a sufficient deterrent – 
and that the initiative had to come from the Europeans. Yet Ball and other Europeanists 
increasingly saw the MLF, as British Labour Party leader Denis Healey aptly put it, “as the grit in 
the oyster, round which the pearl of European unity would form.” 232  In October, a State 
Department instruction approved by Kennedy to the newly arrived Ambassador Bohlen stated 
that “our policy in the nuclear field reflects our basic objective in Western Europe: to work for an 
ever closer partnership between an increasingly integrated Europe and the US.” American 
support for “politically divisive national nuclear programs” such as the French force de frappe 
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obviously did not fit in with the Atlantic partnership. The conviction that the further integration 
of Europe was inexorable rather encourage a certitude about the future course of events: 
 
Time will be required for European-minded groups in France, which favor the multilateral over 
the national approach, to continue to grow in strength; for the repercussions of continuing 
progress toward European integration to make themselves felt; and for the difficulties, costs, and 
limited advantages of a national program to become more widely appreciated. [...] Through this 
transitional period, we should bear in mind that the nuclear issue is one on which we and the 
French have agreed to disagree, and we should have both the tact to avoid reopening this 
difference and the patience to await the verdict of history upon it.233 
 
 Yet the success of Kennedy’s Grand Design hinged in large measure on de Gaulle’s willing-
ness to play his part. The key to de Gaulle’s conduct, as Rusk had been briefed before his June 
visit to Europe, was Adenauer. The German chancellor had shown interest in the American MLF 
proposal in his meeting with Rusk in June. 234  But the year 1962 is above all notable for 
showcasing the acme of Franco-German rapprochement since Adenauer’s first meeting with de 
Gaulle at Colombey-les-deux-Églises in September 1958. From July 2 to 8, when Kennedy gave 
his Philadelphia speech, Adenauer paid de Gaulle a highly symbolic official visit and traveled 
through France in the first major tour of the country made by a German head of government 
since World War II. During this visit, de Gaulle proposed a bilateral treaty of systematic 
cooperation between France and Germany now that the Fouchet Plan had failed; Adenauer 
consented, believing that “it would be better than making Great Britain the arbiter of Europe.”235 
A few months later, in early September, de Gaulle made an equally symbolic state visit to West 
Germany, the first in modern times by a French head of state, where he talked glowingly of 
Franco-German friendship before enthusiastic crowds. Meanwhile, de Gaulle was holding off a 
meeting with Kennedy in the United States, telling Ambassador Gavin on his farewell call on the 
                                                 
233 Memorandum, Dean Rusk to President Kennedy, 16 October 1962, France-General, CS, NSF, box 71a, JFKL. 
234 Rusk reported that his visit to Bonn “removed any doubt I might have had as to the inevitable growth of German 
pressure for nuclear weapons unless there are multilateral arrangements in NATO or Europe or unless there are 
significant steps toward disarmament in this field. The Chancellor asserted in the most positive terms that his 1954 
declaration renouncing the production of nuclear weapons was made under and subject to then prevailing conditions 
(rebus sic stantibus)... .” Secto 48 (Rome), Rusk to President Kennedy and Acting Secretary Ball, 23 June 1962, frame 
852-857, reel 23, PKOF, part 3: DAF, RSC. 
235 De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, 180-181; Maurice Couve de Murville, Une politique étrangère, 1958-1969 (France: Plon, 
1971), 253-254; Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler, 340-341; Maillard, De Gaulle und Deutschland, 220-222. To mark the 
symbolism, Adenauer was treated on an impressive military parade at Mourmelon, in which German troops 
participated alongside French units. 




Elysée that he was concerned such a meeting would end “on a negative note” for lack of specific 
achievement.236 
 The outcome of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 added to the Kennedy 
administration’s confidence in its crisis management abilities, but it had a poisonous effect on its 
relations with the European allies, who – including Macmillan – had not been consulted about 
how to handle it. If anything, Kennedy’s self-contained handling of the crisis showed that an 
Atlantic partnership of equals was still a distant prospect. Dean Acheson, too, was unhappy with 
Kennedy’s performance, both because he thought the young American had not been tough 
enough with the Soviets and because he had not given sufficient weight to the interests of his 
NATO allies. Briefly after the crisis, he wrote a letter to Jean Monnet carping about weakness in 
the West, de Gaulle’s anti-British bias, the mediocrity of world leadership, the tardiness of 
European integration, and the never-ending crisis atmosphere in the Atlantic alliance that made a 
broader ‘Atlantic Community’ seem unrealistic. On November 23, 1962, however, Monnet 
responded with characteristic optimism:  
 
I am not pessimistic as to the conditions of the world. It is inevitable that Europe and the United 
States move on different wavelengths. They are different… The way to get this [Atlantic] 
partnership is for Europe first to get unified and for this, England should be part of it; then 
Europe and the United States should deal jointly with problems that neither of them can solve by 
themselves, such as monetary stability, aid to underdeveloped countries or agricultural surpluses. 
As the interests will become more and more unified, the political view will become more and 
more common. […] I think that if we want men to unite, we must unite their interest first and for 
this it is necessary that they accept to act according to the same rules administered by common 
institutions. I know this may appear to be a long process, but a change in the attitude of men is 
necessarily a slow process. I think this is what we are doing and in fact this is what is 
happening.237 
 
Monnet assured his old American friend “to have no doubt […] that Great Britain will be a part 
of the European unity fairly soon.”238 
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 Moreover, even as Secretary of State Dean Rusk generally preferred to stay on the sidelines 
of intra-European politics,239 members of his department engaged in energetic ‘backstage’ work 
on behalf of Great Britain’s membership bid. When Prime Minister Georges Pompidou told 
Ambassador Bohlen on November 5, 1962, that Great Britain’s desire to join the Common 
Market posed problems that could be “more easily dealt with if there was not too much haste,” 
the latter replied that a delay was undesirable for the political problems it would cause the 
Macmillan government.240 More importantly, the department’s Europeanists – led by George Ball 
– actively worked their relationships in Europe to create the circumstances for positive decisions 
among the Six on British membership, in particular by trying to strengthen the working 
relationship between the European Commission and the British government. On December 8, 
ten days before Macmillan would meet Kennedy for an important summit at Nassau on the 
Bahamas, Ball arranged for Walter Hallstein to come to Washington to discuss the prospects of 
completing the negotiations on British membership at an early date. Ball left no doubt on the 
chairman of the European Commission that the American government considered early British 
entry as a matter of supreme importance. A few days later, Ball informed Kennedy: 
 
I think Hallstein was impressed with the seriousness that we attached to a quick conclusion of 
these negotiations and I feel we have paved the way for some work backstage that can give the 
negotiations a helpful shove. Meanwhile, you will be in a position to advise the prime minister at 
Nassau that we have struck a blow on his side.241 
Conclusion  
Kennedy’s approach to the Common Market is in part inevitably the story of how he sought to 
offset the United States’ relative decline. The sense that the United States’ global position was 
deteriorating was not limited to the military domain. It was pervasive in the economic realm, too. 
Kennedy was acutely aware of this – and he hoped that a more integrated and wealthier Europe 
could provide part of the answer to American woes. 
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 The story about Kennedy’s policies with regard to the Common Market, however, was not 
about economics alone. These policies had an important political gist, too. Most American 
policymakers, in particular those in the State Department, were more concerned about the 
implications of Gaullism writ large in Europe than about the American balance of payments. De 
Gaulle’s oft-stated desire for independence from the superpowers – to establish a united Europe 
as a ‘third force’ in world politics – portended little good. “It was the elementary, fundamental 
question of whether the Europe that we wanted to build up would be European or Atlantic,” 
Couve de Murville wrote of the Franco-American divergence about the Common Market.242 The 
Kennedy administration’s response to de Gaulle’s Fouchet Plan was pragmatic, but only because 
it counted on the pro-Atlantic forces among the Six to ensure that any political union would 
recognize the primacy of NATO and keep Europe from drifting into neutralism. The specter of a 
resurgent nationalism in Europe after de Gaulle’s return to power in France, too, had caused 
concern. From Washington’s vantage point, it made Jean Monnet’s credo of interdependence and 
supranational institutional development the more compelling – a credo to which in particular 
liberally inclined Americans already had been instinctively drawn. In sum, the primary aim of 
American policymakers was not to keep the European allies in a state of dependency in the 
exercise of hegemony, as some historians have suggested.243 It was rather to exercise control over 
Europe’s destiny in order to avoid losing Western Europe in the Cold War and to foil a repeat of 
Europe’s nationalist past through the extension of liberal American values of federalism and free 
trade. 
 The Kennedy administration judged de Gaulle’s European policies in particular for their 
impact on Germany, even more so than the Eisenhower administration had done. Germany had 
been the linchpin in Europe’s disastrous wars. It was the apple of discord in the Cold War. Its 
democratic record was considered still too young and the German political mind too unsettled to 
instill much confidence about its future direction. The Kennedy administration was determined 
to inoculate German politics against the influence of Gaullism. De Gaulle’s stirring declarations 
during his September 1962 visit to Germany – on various occasions he exclaimed to German 
crowds that he considered Germans a great people (“ein grosses Volk”) – and his address to the 
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Führungsakademie of the German Bundeswehr raised eyebrows on either side of the Iron 
Curtain for resuscitating the dreaded German militarism.244 (In American eyes, the French nuclear 
weapons program and de Gaulle’s justification for it was already certain to whet the German 
appetite for nuclear weapons.) De Gaulle’s assiduous attempt to forge a privileged partnership 
with Germany also introduced new risks to America’s Cold War diplomacy: either Germany 
would be tempted to break free from its exclusive pact with an inferior France to strike a separate 
deal with Moscow about its unification, or France would seek to negotiate a deal with Moscow 
without the involvement of the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ on the basis of its claim to speak for continental 
Western Europe and thus for Bonn. Adenauer’s courtship with de Gaulle, albeit an important 
contribution to Franco-German reconciliation, was therefore looked upon in Washington with 
more than a little disquietude. The German chancellor obviously held the key to the balance of 
power in Europe. Adenauer consistently sought to balance Germany’s vital requisite for 
American protection with his desire for political reconciliation with a former arch enemy and an 
inclination for deepened European political cooperation. But could he – or any of his successors 
– be relied upon to always strike the right balance, especially if France and the United States were 
to increasingly find themselves in opposition to each other? If it ever would have to come to a 
German choice between the United States and France, Ambassador Gavin therefore noted with 
foresight, the United States had to be in a position to decisively influence that choice in its favor 
as long as the Cold War had not yet been won. De Gaulle’s successful rapprochement with 
Adenauer’s Germany made it imperative, too, that Great Britain join the movement toward 
European unity. 
 Should Kennedy have supported British membership of the Common Market as strongly as 
he did? He was, of course, following in the footsteps of his predecessor. Yet Great Britain’s entry 
bid in August 1961 was conceived under adverse circumstances. The Six were still negotiating 
amongst themselves, and in particular France and Germany were still seeking to accommodate 
their diverging economic interests within the Common Market. Great Britain was moreover a 
reluctant bidder, trying to preserve as much as possible of its imperial legacy, the Commonwealth, 
and the special relationship with the United States. Macmillan also faced weak domestic political 
support for his volte face decision to seek Common Market membership, both from right-wing 
Conservatives and left-wing Socialists, as well as condemnation from the Commonwealth and the 
EFTA countries. Great Britain was, as Couve de Murville explained to Kennedy after de Gaulle’s 
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veto in 1963, “still subject to a conflict between its relations with the EEC, with the 
Commonwealth, and with the United States.”245 This French analysis was, in fact, similar to the 
prevailing view of Great Britain in the United States, which had been put into words by Acheson 
in his contentious West Point speech in early December 1962.246 Even George Ball had doubts 
about the timing of Great Britain’s application, even though he strongly supported it out of 
principle. In the summer of 1961, Ball recalls in his memoirs, he had been bothered that “events 
lacked synchronization”: 
 
With Britain finally in the position where, with encouragement, it was prepared to join Europe, it 
might not have the chance. […] Did Britain wish to face a European coalition hostile to its 
interests, or a group of European nations working closely with the United States that did not 
include Britain? To avoid these dangers, Britain must try to become the leader of Europe. But no 
British government could publicly admit that it hoped, by taking the leadership of the 
Community, to regain leverage lost through the shriveling of empire; that would stir resentment 
among the continental powers. Nor did Britain wish to turn its back on those tattered vestiges of 
empire that were the sole remaining residue of the Commonwealth – or, in other words, the 
former white dominion. […] Had Britain joined the Schuman Plan at the outset, it could have 
taken the laboring oar in drafting the Rome Treaty that created the EEC, and the peoples of 
Western Europe might today be combining their energies in a broader framework that could give 
real meaning to the concept of an Atlantic partnership.247 
 
The British had missed the boat in the 1950s, however, and by the early 1960s de Gaulle was 
sailing away with it under his own flag. 
 There was nonetheless a strong consensus within the Kennedy administration that Great 
Britain should join the Common Market and any move toward European political union at the 
earliest possible moment. A deepening division within Western Europe between the Six and the 
Seven was seen as too damaging in the context of the Cold War, a concern that was also much on 
Macmillan’s mind when he made the decision to apply for membership. Great Britain’s entry was 
necessary, too, to provide a sufficient counterweight to de Gaulle’s aspirations to use the 
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Common Market as a launching platform for his foreign policy ambitions. It was furthermore 
viewed as necessary in order to tie Germany permanently to the West, something that France 
alone would not be able to accomplish. British membership was sure to strengthen the Common 
Market’s orientation on free trade as well, which served American trading interests and would 
help to alleviate the balance of payments problem. 
 American support for British membership of the Common Market was surely also 
encouraged by the fact that Jean Monnet (‘Mr. Europe’) was adamantly in favor of an early entry. 
Monnet’s active support helped to overcome any qualms among American supporters of 
European integration about the consequences of British membership for the integration method. 
In the long run, they reasoned, the European integration movement would resume its relentless 
course anyhow, as it was the most rational way forward for European countries. American 
policymakers often assumed that Monnet and his co-workers represented the aspirations of the 
vast majority of Europeans, while they denied such legitimacy to de Gaulle. This was, however, 
more a hopeful reflection of their convictions of what arguably needed to happen in Europe than 
a realistic assessment of European political sentiments, which were still far more tied to the 
nation state. European integration, as Alan Milward has argued, got underway because it was a 
politically acceptable – albeit somewhat deceitful – method for Europe’s nation-states to 
resurrect themselves after World War II.248  American policymakers were nonetheless not so 
much out of touch with European political reality as anticipating a new, more desirable reality, 
one which would ensue from the ‘inexorable’ process of economic and political integration at the 
expense of the European nation-state. In a conversation with Kennedy in May 1962, André 
Malraux observed that the American president was “more sure of the idea of Europe than the 
Europeans were.” 249  While Kennedy himself above all hoped that the Atlantic partnership 
program would alleviate the American balance of payments problem, this new political reality in 
Europe was the main trophy for the movers and shakers of the Grand Design – the likes of 
George Ball and the Europeanists at the State Department.  
Most historians are wont to point out that Kennedy’s Grand Design illustrated the chasm 
between rhetoric and reality characteristic of many of Kennedy’s policies. Rather than as evidence 
of hypocrisy, however, it is more instructive to view the Grand Design as an expression of 
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longstanding ambiguities in the transatlantic relationship. The signing of the Rome Treaty in 1957 
and the subsequent emergence of the Common Market had caused a rethink in Washington of 
what was meant by an Atlantic community. Due to Monnet’s remarkable influence, the Kennedy 
administration finally came up with the notion of an Atlantic “partnership” as a way to render 
political support to European integration while giving the semblance of equality within the 
evolving transatlantic relationship and retaining a measure of control. By 1962, “partnership” had 
become the buzz word replacing “community” in official documents and speeches.250 However, 
because it was a rehash of the same conservative and liberal notions about American foreign 
policy, Kennedy’s design for an Atlantic partnership was riddled with the same internal 
contradictions. On the one hand, it relied on the traditional Anglo-American strategic partnership 
to ensure the Atlantic orientation of the Common Market. On the other hand, it openly sought 
to promote the supranational ideal of European integration and transfer the “special 
relationship” from Great Britain to a politically integrated Europe. As Great Britain was always 
unlikely to further the cause of European integration, Kennedy’s Grand Design was charged with 
goals that were clearly at odds with another. Moreover, neither of these goals was acceptable to 
the one European leader on whom the design’s success in the final analysis depended – Charles 
de Gaulle. 
 Kennedy’s Atlantic partnership was a reflection of enduring American ambiguities vis-à-vis 
Europe, too, because it was an uneasy compromise between aloofness from and engagement 
with Europe, between the preparedness to grant Europe a measure of autonomy and the desire 
to retain control. This aspect of the Grand Design might have worked if the Kennedy 
administration would have been more successful at applying its rhetoric of equality to its 
behavior vis-à-vis the European allies. However, the Kennedy administration was unable to put 
equality into practice, as its failure to consult the European allies in the Cuban missile crisis 
showed all too clearly. It did not resolve the contradiction between, on the one hand, asking the 
European allies to carry more of the burden and, on the other hand, strengthening American 
control over the defense of the West. The difficulty with Kennedy’s Grand Design for Europe, as 
Pierre has written, was that “the devolution of power and authority to a United Europe […] was 
never spelled out in the defense realm.” 251  In the realm of military strategy, the Kennedy 
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administration tried to shore up the notion of full integration rather than of equal partnership. 
The drive for military integration was also central to the American proposal for a multilateral 
nuclear force, even as Kennedy administration spokesmen in the fall of 1962 came to hint that 
the United States might relinquish its veto over such a force if Europe became politically 
integrated. The idea of a European alternative to the American nuclear deterrent based upon 
British and French nuclear forces, which appears to have occupied Macmillan’s mind, never 
received serious consideration from the Kennedy administration, since it was at odds with the 
centrality of command deemed necessary in the nuclear age and with the priority given to halting 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Macmillan’s strategy to use the “special relationship” to 
persuade the United States to grant France the attributes of a great power and strike a nuclear 
deal with de Gaulle was thus never more than a blimp on Kennedy’s radar screen. (It remains 
doubtful, at any rate, that American nuclear assistance would indeed have swayed de Gaulle as 
long as the strains attached meant that the force de frappe would lose its independence, much less 
that the Congress would have given its approval to any nuclear deal with France.) 
 
The Europeanists at the State Department believed that the United States had to be prepared to 
apply its leadership if needed to prod the Europeans towards greater unity. However, they may 
have done themselves a disservice by fighting Monnet’s battles. Miriam Camps, for example, 
observed that by “becoming overidentified” with the European proponents of political 
integration, the United States made them vulnerable to “Gaullist taunts that they are simply 
stooges for the American ‘federator.’”252 De Gaulle’s biographer Jean Lacouture moreover judged 
that Kennedy’s Philadelphia speech hardened de Gaulle’s attitude toward Great Britain, since the 
Atlantic partnership idea posed “a significant challenge to de Gaulle’s ‘European Europe’” and 
made the British “seem like courtiers of the American President.” The speech, Lacouture wrote, 
thus became “the first act of a drama in which the young, powerful god who could lay down the 
law and a septuagenarian mortal whose pride was as great as his weakness confronted one 
another.”253 The pressures caused by America’s relative decline combined with the advent of a 
more activist administration thus had caused one of the lessons of the EDC’s defeat for 
American diplomacy to fall by the wayside. This lesson was that it was best for the United States 
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not to seem overbearing, a position that at the time had also been encouraged by leading pro-
integrationist figures in Europe.254  
The success of Kennedy’s Atlantic partnership program ultimately hinged on de Gaulle, who 
was at the apex of his power at the end of 1962 because of the resolution of the Algerian war, the 
abatement of the Cold War after the Cuban missile crisis, his victory in the French elections of 
1962, and his waxing alliance with Adenauer. “In 1962, despite storm warnings from de Gaulle, 
the general Atlantic mood was optimistic, with attention directed to avoiding hazards in the way 
rather than questioning whether it was the right one – or whether America and Europe should 
both be on the same road,” J. Robert Schaetzel recalled.255 In 1963, Kennedy would get stuck in 
the quagmire of intra-European politics. The most debilitating incongruity of Kennedy’s Grand 
Design was therefore the one that was most often overlooked: that it was engineered to counter 
de Gaulle’s conception of a European ‘Europe’ while being wholly dependent on de Gaulle’s 
concurrence for its accomplishment. 
Grand designs are most often engineered by statesmen in order to resolve essential yet 
conflicting requirements to a nation’s foreign policy. However, the contradictions in Kennedy’s 
Grand Design would prove too great to warrant its success, let alone to withstand the General. 
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By the spring of 1962, the political and military-strategic differences between Kennedy and de 
Gaulle had brought about a significant deterioration in their bilateral relationship – and word of 
this was increasingly making it to newspapers and editorials. Prominent journalists and 
columnists such as Joseph Alsop (of the New York Herald Tribune) and Cyrus Sulzberger (of the 
New York Times) were writing that “in the whole history of the Western alliance there has been 
nothing like the present remarkably ugly relationship between France and the US.” 1 Walter 
Lippmann’s considerable esteem for de Gaulle also suffered as the anti-Anglo-Saxon gist of his 
policies became increasingly clear; “my present mood,” he wrote in a letter to British journalist 
Barbara Ward Jackson in May 1962, “is to take an increasingly strong stand against de Gaulle, 
designed especially to detach his German satellite – and I hope and believe Jean Monnet and his 
friends will eventually come out on top.”2 
The Franco-American quarrel turned into a veritable transatlantic crisis in January 1963, 
when de Gaulle scuttled Kennedy’s Grand Design for an Atlantic partnership by vetoing British 
membership of the Common Market and rejecting the multilateral nuclear force (MLF) proposed 
by the United States. De Gaulle’s challenge to the Atlantic partnership idea was much reinforced, 
too, by his signing of a bilateral treaty with West Germany – the Franco-German Treaty of 
Reconciliation. De Gaulle’s “thunderbolt” 3  of January 1963 certainly marked a watershed in 
Franco-American relations during the Cold War. Franco-American differences over the 
transatlantic relationship could still be papered over by diplomats during the first four years of de 
Gaulle’s presidency; in early 1963, however, they reached full public view and would be 
impossible to ignore henceforth. But the clash of 1963 would obviously have much wider 
implications than for the Franco-American relationship alone. For one, it would deeply affect 
American long-term policies toward Europe.  
Whereas the previous two chapters have made clear the extent of Franco-American 
differences, in particular in the military realm and in respect of the movement toward European 
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unity, this chapter will bring Kennedy’s clash with de Gaulle of 1963 into focus. In doing so, it 
will also consider the Kennedy administration’s response and Washington’s changing perspective 
on Europe.4 
At Loggerheads All Along The Board (Spring of 1962) 
Before we delve into the run-up to the clash and the clash itself, it should be noted that the 
friction between Washington and Paris in 1962 resulted at least in part from serious differences 
over the handling of the Cold War crisis over Berlin (which had flared up after the grim 
Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna in June 1961 and had reached its nadir with the erection 
of the Berlin wall by the Ulbricht government in August 1961). We have already noted how de 
Gaulle used the successive crises over Berlin to build up his relationship with Konrad Adenauer 
and to gain German support for his European policies. From December 1958 onwards, de 
Gaulle postured as the more dependable ally in the West, assuming a hard line with the Soviet 
Union and hence allaying Adenauer’s anxieties that France would seek to make a deal with the 
Soviet leadership without Germany having a say. Paris consistently resisted Western initiatives for 
negotiations with the Soviet Union over Berlin. In early August 1961, too, French Foreign 
Minister Couve de Murville objected to Secretary Rusk’s proposal to a meeting of foreign 
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ministers of the Western alliance in Paris for an early initiative.5 The French position was that 
negotiations with the Soviet Union would be possible only in an atmosphere of relaxation 
between the East and the West; in other words, détente had to precede negotiations. Concessions 
would only breed new demands. Moreover, de Gaulle did not believe that Khrushchev would 
risk a war over Berlin. 
The Kennedy administration’s attitude, meanwhile, was marked by a mixture of vigor and 
forbearance. The propensity to fuse muscular energy and cautious diplomacy had been manifest 
as early as in Kennedy’s Inauguration Address (“let us not fear to negotiate”), and it would shape 
Kennedy’s policies – and in particular his management of crises – as well. On the one hand, many 
of these policies were driven by the New Frontier’s cult of toughness and dynamism, which 
viewed foreign policy challenges primarily as “battles that must be won.”6 On the other hand, 
there was a paradoxical readiness to negotiate with the enemy when the chips were down. In each 
of the Cold War crises, while he publicly assumed a hard line, Kennedy carefully sought out 
opportunities to seek a negotiated solution with Moscow.  
In the case of Berlin, this mixture of vigor and forbearance brought Kennedy into conflict 
with de Gaulle and, to a lesser extent, Adenauer. Firstly, the Kennedy administration viewed the 
Berlin crisis as an opportunity to put its new strategy of flexible response into practice and to ride 
roughshod over the European reluctance to accept this strategy as NATO’s own. On July 24, 
1961, Kennedy decided to send “as many as six additional divisions” to Europe in order to 
strengthen NATO’s conventional defenses.7 But he had done so clearly expecting the European 
allies to do their part as well, for on July 20 he asked de Gaulle to similarly beef up France’s 
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conventional forces in Germany. 8 De Gaulle, however, refused to play along. Mostly as a result 
of the French refusal to bring in additional conventional forces, NATO’s contingency planning 
on Berlin hardly amounted to anything, thus leaving Kennedy’s flexible response strategy with 
respect to Berlin dangerously exposed. “The heart of our problem with the French is that they 
are playing a lone hand,” McGeorge Bundy noted in October 1962. 
 
The French military build-up is surprisingly feeble and can hardly carry conviction of French 
seriousness to Khrushchev. Even when the French had four divisions committed to NATO, their 
contribution was lower, proportionately, than might have been expected of so central a power. 
Now it is clear that the French only plan to have two divisions in Germany, holding the rest in 
France as ‘National M-Day Forces.’ If France proposes to play a full role in the defense of Berlin 
and the defense of Germany, these targets are absurdly low. If France means to leave these 
matters to the United States, then at a moment of crisis, the United States may have to act alone.9 
 
Secondly, in contrast to de Gaulle, Kennedy had comparatively few qualms about making 
concessions to Moscow if this would avert a war with the Soviet Union, or even about 
recognizing East Germany. “We have recognized many worse governments,” he remarked 
shortly after the Ulbricht government began erecting the Berlin Wall.10 In the same letter to de 
Gaulle in which he had asked for strengthening France’s conventional posture in Germany, 
Kennedy already had advocated the development of a strategy “to explore all reasonable avenues 
for settlement.”11 On August 24, Kennedy asked de Gaulle to agree to negotiations with the 
Soviet Union over Berlin, arguing that “the necessary complement to the military build-up is a 
clear willingness to negotiate.”12 Again, de Gaulle chose a different position. On August 30, 
NATO Ambassador Thomas Finletter informed Kennedy that among the allies “the unanimous 
opinion, except for France, is in favor of immediate steps looking forward to negotiations on the 
substance...”13 In truth, of course, Adenauer, too, was deeply reluctant to engage in discussions 
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with the Soviets, fearing that Kennedy would make unwarranted concessions on the Oder-Neisse 
line and on Berlin.14 
The Berlin experience of 1961 and 1962 caused considerable frustration inside the Kennedy 
administration with de Gaulle’s rigidity and contrary military policies. American officials were 
particularly irritated with what they perceived as de Gaulle’s shameless and irresponsible 
exploitation of the American nuclear security guarantee. “General de Gaulle believes we are in 
Berlin and that if the Soviets disturb us we will shoot,” Rusk complained to Adenauer on August 
10, 1961. “This is not an adequate position in the sixties when we are considering a nuclear 
war.”15 Kennedy, too, was increasingly aggravated by de Gaulle’s refusal to negotiate, complaining 
at one point to Barbara Ward Jackson that he felt that with de Gaulle and Adenauer “it’s like 
trying to run across a plowed field, every time you move, your feet get heavier.”16 
Kennedy’s irritation with de Gaulle’s intransigence culminated in the spring of 1962 – and 
André Malraux became its unwitting brunt. On May 11, 1962, Kennedy received de Gaulle’s 
minister of culture – and a living legend on his own account for his adventurous lifestyle and 
novels and the man who served as de Gaulle’s “cultural force de frappe”17 throughout the 1960s – in 
the White House Cabinet Room. Their conversation was truly remarkable not only for the 
bluntness with which Kennedy took aim at de Gaulle and his policies, but also for the degree in 
which it brought to light their fundamentally opposed views of the American presence in Europe. 
Pressing for France’s agreement to British membership of the Common Market, Kennedy began 
by brushing off Malraux’s claim that “if England really wished to join the Common Market, 
nothing could prevent her.” He rather believed de Gaulle was deeply opposed to British 
membership for political reasons and “apparently preferred a Europe without Great Britain and 
independent of the United States – a powerful force which France would speak for,” and that 
this view brought “France and the United States into conflict.” Kennedy made abundantly clear, 
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too, that he was tired of de Gaulle’s – and Adenauer’s – unbending position on Berlin, whereas 
the United States would carry the military burden of defending Western Europe if it came to war. 
He deplored that “some Europeans seem to regard our presence in a more sinister light, as a kind 
of unwarranted interference in their internal affairs.” Sensing “latent, almost female, hostility” in 
France and Germany towards American dominance in Europe’s security affairs, Kennedy 
pointedly remarked that if there was a French-German axis “he would be glad to let it try to 
handle the Berlin affair.” Time and again, Kennedy demanded explanations from Malraux about 
de Gaulle’s behavior. “We find it difficult to understand the apparent determination of General 
de Gaulle to cut across our policies in Europe.” And: “What is the reason that we always wound 
up in such sharp disagreement?” The only reason Kennedy could find was that, “deep down 
inside, General de Gaulle did not want the Americans in Europe.” He added, on a more 
menacing note, that “General de Gaulle should make no mistake: Americans would be glad to get 
out of Europe.” During the conversation, Kennedy would repeatedly return to the theme that de 
Gaulle’s policies risked re-awakening America’s innate isolationism. “It has now cost us about 
$1,300,000,000 to maintain our forces in Europe and the savings on these forces would just 
about meet our balance of payments deficit.” In sum, by the spring of 1962, Kennedy evidently 
was fed up with de Gaulle’s obstructionism and anti-American taunts: “We feel like a man 
carrying a 200-pound sack of potatoes, and other people not carrying the same load, at least in 
potatoes, keep telling us how to carry our burden.”18 
Diplomatic contacts between Washington and Paris would remain querulous for much of 
the spring. Malraux’s report of his conversation with Kennedy was received in Paris with similar 
infuriation. On May 16, de Gaulle retorted in a conversation with Ambassador Gavin that the 
United States “should not be mixed up in Western European difficulties and should keep itself 
apart only bringing its weight to bear in case of necessity.”19 This in turn prompted Kennedy to 
instruct Gavin that: 
 
when you see him [de Gaulle] again, I hope you will spell out our inability to accept the notion 
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that we should stay out of Europe’s affairs while remaining ready to defend her if war should 
come. We cannot give this kind of blank check. [...] We shall not hesitate to make this point to the 
Germans if they show signs of accepting any idea of a Bonn-Paris axis. General de Gaulle really 
cannot have both our military presence and our diplomatic absence, and you should make this 
point with emphasis.20  
 
When Gavin did so, de Gaulle icily replied that he did not fear American isolationism, “but 
exactly the opposite, that [the] U.S. will play a somewhat excessive role in European affairs,” and 
he warned that America’s “excessive leadership” in Europe would “only contribute to [a] 
breakdown within [the] Alliance.” In his report to Washington, Gavin underscored that he had 
“never seen de Gaulle in a more unfriendly and tense state of mind,” adding his conviction that 
“if there ever has been need for an agonizing reappraisal of our policy vis-à-vis Europe certainly 
it is now.”21 Whatever Gavin had in mind, de Gaulle professed to Secretary Rusk a few weeks 
later that he did not see how the bilateral relationship could be improved. According to the 
Frenchman, it “was best for each of us simply to play his own game and live with the situation.”22 
Kennedy indeed played “his own game” by proclaiming his plan for an Atlantic partnership in his 
Philadelphia speech soon thereafter – thus doing exactly what de Gaulle did not want: inserting 
American power and ideas into European politics. However, it was an illusion that each could 
play his own game without it ending in conflict. By the spring of 1962, the Franco-American 
crisis of 1963 was clearly in the making. 
The Fateful Meetings of December 1962 
Other factors contributed to the upcoming crisis as well. For one, the political resolution of the 
Algerian conflict with the Evian agreement of March 1962 and the proclamation of Algerian 
independence in July 1962 enabled de Gaulle to concentrate on his policy of independence vis-à-
vis the United States. For another, the National Assembly elections of November 1962 resulted 
in one of the greatest political victories won by de Gaulle over the remaining vestiges of the 
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Fourth Republic, which finally gave him “a bit of peace” on the domestic front to pursue his 
foreign policy ambitions. 23  Moreover, Kennedy’s failure to consult the European allies in 
handling the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 and his summit meeting in December 1962 
with Harold Macmillan at Nassau – which will be discussed in this chapter – put a definitive end 
to de Gaulle’s memorandum diplomacy since September 1958. Rather perversely, the Cuban 
missile crisis also enabled de Gaulle to more easily distance himself from American leadership, 
since it had given him the occasion to attest to the firmness of his solidarity with the United 
States when the chips were down in the Cold War.  
 However, the Franco-American crisis of 1963 was in the end forced to a head by a decision 
in the fall of 1962 that seemed unrelated to Franco-American differences: Robert McNamara’s 
cancellation for budgetary reasons of the U.S. Air Force’s Skybolt missile program. As we will see, 
the chain of events that followed this apparently innocuous decision led to an unintended 
reaffirmation of the Anglo-American strategic partnership at the Nassau summit and, 
subsequently, to a makeshift infringement on the independence of the French nuclear deterrent. 
To de Gaulle, this course of events confirmed his already strong suspicion that Great Britain was 
far from politically ready to join his European project but once admitted to the Common Market 
would rather act as a conduit for American strategic interests. In addition, it induced him to 
publicly disavow the American proposal for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) that had been held 
out to him in the wake of the Nassau summit.  
 The Skybolt – or GAM-87 – was an air-to-ground missile that had been under development 
by the U.S. Air Force since 1958 and was intended to become operational in 1964 or 1965. Its 
long range – 1000 miles, as compared to the 500 miles of its precursor (the Hound Dog missile) 
– was designed to extend the range of American strategic bombers in response to improvements 
in Soviet air defenses. From the initial stage of its development, the British had been actively 
interested in the Skybolt missile as an alternative for their Blue Streak missile; as a result, the 
Skybolt was from the outset designed to be compatible with Great Britain’s V-bombers. Meeting 
with Prime Minister Macmillan in March 1960, Eisenhower had agreed to sell the missile to Great 
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and probably less compromising on the international scene.” Memorandum, David Klein to McGeorge Bundy, 27 
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Britain “in 1965 or thereafter” in return for the use of the Holy Loch submarine base in Scotland 
by American Polaris submarines. Macmillan had subsequently canceled the troublesome 
development of the Blue Streak missile and had staked the future of the British nuclear deterrent 
largely on the Skybolt. 24 Yet, the future of the Skybolt had remained uncertain: its technical 
feasibility was as yet unproven and, as a result, it proved a natural target for budget exercises in 
Washington. The advent of an American administration less prepared to accommodate Great 
Britain’s wish for extending the lifespan of its national nuclear deterrent had merely added to the 
uncertainties. So McNamara’s decision to halt the program was merely self-evident in American 
eyes when the estimated costs of procuring the Skybolt missile had risen from $1.4 to $1.75 
billion in 1962 (on top of earlier increases), the Skybolt program increasingly compared 
unfavorably with other missile programs (such as Polaris and Minuteman), and the conviction 
took root that bombers at some point would be phased out anyhow as a means of delivery. In 
fact, his decision was entirely in accordance with the Acheson Report of April 1961, which had 
advised that “it would be desirable if the British decided to phase out of the nuclear deterrent 
business” and that “if the development of Skybolt is not warranted for U.S. purposes alone, the 
U.S. should not prolong the life of the V-Bomber force by this or other means.”25 
 McNamara’s cancellation of the Skybolt program evidently would cause the Macmillan 
government grave – potentially even fatal – political problems. This was recognized within the 
Kennedy administration, too, as these problems were aptly summed up by the State Department 
at the request of the White House in late October. The Skybolt’s cancellation, the State 
Department judged, would “put in jeopardy not only Bomber Command but a vital element of 
British defense philosophy” and “call into question the whole concept of the independent British 
deterrent.” It would amount to “an unmitigated political blow to the Conservatives” and “to the 
image, both public and private, of Tory competence in these two fields [defense and dealing with 
the Americans].” It even risked irreparably damaging the ‘special relationship,’ as “the British 
would certainly feel let down – hard.” While the State Department neither questioned 
McNamara’s decision nor the United States’ policy of unfriendliness toward national nuclear 
forces (including Great Britain’s), there was a measure of trepidation about its implications for a 
strategic partnership that had been so vital to the Cold War alliance. “If we were to appear to be 
                                                 
24 While the British V-bomber force was capable of delivering British manufactured H-bombs, it was considered 
imperative that it had stand-off weapons to penetrate Soviet air defenses and to maintain an effective nuclear 
deterrent against the Soviet Union. On the early history of the Skybolt program, see Watson, Into the Missile Age, 373-
374, 562-570. 
25 Policy Directive, “NATO and the Atlantic Nations,” FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XIII, #100, 289. 




‘double-crossing’ our oldest and closest ally – and it might well appear this way – it would be a 
serious blow to our whole alliance system.”26 Informing the British government about the plan to 
cancel the Skybolt program thus required a great deal of tact. After having received Kennedy’s 
approval on November 7, McNamara first informed British Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore 
and then Defense Minister Peter Thorneycroft of his intentions. He also volunteered to go to 
London to discuss the alternatives prior to making any final decisions.27 In spite of this, the 
Kennedy administration was ill-prepared for the intensity of the British reaction. As Thorneycroft 
recalled, the unilateral cancellation of the Skybolt “went deeper than defense policy and went to 
the very root of any possibility of the British trusting America in defense dealings again.”28 Nor 
did Washington have a clear view of the ramifications if, for fear of a complete breakdown of the 
special relationship, the British were nonetheless granted a deal to keep their nuclear deterrent 
alive. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric recalled, “no one foresaw […] the chain 
of events that followed.”29 
In the crucible of the crisis produced by McNamara’s cancellation of the Skybolt program, 
the nuclear weapons issue and Great Britain’s bid for membership of the Common Market were 
hurled together in a way that undercut Kennedy’s design for an Atlantic partnership. In 
December 1962, in the time span of one week, Macmillan successively met with de Gaulle at 
Rambouillet and with Kennedy at Nassau – and both issues were on the table. Neither meeting 
was decisive in bringing about the crisis of 1963, yet their combined effect spelled disaster for 
Kennedy’s hopes of de Gaulle playing his part in bringing about the Atlantic partnership that 
Kennedy had put in the offing in July 1962. 
Macmillan’s meeting with de Gaulle at Rambouillet on December 15 and 16 took place 
under a rather worse constellation than their June meeting at Château de Champs. In June, 
                                                 
26 Department of State Memorandum, “Implications for the United Kingdom of Decision to Abandon Skybolt,” 31 
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27 “Notes of Conversations Relating to Skybolt” by Robert S. McNamara, 9 November 1962, in: FRUS, 1961-1963, 
vol. XIII, #399. McNamara’s visit to Thorneycroft on December 11 nonetheless startled both men. McNamara gave 
his British equivalent an aide mémoire on the technical weaknesses of Skybolt. To his surprise, Thorneycroft seemed 
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chapters). McNamara returned from London without having reached agreement on the way forward. Ball thus had 
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Richard E. Neustadt, Staff Memoranda, Richard E. Neustadt, Skybolt and Nassau, 11/63, Meetings & Memoranda, 
NSF, box 322, JFKL, 1. 
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way, both in his own Cabinet and with the British public opinion, the cancellation of Skybolt would not have created 
quite the furor that it did.” Oral history interview with Dean Rusk, vol. 1, JFKL, 185. Also: Rusk, As I Saw It, 266. 




Macmillan had impressed de Gaulle with the depth of his commitment to join the Common 
Market. Yet British negotiators had proved rather less flexible in negotiating the terms of entry in 
subsequent months; meanwhile de Gaulle’s political position – domestically as well as 
internationally – had gotten steadily stronger. After the Philadelphia speech, the Kennedy 
administration moreover had cranked up the pressure on the Six to admit the British, which de 
Gaulle resented. The Rambouillet meeting between de Gaulle and Macmillan not only ended on a 
sour note, but also in a state of considerable confusion about what the two elder statesmen had 
discussed in private. The British prime minister certainly informed de Gaulle of his Skybolt 
quandary and he would claim also to have told de Gaulle that he would ask for Polaris submarine 
missiles if Kennedy would stick to the cancellation of Skybolt.30 De Gaulle at the time confirmed 
that Macmillan mentioned Skybolt, but he later denied to Adenauer that Macmillan had told him 
of his intention to ask for Polaris missiles. Whatever happened precisely, it was clear that the gulf 
between the two had never been so wide. De Gaulle had approached the meeting as if it were a 
trial of whether Macmillan was prepared to sever Great Britain’s close ties with – and 
dependency on – the United States. The Skybolt affair proved to him that the British government 
was at the mercy of Washington and that it was applying for membership of the Common 
Market as America’s pawn. Great Britain’s devotion to the special relationship was only 
underscored by the fact that Macmillan did not take up on de Gaulle’s suggestion that France and 
Great Britain develop a missile together, possibly through reviving the Blue Streak missile. In his 
talks with Macmillan, de Gaulle made his reservations about British membership of the Common 
Market clear in a way that left little doubt about his negative disposition. Immediately after the 
meeting, British diplomats were convinced that “only a bloody fool” would think that de Gaulle 
would agree to British membership of the Common Market anytime soon. It is not entirely clear 
whether Macmillan, too, gloomy and angry at de Gaulle’s attitude, had given up all hope.31 
The Nassau conference between Kennedy and Macmillan from December 18 to 21 stands 
out as a most confusing one. In Ball’s damning estimation, it was “one of the worst prepared 
                                                                                                                                                      
29 Oral history interview with Roswell Gilpatric, JFKL, 89. 
30 Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 1961-1963 (London: Macmillan, 1973), 348. 
31 Neustadt’s report to Kennedy on Skybolt and Nassau includes an analysis of Macmillan’s Rambouillet meeting 
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mood of sulks about the future of Europe politically and would prefer to stay where he is with France dominating 
the Five. At the same time I am not sure whether he wants this to be too public ….” As quoted in: Horne, Macmillan, 
vol. II, 444. For de Gaulle’s interpretation of the Rambouillet meeting, see Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler, 355-356. 




summit meetings in modern times.”32 Kennedy and Macmillan had been scheduled to discuss a 
wide range of topics, but their meeting was completely overshadowed by the topic of Skybolt. In 
preparing for the meeting, Kennedy agreed with McNamara that the decision to cancel the 
Skybolt program was definite, regardless of the problems this posed for the British. Yet Kennedy 
also understood that he could not leave Macmillan empty-handed. Three alternatives were 
therefore discussed in Washington prior to the meeting: the British could finance the remainder 
of the Skybolt program for their own use; they could be offered the shorter-range Hound Dog 
missile as an interim solution; or they could be offered Polaris missiles for use aboard submarines. 
However, with regard to the latter option, to which Macmillan probably referred in his meeting 
with de Gaulle, the State Department considered it essential that Great Britain would only be 
granted missiles if it agreed that they become part of a NATO-owned multilateral nuclear force. 
On November 24, Rusk sent McNamara a letter explaining his concern about the political fallout 
in Europe if the United States would supply Great Britain with Polaris missiles without strings 
attached: “Their [the Europeans’] resentment [of the Anglo-American special relationship] has 
been kept within bounds so far by indications that this relation would not be extended beyond 
the V-bombers (which are obsolescing) into the MRBMs [medium range ballistic missiles] which 
are clearly the next phase in Europe-based nuclear deterrence.” According to Rusk, “the political 
costs of continuing to deny MRBM aid to France would be significantly increased,” and 
American assistance to “nationally manned and owned British MRBMs would almost certainly 
eventually lead to German demands for equal treatment.” He also feared that the provision of 
Polaris missiles would endanger Great Britain’s chances of being admitted to the Common 
Market.33 The MLF had already moved closer to the center stage of American diplomacy in the 
wake of Kennedy’s Philadelphia speech about an Atlantic partnership (see chapter five). Now it 
was also being put forward as a useful device to defuse the potential political fallout in Europe of 
the Skybolt crisis. 
On December 16, the division between the Pentagon and the State Department came clearly 
to the fore as Kennedy met in the Oval Room with his advisers to prepare for his encounter with 
Macmillan. McNamara proposed the sale of Polaris missiles to Great Britain without demanding 
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that these would eventually be included in a multilateral force. Giving priority to prodding the 
Europeans to beef up their conventional forces, he reasoned that “there is no way in which we 
can persuade the Europeans to buy and pay for both a multilateral force and a full compliance 
with NATO conventional force goals.” George Ball, representing the State Department, however, 
argued that any arrangement which would continue to grant the British a national nuclear 
capability would have major political repercussions in Europe and go against the grain of 
America’s non-proliferation policy. Kennedy thus found himself in the horns of a daunting 
dilemma. On the one hand, the political consequences for the Macmillan government would be 
grave if he decided against helping Great Britain. On the other hand, if he did help Macmillan he 
would risk the retribution of the continental European allies – and this could have serious 
repercussions for Britain’s bid for the Common Market. At the end of the discussion, he decided 
that the meeting should be planned on the assumption that the United States would offer Polaris 
missiles to Great Britain on the condition that the eventual force would be committed “to a 
multilateral or multinational force in NATO” and that the British would beef up their 
conventional forces.34 
Given this prelude, it is not surprising that the meeting at Nassau began in an atmosphere of 
considerable mistrust and uncertainty. The core question was whether Kennedy would allow for 
a continuation of the national British deterrent or insist on its gradual dissipation in a multilateral 
arrangement. He began by suggesting to Macmillan that the British could continue the 
development of the Skybolt missile for their own purposes. Although he had rejected Rusk’s 
suggestion to help the British finance the further development of Skybolt in an earlier meeting,35 
Kennedy did offer to share in the costs – a deal which he had worked out with British 
Ambassador Ormsby-Gore aboard the airplane en route to the Bahamas. The British prime 
minister, however, was no longer interested in the Skybolt missile since it had been exposed as 
too expensive and technically flawed; “the lady,” he said, had been “violated” in public. 
Macmillan moreover accepted the American view that the bomber would sooner or later become 
obsolete as a means of delivery for nuclear weapons. Nor did Macmillan see much use for the 
Hound Dog missile as an interim solution because the introduction of this missile would require 
major adaptations to British bombers. The discussion therefore quickly focused on the provision 
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of Polaris missiles for British submarines, which in Macmillan’s view “were more suitable for an 
island like Britain, which also had a great naval tradition.” 
In the remainder of the meeting, Kennedy, strongly seconded by Ball, pressured Macmillan 
to commit the Polaris missiles to a mixed-manned multilateral force and tried to strip the British 
nuclear force of as much independence as possible. Macmillan, however, was adamant about 
preserving the independence of the British nuclear force: “The UK does not want to be a clown, 
or a satellite.” He insisted that Great Britain absolutely needed to preserve the right to withdraw 
its submarines from NATO command for reasons of national interest. He also resisted any 
pressure for mixed-manning of a NATO nuclear force: “The crews must feel that they are the 
‘Queen’s sailors’ until a supranational organization comes into being.” Macmillan acknowledged 
that his position in respect of having a nuclear deterrent was not much different from de Gaulle’s. 
“I do not believe,” he posited, “that the Atlantic partnership will ever succeed or be built up 
except on pooling of equal pride and honor.” Macmillan and his Foreign Minister Lord Home 
furthermore took issue with Kennedy’s statement that the provision of Polaris missiles would 
“shake the European allies” and undercut Great Britain’s negotiations with the Common Market. 
As for the European reaction, Macmillan said that there would be “frankly, absolutely none.” 
Lord Home chimed in by saying that the proposal for a multilateral force had almost no appeal in 
Europe. Since there was “not a single ally in Europe that would allow Germany to have its finger 
on the trigger,” the Europeans would be satisfied “to see the United States, Britain and France 
cooperate in a nuclear force if the Europeans knew about the deployment, targeting, etc.” 
Macmillan also cast doubt on Germany’s interest in “having one of fifteen sailors.” As if this 
fierce defense of British sovereignty were not enough, Macmillan warned that he would feel 
compelled to overturn the historic Anglo-American strategic partnership. If he could not get 
Kennedy’s agreement on a substantial measure of independence for his nuclear force, “we would 
have to undertake an agonizing reappraisal of our military and political policies.” After much 
haggling over precise language, Macmillan finally succeeded in preserving the right to withdraw 
British nuclear forces from NATO “where H.M.G. may decide that supreme national interests 
are at stake.”36 
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At the end of the turbulent summit at Nassau, the strategic partnership between the United 
States and Great Britain thus once again had won the day. Notwithstanding the cancellation of 
Skybolt, Kennedy had granted the British nuclear force a new lease on life with the provision of 
Polaris missiles for British submarines, albeit that this new lease was concealed by the 
concomitant endorsement of a multilateral nuclear force.37 As so often is the case, personal 
relationships had mattered a great deal in bringing about this result. British Ambassador David 
Ormsby-Gore’s intimate rapport with Kennedy had been of particular importance. On the eve of 
the Nassau meeting, it was Ormsby-Gore who had convinced Kennedy of the seriousness of 
Macmillan’s political predicament and of the need for Britain to maintain an independent nuclear 
deterrent.38 Resistance to Macmillan’s escape clause had come mainly from George Ball and the 
Europeanists at the State Department. They had pressed relentlessly for phasing out the British 
deterrent, as well as for Great Britain’s unqualified entry into the Common Market (which 
entailed signing up to the objective of political integration). They had, in fact, endeavored to 
reverse a long history of special links between Washington and London – a mainstay in American 
foreign policy since the 1800s – in order to advance the cause of European integration. Together 
with the Marshall Plan, American support for European integration since 1947, and Kennedy’s 
call for an Atlantic partnership in July 1962, the State Department’s attempt at Nassau to force 
Macmillan into ditching the British national nuclear deterrent was a culminating point in the long 
campaign to reconstruct Europe. A buoyant George Ball certainly viewed his success in foisting 
the multilateral formula on Macmillan at Nassau as an important political and personal victory. 
Like Monnet, he felt that by the end of 1962, great strides were being made toward the goal of an 
integrated Europe and hence toward an Atlantic partnership. In its communications with 
European allies after Nassau, the State Department conveniently ignored the escape clause 
Macmillan had been given. Believing they had been given a presidential mandate to pursue their 
program, the Europeanists had few inhibitions to ratchet up the pressure on the European allies 
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to accept the multilateral formula for an allied nuclear force.39 They had not, however, achieved 
full victory. The joint endorsement of the multilateral force was only ostensibly the main result of 
the Nassau summit, given prominence largely for reasons of public diplomacy. It would not have 
gained Kennedy’s public support if he had not felt obliged to politically offset the provision of 
Polaris missiles to Great Britain.40 As importantly, the Europeanists could claim victory only if 
the one European leader who could still abort their plans would choose to go along with the flow 
of events they had fostered. 
The Treacherous Road from Nassau to Paris 
The Next Problem: France 
As Richard Neustadt has observed, neither Kennedy nor Macmillan was able to keep his mind on 
de Gaulle at the Nassau conference – and their neglect of “French hostility” to their respective 
foreign policy designs was one of the key explanations for “the Nassau story.”41 Of the two, 
Kennedy had been more attentive to the potential fallout of an Anglo-American deal in Europe. 
Although he had wanted to spare Macmillan a political fiasco, his attendant concern about an 
adverse reaction in Germany and France to Great Britain’s preferential treatment had made him 
press the British prime minister to accept the multilateral formula.42 Macmillan, by contrast, had 
focused on preserving the independence of the British deterrent. He had not fully informed 
Kennedy about the gist of his meeting with de Gaulle at Rambouillet just a few days earlier. His 
priority was simply to get Kennedy’s promise to substitute Polaris for Skybolt. Given de Gaulle’s 
intransigence at Rambouillet and weakening domestic support for the membership bid, 
Macmillan may have already concluded that British membership would not come about soon 
anyway. This would at least help to explain his single-mindedness in extracting a promise from 
Kennedy on Polaris. It would also throw light on his apparent disinterest – astonishing given his 
avid earlier attempts to broker a nuclear deal involving Washington and Paris – in getting the 
United States to extend nuclear aid to France and his nonchalance about the possible fallout of 
the Nassau deal in Europe. 
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 Kennedy had ultimately given in to Macmillan’s insistence on preserving a national nuclear 
deterrent. It was quite clear to his delegation at Nassau that this meant a gesture had to be made 
toward Paris as well, or else Great Britain’s prospects of Common Market membership would 
inevitably suffer. Although Adenauer, too, would have to be taken along, de Gaulle posed by far 
the most difficult diplomatic hurdle in the aftermath of the Nassau meeting. Prior to the meeting, 
Ambassador Bohlen had warned against the provision of Polaris missiles to Great Britain because 
of the possible repercussions for Great Britain’s entry negotiations. 43  In addition, the State 
Department had consistently emphasized that any arrangement would have to be multilateral in 
order to avoid the notion that the Anglo-American special relationship was still in force.44 At 
Nassau, the potential repercussions of the Polaris deal with Macmillan had been pointed out to 
Kennedy by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William Tyler, who had calculated 
that de Gaulle would view the Nassau agreement as “confirmation of his claim that the United 
States was more interested in dominating Europe than in encouraging Europe to be really an 
independent and entirely self-reliant entity.”45 Mainly in order to limit any political damage to the 
British membership bid, it was therefore decided that the Polaris offer should be extended to 
France. On December 20, Kennedy cabled a letter to de Gaulle about his agreement with 
Macmillan and stated that he would “consider a similar agreement with you, should you so 
desire.”46 Yet, as George Ball acknowledged in his memoirs, “our offer to the General would 
inevitably appear as an afterthought – and the General was not one to wear anyone’s cast off 
clothing.”47 
 Whether an afterthought or not, one of the peculiar consequences of the Nassau agreement 
with the British was that, all of a sudden, the question of aiding the French nuclear program had 
posed itself in full force. In the course of finding a way to meet Macmillan halfway, the Kennedy 
administration had actually veered away from the strict non-proliferation policy expounded by 
McNamara in the spring of 1962 towards a more lenient policy of pooling the existing British 
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nuclear deterrent under the NATO banner together with a future French deterrent and 
designated American nuclear forces. However, the question of what kind of assistance the United 
States would be prepared to give France and on what conditions was still unanswered. 
Presumably the offer would be similar to the one offered to the British. But what did “similar” 
mean? Would France be granted an independent deterrent or would it be requested to partake in 
the mixed-manned multilateral force that had been proposed by the State Department? Would 
the United States be prepared to go as far as furnishing warheads? In the confusion after the 
Nassau summit, the entire range of possibilities for nuclear cooperation with the French would 
be reconsidered.  
 
The Front Lines in Washington 
Preparations for the Nassau summit had already clearly brought to the fore the division between 
the State Department and the Pentagon on alliance nuclear policies. The State Department’s 
Europeanists were fervent supporters of the idea of a multilateral nuclear force. They did not like 
the rival concept of a multinational force, which merely envisaged the coordination of national 
nuclear forces. Such an arrangement would connote that the United States would recognize a 
French national deterrent as a valuable asset to the defense of the West. In addition, a 
multinational setup could not be extended to Germany without granting it the national nuclear 
capability that the whole concept of a NATO nuclear force was supposed to prevent. In order to 
counteract German sensitivities about being discriminated against, the State Department was also 
strongly in favor of manning the nuclear forces with soldiers from different nationalities. “We 
have been able to find no other way than mixed manning to reconcile authentic German 
participation with denial of a national capability to Germany,” Rostow wrote to Rusk during the 
Nassau conference. “Mixed manning is, therefore, at the heart of our position on a multilateral 
force.”48 However, there was strong opposition within the Pentagon to such a mixed-manned 
multilateral force, which was seen as militarily insignificant and squandering resources better 
spent on conventional forces. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs Paul Nitze, 
who was also at Nassau, was a particularly vocal opponent of a multilateral arrangement. Nitze 
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rather preferred a series of bilateral coordination arrangements between the United States and 
Europe’s nuclear powers, much like “spokes in a wheel.” As a consequence, he was also not 
averse to aiding the French nuclear effort.49 
After Nassau, the disagreement between the multilateralists of the State Department and the 
multinationalists at the Pentagon continued unabated. The summit’s ambiguous outcome – the 
result of Kennedy’s insistence on a multilateral formula and Macmillan’s insistence on an escape 
clause – gave both sides reason to believe they had won the day. The Pentagon placed priority on 
the buildup of European conventional forces. It was concerned that the multilateral force would 
use up the funds that could otherwise be used to strengthen conventional capabilities. For this 
reason, the Pentagon wanted to implement the Nassau agreement quickly and at a minimum cost 
to the British. It also wanted to come to a rapid resolution of the issues with the French. In a 
meeting with Rusk on the implementation of the Nassau agreement, McNamara argued that, if 
France were willing to commit nuclear forces to a NATO multilateral force and accepted 
satisfactory command and control arrangements, “we should be prepared to supply submarines 
and war heads... .”50 He hoped that this would save Paris money, which could then be invested in 
conventional forces. The Pentagon also contended that this might induce a more cooperative 
attitude on the part of de Gaulle: “we must realistically face up the fact that the only avenue 
toward achieving cooperation with our Allies is by our demonstrated willingness to cooperate 
through our own actions.” The Europeanists at the State Department, however, believed that 
extending the Nassau agreement to France would be a mistake and also did not favor a swift 
implementation of the agreement with Great Britain. Behind this position was the expectation 
that the high costs of maintaining an independent deterrent would eventually compel Great 
Britain to join a truly multilateral scheme. The State Department also foresaw a long dialogue and 
did not want to prejudice the outcome by the nature of initial contacts with the French. It was 
playing for time to allow the “inevitable course of European multilateralism” take hold in 
London and Paris.51 
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The Europeanist view on post-Nassau strategy was laid out in a lengthy paper drafted at the 
State Department by Walt Rostow in the weeks after the summit. Presenting the post-Nassau 
period as a “complex transitional process,” Rostow viewed the establishment of a mixed-manned 
multilateral force as vital to the cause of European unity and Atlantic partnership. The MLF 
would ensure that “European nuclear forces be targeted and controlled to the maximum extent 
possible on a unified basis, with maximum acceptance of U.S. doctrine concerning the role and 
use of nuclear weapons.” It would also reduce the feeling of discrimination in Germany; failure 
to do so, it was estimated, would mean that Germany’s western oriented government would 
“sooner or later make way for a government which is committed to more nationalist approaches, 
including a German nuclear program and also the exploitation of its powerful East-West 
bargaining leverage.” In addition, the MLF would help resolve the tension between granting 
European allies a finger on the trigger and the goal of European integration: “One cannot 
simultaneously work for European integration while spreading about and embedding in concrete 
the power of national European governments to trigger a nuclear war which would engulf the 
whole Europe Community.” The paper thus deplored that Great Britain had been allowed to 
hold on to its national nuclear force at Nassau and urged that the United States would henceforth 
“seek to transform the image of the multilateral mixed-manned force from association with third-
class Alliance citizenship to its being the wave of the future.”52 In this context, too, the report 
considered it essential that “the possibility of the mixed-manned force evolving into a European 
force (linked to NATO and SAC) not be excluded at this time.”53 
There is evidence of considerable wishful thinking in Rostow’s paper as to the attractiveness 
of the multilateral formula to the European allies. There was the hopeful expectation that the 
British would eventually relinquish the independence of their nuclear force: “The unavoidably 
high cost of that deterrent will be one of the factors which may incline the U.K. over time to 
participate in a genuine multilateral mixed-manned force.” The paper also prognosticated that “if 
Britain successfully enters the Common Market [...] Britain may, in the course of the 1960s, come 
to accept wholeheartedly the hard facts of interdependence and the case for full multilateralism.” 
However, Rostow was forcibly less confident in predicting the development of French attitudes. 
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“There are strong undercurrents in France which already are prepared for a truly multilateral 
solution […], but it is still to be established whether de Gaulle is interested in moving at all in the 
direction of interdependence.” Yet, even as the paper recognized that “we have not the slightest 
evidence that de Gaulle is prepared to bargain a radical change in his basic policy towards Europe 
and the Atlantic Partnership against equality with Britain in its nuclear relationship with the 
United States,” it still rather naively concluded that  
 
the central task in the post-Nassau period in our policy towards the French is [...] to find out if de 
Gaulle is prepared to enter into dialogue with us over the full range of our current cross-
purposes; and, in particular, whether he is prepared in any serious way to throw his weight behind 
a truly multilateral force (European or NATO) and to contribute positively to its creation. […] 
the costs to U.S. interests of de Gaulle’s present policy are such that we should be prepared to 
establish […] any opening the Nassau agreement may provide to alter the present thrust of those 
policies, and to end the decorous cold war between Paris and Washington. […] It is out of the 
counterpoint between European separatist impulses and the hard facts of interdependence that 
the President’s concept of an Atlantic partnership must be brought to life.54 
 
At the White House, meanwhile, there was a more pragmatic view much less committed to 
the multilateral nuclear option. Prior to the Nassau summit, David Klein of the White House 
staff had written a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy because he found himself “out of 
sympathy with some of the theology that has evolved on the question of our relations with de 
Gaulle, and particularly the impact of our nuclear policy on these relations.” Although he 
subscribed to the view that de Gaulle’s cooperation could not be purchased, Klein believed that 
the American position “has been too often and too dogmatically reiterated” and that “one of the 
first and most useful things we can do now [...] is to take the nuclear question out of the 
immediate forum of debate.” Not only would this help to ameliorate relations with Paris in the 
short run, but Klein also asked whether “in the long run, don’t we really want to leave ourselves 
some alternatives and freedom of choice?” Against this background, Klein suggested that de 
Gaulle be invited to visit the United States soon after Kennedy’s planned meeting with Macmillan: 
“With the President’s Cuban and elections accomplishments clearly on the record, and de 
Gaulle’s election victory to his credit, both sides are probably in the best position in years to get 
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together for such discussions.”55 Following the Nassau summit, the White House staff continued 
to resist the State Department’s strong predilection for the multilateral approach in nuclear affairs. 
However, the MLF enthusiasts at the State Departments clearly had the wind behind them 
after the Nassau summit, partly because the Anglo-American agreement on designating nuclear 
forces to a multilateral force required a lot more staff time to be devoted to the project.56 In early 
January, moreover, Deputy Secretary of State George Ball was sent to Europe to explain the gist 
of the Nassau agreement to the North Atlantic Council and a number of European capitals. As 
was his wont, he emphasized the multilateral aspects of the agreement, and his presentation to 
the North Atlantic Council on January 11 amounted to a strong sales pitch for the mixed-manned 
multilateral force. Ball stressed that the national nuclear forces of Great Britain and possibly 
France would have to be assigned to the same commander as the proposed mixed-manned force 
– SACEUR – and that they could only be used according to the Athens guidelines.57 The Nassau 
meeting’s aftermath was thus at least as confusing as its run-up. The British, on the one hand, 
plausibly emphasized that Macmillan had safeguarded the independence of the British deterrent 
with his proviso. The Americans, on the other hand, led by Ball, chipped away at this 
independence whenever they could, putting great stock in Macmillan’s promise to make the 
British Polaris force “available for inclusion in a NATO multilateral nuclear force,” together with 
“at least equal U.S. forces.”58 In his investigation into Nassau on behalf of Kennedy, Richard 
Neustadt characterized Ball’s position as follows: 
 
The British formula was worth supporting if it made life bearable for the Tories while they did 
their work of bringing Britain into the EEC. It was worth offering the French since a negotiation 
might entangle them in such a way as to assure complaisance toward the British at the coming 
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round of talks on the EEC. But once the British had got into ‘Europe’, we should modify that 
formula as fast as possible, and work our way back to the safe ground of a ‘truly’ multilateral 
solution – MLF.59 
 
Ball’s incurable persistence in casting intra-European and transatlantic relations in a multilateral 
mold clearly puts them in the camp of American foreign policy liberals. His considerable 
pragmatism about the road to be traveled made his attitude also vintage Monnet. But pragmatism 
alone would not be sufficient to overcome the shortcomings of the Polaris proposal as viewed by 
France and the fundamental incompatibility of views between Washington and Paris. 
 
The Mixed French Reaction 
By some tortuous way, McNamara’s cancellation of Skybolt and Kennedy’s ultimate lenience 
with Macmillan had resulted in an offer by the United States to provide Polaris missiles to Paris – 
thus breaking with Kennedy’s policy of categorical non-assistance to the French nuclear weapons 
program. Just how far the Kennedy administration was prepared to go in assisting the force de 
frappe, was not clear; it was still making up its mind. What was clear, however, was that any 
American assistance would come with strings attached. “The key,” said Dean Rusk during one of 
the Nassau follow-up meetings, “would be a sufficiently fundamental change in French policy.”60  
 In the weeks following the Nassau summit, Washington largely remained in limbo about de 
Gaulle’s response. On the day de Gaulle received Kennedy’s letter sent from Nassau, he ordered 
his chief of staff Etienne Burin des Roziers to inform the American embassy that he was “very 
impressed” with its contents and needed time to “reflect on it.”61 There was a mixed range of 
signals. Some exchanges gave Washington the impression that de Gaulle was not averse to 
seriously exploring the matter. De Gaulle’s written reply to Kennedy’s letter was, in the words of 
McGeorge Bundy, “somewhat better than we might have expected and obviously leaves room 
for much more discussion.”62 Upon hearing of the American offer, French Ambassador Alphand 
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nevertheless judged that it would be politely rejected in Paris.63 A few days after the Nassau 
meeting, Couve de Murville moreover indicated that the Anglo-American deal had not been well 
received and had made it difficult for France to concur with Britain’s entry into the Common 
Market. The French foreign minister told American diplomats that the “fact that Macmillan went 
to Nassau at this juncture proves [that] Macmillan [had] not yet decided to be really European 
but is still holding on to Great Britain’s special relationship with the US” and that “any 
arrangement which envisaged [a] close linkage [between] UK-Europe-US would result in all 
involved becoming Americanized.” Couve de Murville also made clear that the American offer of 
Polaris missiles did not fit well with the French nuclear program.64 Many years hence, Burin des 
Roziers summed up French awkwardness with the American offer in the weeks after the Nassau 
summit as follows: 
 
we were offered Polaris rockets to launch nuclear warheads we didn’t have. […] Thus, on a 
technical level, this proposal was of no immediate relevance for us. More importantly, the project 
called for these Polaris rockets to be made available to Great Britain, and eventually to France, as 
part of an international force over which we had no control. This international force, like NATO, 
would be under American command. Granted, there was a clause stating that in grave 
circumstances (in case of national survival), we could use this force. But de Gaulle said he 
couldn’t quite see how, in an apocalyptic case of nuclear war, we would be able to separate our 
nuclear power from this international force.65  
 
 Yet, it was at the time still unclear to Washington how de Gaulle ultimately would decide to 
react to the offer. In the aftermath of the Nassau meeting, the Kennedy administration sought to 
whet de Gaulle’s appetite for American military assistance and hoped that a deal could be struck 
with France on the basis of the Nassau declaration. The most important objective was to draw 
the French into a serious dialogue on nuclear issues and to buy much needed time to work out 
the details of a cooperative arrangement. McGeorge Bundy, for instance, feared above all that “a 
dialogue may be cut off before it begins by those on both sides who prefer to nourish their 
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suspicions of each other.”66 Against this background, too, Rusk advised that Kennedy invite de 
Gaulle to Palm Beach, albeit not before the latter had had his planned meeting with Adenauer on 
January 21.67 In addition, Kennedy hosted French Ambassador Alphand and his wife for New 
Year celebrations at Palm Beach, using the relaxed ambiance to explain his thinking and to 
impress on the French not to reject the offer out of hand but to further discuss the matter.68  
 The Kennedy administration in particular tried to arouse de Gaulle’s interest by purporting 
that the Nassau offer represented a “major turning point” in American policy vis-à-vis France. 
On January 1, the State Department instructed Ambassador Bohlen to convince the French 
president that the United States was now prepared to recognize France as a nuclear power and to 
put an end to the exclusive nuclear relationship with the British. At the same time, Bohlen had to 
make clear that American assistance for the French nuclear program would not come free of 
charge. The United States would only be prepared to revise its attitude “on the understanding 
that the French themselves revise their policy to accept the multilateral principle,” which was 
considered necessary to avoid a German quest for a national nuclear force. The type of assistance 
the United States would be prepared to give France was deliberately left vague.69 Dissatisfied with 
the State Department’s rigid attachment to the multilateral formula, Bohlen actually exceeded his 
instructions – though not, as Neustadt put it, “White House intent” – by stating that “no 
possibilities were excluded” and “all relationships were open for discussion.” 70  In their 
conversation on January 4, an “extremely amiable” de Gaulle indeed left Bohlen hopeful about 
the course of events. Although de Gaulle observed that the American offer was of “very little 
immediate practical value” to the French nuclear program, reiterated his opposition to 
multilateral arrangements and declined to meet with Kennedy anytime soon, he also imparted 
that he did not want to close the door on future discussions. After this meeting, Bohlen 
concluded that de Gaulle “definitely had decided that the advantage to France in the Nassau offer 
is not sufficient to bring him to any degree of commitment to the multilateral idea,” but also that 
“he was holding back with a view of having us make the next move of a somewhat more 
concrete nature, particularly on the question of submarine construction and possibly the question 
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of warheads.”71 In early January, de Gaulle thus still appeared resolved to find out what the 
United States had in store for him at the end of the road. And as long as he was entangled in 
nuclear negotiations with the United States, Bohlen judged, he could not “be beastly to the 
British.”72 Kennedy’s Grand Design for an Atlantic partnership still seemed within grasp. 
 
The General Says ‘No’ 
De Gaulle’s “Thunderbolts” of January 1963 
In little more than one week, de Gaulle issued what George Ball would aptly call the 
“thunderbolts” that struck at the heart of Kennedy’s Grand Design for an Atlantic partnership.73 
In his seventh press conference as president of France, on January 14, 1963, de Gaulle rejected 
British membership of the Common Market anytime soon and dismissed the American proposal 
for a multilateral nuclear force. In a long exposé, he first expounded that Great Britain did not fit 
in with the Six, economically as well as politically, and de Gaulle’s own goal of a ‘European’ 
Europe: 
 
England is, in effect, insular, maritime, linked through its trade, markets, and food supply to very 
diverse and often very distant countries. Its activities are essentially industrial and commercial, 
and only slightly agricultural. It has […] very marked and very original customs and traditions. In 
short, the nature, structure, and economic context of England differ profoundly from those of 
the other States of the Continent.  
[…] the entry first of Great Britain, and then of those other States [belonging to the 
EFTA], will completely change the series of adjustments, agreements, compensations, and 
regulations already established between the Six, because all these States, like Britain, have very 
important traits of their own. We would then have to envisage the construction of another 
Common Market. But the 11-member, then 13-member and then perhaps 18-member Common 
Market that would be built would, without any doubt, hardly resemble the one the Six have built. 
Moreover, this Community, growing in that way, would be confronted with all the 
problems of its economic relations with a crowd of other States, and first of all with the United 
States. It is foreseeable that the cohesion of all its members, who would be very numerous and 
very diverse, would not hold for long and that in the end there would appear a colossal Atlantic 
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Community under American dependence and leadership which would soon completely swallow 
up the European Community. This is an assumption that can be perfectly justified in the eyes of 
some, but it is not at all what France wanted to do and what France is doing, which is a strictly 
European construction.74 
 
Having thus dealt a blow to the immediate prospects of British membership,75 de Gaulle 
went on to roundly reject the American offer of nuclear assistance based upon the Nassau 
agreement and stressed his fundamental opposition to nuclear integration in the context of the 
multilateral force: 
 
France has taken note of the Anglo-American Nassau agreement. As it was conceived, no one will 
be surprised that we cannot subscribe to it. It truly would not be useful for us to buy Polaris 
missiles when we have neither the submarines to launch them nor the thermonuclear warheads to 
arm them […] But also, it does not meet with the principle […] which consists of disposing in 
our own right of our deterrent force. To turn over our weapons to a multilateral force, under a 
foreign command, would be to act contrary to that principle of our defense and our policy. It is 
true that we too can theoretically retain the ability to take back in our hands, in the supreme 
hypothesis, our atomic weapons incorporated in the multilateral force. But how could we do it in 
practice in the unheard moments of the atomic apocalypse […] In sum, we will adhere to the 
decision we have made: to construct and, if necessary, to employ our atomic force ourselves.76 
 
The hope that France could somehow be drawn into the Nassau arrangement or at least be 
pinned down in protracted discussions about its future nuclear deterrent thus vanished from one 
moment to the next. De Gaulle’s press conference of January 14 rightly stands out as a nadir in 
the history of American-French confrontations during the Cold War. He had struck an 
unmitigated blow at Kennedy’s design for an Atlantic partnership. He had rebuffed Great 
Britain’s membership bid of the Common Market and the multilateral nuclear force. He had 
forcefully restated his objection to the supranational Europe favored by the likes of Monnet, 
which had been seen by the Kennedy administration as the indispensable constituent of “equal” 
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partnership. And he had publicly denounced the American goal of a “colossal Atlantic 
Community” – under whatever guise.  
The effect of de Gaulle’s press conference was much compounded by the ceremonial 
signing of the Franco-German Treaty of Reconciliation at the Elysée palace, at the conclusion of 
Chancellor Adenauer’s two-day official visit to Paris on January 22. The treaty provided for the 
coordination of the two countries in foreign affairs, defense, information, and cultural affairs, and 
wove a fabric of regular meetings between the heads of state, ministers and chiefs of staff. It 
stipulated that “the two Governments will consult each other, before taking any decision, on all 
major questions of foreign policy […] with a view to achieving as far as possible a similar 
position.” In addition, the treaty arranged for much closer defense cooperation, such as in 
defense doctrines, armament policies, and training and exchange of personnel. However, it did 
not contain explicit references to NATO’s primacy in European security affairs.77 Within a matter 
of weeks, de Gaulle had thus boldly placed his bid for controlling Europe’s destiny. 
 
Initial Reactions 
De Gaulle’s press conference of January 1963 had truly been, as one French newspaper stated, a 
“conférence de choc” – and today it is difficult to overestimate the vehemence of reactions at the 
time. Press reactions throughout Europe concluded that de Gaulle was claiming French 
hegemony over Europe.78 It is important to recall, too, that a press conference given by de Gaulle 
was hardly an ordinary event. “It was,” as John Newhouse observed, “rather, a piece of theater, a 
happening, an event of sometimes capital importance – a ritual with all the panoply and pomp of 
a royal ceremony, but few royal heads of state performed so brilliantly or to such effect as this 
plebiscitary monarch.”79 In other words, as much as the words, it was the manner that counted. 
 The man who had lost the most was Macmillan. He had staked his political fate on the 
membership bid, and de Gaulle not only left him empty-handed but humiliated. “This man [de 
Gaulle] has gone crazy – absolutely crazy,” an exasperated British prime minister exclaimed to 
Kennedy in a phone conversation on January 19. “The real simple thing is he wants to be the 
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cock on a small dunghill instead of having two cocks on a larger one.”80 To a friend, he wrote 
that “I do not remember going through a worse time since Suez.”81 In a pique, he concurred with 
the Foreign Office’s advice to cancel an official visit by Princess Margaret to Paris. On January 28, 
he mourned in his diary that “all our policies at home and abroad are in ruins.”82 But Macmillan – 
or the British – was hardly alone in his dismay. De Gaulle’s proclamation had caused a row in 
most of Western Europe. The supporters of European integration, who by and large had been in 
favor of British membership, were in an uproar; Couve de Murville, for instance, recalled that he 
had never seen Monnet in such a rage as after de Gaulle’s press conference. 83  In Rome, 
Macmillan found the Italians “angry and alarmed” and bent on revenge against de Gaulle.84 In 
France, too, many feared that de Gaulle was isolating the country from its European partners and 
irresponsibly picking a fight with the Americans. Former Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, for 
instance, wrote in Le Monde in a state of puzzlement: “France isolated, the Entente cordiale 
ridiculed, the irritation, if not the enmity of the United States towards us, when it is their 
presence in Europe that guarantees our liberty, the Common Market, the motive-force of our 
expansion, threatened with splits. And why?”85 
 In the United States, too, the atmosphere after de Gaulle’s press conference was one of 
bewilderment and anger. From the vantage point of Washington, de Gaulle’s reprisal was almost 
irrational as it was perceived to go against the grain of European public opinion. “Tell me, ye 
gods,” one Washington official reportedly lifted his hands to the skies, “how is it possible for one 
lonely, elderly ruler of a small country to frustrate the desires and aspirations of 250 million other 
Europeans?”86 Rather than his positions, however, it was de Gaulle’s bluntness in expressing 
them that had caught the administration by surprise.87 Charles Bohlen, who had been in touch 
with a number of French ministers prior to the conference, observed that the views expressed by 
de Gaulle were well-known per se, but admitted surprise at the “frankness and brutality” with 
which they had been put forward. In particular with regard to the Nassau agreements, Bohlen 
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reported, de Gaulle had gone “considerably farther in the direction of complete rejection than 
had been anticipated.”88 Of all American officials, George Ball felt particularly dressed down. On 
January 14, he was in Bonn to solicit Adenauer’s support for the MLF. The preceding days he 
had been in Paris, where he had been informed by a befriended French journalist of the 
preparations at the Elysée for the press conference. When Ball confronted Couve de Murville 
about this, however, the latter denied it, so he had left the French capital believing the sky was 
clear.89   
 The Franco-German Treaty on January 22 equally distressed Washington; as George Ball 
later wrote, “I can hardly overestimate the shock produced in Washington by this action or the 
speculation that followed, particularly in the intelligence community.”90 The fact that Adenauer 
had kept the United States wholly in the dark raised serious concerns. Consecutive 
administrations had been highly supportive of Franco-German reconciliation as indispensable to 
ending Europe’s history of internecine conflict. But the lack of any reference in the treaty to 
NATO (while it did include important provisions for bilateral military and political cooperation), 
the latent anti-Americanism expressed in de Gaulle’s press conference, and his known aspirations 
to negotiate a separate deal with the Soviet Union to end Europe’s division, gave the treaty a 
highly ominous ring in Washington. Was this the beginning of a Franco-German bloc that would 
act independently from the Western alliance, notably with regard to the East-West conflict? 
Would Adenauer be prepared to support de Gaulle in pursuing a deal with Moscow without the 
consent of the United States? Was he trying to loosen the shackles on Germany of military 
integration within NATO? Did he support de Gaulle’s dismissal of Great Britain? From 
Kennedy’s perspective, de Gaulle was evidently on a crusade to force the allies to choose 
between France and the United States.91 And Adenauer, it was felt, had made a serious mistake by 
appearing to take de Gaulle’s side. Germany would therefore have to bear the brunt of the 
American response.92  
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In the weeks following the press conference, there was still some hope that the other 
members of the Common Market could pressure de Gaulle to refrain from cutting off 
membership negotiations with Great Britain. For many, Monnet’s attitude that “nothing is quite 
an accomplished fact so long as it is not accepted” and his statement to the press that “whatever 
General de Gaulle may have said, the negotiations for British membership of the Common 
Market could be concluded very rapidly” provided a rallying theme.93 Considerable pressure was 
brought to bear by the Kennedy administration on in particular the German government to take 
a stance against de Gaulle. But the hope vanished as Couve de Murville, in a dramatic meeting of 
foreign ministers in Brussels on January 28, declared the negotiations with Great Britain 
suspended as far as France was concerned and the Six were compelled to go along.94 
De Gaulle’s assault on key building blocks of the Atlantic partnership program had been so 
sudden and comprehensive that the Kennedy administration was temporarily swept off its feet. It 
simply had lost the initiative in Europe to de Gaulle, a highly discomforting thought given his 
views. There was moreover considerable speculation about what de Gaulle still had in store for 
the United States. The State Department was infested with “wild rumors” that de Gaulle’s next 
move would be to try to negotiate, with Adenauer’s acquiescence, a European settlement directly 
with Moscow. “We looked at all possibilities of a Paris-Bonn deal with Moscow, leading toward a 
Soviet withdrawal from East Germany to be followed by some form of confederation between 
the two parts of that severed country,” Ball recalled. “That would, of course, mean the end of 
NATO and the neutralization of Germany.”95 Kennedy was also bracing himself for an escalation 
of the confrontation with France, and asked Ambassador Bohlen whether de Gaulle had indeed 
begun a “systematic campaign to reduce American influence and presence on the continent.”96 
Kennedy certainly believed that there were a number of areas in which another move by de 
Gaulle against American interests was possible and asked what could be done about them.97 He 
was in particular concerned that the French would open an attack on the dollar, “to indicate their 
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power to do something if nothing else,” and therefore ordered the Treasury Department to 
prepare for all contingencies.98  
French Ambassador Hervé Alphand, meanwhile, had become something of a persona non 
grata in Washington. He had spent a large part of his career in the United States, serving as 
France’s highest diplomatic representative in Washington from 1958, and had become 
profoundly attached to his American environment, but now he was confronted with hostility and 
incomprehension in many quarters. The status of an unswerving ally that de Gaulle had gained 
only just over two months earlier in the Cuban missile crisis seemed all but lost. “L’ennemi 
numéro 1 pendant quelque jours aux État-Unis n’est pas Khrouchtchev mais de Gaulle,” 
Alphand wrote in his diary.  “Il y a des grands froids dans les dîners. Le Président me fait 
comprendre par son frère Bobby que, pour le moment, il est préférable que je ne le voie pas. 
Toutes choses […] sont tournées contre nous.” Interestingly, the French ambassador held the 
British, in particular his colleague David Ormsby-Gore, responsible for orchestrating the anti-
French campaign by nurturing rumours that de Gaulle was truly planning a reversal of alliances. 
“Ils se conduisent comme des enfants furieux,” he judged. “Il est vrai que rien n’est pire pour un 
Anglais que de ne pas être accepté dans un club.” 99  In the French view, the British were 
exploiting the Anglo-Saxon club to which they still belonged to blacklist the French in 
Washington. However, Alphand could not ignore the fact that it was de Gaulle who had posed a 
wilful – and potentially fatal – challenge to the overarching theme of Kennedy’s European 
policies: the Atlantic partnership program.  
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Holding the Line Against Gaullism 
The Debate within the Kennedy Administration 
The initial anxiety within the Kennedy administration about a possible reversal of alliances in 
Europe lessened with the passage of time and French and German denials that anything of the 
sort had been mooted. However, the notion that Gaullism was on the rise in Europe was seen as 
a political threat of almost equal dimension, since this would reintroduce the specter of 
nationalism in European politics and of European neutralism in the Cold War that American 
postwar policies had been designed to keep at bay. There is little doubt that, from the vantage 
point of Washington, Gaullism was gaining influence in early 1963. “de Gaulle may in fact attract 
more European support than he had before,” the Central Intelligence Agency analyzed in 
February 1963. “Public opinion in France, and to a lesser extent throughout Western Europe, is 
increasingly receptive to his thesis that Europe, with its growing economic strength, ought to 
wield political and military influence comparable to, and independent of, the US.”100 Ambassador 
John Tuthill cabled from Brussels that the Chairman of the European Commission Walter 
Hallstein, too, believed time was on de Gaulle’s side and that his nationalist views could spread 
“like a mist” over Europe. Tuthill also reported that the prominent Dutch Commissioner for 
Agriculture Sicco Mansholt “said that one had to recognize that de Gaulle has pulled the switch 
with the result that the locomotive [of European integration] is proceeding down a different track 
than had originally been envisaged.”101 The Europeanists at the State Department tended to 
interpret every French move as part of an elaborate Gaullist plan to wipe out American influence 
on the European continent. After a European trip in the spring of 1963, for instance, Walt 
Rostow informed Kennedy that the French, in anticipation of trade negotiations with the United 
States, were trying to “nail down the EEC to positions which were unacceptable to us” and 
concluded that this “is simply a version of the general French strategy of making their prediction 
of U.S. withdrawal from Europe come true via French policy.”102 In the midst of all this dismay 
at the turn of events, Dean Acheson was rapidly being moved into a position as the elder 
statesman most capable of reversing the trend. As he wrote to his friend John Cowles, publisher 
of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune, on January 31, he had been busy “hand-holding, encouraging, 
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advising, and prodding on both sides of the Atlantic as General de Gaulle lowered the boom with 
such a resounding thud.” There is no question that Acheson, too, judged the situation in the 
West after de Gaulle’s mutiny against American leadership and the Atlantic community to be 
extremely serious. “This threat is greater than that of last October [the missile crisis] and it can’t 
be handled with a blockade – or with band aids.”103 Following de Gaulle’s ‘thunderbolts’ of 
January 1963, the United States suddenly found itself holding the line against Gaullism instead of 
progressively building an Atlantic partnership. 
In the tumultuous weeks and months following de Gaulle’s January 14 press conference, 
three schools of thought sprang up within the Kennedy administration on the question of dealing 
with de Gaulle – and their interplay would continue to shape American policies toward France 
and Europe through the mid-1960s. 
First of all, there was the indignant response to de Gaulle’s rebuff of the Europeanists at the 
State Department and their powerful patron Dean Acheson. This response was amplified by the 
large body of American public opinion that took offense at de Gaulle’s criticism of the United 
States’ role in Europe. Since the Europeanists had been the prime movers of Kennedy’s Atlantic 
partnership program, the vehemence of their response is easily understandable. More importantly, 
they regarded de Gaulle’s nationalism as a serious threat to their epoch-making European project 
and their design for an Atlantic partnership, based on liberal ideas of free trade and 
multilateralism. Failure of this project would risk bringing back the nationalist demons of 
Europe’s past, most of all in Germany. It would also bring on a perilous weakening of Western 
unity in the global struggle against Soviet communism. Above all, however, de Gaulle had posed 
a potent challenge to their basic views of Europe and of the transatlantic relationship – views that 
had shaped America’s postwar attitudes towards Europe to an important degree. 
As at the onset of the Cold War in 1947, the State Department’s Europeanists believed that 
only the self-confident infusion of American power and ideas could provide the necessary 
antidote to an ominous drift in European politics. Throughout the spring of 1963, they pressed 
Kennedy to engage in a broad political counteroffensive in Europe in order to check the 
malicious influence of Gaullism and raise European morale. In May, for instance, Walt Rostow 
urged Kennedy to task the USIA and CIA to orchestrate a campaign of “counter-psychological 
warfare [...] to assure that French arguments are systematically countered in the European press 
and through other avenues of communication with the European elite.”104 In June, shortly before 
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Kennedy’s visit to Germany, George Ball gave the president a “hard-boiled appraisal” of the state 
of European affairs. While Ball was careful enough to counsel that the United States must keep a 
distance from the “anti-Gaullist cabal,” his memorandum left no doubt whatsoever about his 
hostility to de Gaulle’s “abrupt assertion of old-style competitive nationalism expressed in a new-
style rhetoric”: 
 
Unquestionably, Europe is in a mess, and it is not going to get out of this mess quickly. Never, at 
any time since the war, have European voices been so discordant, European opinions so 
confused, European Government so lacking in direction. Never, at any time since the war – and 
this is the main point – has Europe been in graver danger of back-sliding into the old destructive 
habits – the old fragmentation and national rivalries that have twice brought the world to disaster 
in the past. […] 
In this environment of impuissance and nonfusion, de Gaulle’s interjection of 
competitive nationalism […] is a mischief and a danger. In facing this danger, we must never 
forget – or let others forget – that the General’s brand of nationalism can work in only one 
direction. It can push Europe back to its old fragmentation, can reinstate old rivalries, revive old 
grievances. But it is a destructive force. It cannot build anything, since nationalism motivated by a 
desire for dominance or hegemony, no matter how deceptively decked out, is the negation of 
internationalism and supranationalism.105 
 
Ball feared the political implications of de Gaulle’s “counter-revolution of nationalism” in a 
number of respects. He reasoned that de Gaulle’s authoritarian politics was undermining the 
vitality of French democracy to the extent that it paved the way for a future Communist takeover: 
 
Each week de Gaulle’s France grows perceptibly more absolutist, while the French people have 
packed off on a political holiday – an Indian Summer of political irresponsibility. By destroying 
the whole structure of parties except the Communist party, the General has eliminated the 
institutional means for resisting Communism. 
 
Ball moreover felt that the “contagious infection of resurgent nationalism” – more specifically, de 
Gaulle’s pursuit of an independent nuclear force and his “assault” on the Common Market 
institutions – was endangering German loyalty to the West at a particularly sensitive time, since 
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Adenauer was about to leave from the scene and hand over the chancellorship to Ludwig Erhard. 
“In those changed conditions a Germany not tied closely and institutionally to the West can be a 
source of great hazard,” he prophesied. “Embittered by a deepening sense of discrimination and 
bedeviled by irredentism, a Germany at large can be like a cannon on shipboard in a high sea.” 106 
Dean Acheson’s view of the crisis of 1963 largely coincided with that of Ball. As before, 
Kennedy had called on the elder statesman to sort out his policies in a time of crisis and, in late 
January, had asked for his analysis of the unraveling of the Grand Design and of the measures to 
be taken to regain ground. Acheson produced a sixteen-page memorandum for Kennedy which 
would form the basis for American policies in the first half of 1963. Acheson concurred with the 
view that de Gaulle had not revealed fundamentally new attitudes, but stressed that “the very 
revelation of these attitudes is a change in substance; just as the act of declaring war is a change, 
even after a considerable period of intense hostility.” His prescription for dealing with the crisis 
and for staving off a Gaullist Europe centered on Germany. Acheson was highly critical of 
Adenauer’s compliance with de Gaulle’s designs; “what was surprising about Adenauer was that 
he acted so submissively in signing a treaty of Franco-German rapprochement and unity in effect 
as an acceptance of de Gaulle’s anti-American, anti-Atlantic policy.” He advised Kennedy to put 
maximum pressure on Bonn to make a clear choice between the United States and France. 
“Germany wants the best of all worlds,” he judged. “To allow this is not in American interests.” 
Worried about the popularity of the Franco-German treaty in Germany, Acheson in particular 
recommended that the “first aim of policy should be to prevent [...] early ratification” and the 
“next aim should be to use the treaty to rebuke both Adenauer and de Gaulle [...].” And in order 
to bait Germany out of the Gaullist camp, Acheson proposed that the United States announce a 
stabilization of American troop levels in Europe, further develop the idea of a multilateral nuclear 
force with German participation, strengthen bilateral military ties with Germany, and strongly 
restate support for the goal of German reunification. The Gaullist tide, Acheson believed, must 
be stemmed by an unambiguous German choice in favor of the United States.107 
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The second school of thought – embodied by Charles Bohlen, the ambassador to France 
and one of America’s most seasoned diplomats – took a more stoic view of de Gaulle. Assuming 
that little could be done to alter de Gaulle’s views and that the Europeans – including the 
Germans – could not be forced to make a stance against France, Bohlen argued time and again 
that the United States had no better option than to calmly proceed with its existing policies as 
circumstances permitted and patiently await de Gaulle’s disappearance from the political scene. 
He cautioned against getting into a divisive debate with de Gaulle, favoring a dispassionate 
attitude to Gaullist taunts. 
Bohlen had particularly strong reservations about pushing the MLF on the Europeans as 
long as the United States was not prepared to give up control over the use of its nuclear weapons. 
Looking back on the January debacle, he came to believe that Ball had been the worst person to 
sell the Nassau agreement to the European allies and that his meeting with Couve de Murville 
and presentation to the North Atlantic Council on January 11 had prompted de Gaulle to lash 
out against the MLF in his press conference. 108  “If we intend to leave present presidential 
authorization for use of this weapon as it is, then I believe the multilateral force will soon be 
exposed as a fraud,” he cabled to President Kennedy in February.109 Bohlen reiterated this view in 
a long, personal letter to McGeorge Bundy on March 2. He added that in his opinion very little 
could actually be done to improve relations between Washington and Paris. “I see no prospect 
for any real dialogue developing between the President and de Gaulle.” Furthermore:  
 
It seems to me that […] the difficulty of our policy in regard to Europe is that we have not fully 
adjusted to the fact of European recovery. I do not mean only the economic and financial 
recovery, but also the moral and spiritual vigor that seems to have accompanied this process, 
coupled with a very serious but nonetheless real line of thought to the effect that the danger of a 
Russian attack (particularly after the Cuban crisis) has greatly diminished and, in fact, is non-
existent in the eyes of many Europeans.  
 
Bohlen therefore suggested that it would be better “to leave Europe alone politically and […] 
unchanged militarily” and “not continue to press the Europeans hard for an increase in 
conventional forces” or for a multilateral formula that did not accord them genuine control over 
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nuclear weapons.110 In sum, Bohlen counseled a far more passive stance in Europe in response to 
de Gaulle than either Acheson or Ball. 
 The third school of thought – dominant with those members of the White House staff who 
dealt with Europe – adopted Bohlen’s pragmatism, but was more inclined than Bohlen to admit 
that American policies were at fault and to seek ways to find common ground with de Gaulle. 
Senior members of the staff, in particular McGeorge Bundy and David Klein, felt out of 
sympathy with what they considered the Europeanist ‘theology’ at the State Department. They 
not only doubted the wisdom of picking a fight with de Gaulle, since this could deepen the crisis, 
but they also believed that some of de Gaulle’s grievances were quite legitimate. They took a 
rather more skeptical view of the MLF proposal put forward by the State Department. They had, 
in addition, a less exalted view of America’s role in Europe and were less alarmed by the nature 
of de Gaulle’s nationalism or its potential effects on Germany. Their views were buttressed by 
the analyses and commentaries of fellow Harvard University academics Henry Kissinger, Stanley 
Hoffmann, and Richard Neustadt, all of whom took a more considerate view of de Gaulle. 
Neustadt’s response to J. Robert Schaetzel, Ball’s collaborator at the State Department who was 
about to mount an attack on de Gaulle’s policies in a published article, typified the more 
detached view at the White House: 
 
Are we supranationalists? Are we consistently committed heart and soul to United Europe as 
conceived by the Action Committee before January 14? Are we really convinced that but for de 
Gaulle’s press conference the movement toward that goal was steady, sure, and certain of 
success? [...] By we I don’t mean you. I mean the American government in all its acts and voices 
as seen and heard by the intelligent, informed European readers of your article.111 
 
 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., serving as Kennedy’s special assistant also believed that, as he wrote 
Ball in February, “de Gaulle’s policy is not just one man’s arbitrary and wrong-headed effort to 
turn back the clock of history” but rather reflected “contemporary moods and needs in Europe.” 
It was only natural, Schlesinger emphasized, that a resurgent Europe would seek independence, 
in economic, political, and military fields. De Gaulle’s policy of independence thus sprang “from 
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valid psychological sources,” and the United States had to take account of this. Schlesinger even 
suggested that de Gaulle’s rebuff of the Grand Design had been provoked by assertive American 
policies that denied Europe a measure of independence. “In a sense, it is we who have been 
trying to turn the clock back when we act as if Europe were in the dependent condition of 1948-
49.”  
 However, Schlesinger did not think that the United States should leave the field open to de 
Gaulle. On the contrary, he argued that the Kennedy administration should begin a “serious, but 
quiet, counterattack against the Gaullist conception of Europe” by forging a progressive coalition 
with the emerging European center-left. In many European countries, Schlesinger reasoned, 
there was a “new and surprisingly ardent pro-Americanism on the part of the center-left, arising 
from the fear that a de Gaulle-Adenauer Europe will be restrictive, conservative and 
undemocratic.” This provided the Kennedy administration, given its liberal profile and youthful 
magnetism, with an opportunity to undercut de Gaulle’s position in Europe:  
 
In some way, the notion of independent Europe must be married to that of a democratic Europe, 
a New Frontier Europe, a Europe in which the people make the decisions, a Europe des peuples 
rather than a Europe des pères. […] If we can figure out ways of tapping the social and political 
emotions involved in the idea of a democratic Europe, we may be able to begin to put de Gaulle 
on the defensive and expose him where his ideas are truly regressive – not in his concept of an 
independent Europe, but in his concept of an authoritarian Europe.112  
 
Schlesinger’s advice may not have persuaded Ball, but it did influence the preparations for 
Kennedy’s visit to Europe in June. During this trip, the American president above all sought to 
connect with the people rather than with the governments – “Ich bin ein Berliner!” – and to project 
an image of youthful idealism.113 When read with the rise of the New Left and the events of May 
1968 in mind, which ultimately drove de Gaulle from office, Schlesinger’s words also have a 
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prophetic ring. By then, however, the Vietnam War had caused many European progressives to 
turn their back on the idea of the United States as a beacon.  
 
Forcing a Choice on Bonn 
The Ball-Acheson school dominated the Kennedy administration’s response to de Gaulle’s rebuff 
in the first half of 1963, largely because its activist posture enabled Kennedy to regain the 
political initiative in Europe. While the administration’s official response was one of equanimity, 
its dismay with the turn of events forced by de Gaulle’s coup de théâtre could not be concealed. As 
the unofficial spokesman of the administration, Acheson in particular would publicly take aim at 
de Gaulle and urge the United States to press on with its policies. De Gaulle could slow things up, 
Acheson admitted, but he could not alter the main course of events. While it was not possible “to 
persuade, bribe or coerce de Gaulle from following a course on which he is set, the power of the 
U.S. to shape the inevitable for de Gaulle is immense,” he stated in public.114 As the man who 
was ‘present at the creation’ of the postwar international order explained to his friend Louis Halle 
in March, “it seemed important to put de Gaulle in proportion.”115 
 As Acheson and others had counseled, however, the administration’s counteroffensive 
revolved around Germany. Kennedy had been impressed with Acheson’s forceful memorandum, 
which had urged him to turn the heat on Bonn in no uncertain terms – and he consequently 
instructed that “any discussion we have on [...] Germany should include Dean Acheson.”116 
Washington understood that if de Gaulle were successful in locking Germany into his camp, this 
would amount to a geopolitical landslide against the Atlantic community and American influence 
in continental Europe. 
 At the same time, the Kennedy administration recognized that Germany was the Achilles 
heel of de Gaulle’s strategy, since it depended far more for its security on the United States than 
on France. Adenauer was moreover severely criticized in Germany for his willingness to sign the 
Franco-German treaty under the circumstances. His designated successor Ludwig Erhard was 
known to be far more oriented toward the United States than France and a registered proponent 
of liberal economic policies. After Couve de Murville had ended British membership hopes in 
Brussels, for instance, Erhard fumed that the ratification of the Franco-German Treaty had to be 
put off. And while Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder felt impelled to employ his diplomatic 
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skills to take the edge off Erhard’s anger, he was no enthusiastic supporter either of an 
exclusively Franco-German entente. “Calm down Mr. Erhard, the treaty will be ratified, but 
simply not put into practice,” Schroeder said; all that had to be done was “to defuse any hint of it 
against the Atlantic partnership.”117  
 In the wake of de Gaulle’s coup of January 1963, the Kennedy administration thus staged a 
vigorous diplomatic campaign to compel Bonn to distance itself from de Gaulle. The Franco-
German treaty was the first target. On Acheson’s advice, the German government was pressured 
to delay the treaty’s ratification by the Bundestag, and John McCloy – the highly regarded former 
high commissioner to occupied Germany – was brought in to put pressure on Adenauer to this 
effect.118 The domestic opposition to Adenauer’s easy acquiescence to de Gaulle’s designs was, in 
fact, already strong and there was an overwhelming consensus that Germany could not afford to 
alienate the United States. Heinrich von Brentano, the caucus chairman of the Bundestag and a 
former foreign minister, and Gerhard Schroeder soon began to collaborate on a preamble to be 
included in the German treaty of approval that would express Germany’s continuing 
commitment to NATO, European integration and trade liberalization – thus going against what 
de Gaulle had meant to accomplish with the treaty.119  
The American diplomatic campaign to check Gaullism hinged, in addition, on the MLF 
proposal. Paradoxically, the proposal thrived under the circumstances brought about by its 
rejection by de Gaulle. Washington valued it above all as a bait to keep Bonn from engaging in an 
exclusive relationship with Paris. Aligning Germany more firmly with the United States in the 
military realm would remove the sting of French nationalism. It is moreover useful to recall that 
the prospect of Franco-German nuclear cooperation or of a German nuclear Alleingang was less 
far-fetched in the minds of American policymakers than it often appears in hindsight. “It is no 
good saying that Germans do not want atomic weapons,” Ball noted in the above-mentioned 
memorandum to Kennedy. “Even if that were true today – and the evidence is confusing – what 
Germans will come to demand in a competitive Europe is power and equal treatment.”120 The 
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MLF proposal was viewed, too, as the only device still available to Washington to salvage the 
Grand Design, since it seemed to offer the potential of bringing the European Community and 
Great Britain together even if the latter remained outside the Common Market and of providing 
an avenue for linking Europe with the United States.121 
Of course, what was presented publicly as the pursuit of the common good was in reality 
also a fight against political evil. In Rostow’s view, German support for the MLF could bring 
“definitive defeat” to de Gaulle’s ambitions for “an enlargement of French power via intimate 
military association with Bonn.”122 The view that the MLF was the United States’ strongest trump 
card in the tug of war with de Gaulle over Europe was prevalent in those days. The yearning to 
debunk de Gaulle as the spokesman of Europe even encouraged some American officials to 
suggest that the United States should go beyond Nassau by holding out the prospect of relin-
quishing its veto over the MLF and express stronger support for a European nuclear force. This 
would, they believed, help to undercut de Gaulle’s ability to present the French nuclear program 
as the only way to achieve a European-controlled nuclear force. John Tuthill, the American 
ambassador at the European communities, for instance, suggested that the United States promote 
the cause of European integration and British admission by holding out the promise of assisting 
in the development and manufacture of a nuclear weapon “as a European community enterprise”; 
this would have the political benefit, he argued, of “strengthening the position of those who 
oppose de Gaulle’s conception of both Europe itself and its future relationship with the US... .”123 
Yet another official believed that Washington could “deflate de Gaulle as the champion of a pure 
Europe” by proposing that the Western European Union (WEU) – the one European organi-
zation that comprised Great Britain and the Six – be used as a vehicle for a European nuclear 
force.124 Ball and Rostow also were in favor of hints that the United States would be prepared to 
allow the MLF to evolve into the nuclear arm of a politically integrated Europe, both in order to 
“dramatize” its willingness to treat Europe as an equal partner and to provide a counterweight to 
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de Gaulle.125 The MLF, as Henry Kissinger observed, had thus evolved into “an attempt to 
implement the Grand Design without France and, if necessary, against it.”126  
In early 1963, State Department officials swarmed off to elicit consent for the MLF in 
Europe. Only days after de Gaulle’s press conference, Kennedy asked Livingston T. Merchant, a 
former ambassador to NATO and strong supporter of the MLF, to head an American mission to 
open official talks with the European allies on the MLF. While Kennedy impressed upon him 
that the MLF was not to be pushed on the Europeans, his reservations were obscured from 
European eyes by the fervor of his diplomats.127 The establishment of Merchant’s office within 
the State Department enabled the MLF proponents to minister most aspects of the MLF 
negotiations with little interference, with Ball acting as their guardian in the higher councils.128 
The Policy Planning Council, headed by Walt Rostow and invigorated by Robert Bowie and 
Henry Owen, also took to elaborating the case for the MLF. The Europeanist view of the MLF 
was expounded by Robert Bowie in International Organization in the summer of 1963. Bowie 
argued that, apart from unifying the Western deterrent, any solution to the problem of nuclear 
control should “foster the progress and vitality of European integration and Atlantic partnership” 
and – since “obviously, various tendencies are contending for the ultimate outcome” – influence 
the orientation of the European movement in Europe. Bowie: “The multilateral force should 
foster European integration by bringing together the Five and the British into an integrated 
nuclear effort, open to France when she is ready to join.” 129 The White House, meanwhile, 
preferred not to apply the brakes on the MLF enthusiasts under the circumstances brought about 
by de Gaulle. “If we had made no proposal designed to meet the nuclear ambitions of Europe,” 
McGeorge Bundy reasoned, “[then] indeed we would have left General de Gaulle a free field. 
And the charges of American monopoly and insensitive domination would have been redoubled 
in strength.”130 The idea of nuclear sharing enabled Washington to assert American leadership in 
the face of a policy vacuum in Europe after de Gaulle’s rebuff. It was the straw Washington had 
to cling to in order not to lose more ground. 
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 President Kennedy’s trip to Germany, Ireland, Great Britain, and Italy from June 23 to July 2 
was the crowning element of his diplomatic campaign to counter the Gaullist foray in Europe. 
While lacking in concrete achievements, the trip was a hugely successful exercise in public 
diplomacy. Kennedy was received by large and enthusiastic crowds everywhere he went. The 
German leg of this trip, with a weighty policy speech on the Atlantic partnership in the historic 
Paulskirche in Frankfurt and a roaring speech in Berlin, was even triumphant. In Berlin, three-
fifths of the city had turned out to greet him, “clapping, waving, crying, cheering, as if it were the 
second coming,” and the crowd had responded very strongly to his words – to the point of 
reaching a public hysteria that frightened Kennedy. 131 In Paris, of course, the sensation of 
Kennedy’s trip was warily looked upon. His Germany visit, as French Foreign Minister Couve de 
Murville later wrote, was the most effective move that Kennedy could have made to outdo de 
Gaulle.132 De Gaulle himself acknowledged the set-back in France’s bilateral relationship with 
Germany by declaring that “treaties are like young girls and roses; they do not last long” on July 2, 
on the eve of his last visit to Adenauer as chancellor.133 The American embassy in Paris, too, 
reported that there was widespread disenchantment in Paris with the follow-up to the Franco-
German Treaty.134 And in several meetings with American officials, the otherwise affable Couve 
de Murville bitterly complained that American policies were forcing Germany to choose between 
France and the United States.135 
The Kennedy administration’s diplomatic campaign to hold the line against Gaullism had 
thus reached its objectives by mid-1963. The Bundestag’s decision in May to attach a preamble to 
the Franco-German treaty restating Germany’s overriding commitments to NATO and the 
European communities had already reduced it, in Ball’s words, to “the final act in a love affair 
between two old men.”136 De Gaulle was unable to establish a similar personal rapport with 
Chancellor Adenauer’s successor Ludwig Erhard, who was a devout Atlanticist and free-trader. 
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He had overestimated the ability and the willingness of German polity to distance itself from the 
United States. He had thereby overplayed his hand. As McGeorge Bundy later told Jean 
Lacouture in response to the French thesis that Britain would have been America’s Trojan horse 
in Europe:  
 
A Trojan Horse? But it was in Bonn, not in London. The links of the Germans with us were 
much deeper and more indissoluble that those with the British. De Gaulle may have succeeded in 
distancing Macmillan or even Wilson from us. But not Erhard or Kiesinger, who constantly 
reminded us that, for them, the Atlantic Alliance had primacy over every other consideration.137 
 
However, it would be wrong to conclude that de Gaulle’s bold affirmation of his independence 
from the United States in early 1963 had changed nothing in the transatlantic relationship. 
The Grand Design in Limbo 
The efficacy of the American diplomatic campaign in Europe in the first half of 1963 could not 
conceal that de Gaulle had transformed the political landscape in Europe and that Kennedy’s 
Grand Design for an Atlantic partnership lay in shambles. Since Great Britain would not become 
a member of the Common Market for the time being, it would have to influence the political 
outlook of the Six as an outsider instead of an insider, giving de Gaulle obviously more leeway to 
develop European political cooperation in directions less amenable to the United States. De 
Gaulle’s veto of British membership had also significantly reduced the Trade Expansion Act’s 
potential to lower trade barriers between the United States and the Common Market in the 
upcoming negotiations within the GATT. And as Gaullism appeared to have resuscitated 
nationalism in continental Western Europe, those within the Kennedy administration who had 
vested their hopes in the “inexorable” process of European integration now feared the impact of 
nationalist counter-revolution and the dissipation of their vision of an Atlantic partnership 
between the “new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union” (as Kennedy 
had stated in Philadelphia). 
 To make matters worse for those such as Ball and Acheson who favored assertive American 
leadership in Europe, American diplomacy shifted to a less assertive stance in mid-1963, when 
the sting of the Franco-German treaty had been removed and the shock waves of de Gaulle’s 
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press conference gradually began to ebb away. The shift from activism to aloofness is most 
evident in Kennedy’s decision to go easy on the MLF proposal once reluctance among the 
European allies to engage in the project had come to the fore. Although he had allowed the State 
Department to approach the European allies, Kennedy had always remained deeply skeptical 
about the project and had never fully committed himself. After Nassau, he had learned his lesson 
of caution in the hyper-sensitive area of nuclear politics. Even as he instructed Livingston 
Merchant before his mission to Europe in February, he had expressed his “deep concern” that 
“the United States might be tying itself too closely to a project that might fail.” According to the 
minutes of that meeting: 
 
He [Kennedy] said it was his impression that the British were not for it; the French were clearly 
against it; and the Italians did not have a deep-seated interest in it. The Germans reportedly were 
interested, but once they realized how little they were getting for their money, they might look at 
it differently. Moreover, he wondered whether the multilateral force would have any real 
attraction unless the United States was prepared to give up its veto, and at this point he saw no 
justification for relinquishing the veto.138 
 
Kennedy believed that the drive for the MLF should come from Europe rather than from the 
United States, and he doubted that the Europeans were seriously interested given the 
considerable costs and the domestic political complications of participating in a nuclear force as 
well as the inevitably adverse reaction from Moscow. He was also wary of getting pinned down 
on a complex treaty commitment that would be difficult to get through the Senate. Kennedy 
certainly gave the Merchant mission no leeway to suggest to the European allies that the United 
States would be prepared to sacrifice control over the MLF.139 As Arthur Schlesinger rightly 
observed, Kennedy “considered that, as long as the United States retained its veto (and he never 
mentioned renunciation as a possibility, though other members of his government did), the MLF 
was something of a fake. Though he was willing to try it, he could not see why the European 
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allies would be interested in making enormous financial contributions towards a force over which 
they no real control.”140  
Given Kennedy’s skepticism about the MLF, it is hardly surprising that when the European 
lack of enthusiasm came to the foreground, he decided to go easy on the proposal. Great 
Britain’s continuing resistance to definitively join its nuclear forces with the MLF – in spite of 
strong American pressure – posed particular problems, since it threatened to reduce the project 
to an American-German affair.141 With Kennedy’s European tour in late June in the offing, his 
National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy wrote an important memorandum that strengthened 
the president’s resolve not to stake American prestige on the project. One week prior to 
Kennedy’s departure for Europe, Bundy argued strongly for a “sharp change in planning for 
political discussions of the MLF in Europe.” Bundy’s sobering judgment was that the French 
were hostile, the British opposed, and the Italians divided; the Germans, meanwhile, merely went 
along with developing the proposal because they wanted “to keep the Americans happy.” Bundy 
hence urged for a toning down of the MLF campaign. “Only among the passionate pro-
Europeans like Monnet is there real sentiment for the MLF,” Bundy concluded, “and this 
sentiment itself is conditional upon a clear offer to abandon the veto at an early stage if a 
genuinely European force becomes practicable.” The MLF proposal, he further explained, had 
risen to prominence primarily because the Europeanists at the State Department were 
“passionate believers in the MLF as a means of blocking national deterrents, General de Gaulle 
and all other obstacles to European unity” and had “pressed the case more sharply and against a 
tighter timetable, at every stage, than either you or the Secretary would have chosen.”142 Kennedy 
indeed took to heart Bundy’s advice to go easy on the MLF. He disregarded pressure by the MLF 
supporters within his administration to make his European trip a deadline-setting event.143 And 
upon his return from Europe, he had Bundy instruct Secretary of State Rusk to avoid “any 
impression that the United States is trying to ‘sell’ the MLF to reluctant European purchasers.”144  
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Kennedy’s step on the brakes of the State Department’s MLF campaign was also inspired by 
his increasing interest in 1963 in negotiating a limited ban on nuclear tests with the Soviet Union. 
The call for a ban on nuclear tests had originated in the mid-1950s, after the radioactive fallout of 
an American nuclear test near Bikini had caused casualties among Japanese fishermen. 
Eisenhower had pursued the matter with the Soviets, after initially having defended the 
unfettered continuation of nuclear tests, but the U2 affair had aborted these initial talks in 1960. 
Kennedy had taken an active interest in a test ban treaty, both as a presidential candidate and as 
incoming president. He feared that without such a ban, the number of nuclear powers might 
grow to ten or fifteen in a matter of years. So once it became clear that the Cuban missile crisis 
had bolstered his position vis-à-vis Khrushchev, Kennedy believed the time was ripe for new 
initiatives in this area – and he knew that Khrushchev was interested in agreements that put the 
Soviet Union and the United States on the same level. On June 10, Kennedy issued a call for a 
test ban treaty in a speech at American University; in July, American, British and Soviet 
negotiators initialed a Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), and the treaty was subsequently signed 
on August 5.145 The drive for the LTBT made it incumbent upon the White House not to burden 
negotiations with Moscow with contentious plans to involve allies in the nuclear defense of the 
West. Kennedy moreover hoped he could somehow persuade de Gaulle to sign up to the treaty 
as well. Ted Sorenson affirms that the American president was willing to go a long way to draw in 
de Gaulle and that he even considered giving nuclear assistance to France to this end.146 On July 
19, Kennedy indeed informed Averell Harriman, his chief negotiator, that he wanted to keep “the 
road open for appropriate US-UK nuclear cooperation with [the] French if they adhere to test 
ban [....]”147 And on July 24, in a letter to de Gaulle, Kennedy offered to help find alternatives for 
nuclear weapons tests in the air, under water and in space if France abandoned its refusal to sign 
the test ban treaty.148 Even as Bohlen reported from Paris that Kennedy’s offer had failed to win 
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over de Gaulle, in part because the latter doubted that Kennedy would be able to deliver on his 
promises, pressing for the MLF against his wishes did not seem opportune in this context.149 
In other ways, too, the Kennedy administration’s plans for reforming the Western alliance 
had run into the ground by the summer of 1963. Persistent American pleas for strengthening 
conventional forces as part of the new flexible response strategy had still made preciously little 
headway in Europe.150 Once again, France appeared in Washington’s view by far the biggest 
obstacle to adapting the strategy of the alliance. Throughout 1963, French representatives at 
NATO were resisting the further development of MC 100/1, the Military Committee’s strategic 
reappraisal that was to underpin NATO’s new force goals. In November 1963, the French finally 
stated their outright opposition to the principles contained in MC 100/1 of “flexibility of 
response” and “limited tactical nuclear warfare” and insisted on preserving the alliance’s “trip-
wire” strategy, thus effectively blocking its further consideration. France’s obstructionism within 
NATO was immensely frustrating to American officials, who believed they were just beginning 
to achieve consensus among the allies. They tended to dismiss French objections as insincere. 
McNamara, for instance, argued that France, too, would want to respond initially with 
conventional forces in the event of Soviet aggression despite its official attachment to the 
doctrine of automatic nuclear retaliation. “I am convinced,” the American secretary of defense 
confided to Cyrus Sulzberger, journalist of the New York Times, in December 1963, “de Gaulle 
doesn’t believe his own strategy but is using it only for internal reasons and [...] to apply pressure 
against the allies in order to increase French political ascendancy.”151 Fearing that de Gaulle was 
putting nearly everything in NATO on hold, the Americans were increasingly looking for ways to 
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circumvent the French – establishing a pattern that would become stronger over the years.152 
There were, however, important limits on how much could be achieved within NATO without 
French involvement. In December 1963, NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker informed 
McNamara that he thought that a discussion of MC 100/1 should be avoided “for a very long 
time.” 153  The Pentagon’s concern that de Gaulle’s nuclear program was depleting France’s 
defense budget at the expense of its conventional forces was moreover legitimate.154 
In addition to the stalemate within NATO, the steady progress toward European unity on 
which the Kennedy administration had reckoned with the announcement of the Atlantic 
partnership program appeared to have run into serious trouble by mid-1963.  de Gaulle’s blunt 
rejection of Great Britain’s bid for membership had left a thick residue of mistrust among the Six. 
France was only able to get the Common Agricultural Policy by threat of boycotts. De Gaulle’s 
aversion towards European integration would ultimately lead to the ‘empty chair’ crisis of 1965, 
when France refused to carry out the stipulations of the Rome Treaty regarding the introduction 
of majority voting and the role given to the Commission. British membership meanwhile seemed 
further off than ever, even as the foreign ministers of the Six agreed in July 1963 to resume 
contacts with Britain within the framework of the Western European Union. The whole debacle 
finally cost the skin of Harold Macmillan, the European leader to whom Kennedy had felt the 
closest. On October 18, he resigned as a result of bitter disagreements within his Conservative 
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Party. But it would be a mistake to believe that Britain’s chances of Common Market 
membership would have improved under a new government. “There is no sign that in the 
foreseeable future he [de Gaulle] will change his attitude towards England, and certainly if the 
Labour Government is returned to power this question will be further pushed off,” Bohlen 
reported from Paris in August 1963. “He will continue to view movements towards the so-called 
Atlantic Community as attempts by the United States, through the process of ‘integration,’ to 
establish its control and hegemony over Europe.”155 In sum, 1963 is the year in which it became 
clear that the United States did not have the power to impose its designs on Europe against the 
willful opposition of the man in the Elysée, even as it did have the power to stifle de Gaulle’s 
designs for a ‘European’ Europe. From mid-1963 onwards, therefore, Kennedy’s Grand Design 
for an Atlantic partnership rested in a state of limbo. 
 
Washington’s Changing Perspective on Europe 
“We have been very generous to Europe, it is now time to look out for ourselves,” President 
Kennedy said to the National Security Council on January 22, 1963. “We have to get tougher 
about this. We must keep our economic house in order.”156 Kennedy’s statement, one week after 
de Gaulle’s press conference, summarizes the subtle but crucial shift in Washington’s attitude to 
the movement toward European unity from strong support to guarded ambivalence as a result of 
the events of 1963. Kennedy was particularly adamant that his administration stop the “continual 
hemorrhage” as a result of the negative balance of payments and that Europe should pick up 
more of the defense burden. He believed the time had come to put American national interests 
first. The aftermath of de Gaulle’s coup of January 1963 thus reveals the shallowness of 
Kennedy’s personal commitment to his administration’s fervently promoted Atlantic partnership 
program, confirming suspicions long held by its main proponents.157 
 We have already noted that Kennedy feared there were a number of areas in which another 
move by de Gaulle against American interests was possible and that he was in particular 
concerned that France would open an attack on the dollar. In the wake of de Gaulle’s press 
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conference, there was also a heightened concern about the Common Market’s Common 
Agricultural Policy. In this area, as in others, French and American interests were clearly contrary. 
France tended to view the Common Market as the exclusive outlet for its increasingly efficient 
farm production, whereas the United States was determined to defend its position since World 
War II as a major supplier of agricultural goods to Europe. The French argued that the United 
States gave its farmers similar protection, that Europe was under no obligation to provide a 
market to American farmers, that the revolution in mechanization and modern farming which hit 
the United States a generation ago, producing a tremendous expansion of yields at lower costs, 
had just begun in Europe – a historical accident which had given the United States an abnormal 
share of European markets. However, given that one-third of American commercial agricultural 
products – mostly wheat, flour, feed grains and poultry – was exported to the Common Market, 
the American Department for Agriculture was intensely troubled by the rapid development of the 
Common Agricultural Policy at the expense of American farmers. Secretary of Agriculture 
Orville L. Freeman therefore pressured Kennedy to take a firmer approach. In a strong letter to 
Kennedy on February 9, 1963, he warned that “a new spirit of regional isolationism in Western 
Europe” had gained strength with de Gaulle’s assertion of French interests. Interestingly, 
Freeman based his plea for a firmer stance on a much broader plane than agricultural interests:  
 
This regional isolationism strikes at the very core of the partnership that has been developing 
between the United States and Western Europe. It threatens mutual defense arrangements, it 
threatens political rapprochements, it threatens trade and commerce. It threatens American 
agriculture which looks to the Common Market as the leading dollar buyer of its export products, 
and thereby threatens the international monetary position of the United States because of this 
impending loss of dollar revenue. 
This tragic division within the U.S.-European partnership may represent a clash of 
opposing visions of the future. One vision, as typified by the Monets [sic] and the Schumanns 
[sic] – and this is the vision with which we are allied – is that of a united Europe, fostering Free 
World economic interests, actively strengthening the Western Alliance’s stand against 
communism. The other vision, typified by de Gaulle, is that of opportunism – the opportunity for 
a small group of European nations to emerge as a new, independent world force, with apparent 
total disregard for ties that in recent years have successfully bound the Western nations 
together.158 
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There is ample reason to believe that Kennedy was more susceptible to such warnings after 
de Gaulle’s rebuff of the Atlantic partnership. There is evidence, too, that he took an increasingly 
detached view of the desirability of trade liberalization in general, which was the key assumption 
in the Trade Expansion Action of 1962, and that he was less willing to sacrifice American 
interests on the high altars of free trade and European integration. The episode even seems to 
have caused something of a reconsideration on Kennedy’s part of the desirability of British 
membership of the Common Market, in particular if British membership meant that American 
agricultural exporters would suffer because the Commonwealth countries would gain access to 
the European market. On November 20, 1963, just two days before his assassination, Kennedy 
told Undersecretary for Agriculture Charles S. Murphy that he was “not so stuck on the Kennedy 
Round of negotiations and that if we could not get a good bargain [...] we should make no 
bargain at all”; in a striking admission, he even wondered if “we had not made a mistake in 
encouraging the creation of the Common Market” and thought it “probably was fortunate for us 
that Britain had not gotten into it.”159 In sum, the documentary record strongly suggests that 
Kennedy entertained serious doubts about the official European policies of his administration – 
and that these doubts had become stronger after de Gaulle had put the Grand Design on hold. 
The implications of de Gaulle’s mutiny against American predominance in Europe were not 
limited to the personal views of Kennedy, they also affected broader American perceptions of 
Europe in at least four ways.  
First, de Gaulle had made it substantially more difficult for American policymakers to accept 
a key assumption of the Europeanists: that the sort of European economic and political 
integration advocated by Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States of Europe was 
inexorable and that de Gaulle should therefore be treated as the anachronistic representative of 
the olden Europe of virulent nationalism and internecine war. As a result, the Kennedy 
administration’s Grand Design for a future Atlantic partnership between the United States and a 
politically integrated Europe gradually appeared an increasingly intangible vision. Even as the 
Fouchet Plan for European political union had been rejected in early 1962 and the American 
diplomatic campaign of 1963 had been effective in bringing Germany back into line, de Gaulle 
was bound to leave a lasting mark at the expense of the Communities. Dean Acheson admitted as 
much, despite his insistence that the United States should not hesitate to assert its power in 
Europe to turn the political dynamics against de Gaulle’s rebellion. “Monnet and his people can 




help: they are good at organizing support for a new idea when the opponent is ignorance or 
inertia,” he professed in April 1963. “But they cannot lead against de Gaulle. They have no power 
base.”160 De Gaulle himself certainly felt confident about the degree of support for his foreign 
policy. “Il me semble,” de Gaulle wrote to his old associate Michel Debré following his July press 
conference, “que les Français ont décidément et profondément choisi l’indépendance.” 161  In 
addition, as a French journalist with good contacts in the Elysée informed Washington, de Gaulle 
believed that in the long run his vision would prevail elsewhere in Europe as well: 
 
He [de Gaulle] knows perfectly well that he is isolated in Europe. But he doesn’t care because in 
due course, he is convinced, his European partners will understand that the type of Europe he is 
proposing is the only one which can stand up to both Russia and the United States and negotiate 
with the United States, on equal footing, the close cooperation in which he eventually believes. 
But this Europe, as he sees it, can only be established once France has regained her power. If 
England had been allowed into the Common Market at a period when France was not yet strong 
enough, she would have dominated the association, destroyed its spirit, opened the door to 
American penetration. Only a strong France can avoid all this.162 
 
One ramification of the crisis of 1963 was that the assumption that there was one vision – 
Monnet’s vision of increasing integration and waning national sovereignty – that was bound to 
prevail over all others was no longer tenable. De Gaulle’s foreign policy could no longer be 
simply thrust aside as a nationalist rearguard action against the tidal wave of modernity and 
interdependence. There were now two equivalent but very different visions of the future of 
Europe, each with important domestic and international support; and the outcome of their 
thrashing about was uncertain. Hence, Washington could not ignore that the “nationalist 
counter-revolution” long feared by Europeanist officials at the State Department had indeed 
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transformed the political outlook in Europe. This was bound to affect American policies in 
important ways. 
 Second, the overwhelmingly constructive treatment the European integration movement had 
enjoyed in the United States since the late 1940s evolved towards a position of ambivalence. We 
have already seen how George Ball had to put to rest Kennedy’s fears – and those in Congress – 
that British membership of the Common Market would hurt American economic interests, and 
protecting these interests in case of British admission was a consistent occupation for American 
diplomats. We have also seen that fears of European protectionism were reinforced as de Gaulle 
demanded that French economic interests would be heeded within the Six, in particular by 
collaborating in the development of the Common Agricultural Policy after the Rome Treaty. In 
1963, Monnet – albeit still widely admired and a beacon of practical wisdom for Ball and others – 
stopped being the pivot around which American policies in Europe were developed. De Gaulle’s 
conférence de choc had done much to strengthen American premonitions that the Common Market 
might evolve into an inward-looking bloc under French control rather than an increasingly potent 
and likeminded partner of the United States in the global struggle against communism. Hence, 
with the trade negotiations of the Kennedy Round in the offing, Washington was adopting a 
notably tougher stance toward the Common Market. With de Gaulle firmly in control of French 
foreign policy and determined to shape the Six to his liking, not even the Europeanists at the 
State Department could resist the policy drift. The hardening American position was, for instance, 
reflected in a memorandum from Ball to Kennedy on the eve of a visit by Walter Hallstein, the 
Chairman of the European Commission. “Our consistent support for the European Community 
has been postulated on our assumption that the Community would be outward-looking and that 
the Common Market and the United States had a common interest in increased trade, lower 
barriers and economic cooperation,” Ball stressed. “The continuance of our policy of support 
will depend – to a considerable extent – on a demonstration by the Community and its member 
countries that this assumption is still valid.”163 De Gaulle had introduced a degree of uncertainty 
in American policymaking circles about the future character of the Common Market that 
previously did not exist. 
 Third, there was an increasing tendency in the American policymaking community after mid-
1963 to disregard de Gaulle’s deviant positions rather than to take them head on, to try to isolate 
France within Europe by simply forging ahead with American policies as if there were no de 
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Gaulle, to make the point that France could always ‘resume’ its ‘empty chair’ once it had come to 
its senses (which presumably would be after de Gaulle’s departure). The main proponent within 
the Kennedy administration of showing calmness and composure in response to de Gaulle’s 
program of diminishing American influence on the European continent was undoubtedly the 
seasoned Charles Bohlen. In August 1963, the American ambassador in France wrote a long 
analysis of French foreign policy for President Kennedy, in which he described the fundamental 
notions guiding de Gaulle. “I feel,” Bohlen impressed on Kennedy, “that the United States 
should accept the permanence of these factors without necessarily seeking to modify our own 
attitudes. I say this because under present circumstances there is not the slightest possibility of 
any opposition to de Gaulle within France arising, and while it is true that he is a man 73 years 
old I think we have to look forward to at least a minimum of two, and possibly a maximum of 
nine, years to his continuance in power.”164 Bohlen’s call for stoicism in the face of de Gaulle’s 
provocations was influential with Kennedy and Rusk, and later also with Lyndon Johnson.165 De 
Gaulle’s minimalist attitude on nuclear sharing as well as on other NATO issues was moreover 
already isolating France as the black sheep of the Atlantic alliance. By the end of 1963, it was 
becoming common practice for American diplomats to try to circumvent de Gaulle, to ignore 
French objections, and to proceed with affairs as business as usual whenever possible. Meanwhile, 
the relationship between Washington and Paris increasingly assumed the marks of a dialogue of 
the deaf.  
Lastly, the events of 1963 gave encouragement to those in Washington who argued that the 
United States should not continue to place its major bets on European integration, but should 
rather attempt to play on intra-European divisions in order to maximize its influence. Such an 
approach, which would become a hallmark of the European policies of the Nixon administration, 
would be more attuned to the limitations of American power in Europe, which had been exposed 
by de Gaulle, as well as to its resident potential for controlling bilateral relationships. It included a 
shift away from emphasizing the further development of multilateral institutions within the 
Atlantic community, which had been a key element of Acheson’s advice to Kennedy in the spring 
of 1963. This more detached – or realist – view of the state of European affairs and its 
implications for American foreign policy was, for instance, laid out in April by the Director of the 
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State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Thomas L. Hughes. Hughes stressed 
that the dissipation of the dream of European unity actually worked to the advantage of 
American diplomacy:  
 
de Gaulle is not likely to be able to organize Europe according to his wishes. Europe is today a 
group of independent political entities of which the three strongest, in particular, form a sub-
balance of power within NATO. Their relations with each other and with the United States are in 
constant flux. This fact precludes the establishment of a united Europe for the foreseeable future. 
But is also offers certain advantages to the United States. One feature of this situation is that as 
one state moves into disagreement with specific American policies – and each does so from time 
to time – the others tend to move nearer the US. […] It should be possible for us [...] to 
maximize our own attractiveness as leader of the alliance against any European challenger by 
exploiting the preference of many in Europe for the more distant and more powerful contender 
for this role. 
 
Against this background, Hughes thought cooperation with de Gaulle still feasible and desirable 
after January 1963 and he argued for an “alliance of the possible” between the United States and 
France. 
 
Such cooperation presupposes [...] that we lower our sights somewhat, at least as regards France 
during de Gaulle’s tenure. Satisfactory solutions to all disagreements between the United States 
and France do not seem possible, nor will we be able to harmonize our policies on many 
important issues. Indeed, we are faced by a French attempt, not to break up the Western alliance, 
but to reduce American political influence in Europe. De Gaulle has powerful cards in this 
competition and can do serious damage not only to our concepts of alliance structure and policy 
but also to our national interests in such matters as trade policy. At the same time the natural 
divisions within Europe can be turned to our advantage [...]. We may thus be able to walk a very 
difficult and careful path, doing some business with de Gaulle on specifics, avoiding exacerbation 
of differences on longer term goals, and exploiting intra-European divisions to prevent de 
Gaulle’s leading Europe along paths unacceptable to us.166 
 
While Hughes did not occupy a position of great influence within the Kennedy administration, 
the logic of his analysis and his divide et impera prescription for American diplomacy was powerful 
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enough by itself – and hence it does more to explain actual American diplomatic maneuvering in 
Europe than any reading of public policy statements. As we will see, a similar line of reasoning 
would moreover come to characterize Henry Kissinger’s thinking about Europe (see chapter 
nine). 
The Aborted Relationship: Kennedy and De Gaulle 
On November 22, 1963, on a campaign visit to Dallas, Texas, Kennedy was assassinated in full 
daylight. “Le président Kennedy est mort comme un soldat, sous le feu, pour son devoir et au 
service de son pays,” declared de Gaulle upon hearing the horrendous news. “Au nom du peuple 
français, ami de toujours du peuple américain, je salue ce grand exemple et cette grande 
mémoire.”167 
 The gulf of perceptions between the United States and France that had opened up during 
Kennedy’s aborted presidency had inevitably strained his personal relationship with de Gaulle. In 
many ways, Kennedy had thought of the General as most Americans did: irritating, intransigent, 
insufferably vain, inconsistent, and impossible to please.168 “What can you do with a man like 
that?,” he had often asked in quiet exasperation; at other times, annoyance clearly had gotten the 
upper hand as he would talk of “that bastard de Gaulle.”169 Walt Rostow recalled:  
 
He hated de Gaulle’s having a whip hand over him – getting our protection free; hurting us 
wherever he could; and piling up a gold surplus at our expense, via our NATO outlays in France. 
[…] This sense of weakness in dealing with a nation we were protecting violated something 
personal in the President. […] He would come back to it time and time again – the image of de 
Gaulle sitting there sassing him from his little pile of gold.170  
 
Kennedy could not understand why so obviously a great man took such seemingly petty positions. 
After a long telephone conversation with de Gaulle in December 1961, for instance, having failed 
to persuade him to agree to discussions with the Soviet Union on Berlin, Assistant Secretary of 
State William Tyler had been struck by Kennedy’s “puzzled mood as to how he could get 
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General de Gaulle to understand that what he wanted him to do was something that was really in 
the interest of the West...”171 
Yet, Kennedy had also genuinely admired de Gaulle and had been fascinated with the 
historic figure he had cut out. Aware that he was still only a “novice” in world politics, as de 
Gaulle would put it in his memoirs, Kennedy had paid due respect to the outstanding quality of 
de Gaulle’s political stature. Whereas his personal relationship with Konrad Adenauer had always 
remained standoffish, 172  his personal contacts with de Gaulle were invariably courteous and 
respectful. At a glittering white-tie dinner at Versailles Palace during his visit to Paris, he had 
drawn the French president on his recollections of great men like Churchill and Roosevelt.173 
There is reason to believe that his admiration for de Gaulle’s courage and stamina had been 
enhanced, too, by the various assassination attempts on the latter’s life against the backdrop of 
the Algerian war.174 From the outset, Kennedy had admired de Gaulle’s policy of extricating 
France from Algeria.175 His offer of support to de Gaulle during the attempted putsch of the 
generals in April 1961, only a few months after Kennedy had assumed office, designed to counter 
rumors of American involvement, had also been born out of an authentic desire to help de 
Gaulle in this historic endeavor.176 Kennedy had deeply admired de Gaulle’s “faculty to lead [...], 
to visualize a goal and set sail for it,” a family friend recalled.177 Kennedy’s fascination for de 
Gaulle was in some ways perhaps the envious admiration of a consummate pragmatist who 
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continually examines his goals and changes his tactics for a leader who appeared certain of his 
goals and unwavering in his determination to achieve him. One is indeed tempted to conclude 
that had Kennedy written Profiles in Courage (1955) about international instead of American 
statesmen, he would have devoted a chapter to the life of the Frenchman.  
 Kennedy’s interest in de Gaulle was undoubtedly reinforced by his susceptibility to matters 
of style and intellectual brilliance, as there is much evidence that the Frenchman had caught his 
imagination in this respect. He was known to be impressed with the rhetorical skills de Gaulle 
displayed at his stately press conferences.178 Moreover, while Kennedy had not cherished deep 
feelings for any foreign country (with the exception of Ireland), Bohlen has recalled that, 
“possibly through the influence of Jacqueline, his wife, he had a certain feeling for France, he 
liked the quality of French thought, he liked the sort of élan and being in the audacity of some of 
the thought, and the kind of cool 18th century quality of French thinking.”179 De Gaulle, of 
course, came as close as anyone to the embodiment of the French culture of intellect. In addition, 
however, he was a brilliant and highly effective politician – a modern kind of philosopher king. 
One might argue that the Kennedy mystique of Camelot – the comparison of the Kennedy White 
House with the legendary place where the wise and virtuous King Arthur held court in medieval 
times – had in a sense opened him up to the mystique that de Gaulle had created about 
himself.180 Theodore Sorenson’s characterization of Kennedy as an “intellectual,” for one, could 
be applied to de Gaulle as well: 
 
He meditated, but on action, not philosophy. His was a directed intelligence, never spent on the 
purely theoretical, always applied to the concrete. He sought truth in order to act on it. His mind 
was more critical and analytical than creative…181 
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And in November 1962, after de Gaulle had won his stunning election victory, Kennedy had 
asked for an analysis of his political techniques. He was – “as a political man” – interested in the 
lessons to be learned.182  
Hence, in addition to feeling strangely out of sympathy with many of the official policies of 
his administration, Kennedy had privately felt uneasy with the sad state of affairs in the 
American-French relationship following de Gaulle’s press conference. He had never settled on 
one policy. In the course of 1963, his attitude had in fact come to be guided by all three schools 
within his administration on the question of dealing with de Gaulle. In the first half of 1963, he 
gave the ‘Ball-Acheson school’ leeway, mostly motivated by tactical considerations; later in the 
year he shifted to the ‘Bohlen school’ and ‘McBundy/Klein school’ out of a desire to normalize 
relations. Kennedy constantly tried to find ways of reengaging with de Gaulle. According to 
McGeorge Bundy, “he never gave up on de Gaulle.”183 In the view of one chronicler of the 
Franco-American relationship, the effort to reach a common understanding had preoccupied 
Kennedy even to an “unfortunate degree.”184 He would certainly ask everyone who was acquain-
ted with the General – his ambassadors Gavin and Bohlen, Cyrus Sulzberger of the New York 
Times, and André Malraux – to elucidate the motivations behind his policies.185 “If I can put all 
that effort in the Russians,” he once explained to Schlesinger, “I can put some of it into the 
French.”186 
Kennedy’s premature death has left us with the tantalizing but ultimately unanswerable 
question whether a meeting of minds was still possible after the clash of 1963. There is some 
reason to believe that Kennedy, who always kept himself open to new arguments, had come to 
understand de Gaulle’s policies better, that he was willing to admit that the French president may 
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have been right on some issues and that his own State Department was part of the problem. 
Schlesinger, for instance, believes that he “could never rid his mind of the thought that, if this or 
that had been done differently, it might have been possible to avoid the impasse of 1963.”187 For 
this reason, too, Kennedy had asked Richard Neustadt to undertake his study of the crisis of 
January 1963. Kennedy often sought to arrange a reunion with de Gaulle after their get-together 
in Paris in June 1961. “L’entente de l’Occident,” he stated to Ambassador Alphand, “ce sont les 
bonnes relations entre le Général et moi-même.”188 A meeting with de Gaulle had indeed been 
rescheduled for February 1964 at Hyannis Port. And three weeks before his assassination, 
Kennedy “rather happily” told his former ambassador to France, James Gavin: “Well, I am going 
to see the General in the next few months, and I think I will be able to get something done 
together.”189 Shortly after his assassination, Paris press editorials claimed that Kennedy secretly 
had decided a few days before his death to establish entirely new relations with de Gaulle and 
that a dossier on this project, which the new president would find on his desk, now had the 
“sacred value of a last will.”190  
Such a dossier did not exist and, in hindsight, a true meeting of minds appears improbable 
given divergent interests of the United States and France and the policy context in which 
Kennedy had to operate. De Gaulle, moreover, was bound to have kept a purposeful distance. 
“Au fond,” Alphand explained in his diary about de Gaulle’s refusal to meet Kennedy, “il ne veut 
pas être confondu avec ses voisins, de l’Est ou de l’Ouest européen…et pour le remplacer il 
envoie La Joconde, avec André Malraux.”191 However, had Kennedy lived longer, he is likely to 
have tried to normalize relations with France. If so, he would have had to abandon altogether the 
politics of confrontation with de Gaulle favored by Acheson and Ball. There is reason to believe 
that he was poised to do so by the fall of 1963. For when McGeorge Bundy prepared Lyndon 
Johnson, as Kennedy’s hapless successor, for a meeting in December 1963 on an impending 
confrontation with the French in NATO over military-strategic issues, he wrote: “President 
Kennedy had decided – I think rightly – to damp down this controversy and he never had a 
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chance to say so to Rusk and McNamara.”192 In the same vein, Bohlen has claimed that Kennedy 
– “just before his assassination” – accepted his thesis that little could be done to bring sense to 
de Gaulle.193 Alas, it was an uneasy conclusion which he had privately re-examined often. 
 
Conclusion 
The clash of 1963 between Kennedy and de Gaulle marked a turning point in the postwar 
transatlantic relationship. It was the first time the United States found itself in such clear and 
comprehensive opposition to the policies of a major Western European ally, and – accustomed 
to the self-evidence of American leadership in the Cold War – it was simply caught off guard by 
this. It was also the first time that the disagreement was about the extent and the nature of 
American involvement in Europe. De Gaulle was the first European government leader to reveal 
that this involvement was not unambiguously desired in Western Europe. His aim, stated in 
private and in public, to keep the United States at bay in order to achieve a ‘European’ Europe, 
broke with more than a decade in which European leaders had generally emphasized the 
importance of American involvement in Europe in order to ward off the Soviet threat and help 
reconstruct the European economies. This helps to explain why the distress at the state of affairs 
in 1963 was more severe on the American than on the French side. Americans found de Gaulle’s 
objections to their involvement in Europe hard to grasp and even harder to appreciate. Senator 
William J. Fulbright’s despair with de Gaulle, expressed in a television interview in November 
1963, was illustrative of American public sentiment: “I really don’t know what he means when he 
professes his dedication to friendship with the United States and so on and yet what he does and 
says in other connections seems to be directly contrary to this.”194 Indignation and frustration 
with de Gaulle’s deviation within the Western alliance also pervaded the ranks of officials. Before 
1963, differences with de Gaulle still appeared manageable with the right mix of policies; in early 
1963, however, Gaullism became an albatross around the neck of those within the Kennedy 
administration who had placed their hopes in European integration and the Atlantic community. 
As Dana Durand, a researcher at a Washington think tank, remarked in a paper for McGeorge 
Bundy in early 1964:  
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The U.S. government has been engaged in what might be called a reverse canonization of Charles 
de Gaulle, elevating him to a stature of a virtual political demon. This effort has its supporters in 
certain private sectors, here and in Europe. But without official prosecution, it would hardly have 
attained the proportions of a damnation. The irony of these proceedings lies in the fact that the 
prosecutors obviously admire de Gaulle’s overtowering stature and respect his dignity and force, 
in short, acknowledge that he is probably the outstanding personality of this era. The damnation 
is not one of hatred for a fallen saint of evil, but of sorrow for one who has erred and wandered 
wilfully from the path of righteousness and could be brought back to it if only he would listen to 
sage councils.195 
 
The question of who is to blame for the clash of 1963 has preoccupied many, and the 
answers have predictably varied. By contrast, there is no question that Harold Macmillan was the 
biggest loser at the end of the day – and he paid the highest political price as a result. He had had 
the highest stakes on the table, and in 1963 he lost the most important of them: British 
membership of the Common Market. His ‘grand design’ of the winter of 1960-1961, which had 
sought to construct a deal between the Americans and de Gaulle that would make British 
membership palatable to Paris, had ended in an unmitigated foreign policy disaster. The obstacles 
posed by de Gaulle proved too high and the Americans were too reluctant to play the role 
allotted to them (in particular in the nuclear realm). Macmillan has come in for strong criticism, in 
particular in hindsight, for his inability to choose ‘Europe’ over the ‘Empire’ and the ‘special 
relationship.’196 However, it is hard to see how any British leader could have severed ties with the 
United States and the Commonwealth to the extent that de Gaulle considered necessary. 
American support for the British membership bid moreover depended on the expectation that 
the ‘special relationship’ would persist and – through the good offices of London – be broadened 
to Europe. In the final analysis, Macmillan’s ‘grand design’ was above all the tragic victim of the 
incompatibility of the ‘grand designs’ of de Gaulle and of Kennedy. 
De Gaulle generally has been held chiefly responsible for the clash, in particular in the 
United States and Great Britain. There certainly is reason to believe that he had used his press 
conference of January 14 to bring the issues about the future of Europe to a head. Many years 
                                                                                                                                                      
angrily to Fulbright’s statements. 
195 Paper, “The Damnation of Charles de Gaulle: St. Peter’s Advocate Presents the Defense,” by Dana Durand 
(research associate of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research), sent to McGeorge Bundy on 25 January 
1964. WHCF, Subject File, CO 81, France, box 30, LBJL. 
196 See, e.g., Young, This Blessed Plot, 99-145. 




later, Couve de Murville said that he believed the press conference had been unnecessarily 
provocative and that he had advised to tone it down.197 De Gaulle indeed could have allowed the 
negotiations with Great Britain to come to a less abrupt and rambunctious end, or have chosen 
the gentler course of writing to Macmillan and Kennedy to apprise them of his intentions. De 
Gaulle, however, had wanted to give a demonstration of his conception of Europe and of his 
power to promote it and block competitive designs. The resolution of the Algerian conflict, his 
election victory in the fall of 1962, the abatement of the Cold War after the Cuban missile crisis – 
all these factors had enabled him to assert French independence from the United States. In the 
Council of Ministers of December 19, 1962, after his meeting with Macmillan at Rambouillet, de 
Gaulle had decided against British membership of the Common Market, and had subsequently 
ordered Alain Peyrefitte, his Minister for Information, to arrange his next press conference on 
January 14 in order to settle the issue.198 Since de Gaulle had made this decision before the results 
of the Nassau meeting between Kennedy and Macmillan had become known, ‘Nassau’ cannot 
therefore be blamed in isolation for de Gaulle’s veto. There is moreover much evidence that de 
Gaulle had long believed that he would have to veto Britain’s application in the end, even as he 
gave negotiations the benefit of the doubt.199 Macmillan, as we have seen, might have understood 
– as some British diplomats certainly did – that his exchange with de Gaulle at Rambouillet had 
sounded the death knell to his European ambitions. The outcome of the Nassau meeting 
therefore probably only strengthened de Gaulle’s resolve to end Macmillan’s membership bid; it 
furthermore gave him the opportunity to do so under the banner of resisting the Anglo-
American ‘directorate’ over Europe.  
None of this, however, absolves Kennedy of the incongruities in his Grand Design for an 
Atlantic partnership, of the chasm between the stated policies of his administration and its actual 
conduct vis-à-vis the European allies, and of the makeshift character of his foreign policy. The 
Nassau meeting, including its run-up and its aftermath, symbolized the often erratic manner in 
which the major foreign policy decisions of the Kennedy administration came about. There had 
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been no prior consultation with the French or any of the other allies. At the regular NATO 
ministerial meeting, just one week prior to the conference, the United States had given no 
indication that it attached new importance to the MLF.200 All of this created the impression in 
Paris that Washington and London were attempting to manage the Western alliance from the 
high ground of their special relationship; many French officials actually came to believe that they 
had long before cooked up the Nassau agreement.201  
The offer to extend the Nassau arrangement to France, born out of the improvisational 
proceedings of the summit, was moreover curiously ill-thought through. It did not suit the 
technical requirements of the French nuclear program. The improvised nature of the offer left 
American officials essentially empty-handed when approached by French diplomats about the 
details of the arrangement.202 There was thus never a real dialogue in part because Washington 
had not made up its mind over what it had actually put on offer. What was clear was that both 
the provision of American equipment and know-how and the inclusion of the French deterrent 
in a NATO multilateral force would have undercut the independence of the French nuclear 
deterrent. The offer also dangerously by-passed de Gaulle’s well-known antipathy to NATO. 
When Kennedy asked Macmillan at Nassau whether he thought the Polaris offer should be 
extended to France, the British prime minister therefore volunteered that de Gaulle “probably 
would not want it.”203 Presumably, France might have pried the same escape clause from the 
United States as Great Britain, as Kennedy seemed to have suggested to Alphand.204 However, 
Washington never made a secret of its strong preference for multilateral solutions – if not at the 
time, then in the more distant future. If anything, ‘Nassau’ confirmed that the United States 
would not hesitate to exploit an ally’s state of dependency in order to bring other nuclear forces 
in the Western alliance to heel. If Macmillan had been able to resist the pressure, this he could do 
only by capitalizing on the special relationship. It is unlikely that de Gaulle could be made to 
believe that he or any of his successors could have counted on similar clemency in Washington. 
In sum, it is hard to see how the administration’s post-Nassau stratagem of deliberate vagueness 
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in order to tie France down in negotiations could have worked and a rebuff of the multilateral 
force by de Gaulle could have been avoided.  
The German historian Oliver Bange has nonetheless argued that the American offer to 
France was genuine.205 Yet, the sincerity of the Kennedy administration, too, is to be seriously 
questioned. The Kennedy administration did its best to impress on de Gaulle that the offer was 
serious, but it was also understood that this would have required him to revise France’s positions 
with regard to NATO, the force de frappe, and the European integration process in fundamental 
ways. This was obviously a long shot, in particular since the Kennedy administration was never in 
the position to promise assistance in the development and fabrication of warheads. In the 
absence of such a policy reversal, however, France under de Gaulle, in the words of Rusk in a 
post-Nassau meeting, “does not constitute a reliable partner” and thus would not be eligible for 
nuclear assistance.206 “We were unenthusiastic about this offer to France,” Rusk later admitted. 
“President de Gaulle was quite right that we would probably have asked for conditions that [he] 
would not have been willing to accept.”207 Bundy has, in addition, acknowledged that the Polaris 
offer was extended to Paris mainly for pragmatic reasons in the public relations sphere:  
 
The French problem was daunting, given the distance between the preferences of Washington 
and Paris that had been clear for more than a year. But for Kennedy the next choice was clear. He 
must make it plain to de Gaulle that he was now prepared to consider a program of assistance to 
France comparable to what he was ready to provide for Great Britain. Such an offer he would 
make, and if it were rejected by de Gaulle then at least it would be clear that the decision to go it 
alone was French.208  
 
The crisis of January 1963 that wrecked the Kennedy administration’s Grand Design was 
therefore in part a crisis of its own making. 
 Besides de Gaulle’s strong-willed policy of independence and the contorted history of 
‘Nassau,’ Kennedy’s clash with de Gaulle was prompted by the assertiveness of his own 
European policies, in particular by his ambitious attempts to shape allied strategies and the 
movement toward European unity. From de Gaulle’s point of view, vetoing British membership 
of the Common Market was in large measure a defensive move – as was his rejection of the 
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MLF.209 From his perspective, the Kennedy administration, with Ball and McNamara as its prime 
movers (albeit in different areas), had in reality moved from practicing an accommodating 
hegemony to a stifling hegemony. The crucial year in this respect was 1962. The Kennedy 
administration’s European policies had then become much more overbearing by reinvigorating 
the campaign against national nuclear forces, introducing the flexible response strategy in NATO, 
and launching the Grand Design for an Atlantic partnership. In all fields – the political, the 
military and the economic – Kennedy was trying to make Europe more responsive to America’s 
needs. In a sense, Kennedy revealed the American “will to power cloaked in idealism” that de 
Gaulle had already distinguished in Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944. De Gaulle’s abrasiveness must 
be judged against this background, too. 
 Assessments of Kennedy’s achievements as leader of the Free World have varied widely. On 
the one hand, he was a highly effective politician because of his youthful energy, his self-
deprecating wit, his sense of style – all of which made him seem, in the eyes of Europeans, more 
“European” than American.210 His two presidential journeys to Europe, in particular his last one 
in June 1963, showcased his talents for public diplomacy. Kennedy has also deservedly received 
high marks for his handling of some of the most dangerous crises of the Cold War. He was 
perhaps the greatest political talent of his time, who – in the measured words of de Gaulle – “had 
it not been for the crime which killed him, might have had the time to leave his mark on our 
age.”211  
 On the other hand, most historians have found sufficient reason to mark the gap between 
myth and reality in Kennedy’s foreign policies, between the rhetorical flourish of his speeches 
and the rather less high-minded quality of his day-to-day policies.212 This judgment can certainly 
be applied to Kennedy’s European policies. His intellectual curiosity and the decidedly cerebral 
bent of the people in his administration clearly did not stand in the way of prizing appearance 
over substance. What particularly emerges from the history told above is that Kennedy was 
hardly wedded to the policies of his administration. JFK never fully embraced the Grand Design 
for an Atlantic partnership he so eloquently proclaimed but was construed by others within his 
administration and intimate outsiders such as Acheson and Monnet. If anything, he was vying for 
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control over Europe’s destiny rather than for partnership. He was a consummate pragmatist who 
revealed a cool detachment in almost every sense and continually expressed unease with the 
perceived generosity of American policies. What emerges, too, is that his perennial doubts about 
official wisdom had surprisingly little effect on the gist of his administration’s policies, which 
continued in the postwar bipartisan foreign policy mode. If Kennedy imposed restraint on the 
State Department’s Europeanists, it was for tactical reasons; he rarely gave them the feeling he 
doubted their sagacity. Even as he strengthened the White House staff and proved relatively 
adept at crisis management, he was hardly in control of his administration’s policies. This can be 
seen to have contributed to the deterioration in Franco-American relations during his presidency, 
for while the State Department’s anti-Gaullism never dominated the White House, it had a great 
impact on day-to-day relations and mutual perceptions. 213  For all the innuendo of action, 
Kennedy could thus boast of few foreign policy achievements in his European policies. 
To apportion blame, however, is not to tell the whole story. For the clash of 1963 above all 
brought to light the incongruity of American and French ideas about Europe and the 
transatlantic relationship. The clash of 1963, Couve de Murville rightfully wrote in his memoirs, 
“fut le plus grave, parce qu’elle allait vraiment au fond des choses, je veux dire parce qu’elle 
portait sur la nature même des rapports entre Amérique d’une part, l’Europe d’autre part et en 
premier lieu bien entendu la France.” 214 In hindsight, therefore, the 1963 clash has assumed 
almost an aura of inevitability about it as a clash of perceptions. 
It is important to note, too, that the clash revealed the limits of American power in Western 
Europe more clearly than any other event in the history of the transatlantic alliance had done 
(save perhaps the demise of the European Defense Community in 1954). De Gaulle effectively 
scuttled Kennedy’s design for an Atlantic partnership. For one, he steered the European 
movement away from its focus on Monnet’s idea of a ‘United States of Europe,’ which had had 
such strong resonance in American policymaking circles after World War II. The European 
protagonists of integration and the Atlantic partnership were no less dismayed at this turn of 
events than their American sympathizers. “The press conference of 14 January 1963 marked a 
turning-point in the life of the European community,” Paul-Henri Spaak assessed in his memoirs. 
                                                                                                                                                      
American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
213 As James Gavin remarked in 1965: “Even though some of the top policy makers around the President shared his 
more detached and objective view of General de Gaulle, it is not surprising, when I recall the attitudes I found at 
operating levels of the State Department, that the past four years have been rather sterile of accomplishment in our 
dealings with France and the Common Market countries.” James Gavin, “On Dealing With De Gaulle,” Atlantic 
Monthly, June 1965, 51.  
214 Couve de Murville, Une politique étrangère, 1958-1969, 106-107. 




“After that, the trust, the spirit of cooperation that had prevailed during the first few years were 
not to exist in the same way.”215 Monnet likewise reflected that “by its manner no less than its 
content, it [de Gaulle’s press conference] marked a turning-point in relations between France and 
the other countries of the West.”216 For another, de Gaulle’s veto of British membership changed 
the anticipated course of events in significant ways. Had he failed to block Britain, the movement 
toward European unity might have been more responsive to American influence, the Franco-
German relationship might have been far less central to its further development, the Common 
Agricultural Policy might not have been created, the domestic British view of ‘Europe’ might 
have been far more positive, and transatlantic trade relations might have been more in sync. De 
Gaulle’s veto even undermined Kennedy’s achievements on the domestic front. Most importantly 
in this regard, the Kennedy administration had fought hard to ensure the passage of the Trade 
Expansion Act (TEA) of 1962, which it hailed as historic but whose value much depended on 
Great Britain’s actual entry into the Common Market. Without British membership of the 
Common Market, however, the TEA turned out to be a watershed with – as William Diebold Jr. 
put it – “some dry sides”; rather than fulfilling its potential of breaking with the past, trade 
negotiations would henceforth continue to follow “a familiar kind of watercourse and as time 
passed the flow has not continued to increase in force, depth, or breadth. The stream has not run 
dry, but it has become narrower, stonier, and twistier.”217  
Within NATO, finally, de Gaulle went beyond his dismissal of the MLF by using his veto 
power to frustrate the reform of the alliance’s military strategy on which Kennedy had 
campaigned, and which required the European allies to substantially reinforce their conventional 
forces. 218  The mere coming into being of an independent French nuclear force moreover 
established a radically altered strategic reality for the United States. “It must be recognized that if 
France is capable of creating a nuclear conflict by forcing the United States to come to its aid, the 
power of deciding on war and peace no longer belongs in the last analysis to Washington,” 
Walter Lippmann perceived in 1962. “The ‘force de frappe’ is a stratagem which commits the 
United States while reserving to continental Europe, in the first instance, all nuclear initiative.”219 
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 Yet the main point made here is that the clash of 1963 was a watershed because it served as a 
catalyst to change Washington’s perspective on European affairs. This perspective had been 
dominated since the late 1940s by policymakers – from Acheson to Dulles and Ball – who held 
out high hopes for the ‘inexorable’ process of European integration within the supportive 
framework of the Atlantic ‘community.’ The United States had at various times gone to great 
lengths to advance the cause of European integration. Following in the footsteps of Truman and 
Eisenhower, Kennedy had even held out the prospect of a partnership between equals. De 
Gaulle, however, had turned the Atlantic partnership into a chimera with his thunderbolts. Until 
January 1963, American officials could still indulge in the idea that he might have had his 
reservations against NATO and European integration, but that he would lack the determination 
or the political strength to go beyond his declaratory policy; there was a pervasive belief, not 
confined to the State Department, that “de Gaulle’s France cannot significantly postpone or 
delay the pace of major European developments, including integration and multilateralism.”220 
After January 1963, American officials could no longer underestimate de Gaulle’s tenacity and 
political courage. “His emergence in full control of a strong, rich, prosperous, untroubled France 
was always possible but never really expected,” one memorandum admitted.221 Yet, de Gaulle was 
in full control. Rather than Monnet, moreover, he had now emerged as the harbinger of a 
resurgent Europe. In the wake of de Gaulle’s manifestation of his political will and clout, 
Washington’s stance toward European unity was hence beginning to shift from one of adamant 
support towards one of inherent ambivalence and caution, and, if necessary, one of exploiting 
Europe’s enduring political divisions. 
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The Demise of the Last Atlantic Project: LBJ and De Gaulle’s 
Attack on the Multilateral Force, 1963-1965 
 
On November 22, 1963, the burdensome tasks of the American presidency were placed on the 
shoulders of a man who, very much to his own dismay, had remained at the periphery of power 
for some three years. For Lyndon Johnson, the vice presidency had become a depressing 
straitjacket from which there seemed no escape – “not worth a bucket of warm spit,” as his 
fellow Texan John Nance Garner (“Cactus Jack”) once famously said.1 Within a matter of hours, 
however, he was thrust into the full dimensions of the presidency under circumstances 
unimagined. Upon taking the presidential oath, it was incumbent on Johnson to provide 
leadership not just to his country but to the entire ‘free world.’ Few people were as qualified for 
the harrowing task as Johnson, who was dyed in the wool of American politics and had reason to 
consider Kennedy his political junior. But since he had obtained the presidency in the wake of 
tragedy, Johnson was still very much working in Kennedy’s shadow. With memories of the brutal 
murder in Dallas still afresh, he had little choice but to pose as the faithful executor of the murdered 
president’s policies. “Let us continue,” he therefore pledged in his first presidential address to the 
Congress. “And now, the ideas and the ideals which [Kennedy] so nobly represented must and will 
be put into effective action.”2 
The American project for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) within NATO seemed only 
one case in point – and it is on the ups and downs of this project during the Johnson years that 
this chapter will focus. Johnson had not been made aware of Kennedy’s reservations about the 
project. He rather assumed that his predecessor’s personal support was as strong as the official 
record. In 1964, the State Department’s Europeanists even transformed the MLF into the 
spearhead of his transatlantic policies and a test of American leadership in Europe. They 
presented the establishment of a multilaterally owned and operated nuclear force as far and away 
the best approach to giving the European allies – above all Germany – a say in the nuclear 
defense of the West. To them, the MLF also presented a last opportunity to salvage the Atlantic 
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partnership from de Gaulle’s nationalism and to strengthen the institutional bonds within the 
Atlantic community. Yet, in spite of the considerable political weight the United States 
consequently seemed to attach to the project, it failed to make the passage to reality. In 
December 1964, in one of the first instances in which Johnson would assert himself vis-à-vis his 
foreign policy apparatus, he decided to let the MLF wither on the vine. 
Relatively little effort has been made by historians to explain the ups and downs of the 
MLF project as part of the Franco-American conflict about the transatlantic relationship. 3 
However, the convoluted history of the MLF during the Johnson years deserves consideration as 
part of this study for more than one reason. First, the extent to which de Gaulle was responsible 
for pulling the rug from underneath the project has not been sufficiently recognized. De Gaulle 
had remained steadfastly opposed to the MLF since his press conference of January 14, 1963, 
even as France was not being required to participate. He saw the MLF above all as Washington’s 
instrument to strengthen its grip on European security affairs and particularly on German 
political loyalties; its realization, regardless of whether France would be required to participate, 
was hence wholly incompatible with his own views of Europe and the transatlantic relationship. 
The circumstances that led Johnson to allow the MLF’s ultimate demise to a large extent 
originated in threats that were coming from Paris. As we will see, American officials not only 
underestimated the depth of de Gaulle’s opposition, but also his power in preventing its 
realization.  
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Second, although the MLF did not come into existence, the story of its pursuit usefully 
informs us about the views of those American policymakers who gave it such adamant support. 
In the political context of the day, the MLF acquired great symbolic value as the American trump 
card in the competition against de Gaulle’s designs. The MLF was supported above all by those 
Europeanist officials at the State Department – the likes of George Ball, J. Robert Schaetzel and 
Walt W. Rostow – who regarded de Gaulle’s nationalism as a mortal danger to European 
integration and to the multilateral development of transatlantic ties; these officials, as before, 
received strong support from likeminded wise men of American foreign policy such as Dean 
Acheson and John McCloy.  
Third, the fact that, in spite of the State Department’s strenuous efforts, the MLF would 
be relegated to the transatlantic boulevard of broken dreams greatly weakened the hold on 
transatlantic policies the Europeanists and their outside supporters had enjoyed. The MLF crisis 
at the end of 1964 turned out to be the trigger for Johnson to impose a policy of restraint toward 
de Gaulle on those within his foreign policy apparatus who had consistently wanted to give him a 
showdown. Henceforth, his priorities – not those of the Europeanists at the State Department – 
would dominate American policies toward France and the European allies. The demise of the 
MLF was hence attended with important changes in the making of Atlantic policy.  
LBJ and De Gaulle 
The jarring transfer of leadership created problems of legitimacy for Johnson that could not 
easily be dispelled. Johnson was acutely sensitive to his extraordinary predicament, for he told 
Doris Kearns:  
 
I took the oath, I became President. But for millions of Americans I was still illegitimate, a naked 
man with no presidential covering, a pretender to the throne, an illegal usurper. And then there 
was Texas, my home, the home of both the murder and the murder of the murderer. And then 
there were the bigots and the dividers and the Eastern intellectuals, who were waiting to knock 
me down before I could even begin to stand up. The whole thing was almost unbearable.4  
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Most citizens, senators and congressmen, government officials, journalists and commentators 
clearly could not instantly place their trust in someone who came to power by mere accident. At 
best, Johnson could count on the benefit of the doubt, some initial credit to work with.  
In American foreign policy circles, in particular, Johnson did not have the appeal Kennedy 
had come to enjoy. It was not so much the lack of experience in world politics, for Johnson had 
more practical experience than Kennedy had had at the outset of his presidency.5  Nor could his 
official track record seriously be a source of concern. Johnson was bred in the domestic liberal 
politics of FDR’s New Deal. He had proven himself to be a committed internationalist who felt 
entirely comfortable with the bipartisan foreign policy consensus of the postwar period. As the 
Senate’s majority leader, Johnson had helped to safeguard this foreign policy consensus against the 
isolationist tendencies in the Republican Party.6 As vice president, Johnson had repeatedly gone on 
record as a firm supporter of the Atlantic alliance. If anything, his speeches suggested that he had 
thrown himself in with the activists of the Kennedy administration. On April 16, 1961, speaking in 
Paris, he had heartened the partisans of Atlantic and European unity by following almost literally 
the advice contained in the Acheson Report concerning the progressive strengthening of the 
Atlantic community (see chapter four):  
 
No single nation has enough influence and power to maintain this spacious environment of 
freedom. The coalition of the peoples and the nations of Western Europe and North America is 
indispensable to this end. [...] To the United States it is of prime importance to maintain and 
strengthen the coalition, both for its cohesion and power within the Atlantic area and its capacity 
for constructive action outside that area. If that cohesion and capacity are to be enhanced, 
vigorous measures will be required in the political, military and economic fields. [...] Progress 
toward an integrated European community will help enhance that capacity and thus to strengthen 
the Atlantic Community. [...] Our end goal [...] should be a true Atlantic Community in which 
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common institutions are increasingly developed to meet common problems.7 
 
And on November 8, 1963, in a speech in Brussels, he had again placed himself in the avant-garde 
that wanted to strengthen transatlantic ties and remake Europe. Speaking about the MLF, he said 
that it would be only a “first step” toward a “greater European voice in nuclear matters.” Johnson 
had made it clear that the American veto would become negotiable and he had hinted that the MLF 
could be converted into a European deterrent, if that was what a united Europe later wanted. 
“Evolution of this missile fleet toward European control, as Europe marches toward unity, is by no 
means excluded,” he had said, voicing a greater commitment to the idea than Kennedy at the time.8  
It was, however, the absence of an instinctive interest in international diplomacy and the 
parochial mindset associated with his home state Texas that disquieted many. He was, a friend once 
volunteered, a “nationalist” in the sense that his first interest concerned national affairs.9 There is 
little evidence that Johnson learned anything about international relations from his trips.10 “Johnson 
was generally impatient with the niceties of diplomacy,” Louis Heren wrote. “He accepted the 
existing […] arrangements, such as NATO, as a politician would accept a coalition of local and state 
political forces.”11 His Texas drawl and Hill Country anecdotes easily led people to believe that his 
conception of the world was about the size and shape of the Lone Star state. His background and 
aversion to academics and intellectuals even created something of a cultural discord with an 
important part of his foreign policy apparatus.12 Johnson’s political style and personal conduct were 
simply too different for comfort from those of the cosmopolitan and suave Kennedy. By the time 
Kennedy began to prepare for his re-election in 1964, Johnson was nearly immobilized by the 
prospect of never being able to escape from the margins of power. “Every time I came into John 
Kennedy’s presence, I felt like a goddamn raven hovering over his shoulder,” he later explained. 
“Away from the Oval Office, it was even worse. The Vice Presidency is filled with trips around the 
world, chauffeurs, men saluting, people clapping, chairmanships of councils, but in the end, it is 
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nothing. I detested every minute of it.”13 On his trips, he had indeed often behaved as an unhappy, 
brooding, at times irascible man – and stories about the Texan venting his rage on embassy officials 
on his foreign travels had found their way to Washington.14 Even as “continuity” would be the key 
word after the takeover, the presence of Johnson’s overbearing personality at the helm constituted a 
significant change; and “as the months wore on,” Ball wrote, “the imprimatur of LBJ was stamped 
on almost everything we did – and our method of doing it.”15 As Senate majority leader, Johnson 
had been an undisputed master of politics in Washington, who had carried or stymied bills in the 
Senate almost by sheer force of personality. “I spent years of my life,” Kennedy once explained, 
“when I could not get consideration for a bill until I went around and begged Johnson to let it go 
ahead.”16 But the “treatment,” Johnson’s intimidating trademark handling of fellow senators, was 
hardly appropriate at the level of government leaders and foreign ministers. 
Apart from Khrushchev, de Gaulle was probably the most important foreign leader – and 
certainly one of the most intractable – with whom Johnson would have to cope upon his 
assumption of the presidency. The Frenchman was among the most eloquent and generous in 
paying homage to the deceased president. With “perceptible emotion,” he had imparted to Dean 
Rusk that he had always had the greatest admiration and respect for Kennedy and that his death had 
elicited among the French a sense of a deep personal loss. “I am here,” said de Gaulle, “because I 
have been sent by the people of France.”17 De Gaulle’s spellbinding presence as the world leader 
with the greatest prestige and experience in the front rank of the official mourners worked like a 
magnet on the assembled media. He was the only allied leader of World War II still politically 
active. In the space of a few months, all the West’s ranking political chiefs except de Gaulle had 
moreover departed the political scene in non-elected transfers. The funeral proceedings further 
enhanced his stature. De Gaulle was the first of four government leaders to be received by 
Kennedy’s widow Jacqueline at the end of the ceremony. He was also the first in a row of nine 
foreign leaders with whom Johnson would confer privately. 
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Johnson’s mood in awaiting his personal rendezvous with de Gaulle had been edgy; he 
felt, as Ball remembered, “very awkward” and “ill at ease.”18 It was Johnson’s first brush with 
presidential diplomacy. The circumstances of the funeral were obviously not conducive to any 
real diplomacy, bargaining, or deal-making; but they did make it incumbent on him to present 
himself to the community of world leaders as a confident and able leader who was fully qualified 
to assume Kennedy’s place. 19  Johnson, urged his advisers, had to convey to the phalanx of 
foreign dignitaries, but especially to the General, an air of confidence.20 American officials feared 
that de Gaulle would try to take the helm if Johnson failed to lay the groundwork for his 
leadership during the first months of his administration: “It may easily give de Gaulle the handle 
he needs for some new stroke at his January press conference. Such a stroke, given his nature, is 
almost bound to be framed as a challenge to US leadership and so to you.” 21 Johnson had 
moreover read a cable from his ambassador in Paris, Charles Bohlen, only minutes before de 
Gaulle arrived at the State Department to pay his respects. De Gaulle, Bohlen had reported, had 
privately expressed serious doubts about the credibility of the American nuclear security 
guarantee; the French nuclear force, he had argued, was to be a trigger line to set off America’s 
nuclear involvement in the event of a Soviet attack. Bohlen had urged Johnson to take the matter 
up with his guest.22 
Johnson’s conversation with de Gaulle in the evening of November 25, 1963, lasted only 
twenty-two minutes. The two men talked in as courteous a manner as the use of an interpreter 
would permit, downplaying the problems that had existed between their governments and 
referring to them as being “greatly exaggerated.” When de Gaulle said that France knew perfectly 
well that it could count on the United States if it were attacked, Johnson felt that things were 
going his way and could “hardly suppress a smile.”23 De Gaulle stated his belief that France could 
count on the United States and affirmed that the United States would inversely find France at its 
side in times of crisis. Johnson promptly interjected that the French attitude in the Cuban missile 
crisis had provided sufficient proof for this. In his view, things could hardly be more amiable.24 
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The meeting was, however, yet to produce a hangover for Johnson. His advisers had 
urged him to renew Kennedy’s invitation to de Gaulle to visit the United States in the spring of 
1964.25 Johnson indeed alluded twice to the prospect of a visit to the United States in 1964. De 
Gaulle first replied that Kennedy had paid him a visit in Paris and that he had “intended to return 
it.” At the end of their conversation, while accompanying de Gaulle to the elevator, Johnson 
reiterated his expectation to see him in February. De Gaulle then replied that the details were to 
be discussed through the usual diplomatic channels.26 Johnson was now confident that de Gaulle 
had agreed to visit the United States.27 But it soon became clear that de Gaulle’s equivocal 
reference to “diplomatic channels” meant that the whole visit did not automatically carry over to 
the new administration and had to be entirely renegotiated. Ambassador Hervé Alphand called 
on the State Department the following day to say that de Gaulle preferred Johnson to come to 
Paris, and yet another day later Paris issued a statement announcing that the two leaders had 
agreed that the conditions of their future meeting would be decided upon at the appropriate 
moment by the two governments.29 The impasse was complete. De Gaulle had no intention of 
going to Washington;30 and Johnson would certainly not break away from Washington before the 
presidential elections of 1964 had provided him with a vice president.31 The two men would not 
meet again until Konrad Adenauer’s funeral in April 1967; by the time of their next meeting, at 
Dwight Eisenhower’s funeral in March 1969, they were both out of office.  
Johnson hence failed to establish a personal working relationship with de Gaulle at the 
very outset of his administration. Soon after their meeting, the incompatibility of French and 
American foreign policy designs was further accentuated by France’s recognition of the People’s 
Republic of China in January 1964.32 But they also had too little in common to help resolve 
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outstanding issues. Johnson lacked the insoluble bond of common experience that Eisenhower 
had cultivated with de Gaulle. He also did not have the intellectual curiosity that had drawn 
Kennedy to de Gaulle. Johnson simply lacked the background and the inclination to establish a 
personal rapport with the cerebral French president. As he admitted after having left office: 
 
When Chancellor Erhard came to my Ranch at Christmas in 1963, we knew very little about one 
another, but before he left we’d come to understand each other so fully that I knew no matter 
what issue came between us we’d be able to sit down and reason it out. This is what I wanted to 
happen with every leader I met and most of the time I was successful. President de Gaulle was 
the hardest to get to. I always had trouble with people like him, who let high rhetoric and big 
issues take the place of accomplishment.33 
 
As for de Gaulle, while he consistently expressed admiration for Johnson in his regular meetings 
with Ambassador Bohlen,34 there is sufficient evidence that he felt a much greater remoteness to 
the Texan than he had felt to Eisenhower and Kennedy – or later to Nixon.35 
But it would be wrong to conclude that Johnson did not have a clear idea of how to deal 
with de Gaulle. Johnson felt the atmosphere between Washington and Paris had become far too 
hostile during the Kennedy years. De Gaulle had become a pet target of American commentators, 
officials, and semi-officials. Newspaper editorials mentioned him along with Khrushchev as the 
major obstacle to American diplomacy. Senator William Fulbright in a book and Dean Acheson 
and Robert Bowie in a number of articles and speeches had stated that de Gaulle’s policies put at 
stake some of America’s major postwar goals. There were also insistent stories about low-level 
State Department attacks against the French.36 As vice president, Johnson had kept a distance 
from the verbal combat with the French – and, in his view, there was very little to gain in it. In 
marked contrast to Kennedy, he spent little time on his diagnosis of the General and the policies 
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that would best serve American objectives. Soon after assuming the presidency, he therefore laid 
down his guideline for dealing with de Gaulle: “I made it a rule for myself and for the United 
States government simply to ignore President de Gaulle’s attacks on our policies.”37 Johnson 
would display a remarkable consistency in this posture throughout his tenure. His relations with 
de Gaulle, he relished telling his aides, reminded him of his baseball adventures in younger days: 
he was feared as a power hitter and rival pitchers would try to throw their fast ball at him, but he 
would just lean back and let the ball go into the catcher’s mitt.38 Johnson refused to become too 
upset with de Gaulle; he did not want the Frenchman to think he had “pinked” him.39 Not once 
did he criticize de Gaulle in public; Johnson told Cy Sulzberger he saw no point in “feuding with 
an old man.” 40  He never denounced de Gaulle’s personality or ability, nor did he tolerate 
subordinates making derogatory comments about the Frenchman. 41  Never did he give 
representatives of France’s opposition parties, who came to elicit support from the White House 
with pro-American viewpoints, the impression that he preferred them over the General.42 
Rusk has said that Johnson’s attitude was imbued by a heartfelt solidarity with other 
government leaders.43 If anything, however, it was a display of Johnson’s tactical astuteness in 
dealing with other people. “Johnson had a feminine sense of what the world looked like to other 
people,” Walt Rostow clarified. “He understood enough of what the world looked like to other 
men to know how to persuade them. But he knew there were people you couldn’t persuade and 
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de Gaulle was one of them.”44 Johnson’s code of conduct moreover conformed closely to the 
advice he received from Charles Bohlen, his ambassador to France, who argued time and again 
that very little could be done to improve relations with Paris as long as de Gaulle was at the helm. 
Patience and restraint in dealing with de Gaulle would ultimately pay off, Bohlen assured in one 
memorandum: “It should always be borne in mind that de Gaulle cannot have very many more 
years of being in power, and the present indications are that a very large portion of the 
objectionable features of current French policy would disappear with his departure from 
power.”45 Bohlen’s recommendations did not go unchallenged within the administration. They 
were criticized as overly meek by those wanted to speak up to the General.46 Johnson was at 
times also pressured to replace Bohlen as ambassador by commentators who believed his phlegm 
stood in the way of improving the relationship.47  
Nonetheless, this was the line that Johnson took. Bohlen’s assessment of de Gaulle was 
closest to his own instinct.48 Like Bohlen, he believed that the United States had little leverage 
over de Gaulle and felt that an exchange of ugly words would only play in his hands. For the time 
being, he looked upon de Gaulle, as one commentator put it, as he would at “a recalcitrant Senate 
Committee baron for whom he did not, for the moment, have a handle and therefore had no 
reason to bother his head about.”49 He respected de Gaulle’s monumental achievements. Johnson 
often volunteered that he viewed France under de Gaulle as an asset to the alliance and a great 
improvement over the unstable Fourth Republic. He did not want to quarrel with de Gaulle’s 
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preoccupation with the glory of France, he told French ex-premier Paul Reynaud in 1965, as long 
as he made no “attempts to cut my throat.”50 Time, Johnson thought, would eventually take care 
of the differences with France, for he was convinced that a France without de Gaulle would be 
more amenable. “And just remember”, he told Sulzberger in 1965, “he is lot older than I am and 
I am going to outlive him.”51 Johnson summarized his attitude toward de Gaulle most succinctly 
in his memoirs. Clarifying the background to his temperate response to France’s withdrawal from 
NATO in 1966, he wrote:  
 
Many people expected me to denounce the French leader’s move and to resist his disruptive 
tactics, but I had long since decided that the only way to deal with de Gaulle’s fervent nationalism 
was by restraint and patience. He would not remain in power for ever, and I felt sure that the 
fundamental common interests and friendship of our two nations would survive. To have 
attacked de Gaulle would have only further enflamed French nationalism and offended French 
pride. It also would have created strains among the nations of the European Common Market 
and complicated their domestic policies.52 
 
In 1964, however, the battle within the Johnson administration about how to respond to de 
Gaulle’s challenge to American leadership still had to be won. 
The MLF Re-endorsed 
Johnson’s vice presidential record on the MLF was a deceptive yardstick. He had strongly 
supported the MLF in his Brussels speech only weeks before becoming president, hinting that 
the United States would be prepared to relinquish its veto over the MLF as Europe progressed 
towards political unity. But there is reason to believe that these statements largely originated in 
the State Department, which had routinely provided the material, rather than in his convictions.53 
Johnson had been an outsider within the Kennedy administration and had at no time been 
personally involved in the project. Yet his administration would stake American prestige on the 
project in its first full year to an extent that previous administrations had not. The State 
Department, in particular, would engage in what one observer at the time characterized as “a 
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public relations campaign to gain official, political and academic support [for the MLF], of an 
energy and ruthlessness unknown since Harriet Beecher Stowe […].”54 How did Johnson get so 
deeply committed to a project he cared so little for? 
We have already noted that, given the accidental nature of his rise to power, Johnson had 
little choice but to elaborate on the policies of his predecessor with the people his predecessor 
had appointed. His unfamiliarity with the proposal’s details moreover left him at the mercy of 
those who were keen to push their cause with the White House. In December 1963, McGeorge 
Bundy had tried to warn Johnson of a “tension which existed for many months between MLF 
advocates in [the] State Department and President Kennedy.”55 But Bundy’s warning somehow 
failed to make an impression on Johnson, perhaps because it paled in comparison with Dean 
Acheson’s outspoken advice to Johnson to continue working on the MLF.56 In addition, a major 
objective of American foreign policy during the transition was to dispel any uncertainty in NATO 
about American leadership caused by Kennedy’s death. Drastic policy reversals, such as ending 
the talks with allies on the MLF, were hence to be avoided. In his first meeting on the MLF in 
the White House, in early December 1963, Johnson therefore decided that he would return to the 
issue once these talks were more advanced and the political forces around the MLF had more 
clearly defined themselves.57 In the meantime, administration representatives were to begin low-
key consultations with congressional leaders. A congressional liaison officer was added to 
Livingston Merchant’s staff at the State Department. Eisenhower, who had an active personal 
interest in the MLF and whose support could be useful in eliciting Republican support for an 
eventual treaty, was also brought into the fray.58 Johnson simply proceeded with the matter where 
Kennedy had left it – and for several months the project advanced with little interference from 
higher levels. 
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Yet in the spring of 1964, circumstances began to call for a clear-cut presidential decision 
on the MLF. Under the auspices of the State Department, the discussions in NATO’s Working 
Group in Paris and its Sub-Group in Washington had proceeded at a steady pace. Particularly the 
Washington branch, which produced an endorsement of the military feasibility of the MLF in 
March, was making sufficient progress as to justify further action at a higher level. 59 At the same 
time the project appeared to have lost much of its political vigor. With the exception of Germany, 
the allies participating in the discussions had been diffident at best. The British stressed above all 
that they could not commit themselves because of impending national elections; the Italians 
meanwhile were preoccupied with the rapid alternation of governments in Rome. There was also 
a pervasive feeling among the allies that Johnson was not truly committed to the project. As 
NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker observed, the MLF was generally regarded as “dead” for 
lack of political will.60 The MLF supporters within the administration were naturally troubled by 
this state of affairs and were seeking a greater commitment from the White House in order to 
dispel European doubts.61 Obviously, the time had come for Johnson to show his hand with 
regard to the MLF. 
There was yet another development that demanded the White House’s attention, one that 
lent new urgency to a prime rationale behind the MLF. In early 1964, reports about a secret 
rapprochement between France and Germany in the nuclear realm surfaced with increasing 
frequency. Influential circles in German politics, presumably disillusioned with the sluggish 
progress on the MLF, were reported to favor a closer alliance with France, which would be 
extended into the nuclear realm.62 These reports were serious enough to cause Walt Rostow at 
the State Department to examine the possibility of Franco-German cooperation in producing 
missiles to be deployed in both countries, manned by bi-national crews and equipped with 
nuclear warheads under nominal French control. 63  Although American officials were – with 
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reason64 – generally skeptical that de Gaulle would be willing to cooperate with Germany in the 
nuclear realm, the mere idea that such back-stage maneuvering was taking place set off alarms in 
Washington. 65  Many American officials believed that nuclear flirtations with France would 
merely heighten feelings of discrimination in the German polity, as de Gaulle would not grant the 
equal status it desired. “The ‘Gaullist’ elements in Germany could wax in strength at the expense 
of moderates – thus casting a long shadow over the Federal Republic’s future and our own,” 
Rostow argued. 66 The rumors of a Franco-German nuclear rapprochement strengthened the 
hand of those in the government who continued to believe in the MLF as a nuclear-sharing 
formula within NATO. The MLF proponents could at least point to the political need to 
acknowledge a German desire for a nuclear role within the Western alliance. As a result, the MLF 
again arrived at the fulcrum – and it was now up to Johnson to decide which way the balance was 
to tilt. 
On April 10, 1964, Johnson convened with his foreign policy advisers at the White House 
to discuss the multilateral force. While Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara were absent, some 
prominent supporters of the MLF within the administration had found their way to the Oval 
Office: George Ball, Walt Rostow, Thomas Finletter, Henry Owen, and Gerard Smith (who had 
taken over Merchant’s job at the State Department’s MLF bureau in February). Of those present, 
McGeorge Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler, and William Foster of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency did not belong to the row of staunch MLF advocates. Only 
Foster would in the course of the meeting come to speak against the MLF, pointing out to 
Johnson that the project would stall talks on disarmament and non-proliferation with the Soviet 
Union. His official position, however, did not carry much weight; his argument was moreover 
offset by the fact that the MLF had always been presented as precisely a non-proliferation device. 
Bundy confined himself to an occasional remark of caution, referring to reservations with regard 
to the project in parts of the administration and stating that it would be unwise to force the MLF 
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upon the Europeans. The initiative at the meeting thus unquestionably lay with the band of 
enthusiasts. 
With his usual energy, Ball immediately took the lead in the conversation. He stressed the 
danger of perpetuating German discrimination and emphasized the need for giving the Germans 
a legitimate role, “on a leash,” in the defense of the West. A charter on the MLF, he argued, 
could be signed by the end of the year if Johnson would give his fiat to the undertaking. Finletter, 
who was particularly vigorous,67 stressed that the United States had to stop being “diffident” 
about the MLF. He reported that there was considerable doubt in European capitals with regard 
to Johnson’s commitment. If those doubts could be dispelled by a display of American leadership, 
he believed, a sufficient number of countries would surely be ready to join the MLF. Ball and 
Finletter assured Johnson that the British, who had been the most reluctant participants in the 
negotiations, would also enlist if only the United States insisted: “The British would go back to 
the MLF if the US made clear that the MLF was the only alternative for them.” Other allies, most 
notably Italy, would then follow suit, for they had linked their position to that of the British.  
President Johnson did not take part in the discussion. He heard his aides out and in 
wrapping up the meeting formulated his resolutions: 
 
(1) the Department of State broaden its discussions with Congress on the MLF and begin 
informal briefings on the committees concerned. 
(2) the Europeans be told that in his judgment the MLF was the best way to proceed. The 
President also felt the MLF could satisfy the pride and self-respect of the Europeans but warned 
against trying to shove the project down the throats of the potential participants. 
(3) if possible, an agreement on the MLF be reached by the end of the year.68 
 
There was an inherent inconsistency between, on the hand, Johnson’s agreement to ratchet up 
the diplomatic campaign to reach agreement by the end of 1964 and to intensify contacts with 
the Congress and, on the other hand, his admonition not to shove the project down Europe 
throats. In fact, the extent to which Johnson gave authorization to press the MLF idea became a 
point of bitter disagreement within his administration. The proponents readily believed that they 
had carried the day with the White House. The fact that Kennedy had not taken decisive action 
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against the project in the fall of 1963 and had simply allowed his public record to testify of his 
continuing support had given them sufficient authority to continue their work on the MLF – and, 
as one scholar of the episode wrote, “like contemporary versions of Sisyphus, they slowly began 
to roll the rock back up the hill.”69 Now, the new king of the hill had refrained from pushing the 
rock back. As far as Johnson knew, Kennedy had staked out a public commitment to the project 
and had established the bureaucratic machinery to give force to that commitment.70 What is more, 
he had even appeared to encourage the MLF proponents in their titanic effort. It was probably 
also the colloquial straightforwardness of Johnson’s language, peppered with activism, which led 
the proponents to believe that they had gained solid presidential backing in achieving allied 
agreement on the MLF by the end of the year.71 
Others – particularly within the White House staff – felt that the band of MLF 
supporters had deliberately misrepresented the measure of European support for the MLF in 
order to get Johnson’s approval. Germany’s craving for nuclear weapons was over-emphasized 
and Britain’s reluctance was belittled, they believed; the potentially adverse French reaction to an 
American diplomatic drive for the MLF was never mentioned. One member of the White House 
staff, who was profoundly skeptical of the project’s proclaimed virtues, complained some months 
later about the April meeting: “There was some chicanery – to the extent that the political facts 
of European life were not candidly and frankly stated. The theologians had a cause and were 
more interested in achieving an objective than stating a problem.” 72  Members of the staff 
moreover believed that the State Department was overstepping its bounds by transforming what 
they perceived as Johnson’s casual commitment into a full-fledged diplomatic campaign which 
staked Johnson’s prestige on the MLF’s establishment. Their disapproval of the “theologians” 
was justified to the extent that the zeal of the State Department’s subsequent diplomatic efforts 
on behalf of the MLF was out of step with the shallowness of Johnson’s personal commitment. 
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But one should add that they had also neglected to inform Johnson of the potential pitfalls of the 
project and of Kennedy’s private qualms. 
In the final analysis, of course, Johnson himself was responsible for giving the State 
Department the impression that he strongly supported the MLF. He had certainly neglected the 
opportunity to impose a less zealous stance on his diplomats with regard to the MLF. Because he 
had no strong personal opinion on the MLF or any deep understanding of its history or 
complexity, Johnson too easily reverted to his talent as a compromiser: to the enthusiasts he 
pledged progress, to the cautioners he promised prudence. Philip Geyelin’s account of Johnson’s 
mindset at the time is instructive: “The President [...] argued later that he had not meant to say 
much of anything; the truth probably is that he genuinely wasn’t aware he had. There was no 
urgency then; his attention was turned elsewhere.”73 In contrast with Kennedy, Johnson was not 
given to independent political judgment in the international domain. Instead, he relied heavily on 
his foreign policy advisers. The State Department had put the matter before Johnson as if the 
fate of the project rested solely in his hands. His fiat alone would be enough to establish the fleet. 
The United States could apply its leadership to the cause with relatively little risk and later – 
possibly at the end of the year – reap the fruits of diplomatic success. In his perfunctory look at 
the MLF, Johnson thus gave an authorization that went beyond his own commitment and that 
would later see him engaged in a tough fight with a vital part of his bureaucracy. 
It soon became clear that the band of MLF supporters needed little encouragement to 
double their efforts.74 According to the new timetable, a formal agreement on the MLF was to be 
provided by the first day of 1965. This would be after the elections in the United States and 
Great Britain, and well before the German elections of mid-1965 could seize upon the issue. The 
tempo and the range of the MLF campaign picked up commensurately. Procedures were stepped 
up to canvass Congress, where opinion on the MLF was still largely skeptical.75 Briefings of 
domestic and foreign newspapermen were arranged in order to generate favorable press 
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comment,76 with the important side effect that the MLF increasingly came to be regarded as a 
project on which the Johnson administration staked its prestige. In June 1964, Jean Monnet’s 
Action Committee for the United States of Europe moreover endorsed the MLF as part of the 
Atlantic partnership concept and as a transitional arrangement until the unification of Europe 
had proceeded to the point where an “authority capable of controlling and administering the 
European contribution to joint defense becomes a practical reality.” 77  Most importantly, the 
European allies were notified of the American strength of purpose. Meeting with his NATO 
colleagues in The Hague in May, Dean Rusk stated that any doubt regarding the measure of 
American support to the MLF had been due only to a desire to obtain a genuine European 
reaction. “We have now had that clear response,” Rusk said, “the force is seen as meeting real 
political and military need, and we intend to go ahead.” Rusk moreover strongly challenged de 
Gaulle’s rhetoric of national independence in the nuclear age. Absolute national sovereignty had 
become outmoded with the advent of nuclear weapons, Rusk stressed; the United States “simply 
cannot understand the revival of the notion of absolute independence within the free world.”78 
American officials could soon report that the military feasibility and the political virtues of the 
MLF had become better established in a number of European capitals and that “the climate for 
the MLF has markedly improved in recent weeks.” 79  The MLF’s revival, finally, was 
incontrovertible by the time Chancellor Erhard came to visit Johnson in mid-June. Their joint 
communiqué read that the United States and Germany were agreed that “efforts should be 
continued to ready an agreement for signature by the end of the year.”80 
The Surmountable British  
In American deliberations on the MLF of this period, the French position was rarely mentioned 
or considered. The prevailing assumption in Washington was that it was of little relevance what 
France thought of the MLF – that it was its own business to be opposed to the concept. “The 
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MLF could proceed without French acquiescence,” Rusk volunteered in a meeting with NATO 
Secretary General Stikker, “as long as France was not required to be physically involved.” The 
Johnson administration worked on the assumption that the French were “perfectly willing” to let 
the MLF go ahead without them so long as the MLF vessels would not moor at the harbors of 
France.81 
The German government, meanwhile, had been America’s most loyal ally on the MLF, 
which is hardly surprising given the project’s stated aim of elevating Germany to the rank of allies 
with a voice in the nuclear defense of the West. Ever since George Ball had briefed Konrad 
Adenauer on the issue in early 1963, the MLF had been a touchstone of German policies in the 
alliance.82 Adenauer’s successor Erhard was a particularly firm supporter, primarily because he 
was keen on strengthening Germany’s Atlantic ties in the wake of the clash of 1963. Although 
the State Department was wont to explain German interest in the proposal from a natural desire 
for control over nuclear weapons, the decisive benefit in the German view was that the MLF 
would tie the United States more closely to European security. There was furthermore no good 
reason for the German government to withhold support from a project undertaken largely on its 
behalf. The main argument of American supporters for the MLF was thus rather contrived. “Not 
only did the MLF derive directly from the American view of the German problem,” Alastair 
Buchan, a well-connected British professor whose advice was often sought by Washington, 
remarked in a critical paper for the American government, “but the effect of making it an explicit 
and public proposal [...] was to force the German government to play the role for which the State 
Department had already cast it, namely as a power eager for physical association with the control 
of nuclear weapons.”83 In any event, Erhard and his Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder were 
much the staunchest advocates of the MLF in Europe. In the summer of 1964, the German 
chancellor publicly stated that he supported the project “due to personal conviction,” hence 
attaching his prestige and that of his government to its realization.84 The political coalition with 
Bonn provided the MLF proponents in Washington with a crucial axis from which considerable 
momentum could be generated within NATO.85 
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But merely a consensus between Washington and Bonn was not enough to establish the 
MLF. An exclusively American-German deal would not be palatable to many sides. It would be 
interpreted as too overt an admission of Germany into the nuclear realm. A bilateral deal would 
also deviate from the original multilateral concept. At least one other ally of sufficient stature 
therefore had to participate in the MLF. Since France would not participate, it was obvious that 
Great Britain – the other nuclear power in Western Europe – held a pivotal position. British 
participation was also necessary to mollify Germany’s real or imagined sense of discrimination. 
The American diplomatic effort in 1964 therefore focused on persuading a deeply reluctant 
London to commit itself. 
It was generally understood that British reservations with regard to the MLF could not be 
easily dispelled. The response in Britain to the MLF had ranged from unenthusiastic to outright 
hostile.86 The origins of this were not difficult to fathom, for they were not much dissimilar to the 
objections expressed by that other European nuclear power. “I do not believe,” said Prime 
Minister Macmillan in 1963 in a House of Commons debate on the Nassau agreements, “that our 
Western alliance could really stand permanently if in this vital [nuclear] field the United States 
were given for all time the sole authority. We are allies. We must remain allies, but we must not 
become satellites. I can understand why the French government, who are a world power as well 
as a continental power, wish to develop their own nuclear force.”87 Yet the British government 
had not officially ruled out some kind of multilateral nuclear arrangement under NATO, one that 
also extended to Germany. After all, Macmillan had accepted at his Nassau meeting with 
Kennedy that the future British nuclear force was going to be assigned to a multilateral force. 
British diplomats had furthermore participated in the Working Group negotiations in Paris (albeit 
on a “no-commitment basis”). There was a pervasive sense in London that if the United States 
and Germany eventually agreed to establish the MLF, Great Britain could not afford to stand 
aside. The “special relationship” with Washington had to be safeguarded. 
British reluctance to engage in discussions about the MLF was reinforced by the fact that 
two different concepts had actually been discussed at Nassau: the MLF, which would be 
multilaterally owned and mixed-manned, and a multinational force (MNF) that would consist of 
national nuclear forces assigned to NATO in a looser formula. 88  Following the Nassau 
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conference, the United States had devoted its best minds to the development of the MLF 
proposal. The principal interest of the British, however, clearly lay with the MNF. In response to 
American pressure to accept the multilateral concept, the British drew up a variety of alternative 
plans that started from the notion of a multinational force but would include a small multilateral 
component.89 State Department officials had little patience with British waywardness. In their 
view, it was essential that the MLF be all wrapped up before the ‘Gaullist’ wing of the CDU 
stepped up its slights against Chancellor Erhard in the run-up to the elections of 1965. Increasing 
the pressure to come to terms with the MLF proposal, American officials began telling their 
British interlocutors that the United States would proceed with the MLF regardless of the British 
position.90 This raised the possibility that Germany – as the major or perhaps only European 
participant – would replace Great Britain as America’s most trusted ally. 
The prospect of a Labour Party victory in the British elections of October 1964, 
predicted by most insiders, considerably complicated negotiations about the MLF. Labour leaders 
much surpassed their Conservative antipodes in scorning the MLF, primarily because it was in 
their eyes a disguised proliferation device that could only antagonize the Soviet Union. Harold 
Wilson, the man most likely to be the next prime minister, had even acquired something of a 
record on this. “There are many signs,” said Wilson in an interview with Cyrus Sulzberger of the 
New York Times, “that this [the MLF] could only whet the German appetite, if there is one. If you 
have a boy and wish to sublimate his sex appetite, it may not be wise to take him to a striptease 
show.”91 The party’s stance on the issue was no better than that of its political standard-bearer. In 
the eyes of the strong left wing of the Labour Party, the MLF was pro-German and anti-Soviet 
and this was precisely the wrong order. Party spokesmen also vaguely promised that a Labour 
government would divest Britain altogether of its independent nuclear capability once it came to 
power, in which case the plans for a multilateral force would be rendered rather circuitous. The 
Labour Party’s standpoint did not significantly alter in the election year and its manifesto for the 
elections even called for “re-negotiating” the Nassau agreement. Hence when Richard Neustadt 
was in London in June 1964, on envoy from the White House to gauge the Labour Party’s MLF 
stance, most people he met mentioned the project along with a gamut of curses. Neustadt 
reported: “No member of the frontbench [of the Labour Party ] is impressed with [the] MLF in 
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its own terms; none really buys our line on Europe or on Germany; [...]. Moreover – more 
important – all the internal forces in their system press the other way, to put off the issue, or 
better still (were Johnson willing) to evade it altogether.”92 
Yet, in spite of all the sentiment against the MLF, a new Labour government was not 
expected to refuse participation in a project which had advanced as far as it had and which the 
United States had said it really wanted. Not prepared to abandon the “special relationship” when 
the chips were down, London would in all likelihood succumb to Washington’s will in the final 
moments.93 After his London visit, Neustadt concluded that a Labour government would most 
likely go along if the United States would take care “to ease the path for Wilson, pay him a good 
price, [and] leave him no possible excuse we can foresee for failing to proceed toward the MLF in 
company with us and with the Germans.”94 American officials were also generally optimistic 
about the chances of British concurrence because of de Gaulle’s intransigence within NATO. 
Alastair Buchan observed in a lengthy analysis for McGeorge Bundy: “This France, under 
President de Gaulle, refuses even to discuss, so that any attempt in the next year or two to 
improve the political cohesion of the alliance by means of institutional arrangements rather than 
by the multilateralisation of forces, might risk either a French veto or an open break with France. 
[...] There seems to be a disposition in Washington to assume that when Mr. Wilson has seen the 
limitations of the consultative approach, he will take Britain into the MLF.”95 In sum, combined 
American and German pressure along with a desire to curb de Gaulle was expected to bring the 
British around to the MLF.96  
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Indeed, when the Labour Party assumed governmental responsibility in October 1964, 
Harold Wilson saw himself confronted with a nuclear past he could not ignore. With an eye to 
the timetable, the United States increased the pressure on London to sign up to the MLF within a 
matter of weeks. Wilson had to come up with something, if only in order to strengthen his hand 
in the upcoming negotiations on the MLF charter. His cabinet quickly concocted a 
counterproposal to the MLF. Based on a pre-election alternative, it proposed an Atlantic Nuclear 
Force (ANF) to which the entire British deterrent would be committed for “as long as the 
alliance lasts” but which would be much more loosely defined than the American proposal for a 
multilateral force. 97 Wilson was keen to avoid any appearance of nuclear dissemination. With his 
four-vote majority in the House of Commons, he could not afford even the slightest defection in 
his party. In order to live up to his campaign promise – cherished in particular by the Labour 
Party’s left wing – to dispose of Great Britain’s ‘independent’ nuclear force, the use of the ANF’s 
nuclear weapons would be subject to the veto power of the United States, Great Britain, France 
(assuming it could be seduced to participate), and any of the other participating nations. Wilson 
was also opposed to a ‘European clause’ in any treaty on a NATO nuclear force, since this would 
entail the disappearance of the American veto in the event of the unification of Europe. The 
British ANF proposal provided for a multilateral component, but this was clearly a lesser element 
of the force, mainly designed to gain the political approval of Washington and Bonn. The Labour 
government moreover preferred a multilateral force consisting of land-based Minuteman missiles 
instead of an expensive flotilla of surface vessels. The ANF proposal was thus also more in line 
with British economic interests. 
On December 7, 1964, Harold Wilson traveled to Washington for his first encounter with 
President Johnson. The prime minister, anxious to establish good relations with his American 
counterpart, had arrived understandably fearful of the American response to his ANF plan. Both 
George Ball and Richard Neustadt had personally warned Wilson that the meeting could only be 
termed successful by the United States if he would give in on the MLF.98 Wilson could not see 
how the ANF could carry the day with Johnson and how he could resist the MLF without 
incurring great damage to Anglo-American relations. The vulnerability of Wilson’s position was 
recognized in Washington as well. McGeorge Bundy put it quite bluntly in preparation for the 
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meeting: Johnson’s position was strong and Wilson’s was weak. Johnson had just won a landslide 
victory in the American presidential elections, was at the height of his popularity, and seemed 
intent on realizing the MLF before his credit with Congress ran out. The British prime minister 
clearly found himself in a position in which he could be made to accept vital elements of the 
MLF proposal.99 That is, if Johnson put the screws on him.  
But to Wilson’s astonishment, his American host did not force the issue at all. Johnson 
got off to a furious start, censuring British economic policies and the trouble they were causing 
the United States. Yet once their private conversation turned to the issue of nuclear sharing, 
“with the Prime Minister […] almost on the ropes,” Johnson’s tone changed. Wilson – still 
intimidated by Johnson’s opening salvos – conceded considerable ground, stating that his only 
real objection to the MLF concerned the possible abandonment of the American veto in the 
event of European unity. He said he was not principally opposed to the formula of a surface fleet 
as envisaged in the MLF proposal. Johnson, however, declined the opportunity to squeeze out 
Wilson’s obeisance to the MLF, stating that he “would not take any adamant position and had no 
intention to force the matter now.” He merely handed Wilson a paper restating the American 
position on the MLF,100 and urged him above all to come to terms with Bonn on the way forward. 
The United States, Johnson said, would give careful consideration to anything the British and the 
Germans might work out, but he was not “going to put his feet in concrete.”101 The surprising 
outcome of the meeting was therefore that Johnson had let Wilson off the hook. Their discussion 
of the MLF was described in their communiqué as little more than an “initial exchange of views” 
and “a preliminary to further discussions among interested members of the alliance.”102 There 
were no commitments, no time schedules, no mention of agreements to be signed by the end of 
the year, just vaguely worded intentions. Johnson had not pressed his British counterpart into an 
agreement on the MLF, not even into a modified version of it using elements of the British ANF 
proposal. He had merely impressed on Wilson to hit it off with Bonn under his own steam.  
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The purport of Wilson’s meeting with Johnson did not immediately dawn on the press. 
First appraisals even claimed that Johnson had been adamant and that Wilson was now “stuck” 
with the MLF; the influential Times, for instance, wrote that the meeting heralded the termination 
of the British national deterrent and termed it an “act of national abnegation, surely 
unprecedented.”103 In truth, American officials had impressed on their British colleagues that they 
did not want them to go around claiming that Wilson had killed the MLF. 104  American 
spokesmen continued to pay tribute to the multilateral concept and to encourage the British and 
the Germans to reach an agreement. It would not take long, however, before rumors emerged 
that the Johnson administration had substantially softened its stance on the MLF and allies were 
beginning to take note of the shift in the American position.105 Less than two weeks after the 
Anglo-American summit meeting, James Reston of the New York Times reported in a front-page 
article the existence of a presidential directive to the effect that the United States did not seek an 
agreement on the MLF unless a true consensus in Europe was achieved. 106  The reporter’s 
information, in fact, had come straight from the Oval Office and the document in question was 
National Security Action Memorandum 322 (which we shall discuss later).107 As London and 
Bonn were considered unlikely to produce an agreement on their own account, the implication of 
Johnson’s ruling was that the United States had virtually given up on the MLF. 
Great Britain’s opposition to the MLF, however stiff, had not been insurmountable. It 
was also not the principal cause of the MLF’s demise. Andrew Pierre’s assessment of the episode 
may well serve to buttress this argument:  
 
It is probable that an agreement of some type of an ANF/MLF arrangement could have been 
reached in December 1964, if Washington had insisted upon it. The British were caught between 
the possibility of a purely American-German accord on the MLF, or if this did not occur, the 
danger of a nuclear arrangement between a frustrated Germany and an ambitious France. Both 
were undesirable from London’s point of view, since the former would weaken British influence 
in Washington and make Bonn its most intimate ally, while the latter was even more dangerous 
since it would increase Germany’s nuclear knowledge, create the danger of an anti-Anglo-Saxon 
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‘third force’ in Europe, and be a cause of valid apprehension for the Soviet Union. Despite 
continuing differences of opinion between Britain, Germany, and the United States over the 
make-up of an integrated nuclear force, an agreement could well have been forged between these 
countries plus Italy and some of the smaller European nations in late 1964.108  
 
But Pierre’s otherwise accurate assessment does not recognize the decisive role played by 
France – the only country in NATO that had consistently expressed opposition to the MLF – in 
American decisionmaking. Similarly, State Department officials had failed to take French 
sensitivities and – more seriously – the probability of an effective French counterattack into 
account as they pressed for the MLF. Their eyes fixed on the prize, their efforts had focused on 
London. France only appeared in their calculations as the bulwark of an outdated European 
nationalism which the MLF was supposed to check. They had consequentially lost sight of an 
important political reality: that France could prevent the establishment of the MLF even though 
it would not participate and irrespective of the British position. In the Elysée, a bomb under the 
entire project had been ticking. And Johnson had felt the need to dismantle it.  
But this is getting ahead of the story. The remainder of this chapter will seek to answer the 
question how Johnson’s sudden reversal on the MLF came about. 
The Wide Range of French Opposition 
To de Gaulle, the MLF was clearly an abomination. His foreign policy was predicated on the 
notion that defense matters were fundamentally and immutably tied to the legitimacy of the 
nation state. It was why he had objected so strongly to the European Defense Community in the 
early 1950s. The case for national autonomy was in his view even stronger in the nuclear realm: 
the atom bomb could only be national in character and the independence of the force de frappe was 
hence an unassailable article of faith of Gaullist foreign policy. Since the MLF proposal sought to 
extend NATO’s principle of military integration – worse than obnoxious in de Gaulle’s view – to 
the nuclear realm, there was never much of a chance that he would support it. As long as the 
United States was not prepared to relinquish its veto (which de Gaulle believed would forever 
remain the case), the force would give the European allies only the appearance of control. In his 
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vocabulary, nuclear ‘integration’ was simply a chimera and the multilateral force a “farce.” The 
MLF would be little more than “an American naval foreign legion.”109 
But de Gaulle also had serious objections to the MLF proposal even if France would not 
be required to participate. It would, first of all, strengthen America’s hand in Europe’s security 
affairs. For one, the MLF would cut off de Gaulle’s ambition to have the French national 
deterrent play a central role in the nuclear defense of Western Europe. For another, the MLF 
would lessen the distinction between nuclear haves and have-nots in Europe, thus depriving 
France of its nuclear monopoly on the European continent (in particular vis-à-vis Germany). 
Germany’s participation in the MLF would moreover irrevocably alter Bonn’s relation with Paris 
and Washington, to the obvious advantage of the latter. In addition, the MLF would complicate 
efforts to seek détente in the West’s relationship with the Soviet Union. In sum, the MLF was so 
sharply at odds with French views and interests that it was only natural that its prevention was an 
important objective of French foreign policy.110 
  The French had kept remarkably silent on the MLF since de Gaulle’s rebuke of January 
1963, thus fostering the impression that Paris would not try to block its founding. If anything, 
French spokesmen declared that France had simply decided not to join the MLF project because 
it could not afford both participation in the MLF and development of the force de frappe. They also 
refrained from censuring allies that did show interest. Until the spring of 1964, Paris even seemed 
to tolerate the possibility of German participation. 111  But French acquiescence was only 
guaranteed as long as the MLF was just one of many proposals, headed in no particular direction. 
The French view during much of 1963 and 1964 was that the MLF was a bathtub toy that would 
never float right side up. Yet when American pressure on behalf of the MLF increased following 
Johnson’s April resolutions and raised the possibility that the MLF might come into being, the 
French position began to harden. De Gaulle’s diplomatic drive in the second half of 1964 to 
avert the MLF would turn out to be remarkably effective. 
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 Paris, Bonn, and the Common Market 
Franco-German relations had significantly deteriorated since de Gaulle and Adenauer had 
concluded the Treaty of Reconciliation on January 22, 1963. Having succeeded Adenauer in 
October 1963, Ludwig Erhard was manifesting himself as a staunch Atlanticist. He also came out 
strongly in support of the MLF proposal, primarily as a way to tie the United States more firmly 
to European security. De Gaulle’s ideas about Europe and the transatlantic relationship were 
clearly wasted on him and his cabinet.112 By 1964, the regular get-togethers between the German 
chancellor and the French president had become routine exercises that did little to contribute to 
mutual political understanding and agreement. The Franco-German entente had become a 
“fragile plant,” as André François-Poncet put it in Le Figaro; it permitted a certain amount of 
useful homework but had on the whole been reduced to a dialogue of the deaf.113  
But France remained well positioned to drive a wedge in the coalition between the United 
States and Germany on the MLF. Erhard’s public endorsements tended to obfuscate that 
influential circles in Germany were not as favorably disposed toward the project. There was 
criticism that the MLF was rather expensive for a “loyalty demonstration” that offered no real 
control over Germany’s nuclear defense.114 More importantly, there were also doubts about the 
wisdom of advertising loyalty to Washington and alienating Paris. France’s central position in the 
Common Market and its official policy of reconciliation with Germany were considered too 
important to justify such a course. The strongest criticism of the MLF therefore came from the 
‘Gaullist’ wing of the CDU/CSU, Erhard’s own party. The German Gaullists reproached Erhard 
and his Foreign Minister Schroeder for “sacrificing” the alliance with France by giving 
unqualified support to American policies. “We Europeans should not place blind confidence in 
the reliability and trustworthiness of the Americans, who do not wish without more ado to let 
themselves be drawn into an atomic war,” argued Franz Josef Strauss in true Gaullist style in June 
1963. “So long as Europe has no nuclear weapons, Europe has no sovereignty.”115 German 
Gaullists like Strauss believed that the French nuclear deterrent could in the long run provide the 
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nucleus of a European force. They hence also felt that the costs of the MLF would be better used 
toward furthering a truly European solution.116 The fact that the MLF could prompt France to 
reappraise its policy of reconciliation with Germany clearly raised the possibility of undermining 
official German support for the proposal. Indeed, the inherent and consistent inability of 
Germany’s Cold War foreign policy to choose between Washington and Paris was the real 
Achilles’ heel of the MLF project.117 
The first piece of evidence that the French were shifting from passive to active 
opposition to the MLF surfaced in the summer of 1964, after the Johnson administration had 
intensified its diplomatic efforts to obtain European approval. French spokesmen stopped 
excusing themselves for not taking part in the negotiations. At a West European Union (WEU) 
Assembly meeting in June, Jacques Baumel, the Gaullist leader in parliament, derided the MLF as 
“inefficient, riddled with contradictions, and [...] merely an elegant attempt to solve a problem for 
which it was no solution at all.”118 More importantly, de Gaulle used his talks with Erhard in early 
July to convey a notably tougher stance on German participation in the MLF, briefly after the 
latter had agreed with Johnson that the MLF charter be readied before the end of the year. “Why 
does Germany want to join the MLF?” de Gaulle asked Erhard.119 In his private conversation 
with Erhard, he reportedly also hinted at the need for a truly European nuclear force, describing 
the French force de frappe as a way station to such a force and suggesting that Germany might 
associate itself with it. When Erhard asked whether this meant that Germany would have a say 
over the force de frappe, de Gaulle apparently emphasized the “essential French nature” of the force. 
But he also pledged that French nuclear weapons would be used for Germany’s defense.120 
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Whatever the credibility of these overtures, it was clear that de Gaulle was now pressing 
Bonn harder than before on the MLF. This certainly came as a rude surprise to Erhard.121 Most 
German officials, like their American counterparts, had believed that the French would not 
object to German participation in the MLF. De Gaulle’s July meeting with Erhard robbed them 
of this illusion. The full scope of French opposition would yet have to reveal itself, but some 
German circles were already assuming that it denoted the beginning of a tough French drive to 
head off German participation in the MLF. 122  Any doubts about how seriously de Gaulle 
regarded German participation in the MLF were finally removed by his reproach of Bonn’s 
Atlanticism at his semi-annual press conference on July 23, 1964. De Gaulle’s warning was 
ominous enough to catch the attention of German foreign policymakers: 
 
One cannot say that Germany and France have yet agreed to make a policy together, and one 
cannot dispute that this results from the fact that so far Bonn has not believed that this policy 
should be European and independent. If this state of affairs were to last, there would be the long-
run risk of doubts among the French people, of misgivings among the German people, and, 
among their four partners of the Rome Treaty, an increased tendency to leave things as they are, 
while waiting, perhaps, to be split up. ...[France] is now strong enough and sure enough of herself 
to be able to be patient, except for major external changes which would jeopardize everything and 
therefore lead her to change her direction.123  
 
The reaction in Germany was furious. De Gaulle’s words emanated the dual threat of 
denouncing the Treaty of Reconciliation and breaking up the Common Market in the event 
Germany caused the “major external changes” he had in mind (such as by making the MLF 
possible). President Johnson’s reaction the next day was temperate by comparison, as it 
emphasized that the United States was not trying to force anyone to choose between Paris and 
Washington. 124  The choice, however, was once again intruding itself upon Germany with 
increasing urgency. 
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Although Franco-German relations plummeted in the summer of 1964, French hostility 
towards the MLF would not come into the open until the fall. The record suggests that French 
opposition was directly linked to the project’s prospects of realization. From early October 
onwards, stories appeared in the French and German media on the possibility that the United 
States and Germany might take bilateral steps towards the MLF. 125  These stories stood in 
connection with a visit to Washington by Wilhelm Grewe, the German ambassador at NATO. 
Erhard was keen to have the MLF affair wrapped up well before the German parliamentary 
elections in September 1965, and he had become increasingly disturbed by delays in readying an 
agreement by the end of the year. The stoppage had been caused mainly by British ambiguity, and, 
with Harold Wilson assuming office that month, British procrastination was expected to impede 
the MLF negotiations even more. Grewe was sent to Washington to deliver a letter to Johnson in 
which Erhard expressed his growing uneasiness with the state of affairs and urged the United 
States to keep to the intended time schedule. Erhard also suggested that, if necessary, Germany 
would be prepared to reach a bilateral agreement with the United States at the end of the year – 
to which others could then later add their signature.126 At a news conference on October 6, 
Erhard furthermore added substance to the rumors by indicating that Germany was prepared to 
implement the project together with the United States. “We hope [...] the doors will stay wide 
open for other European countries to join,” but “a beginning has to be made,” said Erhard. And 
asked specifically if he would consider entering the MLF without the other European allies, he 
replied: “I cannot give you a flat ‘yes’, but I cannot deny it.”127  
Grewe never received any clear message that the Johnson administration would seriously 
contemplate a bilateral deal with Germany on the MLF.128 The official view in Washington had 
always been that at least one other major nation – i.e., Great Britain or Italy – had to participate. 
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Johnson’s reply to Erhard confirmed his intention to reach agreement by the end of the year, but 
he also underlined the importance of broad participation in the MLF.129 At the State Department, 
however, there certainly was sympathy for a bilateral deal, primarily out of irritation with British 
foot-dragging. “It would be good to have the British in from the beginning,” one diplomatic 
telegram had stated in June. “However, if [the] choice is between having them in at the beginning 
and a further year’s delay, there is no question but that we want to avoid delay. Any hint that we 
would compromise on this point could involve us in greater difficulty with the Germans.”130 State 
Department leaks had also contributed to the rumor that a bilateral deal with Bonn was secretly 
being prepared. And when Die Welt’s Washington correspondent wrote a story about the “fiasco” 
of Grewe’s visit, he was soon called in by an irritated Henry Owen of the State Department’s 
Policy Planning Council, who stressed that the United States was set on moving ahead with the 
MLF regardless of the British: “The British have no choice – they must either knuckle under or 
watch the MLF go without them.”131 Readiness of this sort was thought to help bring the British 
around. But it also let a different cat out of the bag. Besides forcing the British closer to 
acceptance of the MLF, word of a bilateral deal between the United States and Germany on the 
MLF alarmed the French.132 
It was soon becoming increasingly clear that de Gaulle could not be expected to accept 
the MLF without further ado. “There are indications,” reported Bohlen from Paris on the day of 
Erhard’s press conference, “that recent press reports re[garding the] possibility [of a] signature [of 
the] MLF soon have not been lost on French thinking on this subject.” Adding: “[The] French 
appear never [to] have thought [that the] MLF would materialize and were correspondingly casual. 
Now, however, that concrete possibility looms their basic antagonism to [the] idea [is] becoming 
more active.” Bohlen also cited friendly disposed French diplomats who speculated that de 
Gaulle might move drastically against NATO, the United States, and Germany because of the 
MLF. “We should anticipate [a] more active French anti-MLF campaign for future in spite of [the] 
public line of indifference,” concluded Bohlen.133 By the end of October, alarming reports from 
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the embassy in Paris had indeed become numerous and French resistance to the MLF had 
become a principal concern in Washington.134 
The potential implications of French hostility towards the MLF finally began to dawn on 
Washington. On October 20, the thrust of the French campaign to avert the MLF was revealed 
to the State Department in a call from Bruno de Leusse of the French embassy. In “...perhaps the 
most pronounced expression [of] French hostility to [the] MLF,” Alphand’s deputy highlighted 
the disruptive impact of the MLF on Franco-German relations. By joining the MLF and making 
their security dependent on a non-European power, he argued, the Germans would abandon 
their “European vocation.” The MLF, it was implied, was bound to cause havoc to the spirit of 
European integration.135 Paris appeared to be threatening that pressing ahead with the MLF could 
ultimately lead to the dissolution of the Common Market. 
At this point it is important to note that the Common Market was already experiencing a 
crisis of its own and that this was affecting calculations in European capitals with regard to the 
MLF. In the fall of 1964, the Six had reached a deadlock over the common agricultural policy. 
The Erhard government had time and again blocked an agreement on the prices of cereals. With 
elections less than a year ahead, it was deeply averse to draw the anger of German farmers by 
lowering these prices. And since the Rome Treaty had not demanded a common agricultural 
policy prior to 1970, Bonn felt that it fully stood within its rights to refuse an agreement in 
1964.136 Yet de Gaulle, as we have seen, had made the early enactment of a common agricultural 
policy a priority in French foreign policy upon his return to power and was quite prepared to 
undo the Common Market if he did not get his way. With the Six thus drifting towards crisis, 
there was a widespread reluctance in European capitals to embark on new adventures that could 
further undermine Franco-German relations and the Common Market. Many Europeans, 
perceiving the MLF above all as an American challenge to de Gaulle’s notion of a ‘European’ 
Europe, were concerned that the MLF would provoke him into a more damaging retribution 
against the Common Market than his veto of Britain’s membership in January 1963. 137  The 
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Johnson administration’s drive to reach agreement on the MLF by the end of 1964 thus seemed 
increasingly out of sync with political developments in Europe. As it turned out, the political state 
of affairs in Europe in the fall of 1964 would even enable de Gaulle to kill two birds with one 
stone. 
The hope among officials in Bonn as well as in Washington was that Common Market 
issues and the MLF could be treated separately. Yet the conjuncture was not overlooked by Paris. 
France had valid economic reasons to stand firm on the moot point of the grain price, but de 
Gaulle also recognized the opportunity to link the impasse within the Common Market with his 
goal to scuttle the MLF. Both issues were presented by French officials as a defining test of the 
‘Europeanism’ of the Germans.138 On October 21, de Gaulle’s Minister of Information Alain 
Peyrefitte issued a warning that France would “cease to participate” in the Common Market if 
Germany would continue to resist an agreement on common cereal prices by the end of the 
year.139 Couve de Murville echoed this threat in a speech before the National Assembly a short 
while later and moreover linked it to Germany’s support for the MLF.140 It was the first of a 
couple of speeches by French leaders which presented both the MLF and the issue of agricultural 
prices as test cases for Germany’s earnestness about achieving friendly relations with France. On 
November 5, Prime Minister Georges Pompidou denounced the MLF and the prospect of a 
bilateral American-German agreement as being directed against France. He left no doubt that 
Paris expected Bonn to concede on both issues, or else it would risk the split-up of both the 
Common Market and the Treaty of Reconciliation. “The agricultural common market must take 
shape, for without it the industrial common market will simply collapse,” said Pompidou. And: 
“If the multilateral force were to lead to the creation of a German-American military alliance, we 
would not consider this as being fully consistent with the relations we have with the Federal 
Republic which are based on the Franco-German Treaty.”141 French officials even hinted that 
German participation in the MLF could compel Paris to seek an entente with Eastern Europe, 
which would present additional hurdles for the reunification of Germany.142 Finally, in a speech 
in Strasbourg on November 22, de Gaulle added his weight to the French campaign by warning 
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the Erhard government that it would “inflict a deep wound on a great hope” if it abandoned the 
Franco-German entente to become an “auxiliary” of the United States.143 
The pressure on Erhard to concede on the MLF in order to mollify the French became 
almost unbearable. There was no longer any doubt that the MLF could irrevocably damage 
Germany’s amity with France. De Gaulle struck Erhard where he was most vulnerable. In the 
German domestic political debate, the unproven virtues of the MLF were increasingly 
outweighed by a desire to prevent France’s perennial animosity. When the ‘Gaullists’ launched 
their first major attack in the Bundestag on Erhard’s Atlanticist foreign policy in mid-October, 
Erhard had not yielded an inch. But he could not prevent that soon thereafter a procession of 
concerned German politicians was on its way to Paris when French leaders were beginning to 
lash out publicly against German participation in the MLF. In particular Konrad Adenauer had 
found – at his advanced age – a new calling as the leader of the ‘Gaullist’ wing in the CDU. On 
November 9, the patriarch of Germany’s postwar politics left on a self-appointed mission to 
Paris in order to ease the growing Franco-German rift. His visit was a gala of Franco-German 
goodwill, during which Adenauer even solemnly declared that “we should thank God for having 
given us General de Gaulle.” 144  Adenauer’s mission gravely undermined Erhard’s domestic 
position on the MLF. De Gaulle informed Adenauer of his deep-seated objections to the MLF, 
ranking it even above the common agricultural policy as the Franco-German issue on which 
there was little room for compromise. Upon his return, on November 11, the CDU voted in 
favor of postponing any commitment to the MLF until it could be given a “more European 
character” and be made less objectionable to France. Erhard and his Foreign Minister Schroeder 
were fiercely attacked for their Atlanticist predilection and for being too rigid with the French.145 
Even as Erhard persisted in his support for the MLF, the prospect that a treaty had to pass the 
German Bundestag in the face of French enmity had made his objective ever more controversial. 
De Gaulle’s diplomatic harangue against the Erhard government had raised the possibility that 
the MLF would simply fall through for lack of support within Erhard’s own party.146 
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De Gaulle had furthermore acquired leverage over Erhard because his threats of reprisal 
against the Common Market compelled other European capitals to press Bonn to pay a price in 
the nuclear realm. Walter Hallstein, the German chairman of the European Commission, also 
urged the MLF’s deferral until after agreement would have been reached among the Six on the 
unified grain price.147 Erhard, however, reluctant to link the issues, was even more reluctant to let 
go of the MLF. In late November, he made his sacrifice: he accepted the common agricultural 
policy and lower cereal prices in hopes of gaining French acquiescence on the MLF.148 Yet, as 
Newhouse put it, de Gaulle might have been prepared to “let Erhard wriggle off the grain-price 
hook, at least until after the German elections in September, provided that the MLF was 
discarded.”149 Erhard’s sacrifice was in vain. He had simply paid the wrong price and, as we will 
see, de Gaulle would hence get his way on both accounts.  
De Gaulle’s campaign against the MLF had thus transformed the Erhard government 
into an ally under duress. He had found an important weak spot in the Johnson administration’s 
drive to garner European support for the MLF. Germany’s alleged appetite for nuclear weapons 
moreover had been presented by the American advocates of the MLF as the prime rationale of 
the MLF. With Bonn showing signs of battle fatigue at the end of 1964, the premise on which 
much of the campaign had been built – and on which Johnson had decided to give his uncertain 
support – was rapidly changing. 
 
NATO 
Besides putting the future of Franco-German cooperation and the Common Market in doubt, de 
Gaulle issued strong warnings against NATO in order to stave off the MLF – and this posed 
dilemmas above all to the Johnson administration. In fact, de Gaulle’s initial riposte to the 
establishment of the MLF was always more likely to take some form against NATO than against 
the Common Market.150 French disengagement from NATO, starting in March 1959 with the 
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withdrawal of the French Mediterranean Fleet, was already long in evidence. In April 1964, all 
French naval personnel were withdrawn from NATO.151 In early July, the Central Intelligence 
Agency furthermore informed the White House that, according to an unnamed high French 
official, de Gaulle was actively considering a “drastic step” against NATO.152 And in November, 
de Gaulle notified Ambassador Bohlen of his intention to leave NATO in 1969 (i.e. as soon as 
the treaty allowed for it).153 Suddenly American insistence on the MLF raised the specter of 
prompting de Gaulle into an early withdrawal from NATO while giving him an opportunity to 
blame the Americans for trying to force the MLF down European throats.  
Indications that the MLF could provoke a complete French withdrawal from NATO 
were abundant by November 1964. When Pompidou and Couve de Murville addressed the 
French National Assembly in early November, for instance, neither had been willing to affirm – 
in response to direct questions – that France would continue to participate in NATO.154 The 
possibility of imminent French withdrawal was also inserted in diplomatic contacts between Paris 
and Washington; in a forthright telephone conversation with Dean Rusk, French Ambassador 
Alphand warned that the MLF would cause a “very serious situation” in NATO.155 General 
Michel Fourquet, the chief of the French air force with good access to the Elysée, might have 
given the strongest expression of French hostility to the MLF. In a conversation with Charles 
Bohlen, Fourquet ominously stressed that the introduction of the MLF would “coldly stab 
NATO to death.” Fourquet also reiterated the more widespread belief that the proposal had 
created – rather than responded to – a German nuclear appetite, and he underlined that in his 
view this was the United States’ “main crime.”156 While Fourquet’s statements were unusually 
harsh, they corresponded with the views of the French government. The Gaullist press, too, 
which was sponsored by government circles, was given to combining opposition to the MLF 
with blanket threats to NATO.157  
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Given the barrage of French threats to NATO at the end of 1964, historians have 
generally overlooked the fact that French attempts to stave off the MLF could be at least as 
effective by strictly playing the game by the rules of NATO – and potentially even be politically 
more rewarding to Paris. American officials had always rather easily assumed that the MLF would 
help cement the alliance more firmly and could be incorporated within the NATO framework 
without further ado. According to the concept, the MLF would be assigned to NATO and placed 
under the operational control of SACEUR; the missiles of the fleet would then be targeted by 
SACEUR in accordance with NATO-agreed strategies. 158  But the rule of unanimity within 
NATO meant that France could simply veto the MLF if it felt strongly enough about it, or at 
least prevent its absorption into NATO. While many in Washington and elsewhere may have felt 
that France had already withdrawn from NATO for all practical and political purposes by 1964, it 
was still a full member of the Atlantic alliance with blocking power over all decisions taken in the 
North Atlantic Council.  
To be sure, because of France’s persistent obstructionism, some had been advocating that 
the rule of unanimity be abandoned as the principle superseding everything else within NATO. 
In particular Secretary General Dirk Stikker, who was privately chafing at French negativism 
toward NATO,159 regarded this rule as a cardinal weakness since it made “NATO’s chain of 
strength [...] only as strong as its weakest link.”160 In the spring of 1964, he proposed that the 
alliance adopt a practice already in use within the OECD which meant that if a member 
disapproved of an action desired by the majority it could abstain while the others went ahead. 
Stikker actually sought to strengthen his case by arguing that such a formula was already being 
applied in practice to allied talks about the MLF; these discussions took place in a working group 
of eight nations which been meeting at the NATO headquarters in Paris but not as a NATO 
body (primarily in order to avoid French interference). “But it would be much easier,” he 
explained in a conversation with Dean Rusk, “if the action [on the MLF] could be taken within 
rather than outside NATO and if it could be explained as a NATO action.” Stikker’s abstention – 
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or constructive disengagement – doctrine got virtually no support, also not from Rusk.161 But the 
quandary that troubled him was real and the rule of unanimity would inevitably threaten the MLF 
as soon as the French decided to shift from passive opposition to outright hostility – as they did. 
In August 1964, Stikker was succeeded as NATO secretary general by the one candidate 
who was able to receive the endorsement from both the United States and France: the cautious 
Italian diplomat Manlio Brosio. 162  Brosio had been highly regarded as ambassador in Great 
Britain, the United States and France. In contrast to Stikker, he wanted to be an impartial 
mediator within the alliance.163 From the outset, he was above all concerned with the potentially 
disruptive consequences of the MLF. In Brosio’s view, the American proposal simply elicited too 
much opposition in Europe. He was particularly apprehensive about de Gaulle’s reaction; with 
his good contacts in the Quai d’Orsay and the Elysée, he had sensed earlier than most that 
French hostility toward the MLF was growing. In late September, paying his dues in Washington 
shortly after having taken over from Stikker, Brosio stressed that his “principal preoccupation” 
would be to assuage French hostility toward NATO and that he above all aspired to be an 
“honest broker” who would not take sides. While reassuring his American interlocutors that he 
approved of the MLF concept per se, he left little doubt that in his view de Gaulle might well 
exploit an agreement on the MLF as a “pretext for creating a major crisis in the Alliance […].”164  
Brosio had no desire whatsoever to question NATO’s rule of unanimity. On the contrary, 
he clearly spoke out against any such modification in an address to NATO parliamentarians on 
November 16 – his first major policy statement as NATO’s secretary general. Brosio stated that 
no ally had the right “to develop the structure of the Atlantic organization, or to effect in it 
modification calculated to radically alter its character in the direction of either more or less 
integration without the full consent, unanimously proclaimed, of all its members.” In addition, he argued 
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that the MLF was subject to this provision since it was “manifestly a project with capital military 
and political implications.” Brosio even seemed to be suggesting that setting up the MLF outside 
NATO against the wishes of any member state was incompatible with the terms of the treaty. He 
denied, one day later, that he had wanted to give the impression that it was legally impossible to 
establish the MLF outside NATO, but also reiterated that he preferred to see the MLF issue 
settled within the framework of the alliance and subject to the provisions of the treaty (and 
thereby to the rule of unanimity).165 
According to one alert commentator, Edmond Taylor, Brosio’s speech was “couched in 
prudent diplomatic language and delivered in such unemotional tones that many of his listeners, 
apparently including the press, did not immediately grasp its significance.” However, in an article 
for The Reporter, Taylor rightly called attention to the fact that Brosio’s stance had presented MLF 
proponents with a haunting dilemma. The undeniable implication of Brosio’s reaffirmation of the 
rule of unanimity was that de Gaulle could block the incorporation of the MLF into NATO. The 
journalist revealed that proponents of the MLF in Washington and elsewhere could be faced with 
an entirely different situation than they had previously envisaged. Instead of forcing France to 
acquiesce in the project or withdraw from NATO, these proponents were themselves confronted 
with the possible choice of abandoning the project or setting it up outside NATO. This last 
option did not generate much enthusiasm even among the fiercest advocates of the MLF in the 
United States. “It would, in effect, mean creating a rump NATO alongside the legal one,” Taylor 
observed. “Besides raising a host of technical difficulties, it would probably lead to the gradual 
withering away of the original organization.” Brosio’s address, Taylor pointed out, sent “widening 
ripples” through the alliance. Particularly in the smaller member states, it crystallized the diffuse 
opposition to the MLF:  
 
Observers here believe that the courageous position taken by the NATO secretary-general is 
certain to influence the attitude of several NATO governments that have never had much 
enthusiasm for MLF. Norway’s Foreign Minister Halvard Lange stated in a press conference in 
London that his country would not participate in [the] MLF under any conditions, and it is 
expected here that Denmark and Iceland will take the same stand. There is a strong likelihood 
that Belgium and Luxembourg will do the same. Portugal, Greece, and Italy are also considered 
possible defectors. Thus Washington’s strategy of isolating France as the only holdout at next 
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month’s ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council seems foredoomed to failure.166 
Washington and the “Coming Crunch in European Policy” 
By the end of 1964, a transatlantic crisis over the MLF – with France and the United States as the 
principal antagonists – began to seem inevitable. Because of de Gaulle’s counteroffensive, the 
MLF was bereft of a solid political basis in Europe. Whatever political strength remained behind 
the MLF proposal seemed increasingly derived from Washington’s position alone. This position 
was still one of strong support for the MLF. The Johnson administration had staked its prestige 
as leader of the alliance on the project. Its advocates at the State Department continued to 
control daily diplomatic actions. The clear impression in Europe was hence that Johnson was 
determined to force allied agreement on the MLF in time before the German elections of 
September 1965.  
That a crisis was brewing in Europe was not lost on Washington. In the perception of the 
Europeanists at the State Department, however, it was above all a moment of truth. They 
fervently believed that Washington should not give in to de Gaulle’s counteroffensive or to 
British foot-dragging. This was a crucial battle in the dispute over Europe’s future, comparable to 
the debate about the Schuman plan in 1949 and 1950.167 The Europeanists were quite ready to 
take de Gaulle head on. Rather than making the MLF less commendable, his opposition in their 
view underscored the urgency of counteracting European nationalism and weathering the storm. 
They also hoped that the MLF, once established, would offer a post-de Gaulle government an 
alternative to the expensive force de frappe. In addition, they remained willfully optimistic about the 
chances of securing an agreement by early 1965.168 All that Johnson had to do was to show 
strength of leadership. 
This attitude is revealed in particular in the memoranda drafted at the time by Walt 
Rostow as director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council. Reflecting on the “coming 
crunch in European policy,” he wrote to Dean Rusk on October 12 following a visit to Europe: 
 
Everyone concerned, including the British and the French, now understands that the decision on 
the MLF will determine whether NATO moves forward in the next decade around a pattern of 
increasing Atlantic integration or whether NATO moves towards fragmentation. [...] I believe that 
the underlying forces in Europe are sufficiently favorable for us to make this turn in the road with 
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success; but we should not underestimate the likely noise in the system. [...] Although the issues 
are more muted, I cannot help observing that the turning point of 1965 will be quite as important 
as that of 1947: we shall either solve the array of problems before us on an integrated basis or, 
should we fail, see a quite rapid phase of disintegration take hold in the Atlantic.169 
 
In another memorandum one week later, Rostow gave evidence of the preoccupation 
with the German question so common among proponents of the MLF in the State Department. 
Any argument against the project withered next to the imperative nature of this question. Rostow: 
 
We are not supporting the MLF because it’s fun or because we expect everyone involved will like 
it. We are supporting the MLF because it is the best among a series of unsatisfactory solutions to 
a problem which will not go away. [...] At the core of the problem is Germany, as it has been at 
the core of every major initiative we have taken in Europe since 1945. On this most vital and 
treacherous of issues our objective is to solve the problem in the way most likely to permit 
moderate German politicians to survive and flourish. And that objective has been continuous for 
a generation. 
 
In addition, Rostow characteristically stressed the importance of showing American leadership. 
The defeat of the European Defense Community in the French National Assembly in 1954, he 
argued, produced a relevant lesson: “We should not let the matter drag.” There was moreover 
one significant difference with the EDC: “The United States is prepared to join the MLF. 
Properly handled, this fact can mean the difference between failure in 1954 and success in 
1965.”170 
But the Europeanists could not prevent that the MLF came under more critical review 
within the Johnson administration as the storm in Europe gathered strength. The approaching 
December deadline, too, was thrusting those parts of the bureaucracy into the decisionmaking 
process that were less convinced of the project’s virtues. Rostow may therefore well have written 
his memoranda in recognition of the fact that the State Department’s control over the MLF’s 
destiny was slipping. The MLF project had developed into a question of bending (“surrendering” 
in the State Department’s lexicon) or breaking (“standing firm”). And those in Washington in 
favor of bending were becoming more vocal. On October 31, there was some interagency 
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discussion as to whether it would not be better to let the whole affair slide for two or three years: 
“Were we really sure whether we would be better off after the creation of an Atlantic force? 
Wasn’t there more stability in the present situation than we gave credit for, since the Germans 
were not about to proliferate?” Although it was concluded that for the moment nothing was to 
be gained from delay, the fact that questions were beginning to be raised was important.171  
The State Department’s Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) had been most 
consistent in its objections to the MLF proposal. It was above all interested in reaching 
agreement with the Soviet Union on a treaty stemming nuclear proliferation. Since Moscow 
castigated the MLF as a proliferation device and Soviet negotiators in Geneva named it the major 
obstacle to a non-proliferation treaty, the project greatly impaired their own ambitions.172 The 
ACDA, however, did not carry great bureaucratic weight.173  
In addition, many officials at the Pentagon were skeptical of the MLF’s advertised 
benefits; only the U.S. Navy considered the multilateral fleet a welcome extension. The project 
was considered expensive and complex whereas it would not add substantively to NATO’s 
deterrent posture. The MLF also threatened to absorb scarce European resources to the 
detriment of the conventional reinforcements required for implementing the flexible response 
strategy in Europe. The Pentagon was also warier than the State Department of disruptive 
French moves against NATO.174  
But the strongest resistance to the MLF resided within the White House staff. McGeorge 
Bundy was not opposed to the multilateral concept in principle and his record had reasonably led 
proponents to believe he was on their side.175 But the nature of his office determined that he was 
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above all concerned with guarding the president’s options. He believed that it was his task to 
protect Johnson from getting into trouble over a project to which – Bundy sensed – he did not 
feel personally committed. In addition, Bundy was quite capable of independent judgment on 
foreign policy issues. Concerned with the lack of strong support in Europe, he had always 
remained skeptical of optimistic State Department reports on the MLF negotiations. If anything, 
Kennedy’s ‘Nassau experience’ had conveyed a lesson of caution to him, and he was firmly bent 
on preventing a repetition of events. McGeorge Bundy was therefore on his guard. 
Bundy’s private vigilance was fed by members of his staff. Particularly David Klein, a 
senior member of the staff and responsible for European affairs, frequently expressed misgivings 
about the way the State Department conducted the MLF negotiations, believing that it was 
overselling the project and losing sight of political realities at home as well as abroad.176 In the 
same vein, Klein felt that the aforementioned Rostow memorandum on “the coming crunch in 
European policy” showed a “distortion in emphasis and context.”177 “Even at this late date,” he 
had already argued to Bundy in a long memorandum, “I think it remains moot whether the MLF 
can really strengthen the Alliance.”  
 
The obvious result [of the MLF] would be to replace NATO, a broader-based and perhaps less 
integrated organization, with a smaller grouping, more deeply integrated and less outward looking. 
Is such a development really in our interest?  Do we want a narrower and more exclusive 
European Alliance?  Would such a move be consistent with our desire for an expanding, outward 
looking Europe, bringing together its several parts? In other words, will the MLF contribute to an 
improved Alliance, to improved relations within Europe, and to improved coordination between 
Europe and the U.S.?  This is by no means an obvious conclusion. 
 
Klein also keenly observed that the administration’s public profile on the MLF was far more 
specific and supportive than Johnson’s commitment, and that this might end in political defeat 
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for the American president. “The last thing we want to do is tie this MLF mill stone around the 
President’s neck.”178 
In November, largely as a result of the December deadline for negotiations and the 
increasing mayhem in Europe, the MLF once again came under review from the highest policy 
level after months in which the State Department had had virtual license. A clear position on the 
MLF also had to be prepared before Johnson’s meeting with Prime Minister Harold Wilson at 
the White House in early December. It was high time to make the divided bureaucracy 
responsive to the need of preparing a cogent position. At Bundy’s suggestion, Johnson brought 
his presidential authority to bear on the policy-making process. On November 14, National 
Security Action Memorandum 318 (NSAM 318) ordained that coordination within the 
administration was to be tightened up. More specifically, Johnson’s directive stipulated that all 
American officials who traveled overseas to discuss the matter were bound by written 
instructions cleared in the White House, the State Department, and the Defense Department; in 
addition, only a few designated officials were authorized to discuss the MLF with the press.179 
Following NSAM 318, a committee was formed around George Ball and McGeorge Bundy to 
survey all aspects of MLF diplomacy and to come up with a coherent and unified position. 
Although it came to be called the Ball Committee – the group met at his office and he was also 
responsible for drafting its final report – it was really of interdepartmental reach. Richard 
Neustadt, for instance, who was closer to McGeorge Bundy than to the State Department, was 
brought in to direct its staff work. The essence of the committee’s work was to hammer out a 
consensus within the administration on the way forward. Yet the objective remained to achieve 
what the president had officially said he wanted – to reach allied agreement on the MLF by early 
1965 – without precipitating a political crisis or exposing him to a major policy failure.180 
American diplomacy on the MLF had reached a new – and final – stage. Through the 
involvement of the White House staff, Johnson’s priorities gained currency in the process and 
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inserted a measure of caution. NSAM 318 moreover revealed that Washington was no longer 
exclusively worried about the delay the British were causing. “It is also obvious,” it stated, “that 
we shall have to take careful account of the interests and purposes of France.” 181 De Gaulle’s 
anti-MLF campaign was beginning to have an effect in Washington; for safety’s sake, the Ball 
Committee was charged with devising a fallback that would save Johnson’s face in the event that 
the political risks of establishing the MLF within the foreseeable future became too great.  
The Implacable French 
When de Gaulle suddenly left no stone unturned to head off the MLF in the fall of 1964, this was 
perceived in Washington as a perverse change of course. In fact, both American and French 
officials did their best to appear as the righteous and aggrieved party. Alphand’s phone call with 
Dean Rusk on November 13 was a case in point. The French ambassador strongly conveyed that 
Paris did not understand why the United States had “suddenly started to press [the] creation [of 
the] MLF” as a “top political priority.” Whereupon Rusk replied that there had been no change in 
the American position since the proposal was first forwarded in 1961 – and that the United States 
had been led to believe that France was prepared to condone the membership of other allies. It 
was Paris, said Rusk in his “vigorous riposte,” that had “misleadingly” changed its position.182 In 
truth, the approaching hour of decision marked the end of a period in which France and the 
United States had failed to see eye to eye on the MLF. 
Since French acquiescence in the MLF had been taken for granted, Washington had put 
little thought into dealing with the possible ramifications of French opposition. Paris’ 
protestations suddenly confronted policy-makers with difficult questions late in the day. Could de 
Gaulle still be persuaded to assume his former tolerant stance on the MLF? The nuclear realm 
offered the most obvious opportunities for striking a deal – but also the most elusive. Could 
recognition of the force de frappe as a valuable contribution to the defense of the West have 
persuaded de Gaulle to go easy on the MLF? Exploring the possibilities of accommodation 
between American and French views on the MLF, David E. Mark of the State Department’s 
Intelligence and Research Bureau posed the question as follows: 
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It goes without saying that Washington must again think through the terms it might be prepared 
to offer Paris for a modus vivendi of several years of duration (a genuine reconciliation is 
probably not in the cards during de Gaulle’s reign). The major issue will be the degree to which 
the United States might be willing to recognize, and even to institutionalize, France’s status as a 
very major power in the West. Would the U.S. now be ready to accept France as a nuclear power in its own 
right? [...sanitized...] ...or would this be felt to be too incompatible both with having the U.K. 
move, through the MLF, toward giving up its independent nuclear force and with inducing 
Germany to abjure developing such a force [...]?183  
 
At a high-level interagency meeting on October 31, there was also some discussion in this 
direction. While it was agreed that little could be done to make the MLF per se more palatable to 
the French, McGeorge Bundy suggested that the Johnson administration be prepared to accept 
any kind of association with the future French force de frappe and that the MLF be made “plausibly 
open to the French.” 184  Similar suggestions were indeed inserted in high-level contacts with 
French diplomats.185 They would at the very least help to offset the notion that the MLF proposal 
was aimed against French influence in Europe and that the United States rather than de Gaulle 
was dividing the alliance. There is, however, sufficient reason to assume that the preparedness to 
adjust the multilateral formula in order to include the French was genuine. For one, the 
documentary record shows that Harold Wilson’s proposal for a more loosely defined Atlantic 
Nuclear Force accrued some sympathy in Washington precisely because it provided more leeway 
for an arrangement that included the force de frappe.186  
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Trying to appease de Gaulle by allowing for coordination of the French deterrent with 
the MLF was nonetheless the wrong answer to the problem. De Gaulle had no interest in any 
association of the force de frappe with the MLF (or, for that matter, the ANF). This would simply 
be at odds with his overriding goal of retrieving French independence since it created the 
impression that the force de frappe would be little more than an auxiliary force. It also would put de 
Gaulle’s ambition to organize European defense around his nuclear deterrent at a greater distance. 
De Gaulle did not reject coordination with American or British nuclear forces outside the NATO 
context. But there was in his view no need to hurry. On the contrary, he believed it would pay off 
to wait until the force de frappe had become an operational reality, achieved by France alone.187 
Besides hints at nuclear coordination, some thought was being given in Washington to 
making the MLF less offensive to de Gaulle by stripping the proposal of its wider connotations 
of promoting European and Atlantic integration. “The MLF would appear to be more 
compatible with West Europe’s current stage of political development and mood if the rationale 
for it were depoliticized,” Thomas Hughes of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research for instance believed; if the MLF could be “divorced from the context of European 
integration and Atlantic Community building,” this would “minimize its anti-French 
connotations.” 188  In the same vein, Mark believed that “the matter does not seem entirely 
hopeless” if only Washington could persuade Paris that “the revised MLF, by itself, need not 
present insuperable obstacles to the pursuit by de Gaulle of his European vision. 189  Such 
recommendations, however, came several years too late. The MLF carried a heavy freight of 
political connotations that could not be instantly shaken off. Ironically, the more the MLF 
proponents argued that their project was of capital importance to the future of European 
integration, the Atlantic community and Germany, the less acceptable it became to the one 
European capital whose consent was now being sought. “MLF seems to us to have become 
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blown up as [a] political issue of far greater proportions,” Bohlen and Finletter cabled the State 
Department on November 5, “in which de Gaulle believes that what is at stake is [the] entire 
military and political orientation of Germany, and indeed Europe, vis-à-vis [the] US.”190 And as 
de Gaulle explained to Rusk in December, France could never condone the acquisition by 
Germany – either directly or indirectly – of a nuclear capability.191 
Most American officials realized that, in fact, not much could be done to defuse the 
French campaign against the MLF. The United States simply had very little leverage over de 
Gaulle. Some staff work was committed in late October to examine whether the MLF could be 
made more agreeable to the “reasonable elements” in France.192 But de Gaulle did not have to 
fear domestic opposition to his efforts to foil the MLF; on the contrary, the opposition parties 
were equally unsympathetic to the MLF. “I have seen a lot of a material on the nature of the 
French problem in moving ahead with the MLF, but few ideas on how to deal with it,” Klein 
wrote to Bundy. “Clearly, this is a tough one without much possibility of French give.”193 
This helps to explain why American diplomats put their minds above all to keeping the 
record “straight.” They ardently tried to refute that the absence of a Franco-American dialogue 
on the MLF was caused by a general American unresponsiveness to French ideas about the 
transatlantic relationship going back to de Gaulle’s tripartite memorandum of September 1958. 
Eisenhower’s assumed lack of a response to that memorandum was often cited in newspapers as 
a source of French recalcitrance.194 The air was also rife with insinuations that the United States 
had failed to inform France about its plans with the MLF and that the diplomatic channels 
between Washington and Paris were clogged up. Ambassador Bohlen was particularly thin-
skinned about such allegations – and he repeatedly urged the State Department to issue a 
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declaration listing previous efforts to explain the MLF to France.195 While Bohlen did not get his 
way, there was a fair amount of feigned innocence on the American side.  
The State Department’s initiative to get in touch with the Elysée prior to Harold Wilson’s 
visit to Washington in early December must be considered in the same light. The interface with 
de Gaulle was at the top of the agenda when President Johnson met with his foreign policy 
advisers on November 19 to discuss the MLF. The lessons of Nassau were still fresh in the 
minds of American policy-makers, making it imperative to steer clear of another Anglo-Saxon 
deal without prior consultation of the French. The Ball Committee had conceived of a proposal 
to send a high-profile mission headed by John McCloy to Paris. Rather than a genuine effort at 
consultation, this proposal was an attempt at public posturing. For during the White House 
meeting, George Ball, with Rusk’s support, stressed that the mission would serve to offset 
allegations that the United States was trying to isolate de Gaulle within NATO: “We should 
seriously make the point to him (in such fashion that it was understood publicly): ‘We are not 
against you, but we don’t know what troubles you, and we don’t have proposals from you.’” 
Johnson’s response to his foreign policy advisers, however, was profoundly skeptical – a herald 
of things to come:  
 
[…] this sort of emissary is just going to irritate de Gaulle. He’s after bigger fish. He wants to talk 
to me and he wants to talk about things that are very important to him – assuming that he wants 
to talk at all. […] de Gaulle might well conclude that there was no government operating in the 
United States, just bankers from New York. [McCloy worked with Chase Bank in New York.] de 
Gaulle is certainly not going to succumb to a bunch of errand boys. He might react the way 
President Johnson would if de Gaulle started sending French bankers as his personal emissary.196  
 
In the end, Johnson authorized only Ball himself to visit Paris, where he had an entirely 
unproductive meeting with de Gaulle.197 But the White House session had made clear to Johnson 
the narrow range of options once de Gaulle’s active opposition to the MLF had come to the fore. 
If Johnson was indeed intent on getting allied agreement on the MLF by the end of the year, he 
would simply have to endure fierce and wide-ranging opposition from Paris. To de Gaulle’s 
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advantage, the potentially disruptive consequences of his wrath would hold more sway in the 
councils of decisions than the unproven virtues of the MLF. 
LBJ Acts to Ease the Rift 
The MLF was never at the hub of Lyndon Johnson’s concerns. In 1964, he was absorbed with 
obtaining a popular mandate on his own account in the presidential elections in November, by 
the rapid escalation of the war in Vietnam, by the thorny issue of race relations at home, and by 
preparations for his Great Society program. The transatlantic nuclear project was but one of the 
smaller issues, to which he did not feel personally committed. “We are not going to be adamant 
in our attitudes,” he volunteered at a press conference at his Ranch in late November 1964. “We 
are going to be cooperative and helpful, and we hope we can obtain a meeting of the minds of all 
our allies.” 198  Johnson certainly never brought his presidential stature into play in order to 
persuade Congress of the MLF’s virtues, disregarding Rusk’s and Bundy’s recommendations to 
this effect.199  
Yet Johnson had allowed his name to be attached to the proposal. And with his 
diplomats embarked on an apparently unchecked drive for the MLF, it was reasonably assumed 
that it had found strong support – rather than benign indifference – at the top level. Most 
American diplomats, particularly those who conducted the MLF affair on a daily basis, had 
reasonably taken for granted that the president was intent on achieving the MLF. Johnson, unlike 
Kennedy before him, had never exhorted them to be reticent in their dealings with European 
governments. “I would have thought that Johnson took me off, if he was that cool about it,” 
Rostow remarked many years later.200 The truth was nonetheless that America’s high pressure 
diplomacy on the MLF originated in the strongly held views and singular pertinacity of the State 
Department’s Europeanists and their supporters. The gap between the strength of their 
commitment and the weakness of Johnson’s was bound to lead to a row within the 
administration as soon as European opposition grew.  
 Johnson’s clash with a key part of his foreign policy bureaucracy came within a month 
after his landslide election victory against the Republican Barry Goldwater. Resistance to the 
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MLF in Europe had become much more vocal since his April decision, mainly as a result of the 
French turnabout. The attitude on the Hill continued to tend towards the negative and, in the 
absence of an unambiguous European demand, the White House increasingly seemed bereft of a 
vital argument to guide an MLF treaty safely through the Senate. Johnson’s officialdom, however, 
was still entirely geared towards establishing the MLF. Now that it was increasingly getting him 
into political trouble and he had finally won the White House under his own steam, Johnson’s 
time to assert control had come.201 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s planned visit on December 7 to Washington served as 
the catalyst to come to terms with the political situation. The Ball Committee was charged with 
preparing a position for Johnson. Getting Wilson’s agreement on the MLF – or a variation 
thereof – was still its overriding objective. The committee therefore focused on the question of 
breaching the gap between London and Bonn on the MLF. The British and the Germans still 
differed vehemently on the precise formula and, in the words of American negotiators, even 
seemed to be on “collision course.” Responding to pressures from within the CDU party, Erhard 
was advocating a European clause in the MLF agreement to safeguard the possibility of a future 
European nuclear force developing from the MLF; by contrast, Wilson – harangued by the 
Labour Party’s left wing and cognizant of his scant majority in the House of Commons – insisted 
on the American veto so as to avoid any appearance of nuclear dissemination. Bonn strove for 
some form of majority voting in the control body (although granting Washington a veto for the 
moment); London, however, insisted on retaining an absolute veto. The weight of American 
diplomatic pressure clearly lay on Wilson. Both Ball and Neustadt traveled to London as special 
envoys, impressing on the prime minister that the measure of success of his first meeting with 
Johnson would be entirely dependent on his responsiveness to the MLF proposal.202 The Ball 
Committee’s final recommendation to Johnson suggested some changes in the MLF formula to 
fall in with British wishes, but otherwise advised him to impose the force on Wilson. It stated 
bluntly that “in dealing with the British we must impress upon them that the final scheme must 
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be so arranged that their participation is on a parity with the Germans and other Europeans 
rather than with the United States.” In submitting the committee’s recommendation, Bundy 
stated that the latter’s position was weak enough that he could be made to accept the MLF if 
Johnson insisted.203 
Meanwhile, however, McGeorge Bundy was secretly preparing the ground for the MLF’s 
demise. Convinced that the State Department’s political judgment was affected by a good 
measure of wishful thinking, Johnson’s national security adviser had been gathering information 
around the official channels. Henry Kissinger, for instance, wrote Bundy in late November that 
“...it is simply wrong to allege that the future orientation of the Federal Republic depends on 
pushing through the MLF.” In Kissinger’s opinion, Germany was also not stable enough to 
become the “balance-wheel of our European policy.” He moreover believed that “the present 
State Department line is likely to fail and to fragment the Alliance still further” and that “many 
American officials abroad seem so committed to their preferred solutions that I am not sure they 
can always distinguish their wishes from reality.”204 Being in the White House, Bundy moreover 
had become persuaded of the weakness of Johnson’s commitment to the MLF. In his role as the 
president’s ‘guardian of options,’ he therefore felt that the regular channels failed to provide 
Johnson with at least one important option – that of abandoning the MLF.  
On November 25, in a top-secret memorandum to Rusk, McNamara, and Ball, Bundy 
finally declared himself against the MLF. “Against my own expectations of two weeks ago,” 
Bundy wrote, “I am reaching the conclusion that the U.S. should now arrange to let the MLF 
sink out of sight. Whether this should be done quickly or slowly is an important tactical question, 
but the overriding point which I wish to suggest in this tightly limited group is that we should 
now ask the President for authority to work toward a future in which the MLF does not come 
into existence.” Bundy’s principal argument was that the political costs of pressing on with the 
MLF had become unacceptable; “the MLF is not worth it.” Bundy furthermore expressed his 
belief, “from my own conversations with the President,” that Johnson did not feel committed to 
the project. Bundy acknowledged the embarrassment a sudden change in American policy would 
cause Erhard, but he was in no doubt that the German chancellor “would be glad to join […] in a 
radical defusing of the MLF and a proposal for a completely fresh look at the nuclear defenses of 
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the Alliance, with an ostentatious inclusion of France in this process of discussion.”205 Bundy’s 
memorandum did not have an immediate impact on the preparations for Wilson’s visit. George 
Ball, for one, was in Europe (London and Paris) at the time and would not learn of Bundy’s 
change of heart until the eve of Wilson’s visit. When Johnson began to turn his mind to Wilson’s 
upcoming visit, the Ball Committee’s memorandum was hence still the official recommendation. 
But Bundy had finally staked out his dissent with official policies in his secret memorandum. 
In the afternoon of December 5, Johnson finally met with his advisers to discuss the 
situation. Instead of the routine briefing session that the State Department had in mind,206 he had 
summoned his most senior foreign policy advisers – Rusk and McNamara – to the White House. 
Dean Acheson and David Bruce, the American ambassador to London whose judgment had 
been valued by President Kennedy, were also brought in. Vice President-elect Hubert Humphrey 
served as the liaison to the Senate. From the outset of the meeting, Johnson made clear his 
intense displeasure with the Ball Committee’s recommendation. And thus began a weekend of 
heated debate in the White House. Johnson now controlled the arena, weighing the pros and 
cons of the MLF and scolding his counselors for having led him down a rocky path. “Mr. 
President,” Acheson Reportedly said as tension mounted and hard words were spoken, “you 
don’t pay these men enough to talk to them that way – even with the federal pay raise.”207  
Johnson – at long last focusing his mind on the issue – realized that parts of his 
administration had been pushing the MLF as the centerpiece of his Atlantic policies, to which 
they had devoted massive energy and staked his political prestige. He discovered that American 
officials had been insensitive to the adverse political climate in Europe and that they had been 
acting in flat contradiction with his maxim that the United States “stop telling Europeans they 
have to do this or that – or else.”208 He stressed that he had never committed himself to achieving 
the MLF against all odds, even though he had been prepared to make a best effort to persuade 
the Europeans and Congress of its benefits. He chided his advisers for overestimating his 
political clout, for being inconsiderate of his political interests. In the course of this exchange, the 
official recommendation by the Ball Committee fell by the wayside.209 
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The discussion initially focused on Germany. What would happen, Johnson wanted to 
know, if he should decide against the MLF? Would the Germans then go off on their own? 
Would the MLF’s demise lead to a German national nuclear capability?  His aides responded that, 
within a decade or so, this could indeed be the case. Unless arrangements were made to trim 
down Germany’s second-class status, the mere existence of the British and French national 
deterrents might provoke the Germans into developing one as well. Johnson took the point, 
intimating that he would take this course if he was a German leader. But then, as attention shifted 
from long-term objectives to more immediate political exigencies, the MLF moved into more 
treacherous waters. The conditions in Europe were outright adverse. With his four-vote majority 
and a militant left wing, Prime Minister Wilson was in a tight corner. The Italian government had 
dropped into a crisis once again – and Rome had informed Washington that it would be reluctant 
to sign an MLF charter at the end of the year. Above all, however, de Gaulle’s vehement 
opposition to the MLF spelled political havoc.  
Some of Johnson’s advisers warned that pushing ahead on the MLF was likely to provoke 
a wide range of French countermeasures. De Gaulle’s threats were certainly affecting the 
Common Market and NATO. Belgium, one of the allies in the MLF Working Group, had 
expressed qualms about forging ahead with the MLF without the consent of the French. French 
hostility had already compelled Turkey, another participant, to withdraw its support.210 Denmark 
and Norway never participated in the MLF negotiations; fearing a French attack on NATO, 
however, they began to speak out against the project. Most importantly, as we have seen, de 
Gaulle’s antagonism had divided the German polity. The influential ‘Gaullist’ wing within the 
CDU was exerting strong pressure on Erhard to assume a more accommodating stance toward 
France and stall the MLF. Should Johnson take de Gaulle head on? Could he responsibly incur 
the risk of being blamed for a French attack on NATO, for undermining Franco-German 
reconciliation, and possibly even for the disintegration of the Common Market?  The stakes were 
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unmistakably high. Some tried to persuade Johnson to avoid a confrontation, while others – in 
particular Acheson and Ball – stressed the need for unwavering leadership.211 
Faced with such conflicting advice, Johnson looked for a familiar peg to hang his hat on. 
While the debate in the White House was continuing, influential senators were sounded out on 
Capitol Hill and the results were transmitted to the Oval Office without delay. Most senators – 
some of them seated on the powerful Joint Committee on Atomic Energy – proved as yet 
unconvinced of the project’s virtues. They were generally reluctant to permit anyone to stand 
closely to America’s nuclear hardware if it did not serve a demonstrated good purpose. They 
might also have sensed that the public mood toward the MLF was turning negative.212 Thus 
informed of the situation on the Hill, Johnson asked his advisers how they could expect him to 
sell a complex and controversial treaty obligation to skeptical senators if even the Europeans 
were so ambivalent about it. While conceding that the State Department had not yet undertaken 
a concerted effort to inform Congress about the MLF, primarily because it did not yet know 
exactly what it wanted Congress to accept, Ball and McNamara pointed out that a solid 
presentation after Wilson’s visit would probably remove most of the criticism.213 But Johnson 
remained unconvinced; he had now entered territory on which he was far more familiar than any 
one his aides. He was far from convinced that Congress could be swayed to back the MLF. “His 
election […] had been a defeat of Goldwater extremism and not a solid liberal mandate,” he 
argued.214 “I don’t want to be a Woodrow Wilson, right on principle, and fighting for a principle, 
and unable to achieve it.”215 
Instead of a routine briefing, the White House meeting in preparation for Harold 
Wilson’s visit thus had left the American position on the MLF in complete disarray. Johnson 
strongly felt that the recommendation to twist Wilson’s arm on the MLF was sorely out of touch 
with political reality. It would set him on a track to political trouble soon after having won the 
White House in a landslide. Realizing the predicament he was in, Johnson was clearly searching 
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for a way out. Another session therefore had to be arranged. But before the second session began 
one day later, on December 6, Johnson’s still unformed resolve against the MLF was significantly 
stiffened by his national security adviser.  
In the aftermath of the first meeting, Johnson had asked his aides why Kennedy had been 
“tentative” on the MLF, to which they had opaquely responded that there had been different 
reasons at different times. Early next morning, however, McGeorge Bundy decided to pull out 
the memorandum he had written for Kennedy in June 1963, and to which the late president had 
then reacted “very strongly and affirmatively.” The pith of this memorandum had been that the 
MLF was not worth all the trouble if American diplomatic pressure was the only factor that could 
bring it about, that American diplomacy should switch from “pressure” to “inquiry” and remove 
any sense of a deadline. Bundy had also informed Kennedy that part of the problem was to be 
found within the administration, adding that “there would be a certain loss of face for the 
passionate MLF salesmen, but they are not the US government.” 216 The impact on Johnson of 
reading McGeorge Bundy’s memorandum to Kennedy is not difficult to fathom. Johnson had 
been largely unaware of Kennedy’s reservations, despite Bundy’s attempt in early December 1963 
to inform him, and he had pursued the MLF in part as a matter of loyalty to his precursor. Had 
he known of Kennedy’s disposition, he surely would not have treated the matter as casually. 
Johnson moreover could recognize in Bundy’s old memorandum the situation and the people he 
was struggling with at that very moment. The dilemmas and the names were strikingly similar. 
Bundy’s memorandum even seemed to indicate a way out for Johnson.  
In addition to unearthing his memorandum to Kennedy, Bundy believed that the time 
had come to notify Johnson of the private qualms he had already expressed in his secret 
memorandum to Rusk, McNamara, and Ball. Together with the old memorandum, he therefore 
presented an “alternative view” on the MLF. Although Bundy claimed that he still favored “going 
ahead very hard with Wilson” and merely wanted to inform Johnson that “there is another side 
of the case,” his memorandum presented the case against the MLF as effectively as anyone could 
have done. First among an array of contrary forces, Bundy called attention to the strength of 
French hostility: 
 
General de Gaulle’s hostility is fixed and strongly supported by all French Gaullists. Tactically, the 
violence of French feeling can probably be somewhat moderated if you visit Paris and reason 
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with him, but the underlying hostility of France will remain. It is true that the French propaganda 
now is preventive in purpose, but it will continue at least until ratification in all countries. The 
French will charge us with dividing the Alliance and blocking the future of Europe, and many 
who do not support de Gaulle will believe them. The Germans will be split by this French 
pressure and they, too, will show some tendency to blame us.217 
 
It was the first time that French opposition was listed as a prominent reason by anyone 
on the American side to go easy on the MLF. De Gaulle’s clamor had until then been accepted as 
inevitable background noise to the establishment of the MLF. Its political connotation – that it 
would provide an alternative for Europeans to the French force de frappe and a counterweight to 
the pernicious influence of Gaullism in Europe – had made it all the more difficult to accept that 
de Gaulle’s opposition could be a reason at all to abandon the MLF.  On the contrary, the 
stronger the French resisted, the more important the Europeanists at the State Department 
considered it to show leadership. In a way, therefore, McGeorge Bundy had broken a taboo. At 
the end of his memorandum, he stated that the “devil’s advocate” would state the choice for 
Johnson this way: 
 
 (1) If you go full steam ahead, you face a long, hard political fight, a major confrontation with de 
Gaulle, and a possibility of defeat or delay which would gravely damage the prestige of the 
President.  
(2) If you go half steam ahead, there will probably be no MLF, but it will not be your fault alone. 
You will have kept the letter and spirit of the Kennedy readiness to move if the Europeans 
wanted it. There will be trouble with the Germans, but nothing unmanageable. There will be 
plenty of opportunities for debate, discussion and delay, and for gradual and ceremonial burial. 
Your wisdom, caution and good judgment will have the praise of liberals, of military men, of the 
British, of the French, and of many Germans – and you will have freedom to make a different 
choice later if you wish.218 
 
The effects of French opposition to the MLF would reveal itself to Johnson through 
other channels as well. In the morning of December 6, an urgent cable came in from the 
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American ambassador in Bonn, George McGhee. McGhee reported in vivid terms on the crisis 
in the CDU, describing how those who feared open confrontation with France – Adenauer 
included – were frenetically trying to force Chancellor Erhard into stalling the MLF. According 
to McGhee, the very survival of Erhard’s government was at stake.219 His report was an obvious 
setback to the supporters of the MLF. Not only had the Germans been the only solid allies in 
Europe, but their inherent nuclear appetite had also consistently been put forward by the State 
Department as the main reason for the MLF. Yet now it appeared as if pushing ahead with the 
MLF would cause more problems with the Germans than renouncing it.  
The same morning Johnson also talked to William J. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate’s 
Foreign Affairs Committee. While Fulbright had not originally been adverse to the MLF, he now 
informed Johnson that he would not support it because of lack of European support and that 
any agreement would probably fall short of votes in the Senate. Fulbright had participated in the 
NATO parliamentarians’ meeting in November, where the dearth of European support for the 
MLF and the ramifications of de Gaulle’s counteroffensive had been dominant themes. It was at 
this meeting, too, that NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio had restated the rule of unanimity 
within NATO.220 
By the time Johnson met with his advisers for the second time, in the afternoon of 
December 6, he had made up his mind. At the outset, he simply announced that he was not 
going to sell the MLF to Harold Wilson; instead, a fallback position was to be prepared prior to 
his meeting with the British prime minister the next day. Johnson’s newfound resolve took most 
by surprise and some – Ball, McNamara, and Bruce221 – muttered objections, pointing out that a 
sudden policy reversal would be a blow to American leadership in Europe, leave the field open to 
de Gaulle, and – most ominously – have serious repercussions in Germany. But Johnson was 
bent on chucking the MLF. Significantly, he could rebut his advisers’ protestations with the 
information that had reached him in the morning. When it was claimed that Fulbright supported 
the MLF, he snarled that the senator had just assured him of the contrary. When attention shifted 
to the possible repercussions in Europe, Johnson whipped out Bundy’s memorandum and – to 
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the consternation of George Ball and others – began to recite the arguments for backing down 
on the MLF on the very grounds of European opposition. 222  And Johnson had McGhee’s 
message in hand when some of his advisers warned of a serious backlash in German national 
politics in the event the United States gave up on the MLF. He could now argue that Erhard’s 
predicament would get worse, not better, if Washington continued to press the MLF. “If the 
Germans are going to have trouble with this,” Johnson said, “what in the hell are we going to 
make all this fuss about.”223  
As he lectured his advisers, Lyndon Johnson was at long last riding his bureaucracy with a 
tight grip on the reins. It nonetheless still required some thought in order to define a fallback 
option that avoided the potential fallout of reversing a widely publicized commitment.224 Johnson 
and his advisers were still searching for a method to toss the MLF back to Europe as Wilson 
paced across the White House lawn. In the end, Johnson simply assumed the “inquiry” stand 
which Bundy had suggested to Kennedy in June 1963. He would leave the initiative entirely with 
Wilson (after having first assailed him on some economic issues). Johnson knew that his British 
counterpart would be far from eager to discuss the topic. He would let him present his ANF 
proposal, then offer some polite comments to the extent that modifications were necessary to 
meet German demands, and finally encourage Wilson to sort it out with Erhard under his own 
steam. 
This is indeed how Johnson’s private conversation with Wilson came to pass.225 The 
official meetings between American and British delegations in the three days of Wilson’s visit 
were conducted in similar non-committal fashion. The differences between the MLF and the 
ANF were discussed, but without any serious attempt from either side to breach them. American 
officials were above all interested in managing the public presentation of the summit’s 
conclusions. They were determined to prevent any one, including the British, from claiming 
victory for having killed the MLF; the opposite notion, that major steps had been taken toward 
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achieving the MLF, was also to be avoided.226 Washington in particular went out of its way to 
avert claims that French opposition had influenced Johnson’s decision to go easy on the MLF; 
conversely, it was also exceedingly careful not to supply de Gaulle with the appearance of an 
Anglo-Saxon accord – and hence with a welcome excuse to lash out against NATO or the 
Common Market. If the final communiqué of the Anglo-American summit deserves 
consideration, it is therefore for its utter inconclusiveness and circumspection – or perhaps for its 
seemingly innocuous reference to the “legitimate interests of all members of the Alliance.”227  
The purport of the meeting was at first hidden from the public view, masked by the 
blandness of the communiqué, the apparent satisfaction of both leaders, and the continuing 
assurances from American officials that they still considered the MLF the best idea available to 
solve the nuclear-sharing problem within NATO. Initial press reports even suggested that Wilson 
had given in on the MLF, causing Bundy to warn Johnson that they “may lead de Gaulle to talk 
of another British surrender.”228 Wilson, astonished and relieved that Johnson had not twisted his 
arm on the MLF, declared that the meeting had been “completely successful” and evidenced a 
“total identity of view” between London and Washington. There had been “no theology,” he said, 
referring to the State Department’s pressure in the recent past.229 Gradually it was dawning on the 
allies that there had been an important relaxation in the American stance on the MLF, if only for 
the sheer inaction of the Johnson administration which had pressed so hard for allied agreement 
on the MLF by the end of the year. 
It was a rare Johnson leak to the press that confirmed that the United States had 
withdrawn its active support from the MLF. Johnson had not been wholly comfortable with the 
state of affairs, even after his encounter with Wilson. Firstly, he feared that London and Bonn 
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would catch him by surprise and overcome their differences to strike a deal on an ANF formula 
with a strong MLF component.230 This would then oblige him to resume the active pursuit of the 
MLF whereas de Gaulle’s hostility would not have changed.231  He would then also have to 
approach Congress without a clear European consensus. Secondly, Johnson had been seriously 
disturbed by the fact that a key part of his foreign policy bureaucracy had been so unresponsive 
to his political needs and could lead him into tight spots. In the course of the sessions in early 
December, Johnson had come down hard on his advisers and left them with unforgettable 
lessons. In Philip Geyelin’s view,  
 
rough as some of the sessions [in December] apparently were, they were also instructive. Few 
who were there or heard about it would thereafter make any quick assumptions about what would 
be palatable and what would not, when presented to Lyndon Johnson. Few would come 
unprepared to present their case in minute and, if possible, irrefutable detail. And few would 
presume to speak for the President without being quite certain where he stood. It was a 
memorable object lesson in Johnson decisionmaking, a major development in the President’s 
move towards mastery of the “processes,” a significant turn in the U.S. approach to Alliance 
policy.232  
 
Johnson nonetheless felt he had to take additional measures in order to secure the bureaucracy’s 
responsiveness to his political needs. He was determined to establish tighter control over 
American foreign policy. Johnson was to act with remarkable efficacy to deal with both of his 
concerns. 
On December 17, Johnson summoned his foreign policy advisers to the White House 
and asked them to agree to an unambiguous presidential guideline concerning the MLF. National 
Security Action Memorandum 322 (NSAM 322) nailed down that future discussions on nuclear 
questions within the Western alliance were to be conducted by American officials in observance 
of strict rules. Elaborating on the theme of NSAM 318, the new directive ordained that all 
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members of the American government refrain from exerting any amount of pressure on the 
European allies. In addition, it laid down what political requirements had to be fulfilled before 
Johnson would be willing once again to take the issue up. Any nuclear scheme could only have 
his support, NSAM 322 stipulated, if it was founded on solid agreement among principal 
European allies and after it had been fully discussed with France: 
 
I wish all American negotiators to avoid public or private quarrels with France, and to maintain in 
public and private the following position: We are interested in reducing our differences with 
France; we will never support any proposal for a nuclear force which is in fact directed against 
France; we will not sign any agreement which does not contain open doors for France; nor will 
we make any agreement until after French opinion and French desires have been carefully and 
responsibly explored. 233 
 
Not only had Johnson thus decided against pushing the MLF, but NSAM 322 also reflected his 
resolve not to drive France into isolation. 
The contents of NSAM 322 were publicly known before the ink had dried up – literally. 
The memorandum had come to Johnson’s desk for signature as he was being interviewed by 
James Reston of the New York Times. The president permitted – deliberately or impulsively? – the 
reporter to set his eager eye on the memorandum. 234  Not surprisingly, its gist returned – 
apparently with White House approval – on the front page of next day’s issue of the 
newspaper.235 The impact of Johnson’s press leak was profound. It made it well-nigh impossible 
for the avid proponents of the MLF to continue their pressure tactics under his banner. His 
reversal on the MLF now also dawned fully on Europe’s capitals.236 
The MLF had run its last course. NSAM 322 had sealed its fate. Johnson had virtually 
given de Gaulle a veto over the MLF; no nuclear-sharing plan discussed “in advance and detail” 
with France could have produced the latter’s consent. De Gaulle had raised the price of the MLF 
by launching an attack on several fronts and unleashing a range of forces against the project. 
These hit the MLF where it was most vulnerable. A few months later, a British diplomat told the 
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American embassy in Paris that de Gaulle had said to Hervé Alphand: “The MLF is dead. It is I 
who killed it. Yet I almost regret having done so since it would have permitted me to do sooner 
that which I intend to do.”237 Lyndon Johnson could no longer be blamed as the wrecker of the 
Atlantic alliance. 
Conclusion 
The MLF was never formally laid to rest. It was never murdered – no corpus delicti, no 
embarrassing funeral for one-time advocates to attend. NSAM 322 simply laid down that the 
United States would refrain from using strong-arm tactics to reach agreement on the MLF. 
American officials would still be allowed to assume an encouraging stance in anticipation of a 
unified European position on the MLF. Indeed, when signs of distress in Europe about the 
change in the American position filtered through to Washington,238 the Johnson administration 
staged a measured effort to convey its continuing interest in a collective solution to the nuclear 
problem. The United States was not prepared to force a solution on Europe, but neither should 
its position be interpreted as “aloof” or “neutral.” At a press conference on January 16, 1965, 
President Johnson expressed the “greatest of interest” in Anglo-German talks scheduled a week 
later as a follow-up to Wilson’s December visit to Washington. “I strongly hope in these talks 
there will be progress that will allow us to move on to fruitful multilateral discussions.” Johnson 
reaffirmed, in response to a direct question, that the United States was still “strongly in favor of a 
mixed-manned nuclear fleet.”239 
However, the pervasive and accurate feeling that there was no strong or active support 
for the MLF in the White House could not be dispelled with incantations. The contrast with the 
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Johnson administration’s pre-December 1964 record of activism in support of the project was all 
too obvious – and the fact that this activism was deemed essential inevitably fostered the belief 
that Johnson’s decision to go easy on the proposal implied a withdrawal rather than a slight 
modification of policy. Support in those European quarters that had avowed interest in the MLF 
began to disintegrate under French pressure and Washington’s inaction. As soon as the results of 
Johnson’s crucial meeting with Wilson had been relayed to Bonn, Erhard – pressured by the 
Gaullist wing in his party – urged Johnson to have a “big pitch” with de Gaulle on the MLF. 240 
In mid-January, the German chancellor further backtracked, as he asked that the proposal be put 
on hold until after German parliamentary elections in September 1965 – a move also designed to 
clear the ground for his meeting with de Gaulle on January 19. For a while, the Germans proved 
to be even more reluctant negotiators than the British.241 As for Johnson, he did not publicly 
speak about the MLF again after his January press conference – and for the remainder of the year, 
the MLF thus would live on in a twilight zone of half-hearted pursuit. In December 1965, 
Johnson finally put the MLF to sleep when Chancellor Erhard paid his first visit to Washington 
after the parliamentary elections. In their carefully guarded private conversation, Erhard came 
down squarely on the side of a “hardware solution,” but he found Johnson determined not to 
make any commitments. 242  A few weeks later, the German chancellor confided to Henry 
Kissinger, who was in Europe on one of his trips for the White House, that he had indeed sought 
a revival of the MLF in the weeks prior to his meeting with Johnson. He had noticed, however, 
that American interest in the question had considerably cooled and continued to do so “with 
every passing day.” Kissinger reported:  
 
In Washington he had observed the following line-up: Ball was strongly in favor of German co-
ownership; Rusk more moderately so; McNamara seemed at best indifferent and the President’s 
attitude could be summed up as follows: “Ludwig, I will do anything for you but don’t complicate 
my life by asking for nuclear weapons.”243 
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The story of the MLF’s ultimate demise under Johnson’s watch is important to the subject of 
this study in a number of respects. The failure of the MLF has typically been explained from its 
conceptual flaws. Most importantly, it would not have given the Europeans genuine control over 
their nuclear defense while it would have required a major investment. The Italian statesman 
Altiero Spinelli thus hit the nail on the head when he said to Vice President Hubert Humphrey in 
January 1965 that the MLF was a “half attempt,” and that as far as he was concerned “it would 
be better to have mixed-manning in the Pentagon, rather than in submarines or ships.”244  
Yet careful analysis also shows that French opposition was more significant in bringing 
about the MLF’s demise than often has been recognized. “The French view [on the MLF] may 
be the clearest,” McGeorge Bundy acknowledged in Danger and Survival (1988), “and it may have 
been decisive.” 245 If it had not been for de Gaulle’s active opposition, American pressure might 
have brought it off – and, backed by clear European support, Johnson would also have been in a 
much stronger position to convince the skeptics in Congress. In December 1964, Harold Wilson 
had fully expected that he had no choice but to concede to Johnson on the MLF. The Erhard 
government would probably also have pledged German participation if de Gaulle had not 
marshalled his German supporters on the domestic front against the project. As Bundy wrote: 
“The Germans initially supported the MLF, but only until they learned the strength of French 
opposition, and more because it was an American proposal than because of any strong German 
conviction.” 246  The credible threat of a French attack against NATO had further raised the 
political price to LBJ of pushing ahead with the MLF. De Gaulle could have simply vetoed the 
MLF’s incorporation into NATO as well, which would have left Johnson with the unenviable 
option of establishing the nuclear force outside NATO. In sum, de Gaulle held more trump 
cards than Johnson. 
Second, the story of the MLF’s demise made clear that the United States could not hope to 
isolate France within Europe. It showed, in particular, that the United States could not force 
West Germany to go against France on an important issue, just as de Gaulle had been unable to 
draw West Germany into his camp against American domination with the Treaty of 
Reconciliation in 1963. Already, the clash of 1963 had shown that Washington could ill afford to 
underestimate de Gaulle as a leader willing to go to great lengths to realize his vision; after the 
MLF’s demise, Washington also could no longer underestimate his political clout in Europe – if 
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only because of France’s central role. As Patrick Gordon Walker, the British Foreign Secretary, 
volunteered to William Tyler in March 1965 in an unusually forthright frame of mind, the 
Johnson administration “had killed and buried not only the MLF but the ANF by the position we 
had taken since December.” 
 
He said the only hope would have been for us to continue to press the Germans, instead of which 
we had told the Europeans that they should work things out among themselves. This they were 
incapable of doing, and it was clear that Erhard was not about to do anything which would 
expose him to pressure from de Gaulle. He said that Germany would finally have to choose 
between de Gaulle and the United States, and that unless we held the German feet to the fire on 
this issue, we would be conceding the victory to de Gaulle.247 
 
Lastly, Johnson’s decision against the MLF marked significant shifts in the decisionmaking 
processes in Washington. It had made clear, as Alphand astutely informed de Gaulle, that 
Johnson was not the prisoner of the ‘zealots’ (“zélateurs”) in his administration.248 Johnson’s 
verdict on the MLF was therefore also a declaration of independence from those advisers – in 
particular Acheson and Ball – who had consistently and vigorously sought to use American 
power to promote transatlantic and European unity against the Gaullist tide. In particular, 
immediately following Johnson’s victory in the 1964 presidential elections, Acheson had avidly 
tried to win ‘landslide Lyndon’ over to his activist transatlantic agenda. In a series of 
memorandums in November and December, he had advocated the MLF (or a variation on the 
theme), the creation of a new Atlantic Assembly, and further progress on trade liberalization, all 
“solidly based on the principle that collective, not national, action is the key to progress.” It was 
clear that he held high expectations: 
 
The United States is the most powerful nation in the world, the most concerned with the broad 
international public interest. Our President has had the greatest endorsement of any leader in 
decades. And yet our press is calling for the reconsideration of policies which we have been 
following for years, because Harold Wilson and General de Gaulle […] do not like them. All that 
is needed is a clear lead from you to set things straight and get us started forward.249 
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But Johnson declined the honor of bringing about Acheson’s Atlantic dream. On the 
contrary, having lost the MLF battle, the Europeanists were forced to the margins of Atlantic and 
European policymaking. While remarkably effective at dominating the gist of American foreign 
policy in the early 1960s, they had always had a limited power base in Washington 
(notwithstanding the support of grand old men of American foreign policy such as Acheson and 
McCloy). In the context of the MLF crisis, more pragmatic and realist foreign policy voices 
gained currency in the White House. Writing to Bundy, Neustadt hailed Johnson’s decision with 
a dry wit that revealed that the battle had been as much between the activist Cold War liberals 
and the pragmatists within the administration as between the United States and de Gaulle:  
 
In my ‘professional’ opinion as a President-watcher he not only made a free choice, knowing what 
he was doing, but the right choice for a President to make at this juncture. I’m impressed, and 
proud of him, and I’m not joining the chorus – which will swell for a while – of Achesonians (to-
lead-is-to-lead) or of British Foreign Office spokesmen. Those guys think rulers exist to be used. 
But we’re the king’s men, so to hell with that. The FO officials want an Anglo-German entente, 
for good reasons from our point of view, but if they have to use our king to make theirs move, 
their reasoning is flawed as fatally as that of our “cabal.”250 
 
Reflecting on Wilson’s visit in a euphoric memorandum to Johnson, McGeorge Bundy 
had already reasoned that the preparatory meetings on December 5 and 6 had been “without 
doubt the most productive and useful two days that we have had in foreign affairs since President 
Kennedy went to Berlin.” He hailed Johnson’s refusal to act on the counsel of his advisers “a 
turning point in the process by which you take the effective command of a major issue of foreign 
policy” and the abolishment of the State Department’s MLF office as the most “important or 
constructive administrative decision […] in the last 18 months in that Department”251 Following 
the MLF crisis of 1964, Bundy would feel much less inhibited to develop policy options to 
mollify de Gaulle that were independent of the State Department, complaining to President 
Johnson that its “views are so rigid that I doubt if we will get much from them.”252 
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Disgruntled with Johnson’s decision, the Europeanists in the State Department and their 
outside supporters were dismayed by the surge in pragmatism and realism in American foreign 
policy. “I know your theory,” Acheson muttered to Neustadt at a next occasion. “You think 
Presidents should be warned. You’re wrong. Presidents should be given confidence.” 253  The 
surrender of the MLF came as a rude surprise for those who had envisioned “clear sailing.”254 
The State Department had not fathomed that the president’s commitment was so much weaker 
than the public record. The MLF supporters therefore felt the new guidelines had all of a sudden 
left them “emasculated.”255 And they reproved Johnson for failing to put his leadership to the 
cause. “Here you had a man,” Finletter complained, “one of the most skillful handlers of 
Congress that ever existed in the United States, as President of the United States – just having 
won an overwhelming victory over his opponent – at the very peak of his power with Congress, 
and he never really asked them to do anything.”256 What the MLF supporters could not admit is 
that Johnson, by subsiding on the MLF, wisely prevented a repeat of the Nassau debacle.  
It was the Europeanists’ dexterity and their singular determination that had kept the 
proposal alive after Kennedy tried to quietly extinguish it. Now, they were decisively sidetracked. 
On the same day that NSAM 322 was made public through Reston’s column, the MLF office in 
the State Department, from which the campaign had been orchestrated, was dismantled; Gerard 
Smith resigned as MLF coordinator and his staff was dissolved.257 President Johnson refrained 
from acting vindictively towards the State Department, and some of the MLF supporters – Walt 
Rostow foremost – even climbed to higher ranking positions within the administration. But the 
White House would not allow them to breathe new life into the project. So when George Ball – 
opposed to “letting things drift” and leaving the initiative to de Gaulle, “who loves trouble” – 
prepared to make a speech on the MLF in February 1965, the White House intervened. Ball 
feared that “the long postwar battle to create an Atlantic community could easily be lost” if the 
United States stepped back from the batting plate. McGeorge Bundy, however, dreaded above all 
the “sound of divided trumpets within the administration.” It was ten days before French 
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville would arrive in Washington and everyone – apart from the 
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devout Atlanticists and Europeanists – was content with shelving the project at least until after 
the German elections. “If anyone is to restate our Atlantic nuclear policy,” McGeorge Bundy 
therefore warned Johnson, “it ought not to be someone who is a devout partisan of a particular 
solution like George.”259 Restrained by the White House to speak up against de Gaulle, Ball 
volunteered in exasperation to NATO Ambassador Thomas Finletter: “You know, I can’t do 
anything with the President. I’m sorry I just can’t.”260 
The demise of the MLF and the marginalization of its supporters signaled an important 
shift in American foreign policy away from staking political prestige on the progressive realization 
of an Atlantic community, a ‘commonwealth’ in which – as Acheson had counseled at the outset 
of Kennedy’s tenure – ‘common institutions are increasingly developed to address common 
problems.’ After the clash of 1963, the MLF had come to embody the hopes of a whole 
generation of American officials whose liberal foreign policy beliefs centered on the intertwined 
objectives of European unification and the Atlantic community. In his memoirs, George Ball 
disingenuously asserts that he was never a fervent advocate of the MLF, belittling it as a “clumsy 
if not unworkable military concept” and “seeing it solely as a political instrument.”261 This does 
no justice to the importance the State Department’s Europeanists, including Ball, and their 
sympathizers attached to the project. In the perceptive words of Wilson’s Minister of Defense 
Denis Healy, they had vigorously supported the MLF as “the grain of sand round which the pearl 
of European unity would develop.”262 At the same time, it was to them, as Hammond has written, 
a powerful “tool designed to unite de Gaulle’s opposition in Europe and embolden it within 
France” and supported by many “as a counterattack to de Gaulle.”263 Led by Acheson and Ball, 
the Europeanists had been the fiercest opponents within the American government to de Gaulle, 
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contributing most vocally to his ‘damnation’ and being most inclined to speak up against his 
‘anachronistic nationalism.’ The MLF’s demise was their biggest defeat. 
As poignantly, the State Department’s drive to enlist European – and in particular 
German – support for the MLF backfired against the greater goal of European integration. This 
is more than merely stating, as McGeorge Bundy has done, that “to try to make nuclear weapons 
an instrument of European unification was to ignore the basic reason for their existence in both 
Britain and France.”264 For as Miriam Camps has argued, de Gaulle’s decision in 1965 to leave an 
‘empty chair’ within the Common Market in response to the planned introduction of majority 
voting in the Council of Ministers was motivated in part by “the French failure to shake the 
Germans on the defense issue during the summer and the autumn of 1964.” Camps:  
 
[…] the real lesson [to de Gaulle] of the cereals prices ‘victory’ at the end of 1964 was not that the 
Germans had yielded to the French on this point or had put loyalty to the Community above the 
interest of the German farmer, but that they had stuck to the MLF and were conceding on what 
they considered to be a far less important issue. […] In this situation, it was entirely logical that 
General de Gaulle should have concluded that a ‘European Europe’ was not a possibility; it was 
also entirely consistent that in those circumstances he should have wanted to limit the extent to 
which his hands were tied by commitments to his Common Market partners.265 
 
The MLF crisis also denoted a turning point in the view of those Americans who had 
invested heavily in Europe and the transatlantic relationship since World War II. John McCloy, 
for one, censured Johnson’s decision to “put the ball in the court of the Europeans” as a “real 
triumph” for de Gaulle. His dismay with the turn of events is indicative of the broader context in 
which the ‘wise men’ of the Establishment judged Johnson’s betrayal to their cause: 
 
One of the great objectives of United States foreign policy after World War II was the 
reorientation of Germany and Japan. Thus far, achievements have been made over the opposition 
of both de Gaulle and the Soviet Union. The United States does not want to make the same 
mistake as after World War I. Poincaré was wrong in 1919 and so is de Gaulle in 1965. [...] The 
attempt of France to seek primacy in Europe at the expense of the Germans and the other 
Europeans; the attempt to revert to a system of European alliances; the axes of power concepts 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are simply not good enough as a basis for security 
                                                 
264 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival, 498. 
265 Camps, European Unification in the Sixties, 16, 117-118. 




in a nuclear world – it is toying with outworn concepts. [...] The United States should take the risk 
of leadership to bring about lasting peace. I do not believe we can successfully “put the ball in the 
Europeans’ court.” They cannot handle it alone – they never have and I do not believe they ever 
will. The prospect of their doing so in the face of the competing designs of General de Gaulle 
without our help is almost nil.266  
 
However, those – like McCloy, Acheson, and Ball – who believed the United States must 
incur the risks of leadership in order to face down de Gaulle’s nationalism were not allowed to 
occupy the center stage of American policymaking ever again. The MLF project was the last 
convulsion of the postwar era of American liberal activism in the Atlantic. 
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Chapter Eight  
De Gaulle Throws Down the Gauntlet: LBJ and the Crisis in 
NATO, 1965-1967 
 
Having imposed restraint vis-à-vis de Gaulle on his administration in the MLF crisis, Johnson 
could no longer be seen as the wrecker of the alliance. Yet the most severe transatlantic crisis of 
the Johnson years still lay ahead – and much would depend on how the Texan would deal with it. 
On March 7, 1966, de Gaulle informed Johnson that France would end its military participation 
within NATO. In addition, he requested the removal from France of troops not under French 
command. This chapter will examine Johnson’s response to this blunt challenge to the postwar 
architecture of Western defense.1 
De Gaulle’s distaste for NATO, of course, was not new, nor was his distinction between 
the alliance and the organization (even though this distinction rarely occurred to Americans). De 
Gaulle stressed that he favored military alliance with the United States as long as there was a 
Soviet threat – and that France would therefore remain party to the North Atlantic Treaty. But 
NATO’s integrated military structure did not fit his strong belief that a nation – certainly France! 
– must be in charge of its own defense.2 De Gaulle also objected to the subjection of French 
armed forces to a system of military integration under American dominion. NATO was, in de 
Gaulle’s unsentimental view of international relations, above all a tool for American hegemony. 
What is more, de Gaulle argued that the institutionalized character of the alliance codified the 
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bipolar system in world politics and perpetuated the Cold War. NATO was certainly 
incompatible with de Gaulle’s oft-cited aim of persuading “the states along the Rhine, the Alps, 
and the Pyrenees to form a political, economic, and strategic bloc” and “to establish this 
organization as one of the three world powers and […] as the arbiter between the Soviet and 
Anglo-American camps.”3 While de Gaulle had been willing to admit that NATO had been 
useful when there had been a plausible threat of a Soviet military attack on Western Europe in 
the early 1950s, he had long since argued that events had overtaken NATO’s usefulness. If 
anything, he considered NATO an impediment to the gradual political rapprochement with the 
Soviet bloc that would usher in an end to the Cold War and the creation of “a Europe from the 
Atlantic to the Urals.” 
In 1966, Johnson was forced to face the full implications of this vision. His anticipation 
of de Gaulle’s attack on NATO and his reaction once it occurred will be assessed hereafter. It is 
important to note at the outset, however, that the NATO crisis was about much more than 
France’s withdrawal from NATO. It was also about forging a more constructive relationship with 
the Soviet bloc in order to pave the way for a future European settlement, about finally resolving 
the nuclear sharing issue within NATO, and about bearing and sharing the financial and military 
burdens of defending the West. The interrelatedness of these thorny issues would put Johnson’s 
qualities as a statesman to the test. His skillful performance in the NATO crisis would do little to 
polish his blazon as a foreign policy president, stained as it was by the Vietnam War. But it 
mattered much to the long-term viability of the Western alliance. 
Toward a NATO without France 
Waiting for De Gaulle 
De Gaulle’s hostility towards NATO was, as we have seen, well-established by the time Johnson 
assumed the presidency. Before his return to power in 1958, he had volunteered to journalist 
Cyrus Sulzberger and others that he would withdraw France from NATO if he were in power. 
The threat of withdrawal had been inherent in his tripartite memorandum proposal to 
Eisenhower and Macmillan of September 1958. His important speech on national defense at the 
École Militaire in November 1959 had also amounted to a rejection of military integration. De 
Gaulle had had virtually no room for acting against NATO during the height of the Cold War 
and with France still entangled in the Algerian war; forcing an early break with the United States 
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would also have undermined his ability to coax the other Western European nations into forming 
a strategic entity around France. Even so, he had withdrawn the French Mediterranean Fleet 
from NATO in March 1959; most of the Atlantic fleet followed in 1963. France had barred 
American nuclear weapons from its soil unless it could have a say over them, which in early 1959 
had prompted the relocation of some 250 fighter bombers from France to Britain and Germany 
in the first withdrawal of allied troops from French territory. The French army divisions 
returning from Algeria after 1962 had not been assigned to NATO despite a requirement to do 
so. French officers had been withdrawn from NATO’s planning staff and from certain exercises. 
In sum, the writing had been on the wall ever since his return to power.4 
Following the resolution of the Algerian conflict and with the lessening of East-West 
tensions following the Cuban missile crisis, the circumstances for more decisive French moves 
against NATO began to improve. Kennedy’s simultaneous drive to introduce the new American 
strategy of flexible response and centralized control over nuclear weapons within NATO 
probably only reinforced de Gaulle’s resolve. With the rejection of the Fouchet Plan in 1962 and 
the worsening of Franco-German relations after the departure of Adenauer, there was also less 
holding de Gaulle back. Warning signals about a French attack on NATO began to increase in 
the cable traffic between Washington and its diplomatic outposts in Europe from 1962 onwards. 
The previous chapter has already revealed that de Gaulle might have used the Johnson 
administration’s MLF campaign as a pretext for withdrawal. In early January 1965, Charles 
Bohlen reported from Paris that it had become increasingly clear that de Gaulle’s ideas on the 
reform of NATO “really involved a destruction of the existing structural organization of the 
Treaty.” Friendly officials at the Quai d’Orsay had moreover confided to him that de Gaulle 
preferred to cease French participation in NATO at least before 1969, when Article 13 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty allowed for member states to leave the alliance upon a one-year notice.5 In 
subsequent months, embassy reports were becoming increasingly frequent that de Gaulle was 
planning for drastic steps soon after the French presidential elections in December 1965.6 In early 
May, for instance, he told Bohlen, in more explicit terms than ever before, that all forces and 
installations on French soil would have to be brought under French command before review of 
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the treaty in 1969. De Gaulle also affirmed “very clearly and definitely” that when the treaty 
would be reexamined “any form of integration would have to go.”7 Bohlen by then had come to 
believe that de Gaulle would terminate French participation in NATO between early 1966 and 
early 1968 and denounce the North Atlantic Treaty in 1968 or 1969, intending to replace it with 
“a series of bilateral defense arrangements with at least the US, the UK and Germany.”8 At 
NATO, meanwhile, French officials ominously declined to approve the construction of a new 
building for SHAPE near Paris. And in early June 1965, anti-Gaullist sources at the Quai d’Orsay 
informed the American embassy that Washington would be well advised to develop contingency 
plans for a de Gaulle offensive soon after the December elections.9 There was “stormy weather 
ahead,” France’s representative at NATO warned Thomas Finletter; de Gaulle “would move in 
hard and immediately on NATO” once he had won the presidential elections.10 
 Ever since de Gaulle’s tripartite memorandum diplomacy had run into the ground in the 
early Kennedy years, Paris had not come up with new proposals for the reform of NATO nor 
did it seriously attempt again to find a middle ground with the material leader of the alliance – the 
United States. Pressed by American diplomats to come forward with proposals, French officials 
habitually retorted that it made little sense for France to formally present its ideas for discussion 
as long as the other members of NATO were opposed to substantial changes in the alliance. 
Instead, de Gaulle had resigned himself to unilaterally changing the French contribution to 
NATO and progressively making French abstention a fait accompli within the Western alliance. As 
his Foreign Minister Couve de Murville explained to Cyrus Sulzberger of The New York Times in 
November 1964: 
 
(1) There is no use discussing reform of NATO so long as there is no agreement on the direction 
NATO should take. France wants less integration; everyone else wants more. Therefore the 
argument is hopeless from the beginning. 
(2) Also we have taken several moves already on our part which show which direction we want 
NATO to take. We have reduced our force commitments and at the same time have stressed 
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our plan for an atomic force. We have therefore reformed NATO ourselves to the extent that 
we could. We have disintegrated as much as we could without danger. 
(3) But the atomic affair is most important. We have rearranged the French army without taking 
account of NATO’s view. We have reduced the size of our conventional forces in order to be 
able to spend more on our atomic force. 
 
Pressed why France had not at least drawn up a tentative plan for NATO reform, Couve de 
Murville added:  
 
What would be the point? No one in NATO, apart from France, dares to speak up to the U.S.A. 
And really, apart from France, Britain and Germany, the rest of the allies think the best thing is to 
leave everything to Uncle Sam and spend the least possible amount on defense.11 
 
The most elaborate French statement on NATO reform hence appeared in the form of 
an article in the quarterly Politique Étrangère in the fall of 1965, which, according to a claim by The 
New York Times citing “qualified sources,” had been submitted to de Gaulle for approval.12 Its 
anonymous author echoed familiar Gaullist themes, arguing that NATO had outlived its 
usefulness and was an instrument of American foreign policy rather than of the collective security 
of its members. The article envisaged the “superposition” of two “systems” to replace NATO. 
First, it proposed that the Atlantic alliance be transformed into a general alliance with the United 
States, devoid of any military integration but allowing for strategic coordination (in particular of 
nuclear forces). Second, it suggested a Western European defense compact along the lines of the 
erstwhile European Defense Community. The integration of Western European forces would 
essentially be maintained, even be enhanced, but the number of partners to this integration would 
be reduced by one – the United States. This did not mean, however, that American forces would 
not be maintained in Europe as a symbol of the loose transatlantic alliance and that they could 
not somehow be linked with the forces of Western European nations short of full military 
integration. Nor did the author warmly endorse the concept of military integration, but rather 
thought such a system was necessary as a framework to contain German forces. The article thus 
tried to resolve a central conundrum of Gaullist foreign policy: how to restrain Germany in a 
Western Europe rid of American dominance? The proposed system of military integration, 
moreover, would not include the nuclear forces of its members – France and, if it joined, the 
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United Kingdom – nor would Germany participate in the direction of these forces. Germany 
would thus have to entrust its nuclear defense to France, without having a say over the force de 
frappe. In return, France would commit its nuclear forces to the defense of Germany. 
The article was widely believed to reflect the thinking at the highest French levels, and, as 
such, it caught the attention of the State Department. 13  The French government, however, 
neither endorsed the article nor provided any detailed proposals along these lines for discussion 
among the allies. Nor did it fully reflect de Gaulle’s thinking. In particular, its emphasis on 
integrating European forces was non-Gaullist. De Gaulle was – as Bohlen had rightly surmised – 
rather thinking about a web of bilateral agreements pledging mutual support in case of an outside 
attack. In early May 1965, he told a baffled Alphand that he not only intended to withdraw from 
NATO before 1969 but that he would even aim to scuttle the North Atlantic Treaty in order to 
replace it with a system of bilateral agreements between nation states. And in another 
conversation with Alphand in July, de Gaulle reiterated his intention to propose “un accord 
bilatéral très simple” to the United States pledging mutual support in case of an attack on either 
one. Such an arrangement would hence include a mutual defense commitment along the lines of 
Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. When Alphand protested that the Johnson administration 
would never agree to sign a bilateral agreement, de Gaulle remained sanguine: “Alors il n’y aura 
pas d’alliance formelle. Mais serait-elle nécessaire si vraiment la Russie et les États-Unis ont 
décidé de ne pas se faire la guerre?”14 
These plots against NATO and the North Atlantic Treaty were thus tied in with de 
Gaulle’s assessment that the Soviet Union no longer posed an acute military threat to Western 
Europe. They were also inextricably linked to his long-term vision of overcoming the division of 
Europe through an active policy of détente, entente and ultimately cooperation with the East. As 
between NATO and the Treaty, de Gaulle consistently distinguished between the Soviet Union 
and Russia – the former the courier of a totalitarian and threatening ideology, the latter an 
integral part of any European equilibrium. Even with the Communist Party in power, de Gaulle 
had few hesitations to work towards a state of affairs in which France and Russia would be the 
two main pillars of European stability, keeping the Germans in check and the Anglo-Saxons at 
bay. As we have seen, de Gaulle’s search for a mutually beneficial relationship with Moscow dates 
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back to World War II. The emergence of the Soviet Union and the United States as victors over 
Germany, he had then feared, would either lead to a new war between these two superpowers or to 
a condominium in Europe. De Gaulle’s quest to forestall a superpower struggle around the 
European stake, which he knew would come at the expense of French influence, was ultimately 
ineffective. What is more, Roosevelt’s and Stalin’s refusal to accept France as a great power with 
a say in the postwar order – and the resulting exclusion of France from the Big Three 
conferences at Yalta and Potsdam – left an indelible scar on his mind. His aims of ending the 
“Yalta system” – which in de Gaulle’s lexicon stood for the division of Europe and the 
dominance of the superpowers – and bringing about a “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals” 
were to remain at the heart of his foreign policy. De Gaulle’s decision to withdraw the French 
military entirely from NATO in 1966, his simultaneous efforts at atmospheric improvement of 
relations with the communist world, and the construction of the French atom bomb were 
integral parts of de Gaulle’s plan to end the Cold War and to reinstate France as a pillar of 
European security.15 
In the 1960s, to be sure, de Gaulle was hardly original in pursuing a more relaxed 
relationship with the Soviet bloc. De Gaulle had even been the last of the Cold Warriors. 
Following the Cold War drama of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, Washington and 
Moscow had already embarked on the road towards détente. Johnson’s commitment to 
improving relations with the Soviet Union and diminishing the threat of nuclear war was strong 
from the outset of his presidency, motivated in part by the example of his political hero Franklin 
Roosevelt.16 De Gaulle’s first hint at changing course was only given in a broadcast on New 
Year’s eve of 1963, when he announced his view that the gradual evolution of communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe would coalesce with a transformation of the Western alliance itself to 
pave the way for a Europe “toute entière.”17 This relatively late switch from intransigence to 
rapprochement vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc must be explained above all from developments in the 
all-important relationship with Germany. During the Berlin crises from 1958 to 1961, de Gaulle’s 
unyielding stance had helped to cement his crucial relationship with Chancellor Adenauer. It was 
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moreover aimed at dissuading the German polity from striking a separate deal with Moscow in 
order to achieve German reunification; as Walter Lippmann once pointed out, “at bottom the 
hard policy is directed not against the Russians, but against those Germans who want to make an 
opening to the East.”18 In the course of 1963, it became clear that intransigence towards the 
Soviet Union was no longer producing these benefits in relation to the Franco-German 
relationship. De Gaulle’s relationship with Adenauer’s staunchly Atlanticist successor Erhard 
quickly soured. His aim to build Europe on Franco-German cooperation seemed increasingly 
forlorn. By the mid-1960s, de Gaulle “told any visitor who cared to listen […] that the major 
problem was to keep Germany under control” and “was returning to France’s traditional 
diplomacy of trying to balance off Germany with the Soviet Union.”19 In addition, with détente 
becoming increasingly popular in European circles, it was important for de Gaulle to ensure that 
the Soviet Union would regard France as the natural European interlocutor in discussing the 
future of Germany rather than a future German government. 
From 1964 onwards, there was a notable increase in diplomatic contacts between Paris 
and Moscow. Visiting Moscow in January 1964, French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing reached agreement on negotiating a five-year bilateral trade accord; the accord, under 
which France extended $356 million in credits, was subsequently signed in October 1964. In May 
1965, the Soviet State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy and the French Atomic Energy 
Commission furthermore signed a two-year agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy, 
arranging for exchange visits by scientists and technicians. And in October 1965, Couve de 
Murville paid a six-day visit to the Soviet Union, becoming the first Western foreign minister to 
visit the Soviet Union since Khrushchev’s fall in October 1964 and the first French foreign 
minister to visit there since 1956. French contacts also increased with Poland. In September 1965, 
Polish Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz paid a visit to France, at the end of which both sides 
called for a normalization of East-West relations. One month later, Giscard d’Estaing signed a 
five-year agreement in Warsaw under which trade between the two countries would be increased 
by fifty percent in 1969. 
In early 1966, the stage for de Gaulle’s disengagement from NATO was set. On 
December 19, he had won re-election, albeit in two rounds. 20  In January, the crisis in the 
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Common Market as a result of de Gaulle’s empty chair policy was finally resolved with the 
Luxembourg compromise. The force de frappe was gradually becoming an operational reality with 
the deployment of the Mirage IV bomber. And de Gaulle was planning a state visit to Moscow in 
June 1966. The time was ripe for asserting France’s independence from the United States by 
taking a drastic new step. 
 
American Anticipation 
Given de Gaulle’s longstanding hostility to NATO, it is not surprising that the possibility of a 
French withdrawal came up in American diplomatic correspondence well before 1966. By 1964, 
in part because of the rising tension over the MLF, intimations from French sources that the 
Elysée was preparing a “drastic step” 21  against NATO were not uncommon. As a result, 
American officials began to ponder the implications of such a move by de Gaulle well before its 
actual occurrence.  
In the spring of 1964, the State Department’s Policy Planning Council – headed by Walt 
Rostow – began to secretly explore the possibility of a NATO without France. Interestingly, it 
broke with the routine assessment that French participation in NATO was indispensable. For 
most of the 1950s, France’s military contribution had been considered essential in order to 
withstand a large-scale Soviet attack; its troops and its central geographic position offering 
strategic depth behind the potential frontlines in Central Europe made it so. A Policy Planning 
Council analysis of May 1964 noted, however, that the military value of French participation had 
declined in 1960s for a variety of reasons. The increasing reliance within NATO on tactical 
nuclear weapons; the strategy of forward defense along the eastern frontier of Western Germany; 
the enhanced military contribution of West Germany, as a result of which France’s troop 
contribution accounted only for roughly fifteen percent of NATO’s combat forces by 1964; the 
reduced likelihood of a large-scale Soviet attack, even as the threat of an “unpremeditated 
conflict” in Central Europe remained real; all of these developments had made French military 
participation in NATO less important. The Policy Planning Council therefore concluded that 
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from a military perspective “a NATO without France may be tolerable,” despite the considerable 
hassle and the costs of relocating military lines of communication, infrastructure and facilities.22 
The implications of a French withdrawal would be mostly political, the Policy Planning 
Council believed. The defection of an important ally would naturally send a shiver through 
NATO. It would raise the specter of disintegration within view of the year in which the Treaty 
would be up for review – 1969. It might also weaken public support in the United States for 
NATO and for American troop deployments in Europe. Rostow’s Policy Planning Council 
nonetheless stressed that a French withdrawal could well turn out to be beneficial on balance. It 
anticipated that NATO “pruned of its obstructionist member” would finally be able “to display a 
unity and a scale of activity” considered necessary to deal with the Soviet threat. Even American-
French relations might paradoxically improve in the wake of a French withdrawal from NATO, 
for the potential for any further anti-American moves by de Gaulle would have been significantly 
reduced. The gist of this early policy exercise at the State Department was hence not only that 
NATO could do without France, but that its anticipated withdrawal might even be a blessing in 
disguise.23 
It is also telling that the obvious alternative to a French withdrawal – “a NATO 
reorganized to suit de Gaulle’s nationalistic tastes” – was never contemplated within the Johnson 
administration. The Franco-American disagreement over NATO had moved well beyond de 
Gaulle’s unsuccessful tripartite memorandum diplomacy into a state of paralysis in which 
dialogue was entirely absent. In particular, in the State Department there was virtually no 
willingness to look at the issues from de Gaulle’s perspective. On the contrary, American 
diplomacy had been geared towards containing the wicked effects of his nationalism for most of 
the 1960s, in particular in relation to Germany and the movement towards European unity. 
 The absence of a Franco-American dialogue on NATO also reflected the powerful advice 
of Charles Bohlen, the American ambassador to France. We have already observed in the 
previous chapter that Bohlen consistently discouraged attempts at seeking compromise. Bohlen 
fervently believed that de Gaulle could not be won over by concessions or flattery and had “an 
absolute fixation with independence.” In his view, it would neither be in de Gaulle’s style nor in 
the interest of the United States to seek a compromise over NATO. He considered it “extremely 
doubtful” that de Gaulle ever expected a positive reply to his memorandum proposal of 
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September 1958; it was rather a tactical ploy to justify his premeditated actions against NATO. 
As importantly, Bohlen argued that French foreign policy was almost exclusively the creation of 
de Gaulle’s political convictions, which led him to seek tension in France’s rapport with the 
United States, and that it was not supported by the large majority of the French or by the 
government apparatus. Future French governments were likely to pursue more agreeable foreign 
policies, Bohlen reasoned. From the outset, his advice was thus to weather de Gaulle’s 
provocations with equanimity and continue as much as possible with business as usual.24 
 Bohlen’s sobering advice to President Johnson did not go unchallenged. Prominent old 
hands like Acheson and Harriman and strong-minded policymakers such as Ball believed that de 
Gaulle could be influenced if handled with firmness and determination. Sharing an inclination to 
speak up to the Frenchman, whose views they found incompatible to their own, they were utterly 
dismayed at Johnson’s relatively passive attitude. 25 Others, such as Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs William Tyler, rather disagreed with Bohlen’s assessment that de Gaulle’s 
foreign policy enjoyed scant domestic support and was “merely the product of his peculiar 
outlook and state of mind.” Tyler sensed that many in France and in Europe, even those who 
had no sympathy for de Gaulle, “feel that he does reflect and give expression to a certain 
sentiment not only in France but in Free Europe as a whole […]: a confused sense that it is 
possible, indeed natural and necessary, for Europe to have interests within the framework of an 
alliance with the United States which do not in all cases spring from a conception of the world 
identical with that held by the United States […].”26 Tyler’s realistic assessment, which struck a 
sympathetic chord in McGeorge Bundy’s White House staff, might have given reason for a look 
at NATO from the French perspective. Yet it went against the predominant grain of anti-
Gaullism in American foreign policy circles. Bohlen’s advice to ride out the “impervious” 
General moreover had the edge of providing an operational code of conduct that was closest to 
Johnson’s own inclinations. It was, in addition, the most levelheaded about the potential for 
finding a middle ground. 
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 By the fall of 1965, as de Gaulle began to prepare the public for the final showdown, the 
NATO crisis was unmistakably in the offing. On September 9, 1965, in his twelfth press 
conference, de Gaulle openly hinted at his determination to withdraw France from NATO’s 
integrated military structure before 1969. He also dwelled on the ‘empty chair’ crisis within the 
Common Market. From Washington’s vantage point, “de Gaulle’s juxtaposition of these two 
problems […] was deliberate and designed to build up to a clear ‘confrontation’ between the 
economic, political, and security conceptions reflected by the United States and most Europeans 
(including many Frenchmen) on the one hand, and himself on the other.”27  
A few days before his September press conference, de Gaulle had apprised George Ball 
of his intentions with regard to NATO. De Gaulle had stressed that he did not want to break up 
the alliance and that “there would still be a de facto understanding for common defense even if no 
signed treaty existed,” as Ball recalled in his memoirs. He had made clear, however, that he 
planned to withdraw France from NATO before 1969 and that he would not tolerate any foreign 
forces on French soil which were not under French command – and this included NATO itself. 
He would not make any proposals to this end about which there could then be negotiations 
among allies; instead, he would “lay down conditions in discussions between France and the 
United States that would not include either Germany or the United Kingdom.”28 In a follow-on 
meeting with Ball, Couve de Murville elucidated that de Gaulle would make his move against 
foreign troops on French soil in 1966.29 And a few months later, as if de Gaulle’s intentions 
weren’t sufficiently understood, the French foreign minister derided NATO to American 
journalists as a “thingamagig [truc] at the end of Avenue Foch” which needed to be removed 
“from France’s back.”30 
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Ball had in point of fact already begun working with the Defense Department and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff on plans in anticipation of a French withdrawal from NATO.31 In the course 
of the ensuing interagency debate in the summer and the fall of 1965, there was little doubt that 
NATO could survive militarily without French participation, as the State Department’s Policy 
Planning Council had already concluded in 1964. While the four French air squadrons and the 
missile units stationed in West Germany were considered valuable, the military significance of 
French army units was judged to be marginal. During one interagency discussion in August, Ball 
was asked whether “our objective, if necessary, would be NATO without France.” Ball replied 
that “he had heard of no one in government who opposed this as our policy and that in his 
discussions with the allies, they favored it.” The challenge as American policymakers saw it 
therefore was, in the apt words of Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, “how best 
to end up with a good NATO without France.”32 
As early as the spring of 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had begun to develop contingency 
plans for an orderly withdrawal of American forces from France under the codename EULOC. 
The total American troop strength in France was approximately 28,700, mostly army and air 
force personnel. 33  American military installations in France primarily consisted of lines of 
communications (such as depots, supply centers, and pipelines) for the Seventh Army in West 
Germany and of operating bases of the American Air Force. The Pentagon’s military planners 
looked at a range of actions – from partial withdrawal to complete relocation. On August 20, 
1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally sent a top secret message to SACEUR as the American 
commander in Europe (US-CINCEUR) instructing him to prepare preliminary plans for 
withdrawal of American troops from France.34 The removal of American forces and installations 
was assessed as “militarily feasible, politically acceptable to our Allies and ourselves, and within a 
reasonable cost range.”35 
Interestingly, given this state of affairs, there was some discussion about whether the 
United States should withdraw American forces from France before de Gaulle made his move. 
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There was some instinctive support for such a course of preemption, particularly within the State 
Department; Rusk, for instance, had requested that the option be considered.36 Someone like 
Dwight Eisenhower also advised Ball that, since de Gaulle’s objectives were clear, the United 
States should promptly remove NATO’s headquarters to Brussels before de Gaulle could make 
any formal demands.37 Such an American withdrawal, by seizing the initiative, was above all 
thought to counteract the presumed corrosive effects on the alliance of a wait-and-see attitude. In 
the end, however, the State Department decided against pursuing this option. A preemptive 
withdrawal might have been emotionally satisfying, if only for the dramatic effect of marking 
dissatisfaction with de Gaulle’s policies. But cooler heads prevailed. Bohlen, for one, feared that 
an unprovoked withdrawal of American forces would merely strengthen de Gaulle’s domestic 
position in the run-up to the presidential elections of December 1965.38 It would only have 
played into the hands of de Gaulle and “simply save him trouble.”39 In June 1965, Chancellor 
Erhard moreover had told President Johnson that he wanted to avoid a confrontation with de 
Gaulle with a view to the German elections of September 1965.40 Most importantly, a preemptive 
withdrawal would have incurred the risk of shifting the burden of blame for provoking a crisis 
from de Gaulle to the United States, not least in the eyes of the other European allies.  
The most important issue for American policymakers to resolve was therefore whether 
the United States should agree to a bilateral treaty with France in view of de Gaulle’s larger design 
to substitute NATO – or even the North Atlantic Treaty – with a series of interlocking bilateral 
defense arrangements. It was presumed that de Gaulle’s alliance system, while lacking an 
integrated military structure, would provide for “periodic consultation on a political level and for 
more frequent, perhaps even continuous, contact among national defense authorities for the 
purpose of coordinating national defense plans.” Moreover, “coordination of the French force de 
frappe with US and UK strategic forces could also be accomplished by such bilateral agreements, 
which might in addition provide for tripartite ‘nuclear consultation’ among the three.”41 American 
officials, however, were agreed from the outset that the bilateral set-up of the Cold War alliance 
favored by de Gaulle was not acceptable – and this had also been the purport of Ball’s response 
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to de Gaulle and Couve de Murville in September 1965.42 They were not prepared to abandon a 
system which provided, in their view, “the most efficient method of utilizing the combined 
military capabilities of the members” and “the means for the quickest and most effective possible 
response in time of crisis.” NATO moreover provided “the framework through which German 
rearmament can be controlled, and Germany can play its full role in the defense of the West.” It 
also facilitated “a degree of unity of political attitude and policy in the Atlantic area not otherwise 
obtainable.” Most importantly, while de Gaulle could withdraw from NATO, he could not be 
allowed to turn back the clock of European history. “The central issue,” the State Department 
counseled, “is whether there shall be a collective multilateral system between equal sovereign 
states employing integration only as needed in the interest of effectiveness, or a system of 
bilateral power politics involving all the dangers of the turn of the 20th century.”43 The ghosts of 
the past had to remain under control. 
 
Bracing the Allies: The Select Committee 
For most of 1965, with de Gaulle’s withdrawal hanging like a sword of Damocles over its head 
and the September elections in Germany disallowing any major new initiatives, NATO was 
unmistakably in the doldrums. The Vietnam War was moreover consuming Washington to a 
rapidly increasing degree, this being the fateful year of America’s escalating involvement in that 
war.44 President Johnson meanwhile faced criticism for failing to provide leadership in what was 
seen by some as a period of dangerous drift, in particular after his decision to go easy on the 
MLF. As always, Dean Acheson was in the forefront of those who advocated urgent action in 
order to strengthen the alliance with Europe. Repeatedly at odds with “Mr. LBJ,” Acheson wrote 
to a friend in July 1965 in a state of dejection:  
 
My guess about the Continent is that by the turn of the year de Gaulle will move to dissolve 
NATO and edge us out of Europe. We should not wait for him, but begin to act [...] I would try 
for some agreement on […] Central Europe and German unification, a quiet review of the 
relation of types of military power in Europe to political policy, planning for a step forward on 
international monetary arrangements and tariff agreements. These I would push so that de Gaulle 
will have to disclose a full policy of obstruction. He should not be permitted to choose the battle 
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areas and win isolated (appearing) victories.  
 
Acheson added, “Although I preach this crusade, I have no royal converts and a children’s 
crusade would not be a crusade at all, not even a disaster. That would follow inaction.”45 
 It is true that Johnson did not seek direct or public confrontation with France, as 
Acheson and others would have wanted; he did not want to incur the blame of having provoked 
a French withdrawal – and thereby a NATO crisis – through actions of his own. It would, 
however, be unfair to castigate the Johnson administration for complete passiveness in the face 
of de Gaulle’s imminent attack. On the contrary, during the summer and fall of 1965, the United 
States made a concerted effort to give NATO a renewed sense of direction and purpose in order 
to brace it for the shock accompanying a French withdrawal. Measures “which do not involve 
basic structural reform in NATO and which are thus least subject to French veto, will make 
NATO far less susceptible to de Gaulle’s abrasions and increase its value for other members,” 
the State Department observed in its policy review on France and NATO.46 
 The first of these was the introduction of a new five-year force planning system within 
NATO. The political importance of this system was, at least in part, that it would set force goals 
for 1970. This implied that the alliance would continue in its current form after 1969. For this 
reason, French Defense Minister Pierre Messmer was instructed to oppose it at a ministerial 
meeting in May 1965.47 But France could not prevent talks about such a new force planning 
system to continue. There was, in addition, considerable pressure from the American side to put 
NATO’s Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) on a more stable and financially sound 
footing. This force was plagued by the difficulty of getting NATO financing for its exercises. “It 
thus leads a hand-to-mouth existence,” Harlan Cleveland, the American ambassador to NATO 
reported, “limping along from exercise to exercise to ad hoc solutions, dependent on French 
abstention rather than veto and on the case-by-case support of governments which are becoming 
increasingly reluctant.” But the decision to give the force a higher priority was also fuelled by a 
desire to provide “visible evidence [of NATO’s] continuing vitality,” “to build a NATO project 
on a ‘less than 15’ basis” and “to extend the principle of interdependence, of integrated planning 
and action.”48 
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 The most important progress within NATO, however, was almost surreptitiously made in 
the sensitive realm of nuclear politics. The issue of nuclear sharing, which was closely linked to 
Germany’s place within the alliance, was still unresolved after the MLF was left to drift in late 
1964. Yet nuclear weapons had increasingly become an integral part of NATO’s defensive 
posture as a result of the deployment of American tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe 
since the late 1950s. By 1965, American nuclear warheads stored in Europe already numbered 
over 5,000, and this number was to increase even further. Nine NATO members owned a variety 
of delivery vehicles and had concluded bilateral agreements with the United States providing for 
information and training in the use of nuclear weapons. Two-key systems, other physical checks 
and electronic permissive action links ensured American control over the release of nuclear 
warheads, but the involvement of other European allies in their use had undeniably become an 
operational reality. This development, however, had not been appended by a consultative 
mechanism about nuclear matters at the political level. American officials were moreover still 
seriously concerned at how Germany’s foreign policy orientation might in the long run be 
affected by de Gaulle’s policy of independence and his actions against NATO. 49  German 
participation in NATO’s nuclear defense certainly was considered a main issue by all major 
parties in the Bundestag elections of the fall. 
 On May 31, 1965, at a meeting of NATO defense ministers, Robert McNamara proposed 
a “select committee” of four or five member states to study ways in which allied participation in 
the planning and targeting of American nuclear forces and the exchange of information on issues 
of nuclear defense could be improved.50 Although it was from the outset certain that France 
could not be persuaded to support its establishment, it was also clear that its opposition would 
not run as deep as that against the MLF (or the ANF).51 Given the attention accorded to the issue 
in the run-up to the Bundestag elections, Paris was careful not to categorically oppose a German 
role in nuclear matters. De Gaulle could not count on being able to rally as broad an opposition 
against nuclear consultation within NATO as he had been able to do against the MLF.52 The 
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French reaction to NcNamara’s proposal was therefore one of guarded opposition. On July 7, 
France rejected the proposal but indicated it would not object to other NATO member states 
proceeding without French participation.53 In all, ten member states would participate in the 
discussions following McNamara’s initiative; only France, Portugal, Iceland, Luxembourg, and 
Norway abstained. 
When launching his initiative, McNamara underlined that Washington considered nuclear 
consultation within NATO as “additional to whatever action may be taken on the MLF or ANF 
forces.”54 Yet in the course of 1965 the ‘software’ of consultation rapidly emerged as a suitable 
alternative to the ‘hardware’ of the MLF. McNamara’s initiative solved the pressing question: If 
not the MLF (or ANF), what? The promise of nuclear consultation in particular appeared 
credible enough to meet German political requirements; on election campaign, for instance, 
socialist leader Willy Brandt spoke out in favor of German participation in nuclear consultation 
mechanisms as opposed to hardware solutions. At the same time, it was considerably less 
controversial than the MLF, both on the congressional front and internationally, as it would shy 
away from giving other allies a finger on the nuclear trigger. McNamara’s initiative even offered 
the Johnson administration a welcome opportunity to get the alliance moving again without 
precipitating a crisis. As the American embassy in Paris judged, nuclear consultation “as an 
alternative, rather than a supplement, to the MLF/ANF” had the advantage of “narrowing de 
Gaulle’s area for diplomatic maneuver with respect to NATO” as well as that of a “fresh 
approach” to solving the nuclear defense issue within the West.55  
As importantly, the significance Johnson was beginning to attach to negotiating a nuclear 
non-proliferation treaty with the Soviet Union also worked in favor of nuclear consultation 
instead of sharing nuclear hardware with the allies. The idea of such a treaty had been first put 
forward by Ireland in 1958. American interest in it revived as a result of China’s first nuclear test 
in October 1964; India meanwhile was approaching a decision on nuclear weapons as well and 
there was a concern that Japan would be tempted to follow suit.56 Secretary Rusk had by then 
already created an interagency committee under the chairmanship of Llewellyn Thompson, a 
former ambassador to the Soviet Union, to coordinate discussions about the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. China’s explosion furthermore prompted Johnson to establish a separate task 
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force chaired by Roswell Gilpatric, a former deputy secretary of defense. The MLF/ANF was 
fiercely debated within the Gilpatric group, since the idea of sharing nuclear weapons with 
Germany was obviously anathema to the Soviet Union and the main obstacle to achieving a non-
proliferation treaty. The Gilpatric group did not achieve consensus on this point, but its final 
report did note that a choice probably would have to be made at some point.57  Given the 
sensitive political stage in the MLF affair at the time (see the preceding chapter), the State 
Department strongly objected to Gilpatric’s recommendations and successfully insisted that they 
be kept secret. Regardless of this response to the Gilpatric report, the pursuit of a nuclear non-
proliferation treaty increasingly preoccupied the Johnson administration.58 American and Soviet 
officials began to explore its prospects. On June 15, 1965, the United States moreover proposed 
to resume negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva, 
which had been adjourned in September 1964, in order to draft the treaty (as well as to broaden 
the 1963 limited test ban treaty to include underground tests); on August 17, the United States 
introduced its own draft. The possible establishment of the MLF and a German role therein, 
however, held up further progress, causing Johnson’s disarmament negotiators William Foster 
and Butch Fisher to urge an official abandonment of the MLF and similar mixed-manned 
schemes in Europe.59 
It was McGeorge Bundy who played a central role in the decisive shift in American policies 
from nuclear hardware to consultation in the latter part of 1965. As in December 1964, Bundy 
took it upon himself to break the bureaucratic logjam caused by the continuing advocacy of the 
State Department for the MLF. In October 1965, in a paper for President Johnson, he elaborated 
the case for a “fresh start” in NATO’s nuclear sharing debate in the aftermath of the German 
elections. The United States, he urged, should now clearly decide against the MLF “or any other 
mixed manned weapons system.” The policy of “calculated delay and indecision,” which had 
been pursued in the light of the German elections, had outlived its usefulness. And even 
Germans were not pressing en masse for a revival of the MLF, “in view of its costs with France 
and its possible repercussions on the Common Market.” Bundy hence declared himself 
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unconvinced by admonitions from George Ball’s offices at the State Department that only a 
hardware solution could in the long run satisfy the Germans: “I continue to think George’s 
reporting reflects his own convictions at least as much as the situation.” Bundy recommended 
that President Johnson instead shift his support firmly behind allied participation in nuclear 
policymaking along the lines of McNamara’s proposal, the favorable response to which had left 
him “more encouraged about the prospect of a sensible answer than at any time in years.” A shift 
toward consultation, he assessed, was “for the good of the Atlantic Alliance” – and it had the 
added advantage of making a non-proliferation treaty easier to accomplish. 60  When, on 
November 24, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin finally confirmed the Soviet leadership’s 
interest in a non-proliferation treaty, Bundy was beginning to believe that “a real Johnson 
breakthrough” in the nuclear realm was in the making.61 
 American diplomats were by now indeed actively pushing NATO allies to approve 
McNamara’s proposal for a ‘select committee’ at the December meetings of foreign and defense 
ministers. Despite the generally favorable response to the initial proposal, Harlan Cleveland, who 
had succeeded Finletter as ambassador to NATO, reported that most allies were still fearful of 
provoking the French and of engaging in any action that could be perceived as divisive. 62 
McNamara and Denis Healey, his British colleague, impressed on their German counterpart Kai-
Uwe von Hassel that there were no plans in place for the selective use of nuclear weapons and 
there was an urgent need for effective procedures for political consultation in such an event. 
According to the diplomatic report, “the revelation that his colleagues representing nuclear 
powers were very dissatisfied with the present status of nuclear planning seemed to be a new and 
sobering thought to Von Hassel” and the German defense minister was “rather taken aback.”63 
The American effort at getting agreement on McNamara’s proposal was successful. At the 
meeting of NATO foreign ministers in mid-December, Couve de Murville tried to capitalize on 
fears of a crisis as he ventured to limit the Select Committee to a short-term existence. This 
attempt led to extensive skirmishing between the foreign ministers and Secretary General Manlio 
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Brosio. In the end, however, France agreed to the establishment of the Select Committee without 
setting a deadline. In spite of Couve de Murville’s “fancy footwork,” France had wanted to avoid 
a row with its allies just days before the run-off presidential elections in France.64 The MLF, 
meanwhile, was shelved in the course of the consecutive visits of Harold Wilson and Ludwig 
Erhard to Washington in December 1965. Erhard “came down squarely on the side of a 
‘hardware solution’,” Johnson wrote to Wilson.65 But the American president, as we have already 
noted in the previous chapter, remained uncommitted. And Wilson, as Bundy observed after 
having read the prime minister’s reply, was “moving away from the common nuclear force just as 
fast as he politely can.”66 
 After NATO’s ministerial meetings of December 1965, American policymakers 
congratulated themselves on their ability to get “the Alliance moving again” despite French 
obstructionism. The establishment of the Select Committee and the new five-year force planning 
system indeed helped to brace the European allies for the crisis that was still to come. They had 
gotten accustomed to the notion that a NATO without France was a practical – if inconvenient – 
proposition. Since they were, as Cleveland reported, “increasingly willing to leave the French 
chair vacant and go ahead on moves to strengthen NATO,” French leverage had been 
successfully diminished. As even Cleveland was to admit, however, the success of American 
diplomacy at the NATO conference table was overshadowed by the presence of “two ghosts at 
the feast” – the prospect of a French withdrawal from NATO and the escalation of American 
military involvement in Vietnam.67 
 
LBJ and the Coming Crisis 
President Johnson, meanwhile, stuck to the remarkably philosophical attitude to de Gaulle which 
had been his rule of thumb from the outset. On August 6, 1965, he even specifically ordered all 
American government agencies to “take special measures to prevent U.S. activities in France 
which could needlessly embarrass United States relations with France.”68 This order had been 
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prompted by the diplomatic incident with France caused by four photo-reconnaissance passes of 
an American Air Force jet over the French nuclear production plant at Pierrelatte on July 16, 
1965. There is reason to believe that de Gaulle personally did not take the matter up highly.69 But 
the French government seized on the incident to bolster domestic support for his foreign policy 
of independence and forced the United States into a formal apology on July 22. “If this incident 
had not developed, another would and presumably will,” Bohlen concluded. “Unfortunately, this 
one could not have been better designed to serve de Gaulle’s purposes.”70 
 Johnson’s policy toward de Gaulle was as much one of judicious restraint as one of 
patience, that is, of riding out de Gaulle. This was predicated on the twofold notion that de 
Gaulle had no serious public or political support in France or in Europe for his foreign policies 
and that, because of his advanced age, he would vanish from the political scene in the not too 
distant future. This notion was advanced, as we have seen, in particular by Bohlen. In February 
1965, it was reflected in an assessment of the American embassy in Paris as follows:  
 
Despite the malign delight with which other members of the Alliance might regard an all-out 
confrontation, the stresses thus created for other members of the Alliance would be disruptive, 
and it is probably best to grin and bear it, keeping the empty chair available wherever we can. [...] 
Our hope should always be that the temperature of nationalism will drop and France will return 
to a more accommodating disposition toward the United States.71 
 
The concept of the forlorn General was encouraged, too, by Thomas Finletter, who believed that 
“Gaullist opposition [within NATO] is founded on the unique philosophy and the intellectual 
and moral power of one man […].” Finletter therefore reasoned that “in a not distant future she 
[France] is going to come back into a cordial relationship with the US and with the Atlantic 
Community” and that “the important thing for present is not to create any difference with 
France which will be lasting.”72 Johnson’s assertions that he was going to “outlive the General” 
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were indeed of the same vein, and his resulting equanimity won out against the inclinations of 
those at the State Department, including Dean Rusk and George Ball, who were inclined to allow 
their irritation with de Gaulle to shape policies.73 
 There is some evidence that Johnson’s restraint in dealing with de Gaulle was also 
motivated by his appraisal of the domestic political scene. Whereas he was never able to 
overcome the innate prejudice held against him by the foreign policy establishment, Johnson was 
an undisputed master in the domestic realm. Many of his foreign policy decisions – including his 
decision to let the MLF whither (see previous chapter) – were therefore framed by his reading of 
the measure of support for a particular foreign policy in Congress. Johnson was not devoid of 
foreign policy convictions. On the contrary, he was deeply committed to upholding America’s 
security commitments abroad, to improve relations with the Soviet Union and to reduce the 
threat of nuclear war. But he was constantly concerned with maintaining sufficient public support 
for his foreign policy decisions. He was also determined to avoid strategic setbacks which could 
get him into trouble domestically; Johnson was acutely aware of Truman’s fate, who was heavily 
criticized for having ‘lost China’ when the communists took control in 1949.74 With regard to 
NATO, Johnson was worried that American public support for it could diminish to the point 
where he would be forced to cut down American troop commitments. A war of words with de 
Gaulle, which could have easily gotten out of hand, did not fit in with his overriding objective to 
leave the alliance strengthened.75 
 Discussing European affairs at his ranch in Texas in early November 1965, Johnson 
asked for the advice of Douglas Dillon, who had just resigned from his post as secretary of the 
treasury. Dillon had previous experience with France as ambassador in the 1950s, and Johnson 
was thinking of sending him as his emissary to de Gaulle after the French elections.76 Dillon’s 
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memorandum of January 1966 probably came as close as anything to formulating Johnson’s 
policy of restraint toward de Gaulle and its future implications. After asserting that de Gaulle’s 
views were impervious, Dillon wrote: 
 
Policy toward de Gaulle cannot be considered in isolation. It is and must remain an integral part 
of our overall foreign policy. While it would be possible to devise a U.S. policy which could bring 
about an accommodation with de Gaulle, this would require the abandonment or modification of 
major U.S. objectives. Such a price is far too high to pay [...]. The U.S. should make no substantial 
concessions to de Gaulle, but should pursue whatever policies it finds appropriate, irrespective of 
his position. In arriving at decisions on overall U.S. policy, little weight should be given to 
Gaullist views. We should operate on the assumption that de Gaulle’s leadership of France is 
temporary, and that he will be succeeded by a government more responsive to public opinion, 
hence more favorable to NATO, United Europe and the United States. 
 
Dillon, like Johnson, thus departed from the twofold notion that de Gaulle’s designs were 
incompatible with those of the United States and, in addition, that the General was inherently 
unreceptive to American arguments. But the reality of his intransigence did impose important 
considerations of a tactical nature on Washington. In recognition of this, Dillon went on to map 
out a course of action for Johnson. 
 
While continuing firmly on our course in spite of de Gaulle’s views, we should lean over 
backward to be polite and friendly to France, to de Gaulle personally, and to all French 
government officials. Backbiting, recriminations, attempts to downgrade the importance of 
France as a nation, or attempts at reprisals should be avoided no matter what the temptation. 
They cannot be effective, will only irritate de Gaulle and make him more difficult to deal with, 
and are likely to cause French public opinion to rally to his side against the United States. 
 
In submitting the Dillon paper to Johnson, McGeorge Bundy stated that it represented, in fact, 
the position “you have sustained so skillfully for more than two years.” Dillon extended the line 
of recommendation to predicaments that were soon to come: 
 
If de Gaulle insists on the removal of U.S. forces from French soil we should accede gracefully 
[...]. If France should decide to pull out of any active role of NATO, we should not replace our 
NATO tie with France by any bilateral agreement. Any such agreement would make it much 
more difficult for France to return to the fold at a later date and might set a pattern that could 




undermine the whole NATO structure. In the event of a French withdrawal, we should support 
the continuation of the NATO organization without France. [...] it should be made very clear that 
there is an empty chair always ready and waiting for France should she decide to return.77 
 
LBJ’s Exercise in Restraint – Spring of 1966 
De Gaulle Throws Down the Gauntlet 
On February 21, 1966, at one of his regal press conferences, de Gaulle at last appraised the world 
of his decision to leave NATO by 1969. NATO, he underlined, had become obsolete because of 
the changes in the Communist bloc:  
 
Owing to the internal and external evolution of the countries of the East, the Western world is 
not longer threatened today as it was at the time when the American protectorate was set up in 
Europe […].  
 
He also reiterated his familiar claim that the acquisition of nuclear weapons with which the Soviet 
Union could hit the American homeland had undercut the credibility of the American nuclear 
security guarantee, on which the defense of Western Europe had hinged. In addition, the global 
involvement of the United States held important risks for Europe: 
 
conflicts in which America engages in other parts of the world – as the day before yesterday in 
Korea, yesterday in Cuba, today in Vietnam – risk, by virtue of that famous escalation, being 
extended so that the result could be a general conflagration. In that case Europe – whose strategy 
is, within NATO, that of America – would be automatically involved in the struggle, even when it 
would not have so desired. 
 
De Gaulle moreover made clear that NATO’s concept of military integration was at odds with 
his consuming aim of restoring France’s self-assurance: 
 
France’s determination to dispose of herself, a determination without which she would soon 
cease to believe in her own role and be able to be useful to others, is incompatible with a defense 
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organization in which she finds herself a subordinate.78 
 
These arguments were similar to those de Gaulle had marshaled against NATO and in favor of a 
new security organization in his memorandum to Eisenhower and Macmillan of September 1958.  
But there was – nearly eight years of policy divergence later – no longer the hope of potential 
agreement. 
De Gaulle was, however, still far from precise about the timing and the manner of 
France’s withdrawal in his press conference. On the contrary, his words created the impression 
that he was in no hurry and envisaged a measured extraction rather than a dramatic move:  
 
Consequently, without going back on her adherence to the Atlantic Alliance, France is going, 
between now and the final date set for her obligations, which is April 4, 1969, to continue to 
modify successively the measures currently practiced, in so far as they concern her.79 
 
In late February, Washington was nonetheless receiving indications from a friendly high 
level source at the Quai d’Orsay that a drastic move by de Gaulle against NATO and American 
forces on French soil was at hand.80 These indications prompted George Ball – possibly in an 
attempt to deter or to moderate de Gaulle – to tell the new French ambassador in Washington, 
Charles Lucet, “in no uncertain terms” of the seriousness of the matter.81 Even so, when de 
Gaulle finally ‘laid down his conditions’ for continued participation in the Atlantic alliance in a 
brief handwritten letter to President Johnson dated March 7, the scope and the briskness of his 
action was unexpected.82 Bohlen, who had been called in by Couve de Murville to receive de 
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Gaulle’s letter, reported to Washington that “the line taken was very hard – harder than what the 
Quai was trying to produce.”83  
After pledging allegiance to the North Atlantic Treaty, “unless events in the course of the 
next three years should change the fundamental elements of the relations between East and 
West,” de Gaulle’s letter to Johnson announced that France would completely cease its military 
participation in NATO and that it would ask foreign troops to leave French soil unless 
arrangements could be made that ensured French sovereignty:  
 
France intends to recover, in her territory, the full exercise of her sovereignty, now impaired by 
the permanent presence of allied military elements or by the habitual use being made of its air 
space, to terminate her participation in the ‘integrated’ commands, and no longer place forces at 
the disposal of NATO.84 
 
Reflecting de Gaulle’s insistence on dealing with great powers rather than multilateral institutions, 
he sent similar letters to the government leaders of Great Britain, Germany, and Italy on March 9. 
And on March 11, the French government issued an aide mémoire to each member state of 
NATO detailing the logic behind the French move. All of these communications made clear that 
only the implementation of the French decision was to be subject to further negotiations with 
allies: 
 
Doubtless, it would have been conceivable for negotiations to be undertaken to amend the 
provisions in force by common agreement. The French government would have been happy to 
propose it, had it been given to believe that such negotiations could lead to the outcome that the 
French government itself has in view. Unfortunately, everything shows that such an undertaking 
would be doomed to failure, since France’s partners appear to be, or assert that they are all 
advocates of maintaining the status quo, or else of strengthening everything which, from the 
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French viewpoint, appears henceforth unacceptable.85 
 
A follow-on aide mémoire, dated March 29, clarified that NATO headquarters and American 
forces were to be relocated from France by April 1, 1967.86 Even given his well-known track 
record, de Gaulle was casting off NATO’s – and ipso facto America’s – yoke with unforeseen 
asperity. 
 
Responding to De Gaulle  
In Washington, the State Department was in the grips of indignant anger about de Gaulle’s 
eviction notice. In his letter of March 7, de Gaulle had emphasized that France would remain 
party to the North Atlantic Treaty after 1969. But American diplomats were hardly in the mood 
to recognize this as evidence of de Gaulle’s enduring loyalty to the Western alliance. They were 
rather given to the idea of renouncing France as a member to the North Atlantic Treaty now that 
it had ceased to participate in NATO. Such a radical countermove would at least refute the 
Gaullist assertion that a distinction could be made between NATO and the North Atlantic 
Treaty.87 The notion of expelling France altogether even left its mark on Johnson’s provisional 
reply to de Gaulle on March 7, which had been drafted by the State Department:  
 
I would be less than frank if I did not inform you that your action raises grave questions regarding 
the whole relationship between the responsibilities and benefits of the Alliance.88 
 
De Gaulle’s affirmation of his allegiance to the Western alliance paradoxically also gave 
cause to doubt his steadfastness as an ally. His letter of March 7 had stated that France would 
remain ready “to fight on the side of her Allies in the event that one of them should be the object 
of an unprovoked aggression.” (emphasis added) The inclusion of the word “unprovoked” was not 
a meaningless slip, since it was also used by other French spokesmen. It moreover corresponded 
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with de Gaulle’s assessment that American involvement in other parts of the world would lead to 
conflicts which, as de Gaulle had said in his February 21 press conference, “by virtue of that 
famous escalation” could lead to “a general conflagration” at Europe’s expense. Was de Gaulle 
defining a new curb on the allied solidarity enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty? If so, was he 
thereby seeking to gain leverage over American policies beyond Europe or, vice versa, to create 
room for distancing himself from his allied obligations in case the Vietnam War expanded to a 
“general conflagration”? “An ‘unprovoked’ attack,” Dean Acheson retorted during a Senate 
hearing, “is a slippery term, because an attack is usually the result of a quarrel and nobody knows 
who provoked whom […]. Suspicion always arises when someone introduces a new and slippery 
phrase to loosen up their [sic] obligations.”89  
As usual, the White House staff took a more dispassionate view of de Gaulle’s actions 
than the State Department. McGeorge Bundy had left the administration in late February,90 but 
his role as President Johnson’s watchman against the State Department’s virulent anti-Gaullism 
was more than adequately assumed by the economist Francis Bator.91 On March 7, Bator wrote 
to Johnson that forcing France to renounce the North Atlantic Treaty might satisfy “one’s sense 
of elementary justice,” but would be utter nonsense in every other respect. Any such 
countermeasure would be meaningless given France’s geographic location in relation to the 
Soviet bloc and Germany. “It is like threatening to abandon Kentucky in the face of a land attack 
by Canada. It is hard to do unless one is prepared to throw in Ohio,” Bator reasoned. Support 
for American leadership from the other European allies would moreover be solid only as long as 
“the provocation comes from Paris,” Bator believed. A “cool approach” would even be 
preferable from a domestic vantage point; it would inevitably be criticized for “letting the French 
get away with murder,” Bator argued, but also avoid the potentially more damaging charge that 
“our inflexibility helped to destroy NATO.”92 One day later, Bator put in his apprehension about 
contacts between exasperated State Department officials and journalists. It must be remembered, 
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Bator wrote, that de Gaulle was a “lightweight jujitsu artist” who had “no real cards” to play with. 
“All his leverage comes from our over-exertions.”93 Walt Rostow, Johnson’s pick as Bundy’s 
successor, also did not share Ball’s fury, although he certainly was – like Ball – a fervent anti-
Gaullist. A perennial optimist, Rostow above all focused on the advantages of a NATO without 
France, as he had done in May 1964 as head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council. 
In a memorandum to Johnson on March 7, Rostow judged:  
 
There will be pain and anxiety in Europe in facing a NATO without France. If all we reestablish 
is a NATO – as it now is – without France, the organization could progressively weaken with the 
passage of time. On the other hand, if we use the occasion of French withdrawal to tighten 
NATO and move forward in specific fields leaving an empty chair for a French return, there may 
be psychological and political compensation for the setback.94  
 
 Despite these shades of opinion within the Johnson administration, there was agreement 
that rallying the allies around the NATO flag of military integration was in the first order of 
things to do. Involving the allies through consultations at NATO would be the best way to 
politically isolate France. It would also rebut de Gaulle’s larger aim of reinstating the Western 
alliance on the basis of bilateral agreements between nation states. Johnson’s brief provisional 
response of March 7 therefore pointedly stated that the United States had shared de Gaulle’s 
views with the other allies “to ask for their comment.” 95  The following day, the American 
ambassador to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, was instructed to round up the other thirteen allies to 
see whether they could agree on a common declaration.96 After more than a week of cajoling the 
European allies, who proved reluctant to confront de Gaulle, a short and rather bland statement 
indeed underlined the continuing importance of an “integrated and independent military 
organization” to which “no system of bilateral arrangements can be a substitute.”97 
The Johnson administration was, however, divided over a more substantive response to 
de Gaulle. In particular, George Ball wanted Johnson to speak up forcefully in defense of the 
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pursuit of ‘integration’ in international affairs against the forces of nationalism embodied by the 
General. When called up by journalists, Ball invariably assailed de Gaulle’s distaste for NATO as 
“a kind of hallucination” and as evidence of an unhealthy longing for a disastrous past. This was 
a grave crisis, he stressed, because it concerned a clash between “conflicting views as to how one 
goes about organizing peace in the Western world and bring[ing] about a European settlement.” 
The central objective of the United States in this crisis, Ball posited, was to ensure that the 
“Atlantic world” would continue on its course toward collective decisionmaking. Ball 
characteristically accused de Gaulle of trying to turn back the clock. “… the General is headed 
back toward 1914,” he told Sevareid. “This is gravely dangerous,” he added to Reston, because it 
“sets in motion opposition forces in other places. […] As long as we have a divided Germany in 
the heart of an industrial complex of Europe, we are in real danger.”98 In an interview with André 
Fontaine, published in Le Monde on March 31, Ball similarly stood up for the principle of military 
integration and censured the French withdrawal from NATO as “a step backward toward the 
restoration of the old system of national rivalries.”99 De Gaulle’s withdrawal decision was in Ball’s 
view not so much lamentable in the light of the Cold War, for its military consequences were 
surmountable. It was deplorable because it went against Ball’s own views and convictions as a 
liberal internationalist. France’s departure from the NATO framework was above all a threat to 
the liberal postwar order in the Atlantic region to which he had devoted his life and had the 
potential of unleashing ghosts of the European past. 
As so often when it came to European affairs, Ball found a forceful companion in Dean 
Acheson. On April 4, Acheson publicly assailed de Gaulle for going back to pre-1914 balance-of-
power politics, and for being motivated by a “strong medieval instinct” and a “strong 
resentment” over his wartime treatment by Roosevelt and Churchill.100 “No landlord serving 
notice of termination of a lease upon an undesirable tenant could have been more brusque,” he 
testified before the Senate.101 Acheson had long tried to get Johnson to speak up to de Gaulle. In 
March 1965, concerned by the “reemerging nationalism” in Europe and the stalemate in NATO, 
he had pressed Johnson in vain to agree to a policy review. He had then made no secret of the 
fact that his proposal had been fuelled by disquiet about the impact of de Gaulle’s policies on the 
Western alliance: “Can a place be found for her [France] in new NATO arrangements, without 
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retarding integrated action by other interested countries? If not, how can de Gaulle best be 
isolated and frustrated in his opposition to such actions?”102 In December 1965, concerned with 
the prospect of a French withdrawal from NATO, Acheson had been the driving force behind a 
statement of the Atlantic Council which urged Johnson to bring about a “fully integrated” 
Atlantic community with “joint political, economic, and military institutions.”103 Such advice was 
broad – “so broad that it states very little explicit policy,” according to one official104 – but its 
sense of mission about NATO was vintage Acheson. In the wake of de Gaulle’s withdrawal note, 
Acheson continued to advocate a strong response. As in the aftermath of the crisis of January 
1963, he argued that de Gaulle was a man who “can and does in time recognize the inevitable and 
adjust his conduct to it. […] The power of the US to shape the inevitable for General de Gaulle 
is immense.”105 
On March 16 and 17, 1966, President Johnson convened his advisers to discuss a more 
substantive response to de Gaulle’s letter of March 7. Rusk, Ball and Assistant Secretary of State 
for European Affairs John Leddy represented the State Department; Bohlen returned from Paris; 
Acheson was also brought in; Cyrus Vance and John McNaughton represented the Pentagon; 
Robert Komer, Bill Moyers and Francis Bator of the White House staff were also present.106 
Johnson’s advisers were clearly split into those who wanted to act vigorously against de Gaulle 
and those who strongly preferred to tread carefully and calm the waters. The State Department 
had prepared a reply to de Gaulle which would amount to a sharp rebuke. “This letter flings 
down the gauntlet to de Gaulle and commits us in effect to an opposite course,” Komer jotted 
on his note paper. Unsurprisingly, Acheson briskly supported its towing line, telling Johnson that 
“as leader of [a] coalition, [you] must capture [the] propaganda initiative” and that “our pitch 
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must be to strengthen it [the Alliance] by something new […].” 107  Notwithstanding his 
longstanding advice to Johnson for phlegmatic responses towards French provocations, Bohlen 
also favored a tough reply to de Gaulle’s withdrawal decision.108 
Johnson, however, refused to be pushed into a public denunciation of de Gaulle. “Let’s 
not gig de Gaulle,” he responded to the State Department’s clarion call to join the propaganda 
battle. “Let’s avoid appearances of saying ‘you’re another’ right back.” 109  The president’s 
disinclination to seek out confrontation with his French counterpart was moreover reinforced by 
advice from his White House staff. Following the first meeting, on March 16, Robert Komer 
questioned in particular Acheson’s assertion that “the best way to stop de Gaulle is to beef up the 
alliance – make it more integrated rather than less.” Komer advised against entering “a full-blown 
war” with de Gaulle over “more integration vs. less.” He also warned Johnson that the 
“something new” Acheson considered necessary to reenergize the alliance, could well bring the 
proponents of the MLF back into business: “the lessons of recent history […] suggest that we 
stop, look, and listen before flinging down the gauntlet to de Gaulle.”110 
Encouraged by Johnson’s unwillingness to pick a fight with de Gaulle, the White House 
staff drafted an alternative reply, one which avoided “picking unnecessary fights” and “quoting 
de Gaulle on de Gaulle, putting the worst interpretation on what he says.” Most importantly, this 
draft introduced the notion that “as our old friend and ally […] there will always be an empty 
chair waiting for France.”111 Such an “offer of a golden bridge for the French nation,” Bator tried 
to convince Ball, would give the letter a “gracious ending” and make clear that the United States 
did not want to isolate France; in addition, it made a distinction between de Gaulle and France. 
Ball, however, was “rather disturbed” by Bator’s draft, thinking that it had been “diluted to the 
point where it won’t have anything like the impact it [the State draft] would have had in 
Europe.”112 During Johnson’s second meeting with his advisers on responding to de Gaulle, on 
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March 17, the new draft was assailed as too conciliatory – and the sentence added by the White 
House staff was removed. But the next morning Bator put it back in, albeit in a somewhat 
revised form. “I admit,” Bator confessed to Johnson, “I am thinking what historians will say 
about this letter in 5-10 years – especially if things go wrong, and America is unfairly blamed by 
some Europeans for splitting Europe.”113 
On March 22, Ball handed Johnson’s reply to de Gaulle to the French ambassador.114 The 
letter reiterated American support for NATO, after having sought “the counsel of other Treaty 
members,” and stated that the other fourteen members would continue to organize their 
collective defense through its integrated military structure. There was, however, no longer any 
hint in the letter of renouncing France as a member to the North Atlantic Treaty. On the 
contrary, noting de Gaulle’s assurances on France’s dedication to the Western alliance, Johnson 
stated squarely: “I respect that pledge.” Upon Eisenhower’s suggestion, the letter also implied 
that the United States was open to adaptations of NATO as required by “the needs of the 
hour.”115 The letter had remained the bone of contention between the State Department and the 
White House and some changes had been made at the urging of the former to sharpen the tone. 
Yet the final paragraph had remained unaltered:  
 
Indeed, we find it difficult to believe that France, which has made a unique contribution to 
Western security and development, will long remain withdrawn from the common affairs and 
responsibilities of the Atlantic. As our old friend and ally, her place will await France whenever 
she decides to resume her leading role.116 
 
 Johnson’s position of temperance had now been clearly established, and it would 
continue to guide his public statements.117 At the State Department, however, the bickering and 
the jibes at de Gaulle were unrelenting, spreading the notion that America’s diplomats were on a 
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different track in dealing with the NATO crisis.118 In particular, Ball did little to hide his intense 
frustration with de Gaulle. On April 29, he delivered an address full of ominous hyperbole about 
the French withdrawal from NATO – and he even seemed to publicly criticize Johnson’s muted 
reaction. Ball:  
 
Today there is a special temptation to pragmatism in our relations with Western Europe, where 
we are faced again with the reappearance of an assertive nationalism that challenges the whole 
structure of our postwar arrangements. […] our relations with Western Europe carry a heavy 
freight of history. […] we cannot forget that jealousies, ambitions, and aggressions in Western 
Europe were responsible for the two greatest wars of modern history.  
 
Ball described de Gaulle’s Europe – “a continent of shifting coalitions and changing alliances” – 
as a “nostalgic evocation” which was inherently unable to provide a stable and peaceful European 
settlement. And if ‘Europe’ indeed desired to play a role in the world, Ball pointed out, it had no 
choice but to organize itself “commensurate with the requirements of the modern age.”119 There 
is reason to believe that Ball’s public taunt at de Gaulle as a man who represented Europe’s 
calamitous past was the straw that broke the camel’s back, for on May 4, Johnson instructed Rusk 
and McNamara that he wished “the articulation of our position with respect to NATO to be in 
constructive terms. […] Our task is to rebuild NATO outside of France as promptly, 
economically, and effectively as possible.”120 Rebuilding NATO without France required a less 
confrontational stance toward de Gaulle than Ball’s inclinations and persuasions permitted – 
adding further to the “increasing futility” of Ball’s opinions within the administration.121 
Negotiating the Terms of Separation 
Johnson had thus marked the playing field by resisting the State Department’s advocacy for a 
strong rebuke. The presidential exchange of letters between France and the United States of 
March 1966 set the tone. De Gaulle’s decision could not be revoked; Johnson refused to be 
provoked.  
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But Johnson’s reply was also just the beginning of drawn-out and complicated 
negotiations about the exact terms of separation. French participation in NATO’s integrated 
military structure, American forces and allied facilities in France, and French forces in Germany 
were too entwined to be separated in one clean stroke. These negotiations still allowed for either 
firm or lenient approaches, and Johnson would have to involve himself on a number of 
occasions to determine the American negotiating stance. The line-up in Washington on these 
occasions would be a familiar one. The posse at the State Department, headed by Rusk and Ball 
and shored up by Acheson and McCloy (both of whom were intimately involved in the 
negotiations), continued to press for a hard line vis-à-vis de Gaulle. Fearing that de Gaulle’s 
preference for bilateral relationships would gain currency over the multilateral approach 
associated with the American-made postwar international order, it focused on defending 
NATO’s integrated military structure and on imposing a heavy political and economic price on 
France for leaving it.  
The White House staff, which now included Rostow as Bundy’s successor, however, 
favored pragmatism and flexibility. A provocative negotiating stance, Rostow and Bator feared, 
would shift the blame for the crisis from Paris to Washington. They also believed that the 
‘Fourteen’ – i.e. all allies other than France – would remain united only as long as “our position 
vis-à-vis the French appear[s] to others as reasonable on its own merits.” It was, in their opinion, 
imperative to “minimize the strain on German politics” and keep “the Franco-German rift to a 
minimum,” above all by resolving the thorny issue of French troops in Germany as quickly and 
quietly as possible. Rostow moreover viewed the crisis as a window of opportunity to “make 
clear our commitment to an evolving constructive NATO, which can serve as a base for a policy 
of bridge-building to the East.” 122  With Secretary of Defense McNamara a dispassionate 
participant in the discussions – the Pentagon simply wanted to adjust the posture and the 
organization as quickly as possible – the debate within the Johnson administration about the 
terms of separation was hence mostly waged between the State Department and the White House.  
The first issue that had to be resolved in the withdrawal negotiations concerned the 
relocation of allied troops and facilities from France. The French government, in its aide-
mémoire of March 29, had established April 1, 1967, as the date by which NATO’s facilities – 
such as SHAPE, Central Europe Command, and NATO’s Defense College – and all American 
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troops and facilities had to be moved.123 Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance had already 
assured Johnson that the American military could indeed be relocated by March 1967 and that 
the costs, estimated at roughly $700 million, could be significantly reduced if the relocation was 
used to improve efficiency.124 And in May, McNamara officially notified Johnson that he was 
ready to move American forces and facilities “as promptly as practicable.” 125  George Ball 
nonetheless had been making preparations at the State Department for a “very hard line” in 
response to de Gaulle’s requirement.126  And Rusk was poised to ask de Gaulle whether by 
insisting that all American soldiers would have to leave France he also meant those soldiers who 
were lying dead in military cemeteries on French soil.127 By late May, the State Department had 
consequently drafted “another tough U.S. note to de Gaulle.”  
Once again, however, Johnson foiled the confrontational designs of the State Department. 
Knowing full well that this would “raise hell over at State, where all, including Sect. Rusk, feel 
strongly about the clarity of the historical record,” the president ruled against any delaying 
tactics. 128  Johnson was immovable: the American army was to have withdrawn from France 
before the deadline that de Gaulle had set. “When a man tells you to leave his house,” he 
impressed on his advisers, “you tip your hat and go.”129 This would remain his basic attitude. At a 
meeting of the National Security Council in December 1966, McNamara said that ninety percent 
of American personnel would have left France by the deadline and that the remainder would 
follow by mid-summer. But Johnson insisted that the deadline be fully met:  
 
Let us get out rather than be pushed out by de Gaulle. […] If we cannot meet the French 
deadline for withdrawal, we should avoid a public fight about it if we can. […] We should do our 
very best to comply with de Gaulle’s request that we leave – even if it means putting men in 
inadequate housing during winter.130 
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In all, more than 60,000 people and 813,000 tons of materiel were removed from France within a 
year.131 “For the record,” the American military reported to Johnson, “we did meet the 31 March 
1967 deadline. All operational units and headquarters were out of France and operational 
elsewhere by that date. All materiel and personnel that were scheduled to be out by 31 March 
were, in fact, out.” Ironically, the American withdrawal from France – “one of the most unique 
politico-military operations of modern times” – thus ended on a note of pride.132 
The second issue revolved around the status of France’s military contribution to the 
Western alliance. De Gaulle was realistic enough to understand that NATO was not going to 
disappear only because France was retreating from it. Even from his damning perspective, 
NATO was moreover still indispensable as a framework for German rearmament; “a simple 
respect for General de Gaulle’s intelligence,” McGeorge Bundy therefore slyly noted during a 
congressional hearing, “suggests […] that he has asked SACEUR to leave France only because he 
is confident that his example will not be followed.”133 As NATO was there to stay and France 
would continue to be party to the North Atlantic Treaty, a way had to be found to put military 
cooperation between France and NATO on a new footing. 
Redefining the status of French forces in Germany certainly was the trickiest aspect of 
this issue. These forces comprised about 76,000 military, which included two army divisions, two 
wings of fighter aircraft and two Nike missile battalions. On March 10, in its aide mémoire, the 
French government proposed to establish liaisons between the French command and NATO, 
“as well as to determine the conditions under which the French forces, particularly in Germany, 
would participate in time of war, if Article 5 of the Washington Treaty were to be invoked, in 
joint military actions, both with respect to the command and to the operations themselves.”134 In 
its aide mémoire of March 29, Paris forced the issue to a head by ordaining that the assignment 
to NATO of French forces in Germany would end as soon as July 1, 1966. 
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There was little question within the Johnson administration that all American nuclear 
support for French forces would have to be withdrawn once they were withdrawn from 
NATO.135 But the continuing presence of French forces on German soil posed much more 
difficult questions. It was “our toughest problem on the table,” Bator informed Johnson, since 
“the terms on which they remain, or are withdrawn, will deeply affect French-German relations 
[…].”136 The issue was potentially explosive in German politics. Without a new agreement, the 
continuing presence of French troops in Germany “would smell of occupation” if they were not 
part of NATO. 137  Most German politicians also objected to the diminution of the NATO 
framework, which had allowed for German rearmament. At the same time, however, there was a 
widespread wariness about alienating the French.138 Strikingly, the question of French forces in 
Germany was hardly considered consequential from a military point of view. “The French forces 
are almost all reserve divisions, far back from the line, and not effectively trained, manned and 
equipped by U.S. standards,” the American negotiating instructions judged; “in a completely 
‘unattached’ condition and without the assignment of U.S. nuclear weapons [they] would have a 
minus military value if any.”139 
In early April, after a six-hour cabinet meeting, Chancellor Erhard rejected the French 
position that its troops in West Germany and assigned to NATO could remain there without a 
new agreement defining their legal status and their role “in the framework of the common 
defense of NATO.”140 Erhard hence took the position that France’s withdrawal from NATO did 
affect its rights to station forces in Germany. These rights, Bonn argued, were based on 
agreements on the presence of foreign forces in Germany reached in October 1954, which had 
then assigned these forces to SACEUR.141 In an aide mémoire to France on May 3, 1966, the 
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Erhard government moreover stated that “it makes an essential difference whether the foreign 
forces stationed on Federal territory are placed under a joint command in which the Federal 
Republic of Germany participates in an appropriate degree, or whether these forces are solely 
under the national command of their state of origin.” It insisted that French troops could only 
stay if a new agreement were reached and “a satisfactory arrangement can be made for the 
military tasks of these forces and their functions within the framework of common defense.”142 
According to the Erhard government, French troops in Germany would in some way have to fall 
under NATO command in time of war. 
The State Department was, as was its wont, also preparing to take a very tough stance on 
the question whether French troops in Germany would be allowed to stay if they were not 
assigned to NATO. In mid-April, a trilateral working group – consisting of representatives of the 
United States, Great Britain, and Germany – was established in Bonn in order to develop a 
common position.143 At the State Department’s recommendation, Johnson picked John McCloy 
as his chief negotiator. McCloy was, of course, one of the ‘wise men’ of America’s bipartisan 
foreign policy establishment and a favored troubleshooter of both Democratic and Republican 
administrations; he was also a valid choice given his formidable reputation in Germany as the 
United States’ former High Commissioner to occupied Germany from 1949 to 1952, when he 
had wielded near dictatorial powers over millions of Germans. But, as a staunch Atlanticist and 
Jean Monnet European, McCloy could above all be counted upon by those who wanted to take a 
very tough line with the French. The corporate lawyer from New York had, as we have seen in 
the previous chapter, been dismayed by Johnson’s decision in December 1964 to back down on 
the MLF. He was also deeply concerned about the crisis in NATO – and, fearing that the 
Johnson administration was far too absorbed with the Vietnam War, he was actively lobbying in 
Washington and elsewhere for action to halt the disintegration of NATO. After his appointment, 
McCloy indeed immediately urged Erhard to be hard-hitting with de Gaulle, assuring the 
chancellor that the United States would support any position which “recognized the seriousness 
of the situation and provided an adequate response to the French.”144 Once again, with the arrival 
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of McCloy on the negotiating scene, Germany had become the pivot of Franco-American 
differences.145 
The trilateral working group indeed took a tough negotiating position in May by 
“insisting that the French publicly undertake a commitment to assign these troops to NATO 
when those members of the Alliance with troops in Germany agree that a state of emergency 
exists.” De Gaulle, assessed Rostow and Bator, was “asked to give up a veto which he now holds 
[…] and to undertake a commitment formally tougher than […] ours.” 146  McCloy had also 
already agreed with German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder that if France had not reached 
a new agreement with Germany before July 1, or had at least agreed to leave French troops in 
Germany under NATO command pending a satisfactory arrangement, French troops would be 
required to begin their withdrawal.147 
In the White House, however, feelings were much less adamant than at the State 
Department. Bator had already cautioned in March against “our natural tendency […] to 
discourage any special bilateral arrangement, for fear of setting a bad precedent in further 
fragmenting the Alliance.” In his view, “there is a danger that if we discourage them [the 
Germans] from trying to work out a deal with the French, we will get the blame in Germany and 
the rest of Europe for driving the French out.”148 And in May, Bator – now seconded by Rostow 
– judged that the working group’s position was at heart untenable and therefore should be seen 
as little more than a negotiating ploy: “Nobody thinks de Gaulle will agree to this; it is meant as 
an opening tactic from which we are willing to retreat. […] we must avoid being subject to the 
charge that we presented impossible conditions to the French and that de Gaulle’s negative 
response is justified.”149 As before, the White House was above all determined to avoid becoming 
the culprit of the NATO crisis by seeking confrontation with the French. 
 De Gaulle called the bluff.  The working group’s position had been conveyed to France in 
a memorandum of the German government on May 3. In a succinct reply on May 18, the French 
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government simply discounted the legal aspects of the case. Instead, it deftly raised the issue to a 
political plane by asking whether “the Government of the Federal Republic desires the 
maintenance of the French forces on its territory”; if not, France would be ready to withdraw its 
forces within one year.150 De Gaulle amplified this message by deciding to withdraw the French 
fighter jet squadrons based in Germany. On June 13, he also stated to Bohlen that “in truth […] 
France did not really wish to keep her forces in Germany” and that “objectively it would be 
better if the French troops were back in France.”151 In sum, de Gaulle was not going to be the 
demandeur in this crisis. 
 The French position put the onus back on the German government. The strongly 
Atlanticist Schroeder continued to favor a tough stance, insisting on a NATO framework for the 
continued presence of French troops. Erhard, however, much to McCloy’s dismay, was reluctant 
to sacrifice French-German relations on the altar of NATO. On May 26, the German chancellor 
informed the Bundestag that West Germany “unequivocally” wanted the French forces to stay.152 
De Gaulle had won the day: his negotiating position was now significantly strengthened. 
Throughout June, NATO proposed a variety of arrangements for French forces in Germany, all 
of which were rejected by Paris.153 When the French were making preparations to pull out forces 
from Germany, Erhard quickly came to terms with Paris on an interim-agreement that allowed 
French forces to stay beyond July 1.154 At the end of July, talks on a permanent arrangement 
reached a deadlock. American diplomats above all blamed Erhard’s weakness for the state of 
affairs, since he had given de Gaulle the impression that Bonn “would never invite the French 
troops to leave.”155 In doing so, they closed their eyes to the fact that their diplomat-in-chief in 
the White House had had no desire to force the issue to a head either. 
The status of French forces in Germany was finally resolved at the military level. Having 
reached a deadlock at the political level, the Erhard government decided to authorize SACEUR, 
General Lyman Lemnitzer, to confer with the French chief of staff, General Charles Ailleret, 
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about the extent to which French forces might be prepared to cooperate with NATO. German 
attempts, backed up by the United States, to issue instructions to the two generals concerning 
certain minimum assumptions on the nature of French military cooperation both in war and in 
peace, including the assumption that French forces would serve under NATO command if 
France should enter a war under Article 5 of the Treaty, were rejected out of hand by Paris. It 
took until the end of October before Lemnitzer was finally authorized to begin his talks with 
Ailleret without any preconditions.156 Meanwhile, the French and the Germans had also engaged 
in bilateral discussions on a legal basis governing the status of French forces in Germany. 
Discussions continued without result until the Erhard government was replaced by the ‘grand 
coalition’ of CDU and SPD headed by Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Foreign Minister 
Willy Brandt in early December. Two weeks later, Brandt and Couve de Murville settled the issue 
with a simple exchange of letters. They circumvented the legal problem by stating that the 
agreements regarding the presence of foreign forces in Germany reached in October 1954 did 
“not rule out” the continued presence of French forces. In the end, no military or political 
conditions were attached to the continued presence of French troops on German soil – indeed, 
as one study noted, “a total victory for the French negotiating position.”157  
 On most other issues connected with the French withdrawal from NATO, de Gaulle’s 
intransigence equally won out. This was the case with regard to the possibility of a re-entry of 
American forces into France in the event of war or of an emergency such as the Berlin crisis – a 
subject that Ambassador Bohlen discussed a number of times with Couve de Murville. De Gaulle, 
however, was immovable in his position that a re-entry would not be possible except after a 
declaration of war by France. Neither was he prepared to allow any American military stocks or 
equipment to remain in France, even under French custody, or for any American military 
personnel to remain on a contingency basis.158 
 On some other issues, the predilection in the White House to forestall “another public 
show” conspired with French military interests to devise a pragmatic way out.159 France had, for 
instance, decided to put authorizations for overflights by foreign military aircraft on a monthly 
basis, which presented a hassle to the NATO allies who needed French air space. The resolution 
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of this issue was possible because France had an interest in continued access to the early warning 
information provided by NATO’s air defense system (NADGE), on which the credibility of the 
force de frappe depended. The bargain: the NATO allies would be permitted to continue their 
military overflights in return for continued French access to NADGE. The French were also 
prepared to permit the continued use of the Donges-Metz petroleum pipeline and certain 
telecommunications facilities in peacetime, provided that they were placed under French 
management. Although they could give no assurance that these facilities would be available in 
wartime, since France may decide not to participate in a war in which the rest of NATO is 
engaged, the White House concluded that it would be better to have “something less than an 
ironclad agreement than none at all.”160 
Re-inventing NATO 
Institutional Adaptations 
The French withdrawal from NATO caused changes in the organization of the alliance that still 
define it today. On July 1, 1966, all French military personnel withdrew from NATO’s military 
headquarters. France, however, continued to be represented in the North Atlantic Council. 
SHAPE, with a staff of about 3,000, was relocated to Casteau in Belgium; AFCENT (staff of 
about 2,000) was relocated to Brunssum in the Netherlands; the International Staff (1,000) was 
moved to Brussels; and NATO’s Defense College went to Rome. The Washington-based 
Standing Group – consisting of American, British, and French military representatives – was 
replaced by an International Military Staff located in Brussels. The most politically sensitive 
decision concerned moving the seat of the North Atlantic Council from Paris to Brussels. The 
Johnson administration insisted that the collocation of the political and military councils of the 
alliance was essential; the move, Washington pointed out, was also necessary because France had 
made clear that it might not support NATO in the event of war. Some allies were hesitant, but 
since France assumed a decidedly indifferent stance, agreement could be reached. Indications 
from a “sensitive” source at the Quai d’Orsay that de Gaulle had decided to request the Council 
to leave Paris after the legislative elections in March 1967 may also have contributed to the 
decision.161 In early November 1966, the Council – with French acquiescence – broadened the 
responsibilities of the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), which had been set up in 1963 to 
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oversee NATO’s force planning, to handle all alliance matters in which France would not be 
included. One of its first decisions was to transfer the Military Committee from Washington to 
Brussels.  
The short of all this was that NATO could continue to function without French military 
participation and that Brussels became its indisputable executive hub. On the eve of NATO 
Secretary General Manlio Brosio’s visit to Washington in mid-November, the State Department 
concluded:  
 
The process of developing a new role for France in the Alliance […] has caused less pain and 
disruption than might have been expected. The changes taking place can be characterized as 
pragmatic and evolutionary in nature. […] France has been reasonably cooperative in accepting 
arrangements by the Fourteen for conducting that business of the Alliance in which France does 
not participate.162 
 
At the NATO ministerial meeting of mid-December, the Johnson administration could therefore 
present the picture of a revitalized organization which had surmounted the crisis caused by 
France’s withdrawal. 
Solving the Nuclear Conundrum 
More important than this institutional renewal was that the happenstance of France’s withdrawal 
from NATO, the increased interest in negotiating a nuclear non-proliferation treaty with the 
Soviet Union, and the change of government in Germany produced a way out of the nuclear-
sharing problem that had been haunting NATO since the 1950s.  
In the wake of the French withdrawal, the White House staff feared that the State 
Department would try to breathe new life into the MLF or similar nuclear projects.163 De Gaulle’s 
move against NATO indeed galvanized the State Department once again behind a ‘hardware 
approach’ to nuclear sharing as a way to tie Germany more firmly to the West. It tried in 
particular to get Johnson to pressure Wilson to be forthcoming to Erhard along the lines of his 
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erstwhile proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force. Such attempts, however, were successfully 
aborted by the White House staff, where Bator had assumed the role of Johnson’s watchdog.164 
National Security Action Memorandum 345 (NSAM 345) of April 22 quickly put an end to the 
State Department’s efforts. Johnson instructed his advisers to come up with proposals to 
enhance the participation of the allies in nuclear planning instead. NSAM 345 placed particular 
emphasis on the establishment of “a permanent body of restricted membership within NATO 
with functions including both intensified consultation and the direction of U.S. and U.K. nuclear 
weapons and delivery vehicles assigned to NATO and/or collectively owned.” While two 
alternative approaches were to be considered – “one of which assumes the creation of a ‘NATO 
nuclear force’ and one which does not” – it closed the door for the “MLF-ites” by stipulating 
that any ‘NATO nuclear force’ would not consist of mixed-manned submarines or a surface fleet 
with nuclear weapons.165 
By the fall of 1966, the Select Committee that had been established in December 1965 at 
McNamara’s initiative was beginning to yield results. In preparation of the customary ministerial 
NATO meetings in December, it recommended the establishment of a ministerial Nuclear 
Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC) and a subordinate Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) for the 
purpose of consulting on nuclear policies. Membership of the NPG was the most difficult issue 
to resolve. Whereas the NDAC would be open to any ally, membership of the NPG would be 
limited to four permanent members – the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy – and 
two members to be chosen for one-year terms on a rotational basis. Some allies – in particular 
Canada, Greece, the Netherlands, and Turkey – naturally resented the rotational formula, which 
forced them to vie for membership during the NPG’s first year. 166  But the “Johnson 
breakthrough” in the nuclear realm that McGeorge Bundy had been hoping for in November 
1965 was nonetheless close at hand. At a meeting of the National Security Council on December 
13, 1966, McNamara asserted that the new nuclear consultation mechanisms would in particular 
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meet the needs of the new German government, thus ending all talk of the MLF or ANF.167 “If I 
could do things differently,” McNamara later said, “I would have introduced the Nuclear 
Planning Group much earlier than I did as a means to draw the Europeans into nuclear 
affairs.”168 
The changes on the German domestic front in 1966 had been a decisive factor in 
improving the chances of a solution to the nuclear issue within NATO along the lines of 
McNamara’s proposal. Having talked to a great number of German politicians and officials in 
early 1966, Henry Kissinger concluded that “outside the Foreign Office not a single leading 
German political figure – including the Chancellor – indicated any desire for the hardware 
solution” and “every significant German political figure believed that top priority should be given 
to improved consultation.”169 There were, however, still qualms about a non-proliferation treaty, 
which was interpreted as being primarily aimed against Germany. Many Germans underscored 
that their renunciation of nuclear weapons in 1954 had been conditional on the pledge of the 
Western allies to strive for German unification; if this renunciation were to be extended to 
Eastern Europe, these Germans pointed out, it would have to be accompanied by similar Soviet 
pledges. As Bator argued in a memorandum to Johnson in April 1966, in order to solve the 
nuclear conundrum the Germans had to take the “hardest” step “unilaterally to renounce 
collective as well as national ownership of nuclear weapons, and to justify this as an essential step 
toward non-proliferation, world-wide arms control, a European settlement, and unification.”170  
On December 1, Kurt Georg Kiesinger replaced Ludwig Erhard to become chancellor of 
the ‘grand coalition’ between CDU/CSU and SPD. Willy Brandt, the charismatic vice chancellor 
and foreign minister, effected important changes in German foreign policy. During the election 
campaign, the SPD’s new leader – Brandt had succeeded Erich Ollenhauer as party secretary in 
1964 – had declared support for a non-proliferation treaty and avowed that with the SPD at the 
helm, Germany would not continue to insist on co-ownership or joint control of nuclear 
weapons. More importantly, Brandt sought to strike a decidedly more conciliatory tone with the 
communist bloc than either Adenauer or Erhard, both of whom had looked exclusively to the 
West for political sustenance. Reflecting the growing acceptance of East Germany as a fact of life, 
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he argued in particular that it would be best not to ignore the other Germany’s existence – which 
was the core of the Hallstein Doctrine that governed German foreign policy since 1955171 – but 
to try to transform it through rapprochement (Wandel durch Annäherung). Brandt’s anti-
Communist credentials were impeccable due to his firmness vis-à-vis the Soviets as mayor of 
Berlin in the difficult years from 1957 to 1966, but he had increasingly come to believe in the 
benefits of an “open door policy in human and cultural contacts” with Eastern Europe.172 His 
vision of rapprochement with East Germany – in particular at the societal level and economically 
– was becoming increasingly influential in German political circles (not just within the SPD). It 
appealed at the same time to those who favored peaceful coexistence of the two Germanys and 
relaxation of the Cold War, those who believed that Germans had morally forfeited the right to 
live in a unified state, those who hoped to speed up the demise of the East German regime from 
within, and those who wanted to forestall an economic collapse in East Germany because this 
would make reunification harder to achieve. From the American perspective, meanwhile, 
Brandt’s arrival on the NATO scene in December 1966 made it both easier to solve the nuclear 
discord within the alliance and more pertinent to usher in a less confrontational approach to the 
Cold War. As Secretary Rusk cabled President Johnson from Paris: 
 
One of the most important developments here has been Willy Brandt’s reaction to non-
proliferation. The present German government is ready to forget ‘hardware’ and Brandt told me 
to forget the European clause. […] Brandt made a major impression on NATO in demonstrating 
that the new German government will not be bound by the rigid theology of the Adenauer period 
and is prepared to probe the possibilities of better relations with Eastern Europe, including the 
East Germans. This may not move us forward, but twenty years of hostile confrontation has not 
done so and I believe that we should give them a chance to find out whether another approach 
might produce more results.173 
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The new role given to the ministerial Defense Planning Committee had allowed for 
circumventing France when NATO’s foreign and defense ministers met on December 14. In this 
format they agreed to the formation of the NPG and the NDAC for nuclear planning and 
consultation. Six months later, in May 1967, NATO’s defense ministers also finally adopted 
flexible response as NATO’s official strategy, “after six years of often acrimonious debate.”174 By 
this time, however, the attention of the alliance had shifted from strengthening the defense of the 
West to pursuing détente with the East. 
 
Towards a Policy of Détente 
Before Brandt laid the foundations of his Ostpolitik as foreign minister of the ‘grand coalition,’ 
de Gaulle – as we have seen – had already been looking for a systemic rapprochement with the 
communist bloc. In 1966, French contacts with the Soviet Union actually reached a peak. On 
March 29, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev hailed Franco-Soviet relations at the opening session of 
the 23rd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. In the spring and summer of 1966, Foreign 
Minister Couve de Murville paid subsequent visits to Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and 
Hungary. On May 31, the French carmaker Renault announced that it had agreed to rebuild the 
Moskvich car plant in Moscow, raising its production capacity from 90,000 cars annually to more 
than 300,000. On June 20, de Gaulle began an eleven-day visit to the Soviet Union at the end of 
which he agreed with his Soviet hosts to establish a “hot line” between Moscow and Paris. And 
in December 1966, Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin paid a return visit to France to 
conclude an agreement on Franco-Soviet collaboration in economic, scientific, and technological 
areas. 
In the American media, de Gaulle’s rapprochement to communist Eastern Europe and 
his visit to Moscow a few months after the French withdrawal from NATO heightened 
speculations about a reversal of alliances. But in American government circles an entente 
between Paris and Moscow beyond the pomp and ceremony of state visits and bilateral 
cooperation in strictly confined areas was considered remote.  
In particular the CIA, in a number of reports on Franco-Soviet rapprochement, stressed 
the limitations of Franco-Soviet conciliation. While the Soviet leadership was certainly pleased by 
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the division in the Western camp and for this reason alone was quite ready to court de Gaulle, it 
was also – judged the CIA – very cautious and all the while kept “a watchful eye on Washington 
and Bonn.” Moscow and Paris shared a fear of German ascendancy in Europe. They supported 
similar approaches to the most important unresolved border problem in Europe, being prepared 
to accept the Oder-Neisse rivers as the permanent boundary between East Germany and Poland 
whereas Washington and Bonn always insisted that the eastern border of a reunified Germany 
should be determined in the framework of an overall settlement. But the issue of German 
reunification was also the main obstacle to a real entente. Moscow might have hoped to get de 
Gaulle’s acknowledgment of the status quo of a divided Germany, for instance by officially 
recognizing East Germany. De Gaulle, however, was not prepared to break with the Western 
position in support of German reunification, although he clearly regarded it as a long-term 
objective. Moscow was moreover keenly aware that de Gaulle carried little weight as a mediator, 
recognizing that it would ultimately have to deal with the United States rather than France. In the 
CIA’s view, the Soviet Union even feared that de Gaulle’s attack against NATO would “result in 
a reduction of American influence to an undesirable degree.”  
 
Although Moscow long has made the ‘Bonn-Washington axis’ its bête noire, to some extent it 
welcomes the ties between the two capitals as a restraint on West German ‘revanchism’. Despite 
their fears that the West German tail will somehow wag the American dog, the Soviets would not 
be likely to look with equanimity upon a total disintegration of NATO and an end to the 
American role in Europe.175   
 
Paradoxically, the Soviet reaction to the French withdrawal from NATO was thus rather guarded.  
So when de Gaulle departed for his state visit to the Soviet Union in June, Washington 
did not anticipate any breakthroughs – least of all a reversal of alliances. De Gaulle, too, had tried 
to lay American concerns to rest. Prior to his departure, he had discussed his visit with 
Ambassador Bohlen. De Gaulle was convinced that the Soviet Union was seeking a détente in 
East-West relations and that it was in the interest of the West to support this. However, he also 
recognized that Moscow wanted “some recognition of the two Germanys,” and he assured 
Bohlen that he “would not take any official action that appears to confirm it.” De Gaulle 
regarded his visit as mostly of symbolic significance. “The only thing that he might conceivably 
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obtain in Russia was some indication of reunification as a very long range aim,” Bohlen reported 
to the State Department.176  
De Gaulle’s ten-day visit to the Soviet Union indeed turned out to be an exuberant 
display of public cordiality notably short on achievement. The French president was frequently 
given opportunity to speak in public to large crowds and even delivered a statement on Soviet 
television. He was the first Westerner to be allowed to the Tyuratam site, in order to witness 
launches of a satellite and an intercontinental ballistic missile. For the most part, de Gaulle 
responded in kind. He referred to the historic ties between the two countries and hailed the 
achievements of the Soviet Union. At times, however, he ignored the sensitivities of his hosts by 
speaking of ‘Russia’ instead of the Soviet Union and by describing France as “a country of 
freedom.” More importantly, there was no serious discussion of outstanding East-West issues or 
any rapprochement with regard to Germany.177 As Walt Rostow informed President Johnson 
after de Gaulle’s encounter with Brezhnev: “It is clear that each of these men is trying to use the 
other; but basically there is little give in Moscow on the gut issue, namely German 
reunification.”178 
It should be noted that the Johnson administration was not at all averse to the notion of 
détente with the communist bloc, despite the war in Vietnam. On the contrary, there were few 
issues that Johnson was more interested in than in improving relations with the Soviet Union and 
diminishing the threat of nuclear war.179 Rostow has even observed that Johnson saw the United 
States and the Soviet Union as “the two eldest children in a large family […] with the 
responsibility for keeping peace and order in the family.”180 The idea of “building bridges” with 
Eastern Europe – albeit excluding the Soviet Union – had figured prominently in Johnson’s 
speech in Lexington, Virginia, on May 23, 1964. “We will continue to build bridges across the 
gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe,” said Johnson. “They will be bridges of 
increased trade, of ideas, of visitors and of humanitarian aid.” Shortly after this speech, Johnson 
had instructed the State Department to develop specific programs to this end.181 In 1966, the 
increasing popularity of the politics of détente in Western Europe combined with the need to 
take the wind out of de Gaulle’s sails and to be seen as responsive to German desires made it the 
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more incumbent on Washington to demonstrate support for a relaxation of attitudes towards the 
Soviet bloc. Besides proposals for nuclear consultation, NSAM 345 therefore asked for 
“constructive political, diplomatic, and economic initiatives addressed to Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union” and “other forward looking proposals that would increase the cohesion of NATO 
and the North Atlantic community.”182 
Successive American administrations had until then held that a settlement which arranged 
for the reunification of Germany had to precede détente with the Soviet Union. The reversal of 
this order to a détente-settlement sequence was the key to entering a new phase in East-West 
relations. There are indications that de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw France from NATO and his 
overtures toward Eastern Europe helped Johnson to make the definitive shift towards détente 
politics in the summer of 1966. In the spring, most of his advisers came to agree that the 
president should give a substantive speech on American policy toward Europe – “so de Gaulle 
does not look like the wave of the future” – and that this speech should be held “not too soon 
after de Gaulle’s return from Moscow nor during the August holidays in Europe.”183 Throughout 
the summer and early fall, the State Department and the White House worked frenetically on a 
major presidential policy speech. The groundwork for the speech was laid in NSAM 352 of July 8, 
in which Johnson “instructed that – in consultation with our Allies – we actively develop areas of 
peaceful cooperation with the nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union” and, importantly, 
that “these actions will be designed to help create an environment in which peaceful settlement of the division 
of Germany and of Europe will become possible.”184 [emphasis added] The speech’s principal objective, 
however, as Rostow underlined, was to manifest the United States’ continuing interest in 
European affairs “at a moment when our noises tend to be Asian” and to express “a doctrine 
congenial in Europe” but “different from de Gaulle’s […].”185 
Johnson’s speech to the National Conference of Editorial Writers of October 7, 1966, in 
the Carnegie Endowment Building in New York, incontrovertibly committed the United States 
to a policy of seeking relaxation in the Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union. The 
president argued that Europe’s division could only be overcome if East and West “succeed in 
building a surer foundation of trust”:  
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We must improve the East-West environment in order to achieve the unification of Germany 
[…]. Our task is to achieve a reconciliation with the East – a shift from the narrow concept of 
coexistence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement.186 
 
By stating his opposition to any change by force of existing borders in Europe, Johnson also very 
carefully meant to convey that in the American view this applied as well to the existing Oder-
Neisse border between Poland and Germany. In addition, Johnson emphasized that he wanted to 
forge ahead on a non-proliferation treaty with the Soviet Union. 
 While the Johnson administration thus came out in favor of a détente in East-West 
relations, it was equally preoccupied with safeguarding NATO’s relevance and military muscle. 
For the dilemma it faced was: how to engage in a more constructive relationship with the Soviet 
Union while avoiding the delusion that peace was just around the corner, which could beguile the 
Western alliance into letting down its defensive guard. It was in this vein that Walt Rostow, one 
of the principal advocates of détente politics within the Johnson administration, had counseled 
Johnson in June 1966. Rostow:  
 
[…] on East/West matters we wish to do as much as is sensible to do, but we must always 
remember that the limit on what we can do is largely set by changing attitudes in Moscow and 
Moscow’s commitment to keep East Germany tightly as a satellite. It is the plug in their whole 
security and ideological system. That system is now changing; but we have no evidence other than 
that it will change slowly […].  
 
Johnson’s national security adviser hence cautioned that the effort to improve relations with the 
Soviet Union should not tempt the United States into a “casual” approach to maintaining and 
strengthening the Atlantic alliance.187  
Rostow’s unease was undoubtedly fed by evidence of a slackening in defense efforts 
among the European allies. For one, this slackening rendered Kennedy’s strategy of flexible 
response ever more chimerical. As an internal report on NATO’s force levels assessed, the effect 
of détente on the alliance’s military strategy and wherewithal was undeniable:  
 
The changes that have taken place in East-West relations in Europe have made it more unlikely 
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than ever that NATO will make the effort to improve its conventional capabilities. Because of 
this, and because the underlying changes have affected us as well as Europeans, the U.S. should 
rethink its basic concepts of military strategy and the role of NATO military forces. […] Europe 
thinks that US and USSR have neutralized each other’s nuclear strategic forces. Just as 
importantly, Europe sees the Soviet Union going through a process of embourgeoisement which 
makes preposterous the idea of communist holy wars in Europe. […] In this environment, the 
Europeans generally are no more concerned than they ever have been with the war fighting 
capability of NATO’s forces.188 
 
Détente, however, not only gave occasion to a weaker European defense effort. It also 
encouraged those in the United States who were looking for a reduction of American forces in 
Europe to try their chance. For this report was not merely a complaint about European credulity 
about the Soviet Union. It also posited that indeed “a case can be made for abandoning the effort 
to develop a NATO conventional capability sufficient to withstand a full-scale Warsaw pact 
conventional attack.” This, in turn, would “permit the U.S. to withdraw some combat forces 
from Europe.”189 
Harlan Cleveland shared Rostow’s apprehension that détente could gradually undercut 
the strength and the cohesion of the Western alliance. In November 1966, in a memorandum 
which was widely distributed at the top levels of government, the American ambassador to 
NATO declared that détente – albeit politically alluring – was in reality “dangerous business.” 
Cleveland in particular stressed the need for the United States to retain firm control over the 
détente politics of the European allies. In this respect, he reasoned, Washington and Moscow 
were actually in the same boat. The two superpowers had a common interest in maintaining 
stability in Europe and in ensuring that “the guiding influence in defining a new ‘climate of 
relations’ is US-Soviet and not, say, French-Romanian.” Cleveland’s logic was illustrative of the 
United States’ hard-edged approach to détente: 
 
the US and the USSR have a common interest in seeing to it that the scope and the pace of 
change does not get out of hand – that Europe, West and East, does not revert to its hallowed 
tradition of separatism, violence and war – that the stability attained by the two ‘hegemonies’ 
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(forgive the expression) is not sacrificed to ‘East-West relations,’ which really have no important 
content except in a US-Soviet context. In short, the process of ‘détente’ should, first of all, be 
within a framework acceptable to the US and the USSR – acceptable because of a perceived 
common interest in not abruptly or radically de-stabilizing the situation surrounding their 
perceived national strategic interests. [Cleveland believed that] —rather than abolishing the two 
alliances – both ‘blocs’ should mutate in characteristic fashion and engage in mutually valuable 
intercourse until the time comes when it seems unimportant to keep open the old political 
sores.190  
 
De Gaulle’s independent search for détente and for an end to the Cold War hence did not fit in 
with the hegemon’s approach. By implication, Cleveland believed that such self-regulating 
policies of European allies would lead to political instability which, given Europe’s violent history, 
could only be more dangerous than the bipolar standoff of the Cold War. 
This was the background to what one student of the period has aptly characterized as the 
“multilateralization of détente” in the so-called Harmel Report of December 1967.191 At various 
times, one or the other ally had suggested a reappraisal of NATO’s future, similar to the Report 
of the Three Wise Men in the aftermath of the Suez crisis in 1956.192 The time never seemed ripe, 
however, until the French withdrawal served as a catalyst. The practical necessity of adjusting to 
the French withdrawal combined with the political need to counter de Gaulle’s condemnation of 
the organization finally provided a compelling rationale. A renewed consideration of NATO’s 
purposes had moreover become the more desirable in view of the groundswell in support of 
détente and the short time remaining until 1969, the year in which member states were entitled to 
withdraw from the Treaty. NATO was seen by most Europeans as a Cold War institution par 
excellence – de Gaulle was hardly alone in this respect. In order to re-establish it as an instrument 
of Western policy commanding popular support, its military purpose of deterring the Soviet 
military threat had to be reconciled with the growing desire to ‘build bridges’ with the opponent. 
So when, in the fall of 1966, Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel proposed a fundamental 
review of NATO’s future tasks, this fell into fertile ground – and the North Atlantic Council 
agreed in December that it should be undertaken.  
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In November 1966, when Harmel first approached Washington about his initiative, it was 
agreed that the most important aim of the study would be to underscore the continued relevance 
of NATO “against the background of [the] French withdrawal and [the] approach of 1969.”193 
The Harmel exercise is indeed often credited for reinstating NATO’s sense of purpose after 
France’s dramatic withdrawal in 1966, primarily by resting its future significance on the “not 
contradictory but complementary” objectives of military security and détente. Speaking to his 
colleagues in the North Atlantic Council of December 1967, Harmel concluded that the study 
had “highlighted that the Alliance had developed stabilising effects vis-à-vis the outside world 
and amongst its own members.” And Rusk declared that the exercise itself had reaffirmed the 
validity of NATO’s political role: “[T]he most important thing had been the process of the Study 
itself involving intense consultations among governments.”194 
But the significance of the Harmel exercise for NATO does not point in one direction 
only. The Harmel Report itself, which was bland in its recommendations, had not come about 
with the close involvement of government leaders. President Johnson, for instance, as Rusk later 
clarified, “didn’t take much interest in the Harmel exercise because it was not that sufficiently 
important.” 195  More importantly, the exercise is, on closer scrutiny, also of interest for its 
revelation, “through the extensive and often heated process of developing the study,” of the 
widely divergent views among the allies on core issues.196 
As part of the Harmel exercise within NATO, four working groups were formed in the 
spring of 1967, each assigned to a broad topic and chaired by a rapporteur of certain repute. The 
first working group, on East-West relations, rapidly agreed that ‘détente management’ should be 
a second rationale for the alliance since its first rationale – to provide an effective military 
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deterrent – “was not sufficiently understood, especially by young people.”197 But beyond this 
rather general notion, which would form the core of the Harmel Report, views on how to pursue 
détente diverged considerably. Some members – such as Great Britain, Norway, Denmark, and 
Canada – insisted that the alliance as a whole develop initiatives toward a European settlement 
with the Soviet Union, which would truly have multilateralized the politics of détente. Yet France, 
protective of its independence from the United States, was determined to preserve its bilateral 
policies vis-à-vis the Communist bloc, and it feared an erosion of four-power responsibility for 
Berlin. Regardless of Brandt’s insistence that “the East/West discussions should go on within the 
framework of the alliance,”198 the Harmel Report therefore fell short of proposing a new NATO 
machinery to deal with East-West relations. It merely noted – by way of compromise – that 
“both bilateral and multilateral contacts will be needed” to reach a European settlement and that 
“each Ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet 
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of détente must not 
be allowed to split the Alliance.”199 
The second working group, on intra-alliance relations, was “racked with dissension.”200 It 
was chaired by Paul-Henri Spaak, the outspoken former NATO Secretary General from Belgium, 
who had submitted a forceful and highly personal paper as the basis for discussions.201 Besides 
taking issue with de Gaulle’s foreign policy, Spaak advocated common NATO policies on a wide 
range of non-military issues as well as further progress towards European unity. His paper 
contained many references to the 1956 report of the Three Wise Men, which had already called 
for “a significant strengthening of political consultation” within NATO. The French delegate, 
Jacques Schricke, vehemently objected to Spaak’s Atlanticist sermons right from the outset. As 
Spaak refused to change his paper, however, his working group broke up without approving 
anything.202 
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In the fourth working group, on developments beyond the NATO area, dissension was 
also rampant. The Dutch rapporteur of this group, Constantijn Patijn, an international law expert 
and former parliamentarian, provoked the wrath of France and “at least five other NATO 
members” by writing that “NATO’s task beyond the Treaty area is […] to devise common 
policies for its members.”203 For this purpose, Patijn came up with a number of institutional 
proposals in order to improve political consultations within NATO in respect of global issues, 
such as the establishment of a planning body, small groups to study specific problems and a 
NATO group within the United Nations. He received strong support from American diplomats, 
causing some allies to fear that the United States was above all trying to garner European support 
for the war in Vietnam. But with his legalistic inflexibility and lack of political finesse, Patijn 
failed to bring about a consensus. “Professor Patijn is full of the best intentions,” one report of 
the working group’s proceedings observed, “an idealist unencumbered by an awareness of the 
practical functioning of the Alliance, professorial and unfortunately unteachable.”204 
Only the discussions in the working group on general defense policies, headed by the 
American diplomat Foy D. Kohler, produced little controversy. It broadened the term “security 
policy” to cover not only defense issues but also “realistic measures to reduce tensions and the 
risk of conflict including arms control and disarmament measures.”205 Yet it also emphasized the 
unremitting value of NATO’s military strength and integrated defense model. Seeking to avert a 
slackening of defense efforts, it made the achievement of lower force levels and lower costs 
contingent on arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. Kohler’s report actually planted 
the seeds for subsequent consultations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), which 
proved helpful in containing public pressure for cuts in defense budgets and denied Moscow the 
option of simply waiting for NATO allies to diminish their forces unilaterally.206 
France, meanwhile, voiced predictable reservations throughout the Harmel exercise. In 
December 1966, Couve de Murville had agreed to it on the condition that it would not result in 
binding recommendations for enhancing political integration within the alliance.207 Paris’s qualms 
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about the exercise become the more serious when the four working groups’ reports, in particular 
those of Spaak and Patijn, began to take shape. By the fall of 1967, with the ‘political phase’ 
beginning after the working groups had presented their reports, Couve de Murville warned 
Bohlen that France would be ready for a “showdown” on the final report.208 Paris would not 
accept the final report if it recommended that NATO should assume greater political 
responsibility or come up with a common détente policy. Eugene Rostow and Cleveland 
subsequently informed NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio that the United States preferred 
to “stand firm and to go ahead, on the basis of the open endedness and of the empty chair, 
leaving to France the responsibility of drawing the ultimate formal consequences.”209 Rusk added 
to Harmel that “we should not let ourselves be blackmailed.”210 Robert Bowie, on assignment 
from the State Department, stressed that “the French were already effectively out of the 
Alliance,” adding that as far as Washington was concerned, “the Alliance would in no way be 
weakened if the French were totally out.”211 Washington thus gave the impression of being ready 
to risk French defection from the North Atlantic Treaty in order to get what it wanted in the 
Harmel exercise. 
The diplomatic wrangling in the final stages of the Harmel exercise brought the 
negotiators – faced with a disappointing outcome – to a state of mind “verging on despair,” 
causing Cleveland to remark that the “usual wells of sympathy for French obstinacy had run 
dry.”212 As importantly, however, the Harmel exercise showed that the most important European 
allies – Germany in particular – were unwilling to confront France. A detailed account by the 
CIA of the Harmel exercise summarized the positions of allies as follows:  
 
The West Germans particularly sought to avoid any provocation of the French as they did not 
want to risk what they already had – an Alliance that included France, plus a recognized and 
proven forum for consideration of the German problem. The British […] were worried that a 
dispute over it would adversely influence their Common Market membership application. The 
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Scandinavians, while seeking a new image for NATO, indicated that innovations were a lesser 
concern when compared to retaining France as a counterweight to Germany in NATO. Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and the US were the most determined to see the study through to a successful 
conclusion.213 
 
France finally joined in approving the Harmel Report at the ministerial meeting of 
December 1967, but not until all references to common NATO policies were deleted. De Gaulle 
had no intention of relinquishing membership of the alliance altogether; for this reason, he 
accepted some NATO involvement in the politics of détente, along the lines recommended by 
the first and third working groups. But he was not ready to accept a deepening of the institutional 
bonds within the Atlantic community. Hence he blocked the phalanx of Atlanticists – the likes of 
Spaak, Patijn, and their American supporters – that wanted to use the French withdrawal from 
NATO’s integrated military structure to deepen political integration within the Atlantic 
community. The United States ended up “seeking no new commitments by any ally and [did] not 
contemplate an ‘integrated political command structure’ in the Alliance.”214 It was content with 
NATO’s more modest regeneration as – in Kohler’s words – “a locus for consultation.”215 
The Harmel exercise was significant because, as one student wrote, it “reversed the slow 
process of disintegration that had beset NATO since the late 1950s and that came to the fore 
with de Gaulle’s challenge to the raison d’être of the alliance.”216 It enabled NATO to reestablish 
itself as an organization devoted to détente as well as to defense, thus giving evidence of its 
abiding political and military functions and denying de Gaulle’s thesis that it had become an 
anachronism. It provided the indispensable multilateral context for Germany’s increasing desire 
for rapprochement with the East in the form of Brandt’s Ostpolitik; as a result, it was 
“instrumental in the shift from the bilateral superpower détente of 1963 to the multilateral 
European détente of the 1970s.”217 In pursuing détente, the allies would moreover encourage the 
evolution – not the breakup – of the Communist bloc, recognizing both Moscow’s security 
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interests and America’s attachment to stability in Europe. At the same time, the Harmel exercise 
reaffirmed the political adhesion of its members to the Treaty beyond 1969. None of the 
Fourteen wanted to get rid of the “O” in NATO. And the fact that France agreed to the Harmel 
Report signaled that the alliance could still be an effective forum for reaching common positions. 
Yet, behind the drape of allied solidarity and unity of purpose, the Harmel exercise also 
showed the limitations of the alliance – in particular to those who had held such high 
expectations. The exercise produced no drive for deepening integration across the Atlantic, 
nothing that came close to Acheson’s earlier cited call for a “genuine Atlantic commonwealth, in 
which common institutions are increasingly developed to address common problems.” 
Interestingly, “NATO” was not mentioned once in the Harmel Report. The exercise had also 
shown how difficult it was to get agreement within the alliance on a common approach to 
détente. Even with this agreement, bilateral contacts were to remain more important than 
multilateral approaches. Proposals for a permanent NATO body which would deal with East-
West relations went nowhere. At the urging of the French, the Harmel Report had rather 
emphasized that “as sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to 
collective decision” and that allied consultation merely enabled an ally to “decide its policy in the 
light of close knowledge of the problems and objectives of others.”218 Such language was not far 
removed from de Gaulle’s narrow conception of the Atlantic alliance and a far cry from the 
hopeful ideas of those who had been expecting NATO to progressively manifest itself as a forum 
for collective decisionmaking.  
The Harmel exercise furthermore showed that there was virtually no European support 
for the coordination of policies beyond the treaty area through NATO. In a talk with Secretary 
General Brosio in September, Walt Rostow and Harlan Cleveland had still held their hopes out 
for “some kind of a body for permanent study of a common political strategy” for the 
Mediterranean and Middle East – a proposal that was prompted by the Six Days’ War in the 
Middle East in June 1967.219 Although the Harmel Report mentioned the Mediterranean as an 
area posing “special problems” to allied security, it relegated the crisis in the Middle East simply 
to the sphere of the United Nations. Needless to say, there was no mention whatsoever of 
America’s military exploits on behalf of the Free World in Vietnam. On the contrary, the report’s 
language on allied consultations regarding issues beyond the treaty area is instructive for its utter 
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elusiveness: “In accordance with established usage the Allies, or such of them as wish to do so, 
will also continue to consult on such problems [outside the North Atlantic area] without 
commitment and as the case may demand.”220 De Gaulle had been unable to gain acceptance 
from Washington for his September 1958 memorandum proposal, his opening gambit for 
coordinating the policies of the Western alliance beyond the treaty area. He had – as we have 
seen – then proposed a tripartite security organization for this purpose, which would supplant 
NATO. The Harmel exercise made clear that de Gaulle was not about to accept a NATO role in 
this area in the aftermath of France’s withdrawal from the integrated military structure. 
Finally, the Harmel exercise provides further evidence of a deep-seated reluctance among 
European allies to isolate France, even after its withdrawal from the integrated military structure 
and in spite of frequent irritations with the intransigence of the French positions. The British, for 
instance, “did not want to see a report that was unacceptable to the French” and aimed for a 
result “that was neither too difficult for the French to swallow nor so weak that it would 
undermine the Alliance.” 221  The cautious Secretary General Brosio preferred “a minimum 
agreement on détente with the French,” leaving “the machinery to a later date.” And German 
Foreign Minister Brandt agreed that “it would not be wise to have a clash with the French in 
connection with the Harmel Study.”222 
In short, the history of the Harmel Report is an ambiguous one. On the one hand, it 
revitalized NATO after the French withdrawal and established the Johnson administration’s 
reputation as an effective and responsive manager of the alliance. On the other hand, it was 
another Gaullist victory over those who continued to regard the Atlantic alliance as an 
increasingly important framework for collective action and policy coordination. 
 
The Trilateral Negotiations 
The story of NATO’s revival under Johnson’s stewardship is not complete without considering 
the negotiations in 1966 and 1967 between the United States, Great Britain, and Germany about 
the costs of maintaining troops on the German front. France was not involved in these 
negotiations. But the specter of a further disintegrating NATO after the French withdrawal – and 
                                                 
220 The Harmel Report, available on http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c671213b.htm. 
221 Memorandum of conversation, 25 September 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, #266; Meeting of Rapporteurs 
of Sub-Groups for Study on Future Tasks of the Alliance, 11 October 1966, in NATO Archives, NISCA 4/10/6, 
Item 4,  5 (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_Harmel/documents/volume9/04-V9.pdf). 
222 Record of Meeting between the Secretary General and the German Foreign Minister at the Foreign Office, Bonn, 
9 October 1967, in NATO Archives, NISCA 4/10/6, Item 03, 6. Available on: 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_Harmel/documents/volume9/03-V9.pdf.  




consequently of leaving the European field open to de Gaulle – made it all the more incumbent 
on Washington to resist strong pressures to reduce the American and British troop presence in 
Germany. 
What was at stake? In the early 1960s, in order to help maintain their troop levels in 
Germany, the United States and Great Britain had negotiated a series of bilateral “offset 
agreements” with Bonn. These agreements provided for German purchases of American and 
British military equipment by way of compensation for the costs of maintaining troops in 
Germany;  the local expenses of these troops caused a heavy foreign exchange drain for the 
United States and Great Britain, while they produced an important windfall in foreign exchange 
earnings for the German economy. In the mid-1960s, however, it became increasingly clear that 
the German government would have difficulty continuing its purchases of American and British 
military equipment on a sufficiently large scale. And by 1966, the Erhard government, struggling 
with a budget deficit resulting from deteriorating economic conditions and increased social 
spending, was determined to reduce the offset payments to its Anglo-Saxon protectors.  
This caused serious problems for Great Britain in particular, which faced even greater 
financial problems than Germany. For the Wilson government, defending the pound and 
redressing Britain’s large balance-of-payments deficit was a matter of life and death. In the 
summer of 1966, it therefore threatened to make significant cuts in the British army on the Rhine 
(51,000 military) if West Germany were to fail to continue its offset payments. In the United 
States, too, the level of American military forces in Europe was causing increasingly serious 
financial and political problems. The total foreign exchange cost of stationing American forces in 
Germany (210,000 troops of the American Seventh Army) was estimated at $800 million a year. 
The Johnson administration faced strong pressure in Congress to substantially reduce the 
number of troops given the persistence of the American balance-of-payments deficit and the 
growing prosperity of Western Europe. The costs of the United States’ escalating military 
involvement in Vietnam were also beginning to make themselves felt. The increasing availability 
of airlift and sealift capabilities moreover made it feasible to redeploy troops to the United States 
without undermining the deterrent posture of the alliance. On August 31, 1966, congressional 
pressure culminated in a resolution submitted by Mike Mansfield (D-Montana), the majority 
leader in the Senate, along with 43 co-sponsors, calling for a substantial withdrawal of American 
forces from Europe.223  
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Whereas the crisis precipitated by de Gaulle and the European groundswell in support of 
détente was affecting the spirit and the political content of NATO (the ‘heart’), the offset crisis 
was hitting the alliance in the wallet and was raising serious questions about NATO’s economic 
sustainability (the ‘belly’). “Our allies face the difficult problem of not wanting to accept de 
Gaulle’s solution,” Under Secretary of State Nicolas Katzenbach wryly observed during a meeting 
of the National Security Council, “but not wanting to pay for a NATO solution.”224 What was 
truly at issue in the offset crisis, however, was the ability and the willingness of the United States 
and Great Britain to maintain their troop levels in Germany as well as Germany’s ability and 
willingness to continue to pay for them.  
The most urgent problem confronting Johnson was how to dissuade the British 
government “from rushing into troop cuts,” which would “start an unraveling process in 
NATO” and “increase domestic pressure on us to follow suit.” 225  In late August 1966, he 
therefore proposed to hold trilateral negotiations on the interconnected issues of troop levels, 
offset payments, and the force posture still required by the threat. British Prime Minister Wilson 
promptly agreed, after Johnson had offered him to have the Pentagon place orders for military 
equipment in Great Britain ($35 million) on the condition that he would make no changes to 
British troop levels until the conclusion of the trilateral negotiations. Johnson next forced 
Chancellor Erhard’s hand during the latter’s visit to Washington in late September. The 
negotiations began in earnest in October 1966 and would last until the end of April 1967.  
The Johnson administration, however, was also divided on the question of drawing down 
military forces from Germany. As was to be expected, the State Department was extremely 
cautious about any troop withdrawals from Europe, as this would seem to weaken America’s 
commitment to European security. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in addition, underlined that there 
was no military justification for any withdrawal and that such a withdrawal would reduce the 
capacity to carry out the strategy of flexible response. Secretary Rusk ultimately recommended 
only a very limited withdrawal of American troops from Germany by “dual-basing” two of the 
three brigades of one army division and 162 of the 216 airplanes in three air wings (out of a total 
force of five-plus divisions and nine air wings with 662 aircraft). This would save the United 
States an estimated $100 million annually.226 Secretary of Defense McNamara, however, differed 
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with his chiefs of staff. He strongly favored deeper cuts in the American troop presence in 
Europe; he was moreover convinced that the Johnson administration would not be able to 
prevent Congress from imposing deeper troop cuts than even he considered wise.227 McNamara 
therefore recommended the dual-basing of four of the six brigades of two divisions and 324 of 
the 432 aircraft in six air wings – twice the troop withdrawal that Rusk considered acceptable. 
This would save the United States twice as much: an estimated $200 million annually.  
Johnson had asked the strongly Atlanticist John McCloy to represent the United States in 
the trilateral negotiations with Great Britain and Germany. “The choice of McCloy,” as Eugene 
Rostow has pointed out, “was not simply window dressing, it was part of a policy of 
strengthening the hands of the people within the government who wanted to stay, and not to 
have any change [of troop levels in Europe] unless the Russians changed.”228 The elder statesman 
vigorously opposed McNamara’s recommendation for deep cuts; Rusk’s recommendation for a 
more modest withdrawal was in his view acceptable only if the United States could demonstrate 
that these troops could be redeployed quickly and pledged that no additional withdrawals would 
be contemplated except in case of a reciprocal reduction of Soviet forces. McCloy stressed that 
American troop withdrawals would not be consistent with the emphasis placed on conventional 
forces in the American-sponsored strategy of flexible response, especially since they might 
precipitate troop withdrawals by other allies as well and would certainly make it harder for the 
United States to prod them to do their part within NATO. More importantly, McCloy was 
opposed for political reasons having to do with the future of the Atlantic alliance. As one of the 
founding fathers of the United States’ internationalist foreign policy following World War II, he 
was deeply concerned by the Mansfield resolution, which he believed sprang from isolationist 
sentiments.229 Troop cuts would moreover encourage a dangerous political drift in Europe and, in 
particular, in Germany in the direction of a Gaullist-type nationalism. “There is a growing 
danger,” he reasoned in a letter to Walt Rostow, “that Europe will drift back into a condition 
where the old struggle for leadership with alliances and counter-alliances and cross axes again 
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become a pattern of history, while at the same time a widening of the distance between Europe 
and the United States develops.” The Germans, he felt, were at risk of becoming “prey to a new 
form of nationalism patterned on Gaullism.” 230  In November, with the negotiations barely 
underway, McCloy therefore strongly urged Johnson to decide against any appreciable troop cuts, 
“squeeze as much offset money as possible out of the Germans” and “be prepared to eat the 
difference.”231 
President Johnson meanwhile was wrestling with the fiscal implications of financing both 
his Great Society programs and America’s involvement in Europe and Asia. In his view, the crisis 
in NATO was compounding the growing budget deficit of the American government. In a 
National Security Council meeting at the end of 1966, Johnson furthermore opined that the 
developments in Europe were fanning isolationism at home. Referring to Republican gains in the 
congressional elections of November, he said: 
 
Recent French, British and German actions make clear that they are looking inward. We can’t get 
the American people to support our NATO policy when they see the actions taken by the 
French, British, and Germans. We are fast approaching a day of reckoning.232  
 
As usual, Johnson was focused on the mood in Congress. In a discussion with McCloy in early 
March 1967, he repeatedly dwelt on the difficult situation on the Hill with regard to American 
troop levels in Europe – “I have dealt with those babies for 30 years” – and said he expected to 
have to withdraw at least two divisions. But Johnson was equally sensitive to the potential 
political impact of American troop withdrawals on NATO and Germany. Johnson had been 
regularly fed reports about German nervousness about American steadiness. 233  A substantial 
withdrawal would be perceived as a historic shift in American foreign policy, possibly leading to 
the unraveling of NATO. Like Vietnam, Johnson was not prepared to ‘lose’ NATO. “I want to 
use all the influence I can to hold the Alliance together and to get the Germans to pay the bill,” 
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he therefore concluded.234 Unlike Great Britain, however, the United States stopped short of 
issuing a threat to withdraw troops if the Germans failed to deliver. 
The tripartite negotiations were completed on April 28, 1967. In the end, Washington 
reassured Bonn that it had no plans to significantly reduce the American troop presence in 
Germany. Bonn, in turn, proved prepared to assist in redressing the American balance of 
payments deficit. It agreed to continue its procurement of American military equipment and to 
initiate the Bundesbank’s purchase of medium-term U.S. government bonds; in addition, it 
agreed not to convert any of its large dollar holdings into gold. Similar arrangements were made 
for the British, although some help was needed from the Johnson administration to underwrite, 
through military purchases in Great Britain amounting to $40 million, that part of the British 
deficit that was not covered by Germany. The United States limited its troop withdrawal from 
Germany to the two brigades of Rusk’s recommendation (using the “dual-basing” formula), and 
to the redeployment of 96 aircraft.235 
France had no direct involvement in the trilateral negotiations. Yet the French withdrawal 
from NATO had played a crucial role in their successful resolution. It had, first of all, made it 
incumbent on the Johnson administration to overcome the offset crisis regardless of the fiscal 
implications. Secondly, de Gaulle’s “eviction notice” of March 1966 had enabled the United 
States to quietly reduce the number of overseas forces and costs as well as to relay German 
concerns about the credibility of the American security guarantee by relocating some units from 
France to Germany. “I think it is fair to say,” McNamara had confessed to the Senate in June 
1966, “that in these relocations and reorganizations we hope to achieve, over a period of years, a 
situation substantially better than the status quo with respect to both U.S. expenditures and the 
balance of payments.”236 The resolution of the offset crisis contributed significantly to holding 
NATO together in the 1960s. Johnson and McCloy deserve most of the credit. They were able to 
broker an arrangement acceptable to all sides for spreading the financial burden of maintaining 
NATO’s defensive posture. Ironically, their success had been made possible in part by the 
French withdrawal from NATO. 
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The French withdrawal from NATO was “probably the most serious event in European history 
since the end of the war,” the otherwise cool, calm and collected Charles Bohlen impressed on 
the members of the House of Representatives.237 General Lauris Norstad similarly insisted, in a 
Senate hearing, that “this is a crisis.”238 Yet the question remains: To what extent can one truly 
speak of a crisis as a result of de Gaulle’s withdrawal notification?  
The military repercussions of the French exodus from NATO were considered 
bothersome but surmountable. The French move against NATO had moreover been anticipated. 
The Franco-American dispute had long evolved from the tripartite debate under Eisenhower via 
the open clashes under Kennedy into a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ under Johnson. Thomas Hughes, 
the State Department’s director of Intelligence and Research, had been one of only a few who 
had tried to define terms of agreement with France by making adjustments to NATO – but his 
views were hardly influential.239 At the Pentagon, attitudes toward de Gaulle’s views had also 
been less hostile than at the State Department.240 In White House circles, too, critical voices of 
NATO could be heard that would have received a welcome hearing in the Elysée.241 Yet there 
was by the mid-1960s no starting point left for a compromise that could have averted a French 
move. The damnation of de Gaulle by the foreign policy establishment, led by Acheson and 
McCloy, would furthermore have aborted any attempt to seek a middle ground. “Too many hard 
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voices have been allowed to speak for Washington,” Bernard W. Poirier, an American business 
consultant who had helped formulate Kennedy’s defense policies, concluded in a letter to Walt 
Rostow. “The truth is we lost the original opportunity to revamp NATO by growling at every 
French suggestion to discuss changes to the treaty or its implementations.”242 
 The dearth of American initiatives to reach a compromise with de Gaulle on NATO can 
be explained in the first place by the unattractiveness of such a compromise from the American 
vantage point. Firstly, given its huge stake and investment in European security, the United States 
could hardly be expected to take a back seat in the alliance. Washington was determined to retain 
control over its military affairs. “In moments of crisis the vital need of the Alliance is political 
unity backed by American strength,” McGeorge Bundy explained.  
 
To meet this need SACEUR […] is indispensable. […] Without an effective command – plainly 
responsive both to the alliance as a whole and to Washington as the center of strategic strength – 
there would be no instrument for measured response in any new crisis, and without that 
instrument we should lose a critical governor for peace.243  
 
This American view of the central importance of SACEUR and of an integrated command in 
wartime was incompatible with de Gaulle’s insistence on national control over French forces and 
operations on French soil. De Gaulle would have no recurrence of his clash in December 1944 
with General Eisenhower, who had ordered French troops to withdraw from Strasbourg three 
weeks after it had been liberated (see chapter one). As one diplomat at the Quai d’Orsay 
explained to Kissinger in early 1966:  
 
The difficulty was not the peacetime but the wartime status of ‘integrated’ units. According to 
present arrangements once forces were released to SACEUR, he could use them in any part of 
the NATO territory as he saw fit […]. This was an intolerable situation for France. France not 
only wanted to have the right to release its forces in case of war; it also wanted to have a decisive 
voice in the conduct of military operations on its territory. It did not want retreats which treated 
its soil as a pawn in some larger game.244 
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Secondly, any American concession involving an enhanced status for France within the 
alliance would have caused serious problems with the other allies, and most importantly with 
Germany; as Eisenhower had learned after de Gaulle’s tripartite memorandum proposal, they 
were vigilant about even the hint of a directorate within NATO. Thirdly, the existing 
arrangements served the United States and the majority of European allies rather well. Most 
European allies preferred a system in which the United States presided as the primus inter pares 
over the Gaullist alternative of a European pillar in which the leadership would accrue to one or 
two European states. The American political position in Europe was hence strong. Fourthly, 
France was hardly an indispensable ally both from a military and political point of view. Both 
Germany and Great Britain ranked above France in terms of their importance to NATO. Well 
before de Gaulle’s withdrawal notification, the Johnson administration was therefore in a 
position to conclude that American interests were better served by a French withdrawal from 
NATO than by a NATO reorganized to suit Gaullist preferences. And fifthly, any concession the 
United States would have been willing to make was at best uncertain to have satisfied de Gaulle 
to produce a compromise. “I honestly don’t know,” John Leddy confessed to Congress, “what 
alternate system there is that would provide the requisite security, that would continue to move in 
the direction of more cooperation rather than less, and would at the same time meet the 
fundamental concepts of General de Gaulle.”245 
The truth is that by 1965, the Franco-American relationship had already degenerated into 
an implicit agreement to disagree. This was manifest in the persistent refusal on both sides to 
hold a presidential summit. Johnson was frequently pressed to arrange for such a meeting.246 But 
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the White House desisted. Nor was de Gaulle interested. “We have nothing to request,” he 
volunteered to Sulzberger in July 1965. 247  A proposal by Senator Mansfield for a meeting 
between Johnson and de Gaulle was not well received in Paris, as Kissinger reported in January 
1966, “particularly when Senator Mansfield said that de Gaulle and Johnson would make two 
beautiful figures together on the balcony.”248 As a result, Johnson’s first-ever meeting with de 
Gaulle in person was not until Adenauer’s funeral in April 1967, some four years after assuming 
the presidency. 
In a way, therefore, de Gaulle’s move against NATO and the American troop presence in 
France merely brought the long malaise in Franco-American relations to a head; only the 
comprehensiveness and the briskness of de Gaulle’s move had contained an element of surprise, 
fuelling emotional outrage among Americans. What is more, France’s departure from NATO was 
seen by influential parts within the Johnson administration as a welcome window of opportunity 
for revitalizing NATO and for streamlining the American force posture in Europe. On the day of 
the French withdrawal, Walt Rostow wrote to Johnson with a sense of relief that “de Gaulle’s 
cards consist in threats more powerful if they hang over us than if they are executed.”249 France’s 
separation from NATO’s integrated military structure was accomplished with relative ease, in no 
small part due to Johnson’s resolve not to pick a fight with de Gaulle. The most sensitive issue – 
the arrangements for the continued presence of French troops on German territory – was finally 
resolved by giving in to de Gaulle’s position. Johnson also used the circumstances of the French 
defection from NATO to resolve the question of nuclear sharing that had haunted the United 
States since the 1950s and to make some useful institutional adaptations. The French historian 
Frédéric Bozo has credited de Gaulle for being “indirectly responsible for the move to redefine 
the objectives and political legitimation of the Atlantic Alliance.”250 If anyone deserves credit for 
revitalizing NATO, however, it would have to be Johnson for his calm response and skillful 
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alliance diplomacy. Under his leadership, the United States behaved – as Couve de Murville was 
to admit in his memoirs – like a “pouvoir responsable.”251 
The NATO crisis of 1966 was a crisis mainly in other respects. Firstly, it was a crisis 
because de Gaulle’s critique of NATO was compounded with a yearning across Europe for 
détente in the East-West relationship and with strains on the alliance resulting from the heavy 
financial burden of the Cold War military posture. In addition to responding to the French 
withdrawal from NATO, Johnson had to resolve complex questions on which the future of the 
alliance hinged: How to talk détente without undermining the military readiness of the alliance 
required by the Soviet threat or giving up the goal of German reunification? How to ensure the 
defense of the West without going bankrupt? In addition to relocating NATO’s facilities from 
French soil, such questions required nothing less than NATO’s political reinvention in the 
aftermath of the French withdrawal. Johnson was remarkably adept at overcoming this part of 
the crisis, for which he has belatedly earned his rightful credit.252 Under Johnson’s responsive and 
politically astute leadership, NATO showed more flexibility and resilience than either its critics or 
its friends had supposed.  
Secondly, it was a crisis because de Gaulle’s actions against NATO challenged the 
viability of the Atlanticist ideology of the alliance. While de Gaulle’s decision to pull France out 
of NATO allowed Johnson to re-establish it as an up-to-date institution, the French withdrawal 
also brought out into the open in the most dramatic way a fundamental conflict of purpose 
within the alliance (regardless of the Harmel Report). Since the early days of NATO, the strain of 
liberal internationalism in American foreign policy had saddled the transatlantic relationship with 
an activist program of reform. This program had included strong support for the European 
integration movement and for British participation in it, the Marshall Plan, the proposal for a 
multilateral nuclear force under NATO, and efforts at trade liberalization across the Atlantic 
(such as in the context of the Kennedy Round). It had accounted for the ‘enlightened’ character 
of postwar American foreign policy – and for some of its most substantial achievements and 
most notable defeats. It had also caused the transatlantic relationship to become loaded with 
soaring expectations about the future Atlantic community. These expectations were becoming 
increasingly unrealistic in the course of the 1960s, in no small part because of de Gaulle’s 
obstructionism.  
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Following the rebuttal of Kennedy’s Grand Design in 1963 and the derailing of the MLF 
campaign in 1964, the NATO crisis engendered by de Gaulle in 1966 contributed decisively to 
the shift in American foreign policy toward a more pragmatic – and hence less ideologically 
driven and less ambitious – approach to the transatlantic alliance. Or as Thomas C. Schelling, the 
economist and strategist from Harvard University, analyzed:  
 
Whatever he says to the contrary, President de Gaulle has challenged the alliance itself – not the 
mutual defense commitment of Article 5, but the developing community of Atlantic nations. He 
is not merely withdrawing from it, he is denouncing it. And, unfortunately, it is within his power 
to spoil the Alliance. […] In a sense, the Alliance is dead. Or perhaps it is only the ideology of the 
Alliance that is dead. This Alliance did have a lot of ideology. It also had a lot of rhetorical theory 
and architecture – involving pillars, dumbbells, concentric circles, vertical and horizontal 
integration, and other metaphors and analogies that were meant to describe it. […] It seems to me 
that we have reached the end of our architectural period in Europe, the period of integrated 
cohesive schemes supported by theories. We may be entering a more pragmatic period. There is 
more than disappointment; there will be a loss of morale on both sides of the Atlantic.253 
 
To this one should add that there had always been a nagging concern within America’s 
foreign policy establishment that a lack of forward movement in achieving transatlantic unity 
might give occasion to a relapse into a violent past. From the late 1940s onwards, lack of 
progress toward more integration was consistently thought to give nourishment to a latent 
European nationalism, most ominously in Germany. George Ball’s strongly worded public 
reaction to France’s military withdrawal certainly falls in this category:  
 
... we have always recognized the danger that the European people, with reflexes conditioned by 
history, might from time to time be tempted to lapse into the habits of the past, to unfurl the 
dusty banners of other centuries, and to re-create the conditions in which Europe might once 
again become the cockpit of the world. 
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Ball’s reaction revealed the continuing ambivalence in American perceptions of Europe. The 
‘new’ Europe – personified by the likes of Jean Monnet and Paul-Henri Spaak – was 
enthusiastically supported, whereas the ‘old’ Europe – personified above all by de Gaulle – 
brought back haunting memories. “If there was to be peace in Europe and in the world,” Ball 
reasoned, “the old national rivalries had to be replaced by something more constructive.”254 But 
that ‘something more constructive’ hardly resembled the state of affairs in 1966, with NATO in 
disarray and the European movement held hostage by de Gaulle’s assertion of national prerogatives.  
De Gaulle’s nationalistic ‘atavism’ was also held partly responsible for letting the genie of 
American isolationism out of the bottle, spearheaded by those in Congress – such as Senator 
Mansfield – who pressed for a significant reduction of American troops in Europe. Mansfield 
himself explained to the administration that he had introduced his resolution because “we are the 
only NATO country that is meeting its commitments” and because he felt the continued 
presence of American troops in Europe was no longer unambiguously desired by Europeans, and 
not because of financial reasons or the war in Vietnam.255 
After the scuttling of the MLF in late 1964, Johnson’s purposely unruffled response to de 
Gaulle’s defection from NATO was another victory for the pragmatists over the Atlanticists. 
Johnson’s attitude of restraint was a milestone in the evolution of American policies toward a 
more realistic conception of the Atlantic relationship. Despite the intimate involvement of 
Acheson and McCloy in responding to the NATO crisis, the Establishment was gradually losing 
its grip on the direction of American foreign affairs. The Vietnam War and the unstoppable 
advance of age also did their grinding work. It is not sufficient to note that Johnson deserves 
credit for leading the alliance into calmer waters, which he does. It is also important to recognize 
that Johnson’s policy of restraint had not come about without serious clashes within his own 
administration – both over the issue itself and his style of leadership. “In acting as Chief of Staff 
for the NATO-France crisis,” Dean Acheson wrote to Anthony Eden in June 1966, “I have 
found myself in the middle of a whole series of intra-USG [US government] vendettas – Defense 
vs. State, White House vs. State, JCS vs. McNamara, Gaullists vs. European Integrationists, and 
LBJ-turn-the-other-cheekism vs. DA-let-the-chips-fall-where-they-mayism.”256 
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At one important White House meeting on responding to de Gaulle in May 1966, as 
David Bruce recorded, Johnson finally ignited the “Acheson powder magazine” with a “wholly 
intemperate attack on United States officials who had assailed President de Gaulle for his NATO 
stance.” Acheson, backed by Ball, responded to Johnson’s accusations with strong words of his 
own about the president’s behavior, and “the fat sizzled in the fire for quite some time.”257 But 
there was more at hand than a spat of personalities. Acheson’s argument with Johnson was also 
one about the intrinsic value of the transatlantic alliance in American foreign policy. While 
Johnson spent much more time on European issues than he is usually given credit for, from 
Acheson’s perspective this was hardly enough. What Acheson wanted was strong presidential 
leadership in defense of the Atlantic community against the resurgent forces of European 
nationalism embodied by de Gaulle. What Johnson wanted was merely to “rebuild NATO 
outside France as promptly, economically, and effectively as possible.” 258  Once he had 
accomplished this, his attention was once again diverted to more pressing issues, and in particular 
to the war in Vietnam. “Europe is forgotten,” Acheson bitterly complained in a letter to his old 
boss Harry Truman, “and a good deal that you, General Marshall and I did is unraveling fast.”259 
While this assessment was too bleak, there was truth in British Ambassador Patrick Dean’s 
judgment in early 1967 that the United States was beginning to see itself “less as a leader of the 
Atlantic Community and more at the Atlantic-Pacific Power whose best interest lies in 
encouraging, but not being to closely enmeshed in, the development of collective regional 
endeavors in all areas of the world.” The conjunction of the NATO crisis of 1966, the Vietnam 
War, and Johnson’s desire for détente in the East-West relationship also ushered in a new era in 
the transatlantic relationship, with “less sentiment and more hard-headedness in the American 
attitude to Europe.”260 
The representatives of America’s revered foreign policy establishment were thus deeply 
disillusioned with Johnson’s leadership and with developments in the transatlantic relationship. 
Their heirs, many of whom had entered the Kennedy administration with grand ambitions about 
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transforming the transatlantic relationship, were moreover being replaced by men of more 
pragmatic disposition as the Johnson years took their course. In September 1966, six months 
after de Gaulle’s eviction message, Ball – already a maverick on Vietnam – quit the administration. 
“My job had lost its savor, and, as our involvement in the Vietnam nightmare had passed the 
point where I could significantly influence policy, it was time to resign,” he explained in his 
memoirs.261 Acheson’s disillusion and Ball’s departure marked the transition to a less ambitious 
era in the transatlantic relationship. 
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Chapter Nine 




If one had to pick a year in which the Franco-American relationship reached a nadir, it would no 
doubt be 1967. Following the withdrawal from NATO, de Gaulle capitalized on his newly 
achieved ‘independence’ by seeking rapprochement with the Warsaw Pact countries. In 1967, 
France would also proclaim a nuclear strategy that made no distinction between the West and the 
East, issue high-profile statements on a range of issues across the globe which set France clearly 
at odds with the ‘Anglo-Saxons,’ and launch an attack on the American dollar as the linchpin 
currency of the international monetary system.  
 In all of these issues, French foreign policy was more openly than ever aimed at redressing a 
global balance of power which de Gaulle felt was tilted too heavily in favor of the United States. 
De Gaulle argued that, while there was an apparent military stand-off between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, “the US was so much more powerful from the economic and financial 
point of view as well as in organization of its state that there was no comparison.” In his view, 
the United States’ hegemonic hubris had become more of a threat to peace than the ideological 
designs of the Soviet Union. “It was ‘inevitable,’” he declared to Bohlen in the summer of 1967, 
“that so much power as that possessed by the U.S. sooner or later […] would begin to influence 
the policy and conduct of any country.”1 By the fall of 1967, the CIA had come to believe that de 
Gaulle was “more concerned with […] the dominant role played by the United States in Europe 
than with fears of Soviet hegemony” and might withdraw France from the Atlantic alliance 
altogether by 1969; de Gaulle, given his age, was judged to be “anxious” to present his successors 
with a fait accompli.2 
 It is therefore not surprising that de Gaulle’s foreign policy by 1967 was seen as virulently 
and incorrigibly anti-American. His popularity among Americans dropped to new lows. In 
October 1967, Dean Acheson voiced his frustration at de Gaulle’s grandstanding by lashing out 
against the French as “the most […] selfish people in the […] world” and “the greatest nuisance” 
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in Europe.3 And in December, asked what would happen if France were to renounce the North 
Atlantic Treaty in 1969, the former secretary of state bluntly declared that “France is worth 
nothing to NATO – absolutely nothing whatever – and NATO will be improved by the absence 
of this France rather than helped by it.” 4  Acheson’s emotive responsive to de Gaulle’s 
independent posture was indeed reflective of the public mood at the time.5 
 The atmosphere was only marginally better at the level of heads of state, although it was 
obviously restrained by the demands of the office and President Johnson’s determination to 
retain an attitude of politeness.6 Johnson’s reunion with de Gaulle at Konrad Adenauer’s funeral 
on April 25, 1967 – der Alte had passed away at the respectable age of 91 – was a case in point, as 
it made painfully clear how little communication was possible between them.7 In a mood of 
resignation,  Johnson wrote to Dwight Eisenhower upon his return to Washington that “there 
does not appear to be a great deal of substance we can constructively say to one another.”8 If 
anything, their get-together in Bonn added an uncomfortable experience. Johnson’s outgoing 
behavior, which often bordered on boorishness, had clashed with de Gaulle’s aloof and solemn 
demeanor. Before entering the Bundestag, “when photographers urged a handshake, Johnson 
reached across [German president Heinrich] Luebke and clasped de Gaulle’s hand,” the 
American embassy in Bonn reported. “Luebke stacked his hand on theirs. Johnson [and] Luebke 
smiled and [a] faint trace of [a] smile [was] reported on de Gaulle’s face.”9 De Gaulle was visibly 
annoyed at being drawn into this show of political unity at the funeral of his German 
companion.10  
 And yet, in the last year of Johnson’s presidency and the early days of Nixon’s, a remarkable 
rapprochement took shape between Washington and Paris. For both, 1968 turned out to be an 
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annus horribilis. It taught both the United States and France that they had outlived the means and 
the popular support required for their respective foreign policies. They hence moved toward a 
less confrontational relationship. According to Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty, any 
member state would be permitted to renounce membership of the alliance after the treaty had 
been in force for twenty years. April 4, 1969, passed without a ruffle in the water. Franco-
American relations were better than they had been at any time during de Gaulle’s tenure. This 
chapter will seek to chart and to clarify this noteworthy shift from divergence to accommodation. 
The Dollar and Transatlantic Unity 
By 1967, the most important disagreement between de Gaulle and the Americans arguably 
concerned economics and finance. De Gaulle continued his policies of independence in the 
military realm and détente with the East, but such strategic issues no longer took center stage in 
the row between Washington and Paris. The United States no longer made any effort to put an 
end to the French nuclear program and, after the demise of the idea of a multilateral nuclear 
force and the establishment of a nuclear consultation mechanism within NATO, Franco-
American relations were also no longer disturbed by American attempts to involve Germany in 
the club of nuclear “haves.” By withdrawing from NATO, de Gaulle had not only set France 
apart within the Western alliance but had also allowed the United States to resume the initiative 
within the alliance. And by ‘NATO-izing’ détente through the Harmel exercise, Washington had 
taken the sting out of de Gaulle’s rapprochement with the Communist bloc. 
 From early 1965 onwards, the French government actively and publicly opposed the 
privileged position of the American dollar in the international monetary system (known as the 
‘Bretton Woods’ system after the mountain resort in New Hampshire where this system was 
engineered in July 1944), consistently pressed for the elimination of the United States’ balance-of-
payments deficit, and called for an increase in the official price of gold and a return to the gold 
standard. French criticism both reflected and aggravated the strains on the Bretton Woods 
system, which had become increasingly evident during the 1960s. The crisis in the system hence 
did not begin in 1967, nor was it principally of de Gaulle’s making. Yet it spinned out of control 
during the so-called “gold crisis” from November 1967, when Great Britain devalued the pound, 
to March 1968, when Johnson requested the closure of the London gold market and introduced 
the two-tier market.11 Given that the sustainability of the entire postwar international monetary 
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system was at stake, the Johnson administration seriously feared a return to the 1930s. French 
actions during this crisis were seen as irresponsibly fanning the flames of speculation against the 
dollar and as detrimental to fixing the system. The indignance in American circles at de Gaulle’s 
obvious willingness to exploit America’s monetary vulnerability ran high. As Hervé Alphand 
intimated to de Gaulle’s biographer Jean Lacouture:  
 
In all these ‘crises’ between de Gaulle and the Americans, there was only one that made it difficult 
for me to play my role as a link between France and the United States – and that was the dollar 
crisis. There I felt that the Americans had been given a terrible blow. That ungrateful de Gaulle 
was not content to detach himself from them, to talk pleasantries with the Communists, to give 
them lessons on morality and political wisdom: he was even going to try and undermine American 
prosperity, to affect the wallet of every citizen of that free society!12 
 
 What is more, this period of monetary turmoil was compounded with a concurrent shift in 
American views of the Common Market, seeing it less as a promise of political integration to be 
supported even against economic costs for the United States and more as an economic rival to be 
wary about. 
The Decline of the Imperial Dollar 
The overriding objective of the Bretton Woods system was to avoid a recurrence of the 
economic mismanagement of the interwar period that gave rise to the Great Depression and the 
emergence of right-wing, authoritarian regimes in Europe. It was to discourage countries from 
curtailing international trade in order to achieve a national balance of payments, which would 
send economies in a downward spiral and causing mass unemployment and high inflation.  
To this end, the system combined discipline with flexibility. The discipline was provided 
for by fixing exchange rates to the American dollar and by fixing the value of the dollar, in turn, 
to gold at $35 an ounce; this system became known as the gold exchange standard.13 The fixing 
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of exchange rates would discourage excessive monetary expansion on the part of the participating 
countries, which had to maintain the value of their currencies vis-à-vis the dollar, as well as on 
the part of the United States, which had to maintain its ability to convert dollars into gold at the 
fixed price. It would thus work against inflation and – another spectre from the 1930s – private 
speculation. It also provided the currency stability that was beneficial for international trade. The 
flexibility was provided for by creating the possibility of addressing temporary imbalances in a 
national balance-of-payments either through the lending facilities of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) or through adjusting the fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar by devaluing or 
revaluing the national currency (provided that the IMF agreed that the imbalance was 
structural).14 This mechanism allowed for rebalancing national balances-of-payments in an orderly 
fashion and without resort to protectionist measures.15  
The Bretton Woods conference of 1944 had thus established the United States as the 
indispensable power in managing the world’s monetary affairs. For at the heart of the system 
there was the American dollar, the only currency convertible into gold and the one currency 
against which the other currencies were valued. The United States was the only country which 
could not revalue or devalue its currency, except by changing the price of gold. It was responsible 
for maintaining the price of gold at $35 an ounce. In order to guarantee to foreign central banks 
that they could convert their dollars into gold at that price, it had to hold sufficient gold reserves. 
Since the American dollar was as good as gold and freely convertible with other currencies, it 
became the principal currency which foreign central banks held in reserve and the universally 
preferred currency of trade. The Bretton Woods system thus made the United States the banker 
of the world. As a result, it enabled the economic reconstruction of Europe. The countries most 
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afflicted by the war desperately needed goods and services which only the United States could 
provide, but there was a shortage of dollars for their purchase (a problem known as the “dollar 
gap”) and they still suffered from balance-of-payments deficits. By infusing billions of dollars into 
Western Europe through the Marshall Plan, the “dollar gap” was closed, benefiting both the 
reconstruction of Europe and the continued growth of the American economy. 
However, the Bretton Woods system came increasingly under duress. First, the system 
was highly dependent on the ability of the United States to continue to play its role as the world’s 
banker. This became increasingly hazardous as the economic balance of power between on the 
one hand the United States and on the other hand the recovering economies of Europe and 
Japan became less skewed. Europe gradually recovered the ability to produce its own goods and 
services. As a result, the American trade balance worsened in the course of the late 1950s and the 
1960s.  The resulting balance-of-payments deficits were further aggravated by military spending 
and foreign aid and by the overseas investments of American companies. At the same time, the 
Bretton Woods system encouraged countries to keep dollars in reserve, thus affording the United 
States the luxury of spending more than it earned.16 But, as a result, the United States also became 
more reliant on the willingness of its allies to accumulate large dollar holdings. These allies had 
been willing to do so because the dollar was certain to be as good as gold and dollar holdings had 
the added advantage of earning interest. Moreover, as the supply of gold was not keeping up with 
the growth of the world economy, central banks could only ensure sufficient levels of 
international reserve by accumulating dollars. However, mounting balance-of-payments deficits 
led to growing doubts about the strength of the dollar, causing countries to exchange dollars for 
gold. The United States’ gold reserves dwindled to an increasingly worrisome level.17 In addition, 
the growing scarcity of gold gave cause to upward pressure on the market price of gold, making it 
harder for the United States to stabilize this price at the official level of $35 per ounce. From 
1960 onwards, it was often feared that the United States would sooner or later devalue the dollar 
relative to gold. 
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16 By 1968, the total U.S. balance-of-payments deficit on a liquidity basis since 1960 amounted to $19 billion, of 
which $7 billion was financed through gold sales and $12 billion through an increase of private and official dollar 
holdings abroad. Memorandum, Walt W. Rostow to President Johnson, 14 February 1968, Gold Crisis, book I, 
NSCH, NSF, #32a and #33a, box 53, LBJL. 
17 The U.S. gold stock was at its peak in 1949, amounting to $24.5 billion, which accounted for 70 percent of the 
monetary reserves of gold at that time. By 1967, this gold stock had dwindled to $13.1 billion. Michael M. Reyna, 
“Foreign Economic Decisionmaking in the Johnson administration: the Gold Crisis,” draft report for the LBJ 
School of Public Affairs, Austin, TX, July 1982, 8. 




Secondly, the money market became more susceptible to speculation as a result of the 
increased mobility of private capital and of the expansion of foreign exchange trading following 
the restoration of the convertibility of most European currencies in 1958. This made it much 
more difficult to maintain the gold exchange standard with its fixed exchange rates and fixed 
valuation of the dollar in gold. A country with a large and persistent deficit would continually be 
suspected of being pronounced in ‘fundamental disequilibrium’ under the IMF Articles of 
Agreement, and thus ready for a currency devaluation. Suspicion of an impending devaluation 
could, in turn, spark a wave of currency speculation and a balance-of-payments crisis. By the 
1960s, balance-of-payments crises became more frequent and violent. As early as 1960, a central 
bank intervention and a statement from presidential candidate John F. Kennedy had been 
required to restore stability in the London gold market. In 1961, a group of ten industrial 
countries – including the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany – agreed on a special 
lending arrangement through the IMF. In addition, a gold pool was established to stabilize the 
price of gold in the private market at $35 an ounce and to distribute the burden of any losses.18 
The gold pool worked well until the mid-1960s, mostly because of a temporary improvement in 
the American balance of payments. In 1966, however, the demand for gold began to outpace 
supply and members of the pool began to lose increasing amounts of gold to the market. The 
balance-of-payments problems of the United States and Great Britain moreover persisted. 
In 1960, Robert Triffin, a Belgian economist at Yale University, called attention to the 
certainty that the United States within the foreseeable future would no longer be able to 
guarantee the convertibility of every single dollar into gold at the price of $35 an ounce. His book 
on this topic deeply influenced American policymakers in the 1960s.19 Although the American 
gold stock still exceeded the aggregate dollar holdings of foreign central banks in 1960, Triffin 
argued that, as the need of central banks for international reserves continued to grow in parallel 
with the growth of the world economy, these dollar holdings would eventually exceed the 
American gold stock. This would, Triffin reasoned, undermine international confidence in the 
dollar, since it would no longer be “as good as gold.” He warned that this would precipitate a 
breakdown of the entire system by prompting banks and private investors to cash in their dollars 
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for gold before it was too late – much like in the early 1930s, when the relatively small size of the 
British gold reserve led to a sudden and massive conversion of pounds into gold, thus causing the 
gold standard to collapse. There was, Triffin argued, a need for a more sustainable source of 
international reserves to finance growing world trade. He therefore proposed the creation of a 
new international reserve unit to be issued by the IMF which central banks could hold in place of 
dollars and which would, in fact, have made the IMF into a world central bank.20 Both the spectre 
evoked by Triffin and his proposed solution left a deep mark on the international monetary 
policies of the United States in the 1960s. They were, for instance, manifest in the 
recommendations President Johnson received in late 1964 from his advisers on foreign economic 
policy, who agreed that “major reliance must be placed on [the] multilateral creation of reserves.” 
This approach to the United States’ monetary woes obviously required the cooperation of the 
European allies. This dependence was far from a disincentive, however, since Johnson’s advisers 
had also concluded that the “continued elaboration of common economic institutions may 
provide the best available approach to the goal of North Atlantic unity.” 21 
 
“Gaullefinger” 
De Gaulle, contrary to conventional wisdom, had a keen interest in finance and economics and 
he always made sure that his government included competent managers (such as in August 1945, 
when he asked Jean Monnet to modernize the French economy with the infusion of American 
dollars). Whenever in power, he gave ample personal attention to economic and financial affairs. 
It is nonetheless true that his interest in such affairs was largely a function of politics rather than 
the other way around. “Politics and economics are as closely linked as action and life,” de Gaulle 
explained in his Memoirs of Hope. “If the national task which I was undertaking demanded the 
allegiance of men’s minds, it naturally presupposed that the country had the means to achieve 
it.”22 De Gaulle had been acutely aware of the destitute and dependent state of the French 
economy after World War II as well as of the vigorous entrepreneurial  energy of the American 
economy – and of the political  implications of this. Economic prowess was not only an 
indispensable ingredient in the balance of power, but his dedication to national sovereignty also 
entailed striving for a maximum capacity for financial and economic self-determination. This 
required inter alia a strong currency, “the criterion of economic health and sine qua non of credit, 
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whose soundness guarantees and promotes saving, encourages enterprise, contributes to social 
harmony, procures international influence, but whose weakness unleashes inflation and waste, 
stifles growth, provokes unrest, jeopardizes independence; I was therefore to give France a model 
franc whose parity was to remain constant as long as I was in power […].”23 
In 1965, as the United States stepped up pressure on other governments to hold on to 
their dollar reserves, de Gaulle began to level public criticism at the position of the American 
dollar in the international monetary system. He felt that the United States and Great Britain had 
been too lax in dealing with their balance-of-payments problems because the fact that the dollar 
and the pound  were reserve currencies had made it too easy for them to obtain international 
credit. From late 1964 onwards, France converted nearly all its reserves from dollars into gold.24 
In September 1965, after having twice provided assistance to the British (in November 1964 and 
in May 1965), the French refused to once again rush to the assistance of the pound. 25  By 
imposing substantial gold losses, Paris tried to compel Washington and London to introduce 
tighter monetary and fiscal policies. But the French criticism went further. On February 4, 1965, 
in response to a question at a press conference, de Gaulle called for a gradual return of the world 
monetary system to the gold standard. Gold, he said, was the only “unquestionable monetary 
basis which did not bear the mark of any individual country,” and therefore the most equitable 
standard upon which to conduct international financial transactions. “America’s monetary 
hegemony reflected a political relationship between Europe and America that was increasingly 
inappropriate” and benefited the United States above all.26 De Gaulle’s support for a return to 
gold standard earned him the nickname of “Gaullefinger” in a Herblock cartoon, an adaptation 
from the immensely popular James Bond movie Goldfinger released in September 1964 about a 
rogue who tried to raid Fort Knox.27 
De Gaulle’s economic and monetary views were influenced in particular by his adviser 
Jacques Rueff (1896-1978), who combined a standing as a brilliant economic theorist with a 
wealth of policy experience gained as a government practitioner since 1923.28 Rueff had been the 
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author of the sweeping and highly successful plan de Gaulle adopted in December 1958, despite 
the unanimous opposition of his cabinet, to balance the budget and to secure the convertibility of 
the franc after a 17.5 percent devaluation.29 Rueff was anything but a novice to monetary fixes. 
His first study as a young man in his twenties – “Exchange: A Natural Phenomenon” (1922) – 
had concerned fluctuations in exchange rates. When Raymond Poincaré became French prime 
minister in 1926, he had commissioned Rueff to determine the level at which the French franc 
should be stabilized. From 1927 to 1930, Rueff had worked as a “currency doctor” for the 
League of Nations devising economic programs for countries such as Greece, Bulgaria, and 
Portugal. In 1929, he had been assigned to the League’s Gold Committee. In one report, Rueff 
had first called attention to the hazards of the gold-exchange standard. He had cautioned that the 
system’s reliance on reserve currencies tended to pass on inflation or deflation on a worldwide 
scale. As the French financial attaché in London from 1930 to 1933, put in charge of the Bank of 
France’s sterling reserves, Rueff had correctly foretold the deflationary collapse of the gold-
exchange standard. The gold values of the dollar and the pound  had been re-established at their 
parities prior to World War I, even as wartime monetary expansion had caused a substantial 
increase in price levels. Ultimately either the gold parities would have to be adjusted to match 
consumer prices, or prices would have to deflate back to their prewar level. Rueff had seen it all 
before. 
After having put the franc on a more stable footing in 1958, Rueff turned his mind to the 
shortcomings of the Bretton Woods system. The dollar deluge encouraged by the postwar 
international monetary system increased international demand without reducing it in the United 
States. Lacking a built-in adjustment mechanism, Rueff concluded, it inevitably led to inflation. 
American debts would continue to grow until the system would become unmanageable. At some 
point, countries would be forced to abandon fixed parities and to protect themselves by capital 
and trade controls – thus risking a disintegration of the international economy similar to the 
1930s. Like Robert Triffin, Rueff thus correctly predicted the system’s ultimate collapse (which 
came in 1971). But he disagreed with Triffin about the solution. Whereas Triffin advocated the 
creation of  a paper currency issued by the IMF and loosely linked to gold, Rueff called for a 
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return to an international gold standard, getting rid of reserve currencies, and advocated a 
‘Marshall Plan for the United States’ financed by doubling the gold price.30 A solution to the 
United States’ balance-of-payments deficit required a much stricter discipline with regard to both 
its domestic and foreign policies, and he doubted that this could be achieved in an international 
monetary system that gave American policymakers such leeway. Rueff was convinced that only a 
return to the gold standard could restore international monetary stability. 
Apart from Rueff’s criticism of the Bretton Woods system, the French central bank’s 
gold purchases were motivated by the fact that France was indirectly helping American 
companies to buy up French companies by holding on to many dollars.31 The industrial policies 
of the Fifth Republic have been an amalgamation of liberal and statist doctrines and practices.32 
De Gaulle recognized “freedom” as “an essential lever in economic action,” but not without 
emphasizing that “this action was none the less collective, it directly controlled the nation’s 
destiny, and it continually involved social relations.” Hence a liberal economy required “an 
impetus, a harmonizing influence, a set of rules, which could only emanate from the State.” De 
Gaulle firmly believed that the state embodied the collective interest of the nation against and 
above particular interests and that the definition of the nation’s economic goals could not be left 
to the realm of individual economic actors. “In short, what was needed was State direction 
(dirigisme).”33  
In much the same vein, foreign control of important sectors of the national economy did 
not sit well with de Gaulle’s overriding objective of national self determination and independence. 
On the contrary, in order to bolster national autonomy, the French government tried to develop 
national champions large enough to compete with American multinationals in particular, whose 
presence in the world economy loomed large. American business activities in France were not 
disproportional compared with those in other Western European countries. 34  But many 
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Frenchmen resented the notion that important decisions concerning the French economy could 
be made in company headquarters in the United States, such as in the summer of 1962, when 
General Motors and Remington-Rand laid off hundreds of French workers without prior notice, 
and in early 1963, when Chrysler swallowed the French carmaker Simca in a surprise takeover.35 
In government circles, there was also concern that the dominance of American multinational 
companies would relegate France to a state of technological dependence and that this could 
directly affect national security. (The American refusal in 1964 to sell advanced IBM computers 
for the purpose of nuclear research in France undoubtedly confirmed de Gaulle in this 
conviction.) The inroads made into French society by the American business world were 
moreover often emotive for other reasons. Although the life of the ordinary Frenchman had 
been ‘Americanized’ (if only because his material well-being had grown substantially since World 
War II), there remained a strong streak of social and cultural conservatism in French society from 
right to left. Most Frenchmen believed there was something repugnant and disrespectful about 
American business practices, which were routinely seen as ‘aggressive’ and ‘ruthless,’ in particular 
if they appeared to threaten artisanal production and the French way of life.  
There was, as a result, widespread public and political support in France for a policy to 
keep foreign investment – at the time synonymous with American investment – in check. The 
right feared the power of American multinationals and its consequences for the nation’s 
autonomy and culture; the left added an ideological gloss by assailing the government for not 
doing more to prevent “the colonization of France by foreign capital.” 36  From early 1963 
onwards, the French government established controls which made it more difficult for American 
companies to invest in France. Whether these controls in effect turned away American 
investments remains an issue of debate among historians.37 There is, however, reason to believe 
that the effect, if any, was minor. Support for restrictive policies diminished as soon as they were 
hurting the French economy. “American investments are better than no investments at all,” 
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Michel Debré, who had become finance minister in early 1966, explained. 38  American 
policymakers, too, noted that American companies hardly ever encountered any difficulty with 
the French authorities. Although American companies had been made “in effect second class 
citizens” in France, Ernest Goldstein underlined in a memorandum to President Johnson in late 
1967 that “none of my clients ever were refused a chance to invest.”39 As National Security 
Adviser Walt  Rostow observed in December 1967:  
 
French policy toward U.S. investment is selective. Licenses are granted quickly for investments 
that bring new technology and raise productivity. The fact is that the French cannot afford to act 
alone in discriminating against U.S. investments. To do so would drive such investments to their 
partners to the disadvantage of the French competitive position within the Common Market.40 
 
At heart, the French were deeply ambivalent about American economic preponderance. 
This ambivalence helps to explain the enormous success of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s Le 
Défi Américain (The American Challenge) (1967), which rapidly became the best-selling book in 
France of the 1960s. On the one hand, Servan-Schreiber raised the spectre of the dominance of 
American multinationals, outclassing European companies on all fronts and relegating them to 
becoming mere subsidiaries. On the other hand, he called upon the French – and the Europeans 
– to imitate American practices if they wanted to hold their own. The journalist and co-founder 
of L’Express was highly critical of the Gaullist fondness for national solutions and economic 
conservatism. France had no choice but to rise to the American challenge by becoming more 
American themselves.41 The French unease about the power of American multinationals could 
only reinforce the French criticism of the Bretton Woods system, which was so lenient on 
printing the dollars with which American businessmen could conquer Europe. 
Despite de Gaulle’s public declarations and Rueff’s analyses, the French government 
never put forward specific proposals for reforming the international monetary system. In a 
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speech on February 11, 1965, one week after de Gaulle’s aforementioned press conference, 
Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing did put forward his ideas about reducing the reliance 
on the dollar as a reserve currency and reinstating gold as the foundation for the international 
monetary system.42 Yet in a conversation with Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary 
Affairs Frederick L. Deming in July 1965, he put the ball squarely in the Anglo-Saxon court:  
 
The French authorities recognized that it was not for them to initiate the necessary action to deal 
with the unhealthy situation. They had done what they could to call attention to the problem. 
Now it was up to those upon whom fell the major responsibility for the functioning of the 
present system – namely, the reserve currency countries – to accept that responsibility and decide 
how they wanted to deal with the problem.43 
 
The Johnson administration was obviously displeased with de Gaulle’s verdict on the 
Bretton Woods system of February 1965. From the American perspective, the central dilemma 
was that since American balance-of-payments deficits financed the growth of world trade, 
international trade flows might slow down as a result of a lack of capital if the United States 
achieved the goal of a balance-of-payments (a dilemma known at the time as the ‘Triffin 
dilemma’). Following Robert Triffin’s prescriptions, the Johnson administration therefore took 
the lead in “seeking agreement among the major countries on the creation of a new international 
reserve asset – the Special Drawing Rights.” 44  De Gaulle’s comments were interpreted as 
undercutting these efforts. “In fashionable opinion,” David Calleo sarcastically noted, “defending 
gold represented atavistic nationalism and antediluvian economics.” 45  He had moreover 
politicized an issue that Washington preferred to regard as monetary and technical.  
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As usual, George Ball was in the forefront of those pressing for an immediate and firm 
rebuke.46 On February 4, the Treasury Department indeed objected to de Gaulle’s suggestion to 
revert to the full gold standard, arguing that such a monetary system had “collapsed” in the early 
1930s and was “incapable of financing the huge increase of world trade” since World War II.47 
On June 1, Chairman of the Federal Reserve William McChesney Martin added his voice by 
declaring opposition to a rise in gold prices.48 On July 10, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler 
proposed an international conference on monetary reform only to be turned down by Giscard 
d’Estaing, who opposed such a conference because “there exists a minimum of agreement on the 
nature and objective of the reform to be undertaken.” 49  One year later, Fowler was still 
sufficiently “disturbed about the French attitude and by the implications of a continuation of 
their present gold-buying policy” to request a private meeting with President Johnson.50 In July 
1966, highlevel State Department officials even raised the possibility of unilaterally ceasing to sell 
gold to France – a policy of “selective non-convertibility” – in a memorandum entitled “A 
Proposal to Isolate France in the Field of International Finance.”51 As had been the case with 
regard to military matters within NATO, there appeared too little common ground between the 
United States and France for a constructive dialogue.  
In the summer of 1967, after lengthy negotiations, France did join in an agreement on the 
creation of the so-called ‘special drawing rights’ (SDRs) to be issued through the IMF. But the 
implementation of the agreement was made contingent on a reduction of the American balance-
of-payments deficit. At French insistence, the Common Market countries could moreover veto 
the timing and the manner of implemention. France had not been alone in pressing for a 
reduction of the American balance-of-payments deficit as a condition for implementing the 
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agreement. But “the French position has been the most negative and […] French obstruction of 
negotiations has created lengthy delays,” the CIA insisted in one analysis in March 1968. “These 
delays in turn have contributed to the severity of the recent gold crisis.”52 
 
Johnson, De Gaulle, and the Gold Crisis: 1967-1968 
By 1968, as Robert Triffin had predicted in 1960, the United States’ gold reserve no longer 
exceeded the aggregate dollar holdings of foreign central banks. The gold stock in American 
custody had dwindled to $12 billion, whereas the official dollar holdings of other countries 
amounted to $16 billion; in addition, there were private dollar holdings abroad of another $16 
billion. President Johnson was assured in February 1968 that “this is a high ratio in banking 
terms” and that countries had good reasons to hang on to their dollars (primarily because of the 
interest they earned). But the changing dollar-gold ratio did put a higher premium on confidence 
in the continued readiness of the United States to convert dollars into gold at the fixed rate of 
$35 an ounce. At the same time, it increased the reliance of the United States on the willingness 
of other countries to refrain from converting dollars into gold. “Most big countries have 
recognized their responsibilities and have not pressed us hard for gold conversion when their 
dollar holdings increased,” Rostow informed Johnson. “France is the key exception.”53 
The Johnson administration had hoped that its plan for a new reserve asset – the SDRs – 
would calm down the gold market. This, however, did not happen. The Arab-Israeli war of June 
1967 caused instability in the financial markets. An increased industrial demand for gold further 
upped pressure on the price of gold. The chronically weak position of the pound caused market 
forces to speculate that a devaluation of this currency was inevitable, which would ultimately also 
affect the dollar and force a rise in the price of gold. The rising inflation as a result of the 
expansionary monetary policies of the Federal Reserve in 1967 and 1968 also encouraged 
speculation against the dollar.54  
In 1966 and 1967, the gold pool continued to suffer losses and, as the original pledge of 
$270 million was used up, it had to be regularly replenished. After the first such replenishment in 
the spring of 1967, however, France refused any further contributions. In June 1967 it withdrew 
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from the gold pool, although it agreed to keep the withdrawal secret and to enable the United 
States to quietly pick up its share. Most pool members agreed to continue supplying gold, but as a 
result of the French withdrawal the American contribution grew to more than half of the total. 
Vesting hope on “the new reserve plan” and on a new proposal for a “big gold pool” which 
would consist of gold certificates in addition to gold, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler 
reported in November 1967 that he remained optimistic that “some better way can be found to 
deal with this problem.”55 Fowler had been advised that SDRs could develop into a “seasoned 
reserve” which would represent an “evolutionary resolution of the gold problem” by “insulating 
international liquidity from gold market pressures and avoiding an increase in the price of gold.”56 
Fowler also still hoped that the “sterling situation can be brought under control.”57 
By November 1967, however, the question was no longer whether but when and by how 
much the British government would devalue its currency. For decades, London had resisted 
devaluation. A strong pound (at a parity of $2.80) was thought to be required to guarantee its 
position as a financial centre. Prime Minister Harold Wilson had initiated an austere economic 
programme to defend the currency.  The Johnson administration had also helped out more than 
once, mainly in defense of the dollar and in order to guarantee the continuation of costly British 
defense commitments in Europe and elsewhere. But Great Britain was simply living beyond its 
means. After having agreed to maintain the British army on the Rhine in the trilateral talks (see 
the previous chapter), the Wilson government had to give somewhere else. In the summer of 
1967, Wilson decided to phase out British military presence in Singapore and Malaysia within a 
few years. The crisis of the pound  was finally brought to a head by the British dock strike 
beginning in September, which lasted for two months and cast doubt on the feasibility of wage 
restraints (a centerpiece of Wilson’s austerity program). On November 18, Great Britain devalued 
the pound  by 14 per cent to $2.40.58 
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Realizing that the devaluation of the pound spelled trouble for the dollar and 
foreshadowed a probable rush on gold, the Johnson administration tried to calm the market by 
promptly issuing a statement underlining that the United States remained committed to the 
convertibility of the dollar into gold at $35 per ounce. Within one week, however, the gold pool 
lost $641 million and the gold market continued to teeter on the brink of a crisis. The response in 
Washington was to brace itself against the market. The Johnson administration was determined 
not to be forced into raising the price of gold. This would be, Rostow emphasized, a “great blow 
to U.S. prestige and a straitjacket on our economic policies in the future.” Johnson’s national 
security adviser acknowledged that defying the market was risky as it could result in significant 
further gold losses, but assured the president that “if we beat back the speculative attack – even 
at a substantial cost in gold – it will be a great victory for the U.S. and for the stability of the 
world monetary system.”59 This course, however, required repealing the so-called ‘gold cover’ and 
a pledge by other countries not to add to their gold stocks.60 Washington also pushed even harder 
for activation of the SDR plan and international acceptance of the new gold certificate scheme. 
“But even this route has some costs,” Gardner Ackley, the chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisers, pointedly observed. “To get paper gold created by international agreement, we will 
have to keep negotiating with other major nations through the IMF. This means sharing the 
control of international monetary affairs; it will probably mean accepting some of the demands of 
foreigners for greater discipline in our balance of payments.”61 The dollar was clearly losing the 
imperial rank it had been bestowed at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference. 
From the American vantage point, France’s criticism of the Bretton Woods system and 
of American-proposed fixes presented a dangerous liability throughout the gold crisis. Only two 
days after the British devaluation, French officials made known that France had already 
withdrawn its participation in the gold pool. Press stories “fed by leaks out of Paris” furthermore 
raised doubts about America’s willingness to prevent the price of gold from rising; American 
policymakers blamed these stories for fanning speculation.62 “French government attitudes, and 
                                                 
59 Note, Walt Rostow to President Johnson, 22 November 1967, Gold Crisis, Book I, NSCH, NSF, #5a, box 53, 
LBJL. 
60 The Federal Reserve System was required to keep a 25 percent (reduced from 40 percent in 1945) gold cover 
behind its currency and deposit liabilities. This had “an adverse psychological effect on the market since it suggested 
that the U.S. could not […] run gold stocks as far as they could go to meet the commitment to keep the dollar 
convertible.” In his State of the Union address on January 17, 1968, President Johnson indeed asked the Congress to 
repeal the gold cover. National Security Council History of the Gold Crisis, November 1967-March 1968, Gold 
Crisis, book I, box 53, NSCH, NSF, #1a, LBJL. 
61 Memorandum, Gardner Ackley to President Johnson, 27 November 1967, Gold Crisis, Book I, NSCH, NSF, 
#11a, box 53, LBJL. Underscoring in the original. 
62 Note, Walt W. Rostow to President Johnson, 22 November 1967, Gold Crisis, Book I, NSCH, NSF, #5a, box 53, 




the actions of some French officials, were important factors contributing to the massive 
speculation against the dollar and the pound during the recent gold crisis,” the CIA believed. “In 
the weeks following the devaluation of the pound […], the French fanned the speculative flames 
by leaking unsettling financial news to the press and may have encouraged some countries to 
convert their dollars into gold.” In particular Paul Fabra, the authoritative financial editor of Le 
Monde, was seen as “the mouthpiece” of the French ministry of finance. Fabra regularly published 
accurate and unsettling information, some of which had been very closely held and was only 
discussed orally among the gold pool members. He had been the one revealing that France had 
already secretly withdrawn from the gold pool in June 1967. The CIA therefore surmised that “a 
small coterie of overzealous Gaullists was attempting to push the world monetary machinery over 
the edge to increase the price of gold.”63 In the words of Ernest Goldstein, “we were at war with 
the French, or the French were at war with us, more properly, on our monetary policy.”64 There 
was even some fear among American policymakers that, if the London gold market were to close 
for more than a few days, the French would change to the gold standard singlehandedly by 
making a deal with South Africa, the main supplier of gold, and raising their own official gold 
price.65 
French antagonism was thus less alarming for possible gold purchases by the French 
central bank, whose dollar reserves had already been substantially diminished by previous 
purchases anyway, than for its effect on the market’s confidence in the ability of the United 
States to control the situation. Confidence played a key role, Rostow explained to President 
Johnson: “a more important role than reserves themselves.”66 The “real importance” of French 
opposition, the CIA concluded in March 1968, “lies in the attitude of the public at large, the 
public that actually bought the gold, sold the sterling and dollars, and feared imminent collapse of 
the world monetary system. This public was convinced of official French complicity. Moreover, 
the notion was daily gaining ground that the oft-repeated Gaullist thesis was correct: that the 
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dollar could not hold out, that the US gold stock could be profitably assaulted, and that the dollar 
devaluation that soon would yield great profits to gold holders was indeed imminent.”67 
From the perspective of American policymakers, the French position was doubly 
offensive since it appeared to foreclose the common approach within the Western alliance. This 
approach, they believed, was necessary to ensure the long-term stability of the international 
monetary system based on the gold-exchange standard. To reserve resentment for the French, 
however, was not entirely fair. Most European allies were extremely reluctant to go along with 
American proposals to de-emphasize gold and to continue the gold pool arrangement. American 
representatives had a “rough going” in their talks with the remaining European members of the 
gold pool.68 The Europeans did not accept the gold certificate plan. By March 1968, even the 
Bank of England preferred an increase in the price of gold.69 Germany, moreover, consistently 
resisted pressure to revalue its currency, which would have taken substantial pressure off other 
currencies. 
Yet, it must be noted that France was most vocal in its criticism of American monetary 
policies and least cooperative in developing measures to put an end to the crisis. Whereas the 
United States consistently framed the problem as one facing all allies in equal measure and 
therefore to be solved through their cooperation, de Gaulle presented it as primarily an American 
problem which the United States was trying to resolve at Europe’s expense. When President 
Johnson, in his State of the Union address in January 1968, announced restrictions on American 
foreign investment and on tourism abroad in order to improve the country’s balance of payments, 
French spokesmen argued that these measures placed the burden of redressing the American 
balance-of-payments deficit on Europe.70 Prime Minister Georges Pompidou likewise imparted to 
Ambassador Bohlen that Johnson was plainly taking measures “which would not be unpalatable 
to American public opinion in an election year but were perhaps somewhat more indifferent 
towards the interests of others.”71 
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 As so often, American policymakers strongly associated French attitudes with those that 
had sent Europe into the spiral of conflict in the past. As a result, their stand to preserve the 
position of the dollar in the international monetary system became, paradoxically, also a stand 
against a return of economic nationalism. By early 1968, they had become convinced that the 
situation they were facing was similar to the one which had plunged the world economy into a 
deep depression in 1929. This sense of standing at the crossroads of time was strongly 
encouraged by a paper written by the British economist Barbara Ward (later Baroness Jackson of 
Lodsworth), a celebrated economist who was a visiting scholar at Harvard University: 
 
A situation is brewing up in the world economy with some dangerous overtones of the 1929/31 
disaster. If a crisis were to occur, the economic consequences might be so considerable a 
dislocation of world trade that depression and massive unemployment could appear in Europe 
and deflation spread quickly to the developing continents. This in turn would have profound 
political effects. The Russians might scent the long-hoped-for failure of capitalism and revert to 
hard-line adventurism and hostility. Despair in the poorer countries would cancel out present 
disillusion with China and its cultural revolution. The world could tip dangerously away from its 
present not wholly ineffective ‘co-existence’.  
 
Noting that, as in the 1920s, France was hoarding gold, Ward stressed that “the Atlantic nations 
cannot handle this separately” and that “America […] must quietly and immediately […] secure 
as much understanding and support as possible in Europe, particularly in Germany.” 72  In 
monetary affairs, as in military matters and on the issue of political integration, de Gaulle 
appeared largely as an anachronistic obstacle to progress and as an outsider within the Western 
alliance. President Johnson was impressed with Ward’s apocalyptic analysis. He circulated it 
among his advisors for comment. Ackley and Rostow thought that her analysis was a tad 
pessimistic, “but her overall assessment is just.”73 The themes of Ward’s paper would indeed 
resurface in the administration’s memoranda and in Johnson’s correspondence with other leaders 
on the gold crisis. 74  Johnson even had Harold Wilson read it during the latter’s visit to 
Washington in February 1968 to discuss the monetary crisis.75 
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 However much the Johnson administration was determined to stand its own in the wake 
of the devaluation of the British pound, it was unable to put an end to the crisis. In February 
1968, the balance-of-payments figures for 1967 were published – and these figures showed an 
increase in the deficit to $3.7 billion (with a rapid increase in the fourth quarter). While friendly 
central banks could still be pressured to keep dollars, private investors were much harder to 
control. By early March, there was a veritable rush on the London gold market. With no 
European support for the gold certificate plan forthcoming to keep the gold pool going, 
Washington’s cardhouse came tumbling down. By mid-March, Johnson’s advisers were in 
“constant session” to find a way out of the gold crisis.76 There was a growing consensus that the 
entire gold pool had to be given up, that the market price for gold could no longer be controlled 
and that taxes had to be increased.77 In particular, proposing that taxes be increased was equal to 
asking for trouble on the domestic front. In early March, Henry Fowler, who was in charge of 
dealing with Congress as well as European central bankers, called Rostow in despair, describing 
the “attitude on the Hill as one of almost anarchistic willingness to pull down the temple around 
their ears” and sympathizing with the Europeans for feeling that “our Executive Branch and 
Congress are incapable of generating a tax-expenditure policy that would keep us in reasonable 
order.”78 
On March 14, after the United States had lost $372 million in one day alone and faced the 
prospect of losing another $1 billion the day after,79 President Johnson threw in the towel. He 
asked Harold Wilson to close the London gold market and decided to give up supporting the 
gold pool. In effect, the United States defaulted on its obligations under the gold-exchange 
standard. On March 15, Johnson sent a letter to Wilson, German Chancellor Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger and Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in which he reiterated the American 
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commitment to retain the official price of gold a $35 an ounce, pressed for the rapid 
implementation of the SDR plan, and called for an emergency meeting of central bankers in 
Washington. Johnson was exerting considerable political pressure on his European allies to lend a 
hand, for the letter included a veiled threat:  
 
These financial disorders – if not promptly and firmly overcome – can profoundly damage the 
political relations between Europe and America and set in motion forces like those which 
disintegrated the Western world between 1929 and 1933.80  
 
At their emergency meeting in Washington on March 16 and 17, the central bankers 
agreed on a ‘two-tier’ gold market. This meant that the United States’ Federal Reserve maintained 
its commitment to exchange gold with other central banks at $35 per ounce, but would no longer 
be prepared to sell gold on the private market or be active as a buyer of gold. The gold transfers 
between central banks were thus insulated from gold price fluctuations in the private market. 
Since the gold pool was empty, and countries were forced to promise not to exchange dollar 
reserves for gold and to accept the SDR as a new source for reserves, the world was on a de facto 
dollar standard. By severing the link between the dollar supply and the market price of gold, one 
of the main goals of the Bretton Woods system – to prevent inflation by fixing the value of the 
dollar in gold – had been all but abandoned. At the urging of the Europeans, the United States 
had stuck to its commitment to exchange gold for $35 per ounce with other central banks, but 
the Johnson administration had been quite prepared to ‘demonetize’ gold altogether. In the 
course of the gold crisis, Calleo observed, “U.S. international monetary policy became more 
frankly hegemonic.”81 
The Johnson administration had not invited France to the Washington meeting of central 
bankers. Fowler even waited until March 20 to send the meeting’s communiqué to Debré.82 
France was the only major country to publicly dissociate itself from the results of the meeting, 
pressing the need for fiscal measures to address the American balance-of-payments deficit 
instead.83 Yet Paris did act with noteworthy restraint. The Johnson administration seriously feared 
that France would be tempted to deliver a fatal blow to the system by selling gold it received in 
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exchange for dollars on the private market. “France would not only defeat the gold policy agreed 
upon last Sunday [i.e. of not selling monetary gold on the private market]; she would also make 
an arbitrage profit,” Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony Solomon 
surmised.84 But Paris refrained from exploiting America’s vulnerability during the crisis. Even 
when it had the opportunity, as a result of a substantial inflow of dollars in late 1967, it did not 
purchase gold from the United States. Since the Paris press leaks of late 1967, the French 
government had generally refrained from unsettling actions and, at least at the official level, acted 
with “perfect correctness.”85 To be sure, this was more than gentlemanly behavior toward an ally 
in trouble. French officials did not want a devaluation of the dollar in relation to the franc, since 
this would have seriously hurt the French balance of payments.86 
Since the Washington meeting had not addressed the core need for monetary and fiscal 
measures in the United States, its results drew mixed reviews.87 After March 1968, the gold crisis 
nonetheless subsided. On March 29 and 30, the finance ministers and central bank governors of 
the Group of Ten (including France) convened in Stockholm to agree on the activation of the 
SDR as a supplement reserve to gold and the dollar. French Finance Minister Michel Debré took 
exception to many positions, yet the final communiqué reaffirmed the “determination to 
cooperate in the maintenance of exchange stability and orderly exchange arrangements in the 
world, based on the present official price of gold.”88 Eugene Rostow reported to Johnson that 
prevailing over the French had been key: 
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The central issue was whether France would be able either to stall the proposal or change its basic 
character. Either outcome would have caused an international monetary crisis and a major drive 
to raise the official price of gold. […] The willingness of the Four [Germany, Italy, Belgium and 
the Netherlands] to stand up against the French is a major political development. It demonstrates 
again that there are limits on how far de Gaulle can push them.89 
 
The immediate danger of disintegration of the international monetary system was hence reduced. 
The Johnson administration had used strong-arm tactics with its European allies. But Ackley 
understood that the onus was still on Washington to prove de Gaulle wrong by putting its own 
house in order:  
 
In joining with us, the other European countries have placed their bets on the health of the 
American economy and on our determination to pursue responsible domestic policies. They have 
done so in the face of French charges that our budget and our balance-of-payments are 
hopelessly out of control. It is now up to us to show that the confidence of our friends is 
warranted.90 
 
In the aftermath of the gold crisis, the Federal Reserve indeed tightened the money 
supply and in June, Congress agreed on a rare tax increase. European developments in the 
remainder of the year were also important in taking pressure off the dollar, as we will see.   
Many American policymakers and most citizens regarded de Gaulle as the culprit in the 
gold crisis. They believed his attachment to gold was as anachronistic as his dedication to political 
and military sovereignty, and that his raids on American gold were inappropriate for an ally, in 
particular given the pains the United States went to to defend Western Europe. In the spring of 
1968, the White House received a steady stream of letters pressing the administration to demand 
that France repay its outstanding war debts to the United States.91 President Johnson was equally 
upset by French actions during the gold crisis, admitting in his memoirs that he was “tempted to 
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abandon my policy of polite restraint toward de Gaulle.”92 However, French criticism of the 
Bretton Woods system and of American economic and monetary policies was much more in the 
right than Americans cared to admit. De Gaulle understood early on that the convertibility of the 
dollar into gold was ultimately unsustainable because of the American balance-of-payments 
deficit.93 Today most economists blame the Johnson administration’s macroeconomic policies in 
the mid-1960s for inaugurating the ultimate demise of the Bretton Woods system.94 The costs of 
escalating the war in Vietnam and of Johnson’s Great Society programs also exacted a heavy toll, 
in particular since these increases in government spending were not accompanied by a sufficient 
increase in taxes. The tax increase of June 1968 did little to repair the damage. The creation of the 
two-tier gold market and the introduction of the SDR turned out to be merely a halfway station 
toward the final undoing of the gold exchange standard of the Bretton Woods system in the early 
1970s.95  
 Throughout the 1960s, the United States had searched for internationally agreed fixes to the 
troubled Bretton Woods system. De Gaulle, however, believed that these attempts were bound to 
be futile in the absence of a sufficiently strong multilateral regime. The international monetary 
system would have to be built on the reality of the nation-state and the proven value of gold in 
order to be viable. At the highpoint of the gold crisis, he argued to his cabinet:  
 
Le système du Gold Exchange Standard est virtuellement terminé. […] Il faut un nouveau système. 
Ce système nouveau doit être bâti sur un fondement solide. Il y en a deux possibles : l’or, qui a 
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pour lui experience; et quelque chose d’abstrait – mais pour cela, il faudrait un gouvernement 
international singulièrement fort.96 
 
De Gaulle’s premonition was not without justification. The international monetary system could 
not be insulated from calculations on the basis of national interests. Not only were the 
Europeans – the French foremost – increasingly unwilling to pay the price for American balance-
of-payments deficits and the dollar’s weakness, but the United States also became more inclined 
to design its monetary policies without regard to the interests of its European allies. As Calleo 
wrote, “the U.S. Federal Reserve is perhaps not very well suited to be a monetary Vatican City.”97 
The Pragmatic Beginnings of Franco-American Accommodation Under LBJ 
At Loggerheads on All Horizons 
In the course of 1967, de Gaulle took positions on a wide range of foreign policy issues – not just 
on NATO and monetary policy – that greatly strained the Franco-American relationship. His 
criticism of American military involvement in Vietnam, as we will see, reached a pinnacle. In the 
six-day Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, de Gaulle opposed the Johnson administration’s continued 
support for Israel. He had explicitly warned Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban against initiating 
the war; once the attack occurred, he strongly condemned Israel as “the aggressor” in the conflict 
and aligned French diplomacy in the crisis with that of the Soviet Union. 98  De Gaulle’s 
insinuations that the war could have been averted if only the United States would have exercised 
its leverage over Israel did not sit well with American diplomats.99 They caused Bohlen, in a 
telegram that betrayed his deepening sense of frustration with de Gaulle’s criticism of the United 
States, to express “concern” about “the degree to which under de Gaulle’s one-man rule personal 
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and subjective prejudices have been translated into political action.”100 On November 27, in one 
of his more notorious press conferences, de Gaulle moreover appeared to add an antisemitic 
gloss to his criticism of Israel’s behavior by typifying Jews as “an elite people, sure of itself and 
dominating.”101 From the American perspective, the General was once again stirring up Europe’s 
ghastly past. 
 Shortly after the crisis in the Middle East, de Gaulle took his dispute with American 
dominance in world affairs across the Atlantic. With his riveting – and somewhat improvised but 
no less intentional – call for a “Québec libre” during a rally in Montreal on July 24, his policy of 
independence stepped out of bounds. Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson had no choice 
but to denounce de Gaulle’s statements for inciting separatism. The fervent response of the 
Québécois to his visit had rekindled in de Gaulle emotions he had experienced upon his re-entry of 
France as a liberator at the end of World War II. But his interest in promoting the cause of the 
French in Canada already had a long history, and he had made clear to his advisers prior to his 
departure aboard the warship Colbert that he would not be going to Quebec as a tourist but “pour 
faire l’Histoire.”102 Unruffled by the denunciation of his statements by the Canadian government 
and the often vehement criticism from many quarters (including in France), de Gaulle returned to 
France as if he had achieved a moral and political victory. 103  Half a year later, he told Cy 
Sulzberger of the New York Times that in his view the French Canadians were the “worst 
oppressed minority in the world, with the exception of the Arabs in Israel and the Tibetans in 
China.”104 It is important to note, however, that de Gaulle’s statements on this trip were aimed 
less against Canada than against the United States. “The French part of Canada now intends to 
organize, in conjunction with other Canadians, means of safeguarding their substance and 
independence in contact with a colossal State that is their neighbour,” he had said in another 
speech in the city of Quebec, one whose words had been more carefully weighed [emphasis 
added].105 There is reason to assume that de Gaulle was prepared to go even further and “to 
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promote an independent French-speaking republic in North America.” 106  In addition to 
expressing support for the residue of French civilization in the New World and to reinstating 
France as a power with global political connections, de Gaulle had sought to use the Canadian 
French in part as an avant garde in reducing the influence of the United States – the Anglo-Saxon 
powerhouse – in its own neighborhood.107 
In the realm of nuclear strategy, de Gaulle’s policy of independence was carried to its 
logical conclusion with the doctrine of ‘defense in all directions’ (défense tous azimuts). This 
doctrine was articulated in December 1967 by General Charles Ailleret in an article in Revue de 
défense nationale and it accurately reflected de Gaulle’s strategic thinking.108 The tous azimuts doctrine 
categorically stated that the force de frappe should not be aimed at one single enemy, but be able to 
strike anywhere in the world in order to deter “those who might wish, from whatever part of the 
world, to use us or to destroy us in order to assist in the achievement in their war aims.”109 It did 
not discriminate between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. And it clearly implied that the United 
States was to be considered a potential adversary, in particular since it might be tempted to seize 
control over French territory in case a war broke out in Europe.110  
 All in all, de Gaulle’s policy of independence was carried to such extremes in 1967 that its 
support in France began to weaken. He was more frequently censured in French newspapers for 
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having lost touch with political reality and, in particular in the context of the Mideast crisis and 
his visit to Quebec, for needlessly antagonizing France’s allies. The General was “entering a sort 
of planetary drift, in strategic matters, the Near East or his relations with Western allies,” his 
biographer Jean Lacouture has written. “The vision was still dazzling. But a new intemperance 
and sometimes a disconcerting distance from reality were perceptible.”111 Opinion polls moreover 
began to show that a majority of the French people, of all political colors (i.e. including Gaullists 
and Communists), was opposed to the idea of leaving the Atlantic alliance altogether and wanted 
to preserve the American link.112 
Charles Bohlen, meanwhile, having served for more than four years as ambassador in 
Paris, had become deeply frustrated with de Gaulle’s habit of chiding the Americans at every turn 
on any issue. De Gaulle had worn down the veteran American diplomat. He had begun his tour 
on a high, branded as the “right man on the spot” by Time.113 His advice as a “very shrewd judge 
of the way Europeans judge us” – in McGeorge Bundy’s words – had carried much weight within 
the Johnson administration. 114  Over the years, however, Bohlen’s reporting from Paris was 
becoming noticeably more acidic about the General and more disheartened about the possibility 
of any accommodation between France and the United States – and hence less capable of nuance 
and less valuable. Walter Lippmann, for instance, after having spent an evening with the Bohlens 
in Paris in early 1964, judged that the American ambassador was too hostile to de Gaulle to be 
able to do an effective job.115 In November 1966, Bohlen had concluded that de Gaulle, “who 
conducts completely single-handedly French foreign policy,” had lost his “sense of timing and 
appropriateness,” and was even beginning to show signs of mental instability: 
 
It would seem that de Gaulle is suffering from two aspects of old age: (1) a progressive hardening 
of the prejudices – of which he had plenty, and (2) a growing indifference and even unconcern 
with the effect of his words on international and French public opinion. The fixation which he 
has always had in regard to the power and size of the United States has grown into a compulsive 
obsession. [...]  we now must definitely recognize that one of the motivating forces of de Gaulle’s 
conduct of foreign policy is his anti-American obsession and I believe that we can expect that 
almost anything he says in the future will contain some uncomplimentary references towards the 
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United States. [...] It is perhaps too soon to state that de Gaulle is ‘becoming senile,’ but certainly 
the restraint which used to accompany his actions and characterize his words seems to be slipping 
very badly.116 
 
 In 1967, as the Franco-American relationship plummeted to new depths, Bohlen’s reporting 
showed signs of exhaustion and resentment at de Gaulle’s unrelenting public criticism of 
American foreign policy. He was relieved of his post in November 1967, leaving it the next 
February to become deputy undersecretary of state for political affairs. Bohlen’s final assessment 
of de Gaulle’s foreign policy upon leaving his post was illustrative of the cul de sac in which the 
bilateral relationship loitered in early 1968. “[…] De Gaulle’s preoccupation with the power of 
the U.S. became an obsession,” he wrote, and as long as the General remained in power there 
was no room for improvement. Interestingly, however, Bohlen was less concerned about the 
long-term orientation of French foreign policy than about the impact of de Gaulle’s anti-
Americanism on American foreign policy. “France is eternal and de Gaulle is not,” Bohlen 
stressed in his last cable as ambassador to France, and the French were at heart sympathetic 
towards the United States. But de Gaulle’s consistent opposition “cannot help but produce a 
feeling in the U.S. that the policy of France is indeed hostile to that of the U.S..”  
 
It seems to me that the greatest problem in Franco-American relations now lies on our side of the 
Atlantic. There is no doubt that American public opinion is being badly affected by the policies 
and action of General de Gaulle, and I regret that I have found very little comprehension among 
leading French political figures, and with the General himself, as to the special importance this 
factor bears in the American Governmental structure and that an explosive American public 
opinion could very easily force a change in the present attitude of the American government 
towards France.117 
 
 In the conclusion, we will return to the question of whether de Gaulle’s policy of 
independence had much of an impact on American foreign policy. For now, we would note that 
Bohlen proved to be too fatalistic about the potential for an improvement in Franco-American 
relations with de Gaulle still at the helm. In the course of 1968, French public opinion became 
increasingly concerned with the implications of de Gaulle’s relentless quest for independence and 
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with his anti-American rhetoric. His Middle-East policy was far from popular, and in particular 
his statements on Israel drew heavy criticism. With his call for a “Québec libre,” de Gaulle clearly 
overstepped the boundaries of diplomatic decorum according to virtually the entire French press. 
In January 1968, the New York Times reported from Paris about “strong signs” that de Gaulle and 
his advisers were beginning to worry about the increasingly strong – even vitriolic – reactions to 
French policy statements in the Anglo-Saxon world, even from “thoughtful and normally soft-
spoken commentators.” There was, in addition, a growing perception among French 
businessmen that upsetting Americans was not good for business, or as an article in L’Express 
stated: “French industrialists today realize that they have a sales manager: General de Gaulle, 
magnificent for exporting to the Middle East, terrible for selling to the United States.”118 Most 
importantly, however, developments in a number of other areas conspired in 1968 to bring the 
United States and France closer before LBJ left the Oval Office in January 1969. The common 
feature of these developments in 1968 was that they made clear to both Washington and Paris 
that their respective foreign policy aspirations had reached a dead end, and that they stood to gain 
from an attenuation of their differences. 
 
Vietnam – From Bombing to Negotiating 
The Vietnam war was never central to the Franco-American relationship in the 1960s, nor did the 
Franco-American dispute over the war significantly affect its outcome. The Franco-American 
row over Vietnam was nonetheless significant for a number of reasons. While discomfort and 
disaffection with the United States’ military involvement in Vietnam were widespread in Western 
Europe, especially after 1965, de Gaulle was the only allied government leader to openly voice 
criticism. This criticism was the more important because French influence was still felt in 
Vietnam, a former French colony, and because it lent authority to critics of the war in the United 
States. De Gaulle’s criticism was also significant for underscoring the lack of active support from 
European allies for the war. Rather than assuring the European allies that the United States was 
faithful to its security commitments in the face of the communist threat, its military quandary in 
Vietnam damaged American authority in Europe. To many Americans, in turn, the absence of 
European support in Vietnam cast a sobering light over the significance of NATO – or the more 
abstract notion of an Atlantic community – to American foreign policy in other parts of the 
world. But one should note as well that by 1968 the conflict also provided an opportunity for 
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rapprochement between the United States and France. De Gaulle responded favorably to 
Johnson’s announcement of a partial bombing pause and simultaneous call for negotiations on 
March 31, praising it as “an act of reason and political courage.”119 Hanoi subsequently proposed 
(and the United States accepted) Paris as the site for preliminary talks. In the spring of 1968, the 
Vietnam war ceased to be a divisive issue between the United States and France. 
 De Gaulle was one of the earliest and most consistent critics of American policies in 
Vietnam. 120  His views had been shaped by the painful conclusion of the French colonial 
experience in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, which had taught him that superior military power 
could not achieve political victory over Third World nationalism and that it would be wiser to 
settle for a negotiated end to the conflict even if this meant accepting a setback (at least 
temporarily). This meant accepting the neutralization of Vietnam along the lines of the 1954 
Geneva Agreements as the best possible outcome, even as this was widely understood to bring a 
communist government to power. In June 1961, de Gaulle had issued a private warning to 
President Kennedy against the quagmire the United States would find itself in if it decided to step 
up its military involvement.121 While some evidence suggests Kennedy took de Gaulle’s words of 
caution to heart and Washington had considered neutralization an acceptable solution to the 
Laotian crisis in 1962, Kennedy also feared that another setback would open him up to charges 
that he was too “soft” on communism.122 When, on November 1, 1963, Diem, who had been 
sympathetic to the idea of a negotiated neutrality, was killed in a coup backed by the Americans, 
de Gaulle openly distanced himself from American policies in Vietnam for the first time.123 By 
then, neither Kennedy nor Johnson was susceptible to de Gaulle’s warnings. They were 
determined to prevent a communist takeover in South Vietnam. From 1963 onwards, as the 
United States progressively heightened the military stake in the conflict, the difference of opinion 
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with de Gaulle became increasingly more public. In particular after the Johnson administration 
took its fateful decision to escalate the number of troops in Vietnam in early 1965, de Gaulle’s 
public opposition became openly antagonistic. Johnson’s decision to bomb the North 
Vietnamese, he argued to Ambassador Bohlen, was only hardening Hanoi’s negotiating stance 
and made negotiations on a political settlement virtually impossible.124 
 American officials feared the residual French political, economic, and cultural influence in 
South Vietnam, which tended to either bolster neutralist sentiments within the South Vietnamese 
leadership or raise fears that the United States might adopt neutrality as a solution. The impact of 
France’s deviation on domestic and international public opinion also worried American 
diplomats.125 “To the [Vietnamese] generals here, de Gaulle looks much bigger than he does to 
us,” Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge jr. cabled from Saigon in early 1964.126 Shortly thereafter he 
called the State Department’s attention to “secret information indicating that there are persons 
purporting to be under the strong influence of the French government who are working directly 
against U.S. vital interests in Viet-Nam” and urged the State Department to request de Gaulle “to 
call off his dogs.”127 De Gaulle’s position also undercut the Johnson administration’s ability to 
build a domestic political consensus behind the military involvement in Vietnam. “The de Gaulle 
approach offers a faint glimmer of hope in a way to a solution at a cost to us somewhere 
commensurate with our national interests in Southeast Asia,” Senate Majority leader Mike 
Mansfield, for instance, wrote in one of his many letters to Johnson on Vietnam. “We should be 
prepared to listen most intently and with an open ear and mind to whatever the French may have 
to say on Vietnam.”128 And McNamara reported to President Johnson after a visit to Vietnam in 
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March 1964 that “de Gaulle’s position and the continuing pessimism and anti-Americanism of 
the French community in South Vietnam provide constant fuel to neutralist sentiment and the 
coup possibility.”129 
 In particular in 1964, the United States tried to bring the views of the French more in line 
with American policies. In early June 1964, for instance, President Johnson sent George Ball on a 
mission to Paris to talk directly to de Gaulle in order to solicit his views on “any new blueprint 
that would assure the guaranteed independence of the nations of Southeast Asia.”130 Despite 
Ball’s valiant effort at persuasion, de Gaulle was immovable. He stressed that Vietnam was a 
“rotten territory” where victory would continue to elude the Americans. “I do not believe that 
you can win in this situation even though you have more aircraft, cannons, and arms of various 
kinds,” de Gaulle predicted. “The more the US becomes involved in the actual conduct of 
operations[,] the more the Vietnamese will turn against us [the United States].” De Gaulle 
predicted that the United States would sooner or later “come to the conclusion that we would 
have to make peace […] with China and others in the area.” He rejected the notion put forward 
by Ball that China was an expansionist power, pointing out that China moreover would not have 
the resources for an aggressive foreign policy for a long time. He talked of a “vast diplomatic 
operation” to bring the conflict to an end. “De Gaulle is merely waiting for events to come his 
way,” Ball concluded, and “he probably envisages that some time in the not too distant future we 
will begin to consider seriously his suggestion of a conference.”131  
 While important newspaper men such as Walter Lippmann, James Reston, and Cy 
Sulzberger, as well as congressmen like Senator Mike Mansfield, had come to support the ‘de 
Gaulle solution’ for Vietnam by the spring of 1964, his views made no inroads whatsoever within 
the Johnson administration. Ball, incidentally, was the only prominent dissenter within the 
administration, but it cannot be surmised that his dissent had been motivated by de Gaulle. On 
the contrary, he chafed at de Gaulle’s criticism, believing that the General merely wanted to cut 
down the United States and to build up France, and rejected the notion of granting the French a 
diplomatic role in achieving a solution. 132  If de Gaulle had any influence on Ball’s Vietnam 
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position, it was because the nationalist danger Gaullism represented to him made it all the more 
incumbent to avoid diversions from the European into the Asian theater.  
 Ball did return to Washington hoping that his exchange with the General would bolster his 
own position as opponent of America’s growing military involvement in the Vietnam war. Yet he 
found Johnson “unwilling to listen” and rather preoccupied with drumming up congressional 
support for the war effort.133 “Southeast Asia represents the most difficult of the postwar crises,” 
Walt Rostow had written to Johnson in order to stiffen his resolve while Ball conversed with de 
Gaulle. “Neither President Eisenhower nor President Kennedy gripped it directly. The softer 
options have been about used up. And there it stands before you.”134 Two months later, in early 
August, Congress passed the so-called Tonkin Gulf Resolution, giving Johnson a blank check for 
further military action in Vietnam. In early 1965, after Johnson won his landslide victory in the 
presidential elections, the United States deployed the Marines to South Vietnam and began 
bombing North Vietnam. De Gaulle’s cautionary counsel was thus thrown to the winds. 
Washington was even wary of sharing any information with Paris for fear of informing Hanoi.135 
 Rather than giving pause for reflection, American officials typically dismissed de Gaulle’s 
criticism as self-serving. “The one cardinal interest that the French have in the Vietnamese matter 
is that of enhancing the prestige of General de Gaulle,” Bohlen reported in 1965.136 De Gaulle’s 
views were also thrust aside as just one more illustration of the “obsessive” anti-American gist of 
his foreign policy. After one conversation at the Elysée, Bohlen even detected a “considerable 
measure of Schadenfreude” at America’s toil.137 There always seemed a reason not to consider 
French qualms about the Vietnam policies of the United States at face value. Upon Johnson’s 
decision in early 1965 to substantially raise American troop levels in Vietnam, for instance, Couve 
de Murville expressed his concern and pressed the case for negotiations with the North 
Vietnamese on a visit to Washington. Bundy believed that the French foreign minister “honestly 
does not think we can avoid defeat in South-Vietnam” and that “his worry is not pretense.” In 
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the same breath, however, he cast off Couve de Murville’s concern as “a comforting conclusion 
for a Frenchman for obvious reasons.”138  
 De Gaulle’s frequent allusions to the hard lessons to be learned from the French experience 
in Southeast Asia indeed hardly impressed Americans. One internal review of the Johnson 
administration’s foreign policy accomplishments typically stated that the Vietnam predicament 
was not the result of American policy mishaps but had been created “by generations of French 
mismanagement and the thrust of expanding communism from the north.”139 Most American 
officials resented de Gaulle’s thesis that the United States was bound to fail where France had 
failed before. They were convinced that the nature of the American involvement in Vietnam and 
the reservoir of resources available to the United States simply could not be gauged in equal 
terms. Of all American officials, Secretary Rusk appears to have been singularly incapable of 
appreciating de Gaulle’s position on Vietnam. He blamed de Gaulle for undermining Vietnamese 
morale and for undercutting the United States’ quest for safeguarding Southeast Asia. Time and 
again, Rusk asserted that the United States was making a stand in Vietnam since a failure to do so 
would directly affect the credibility of the American security guarantee to Europe.140 But Rusk 
was hardly exceptional. In late June 1965, faced with advice from McNamara and Rusk to once 
again drastically step up the military campaign in Vietnam, President Johnson asked McGeorge 
Bundy to compare the French experience in 1954 to that of the United States in 1965. Bundy 
reached the ‘comfortable conclusion’ – to use his own words – that the dissimilarity was 
overwhelming and was heavily in favor of the latter: 
 
France in 1954 was a colonial power seeking to reimpose its overseas rule, out of tune with 
Vietnamese nationalism, deeply divided in terms of French domestic opinion, politically unstable 
at home, the victim of seven years of warfare […]. The U.S. in 1965 is responding to the call of a 
people under Communist assault, a people undergoing a non-Communist national revolution; 
neither our power nor that of our adversaries has been fully engaged as yet. At home we remain 
politically strong and, in general, politically united. Options, both military and political, remain to 
us that were no longer available to the French.141 
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The haughty unresponsiveness of the United States to his words of caution annoyed de 
Gaulle.142 In his discussion with Ball in June 1964, de Gaulle had suggested an international 
conference to begin the search for a negotiated solution; in 1965, French diplomats avidly 
engaged with North Vietnamese and Communist Chinese representatives in Paris and talked of a 
“concerted action” with the Soviet Union. When the Johnson administration nonetheless 
enhanced its military involvement in Vietnam, however, de Gaulle concluded that for the time 
being there was no basis for negotiations. This did not mean that he had given up on a negotiated 
solution, but that he would be content to let the war unfold until it would dawn on the 
Americans that they could not achieve a military victory in South Vietnam. In order to facilitate 
future talks, de Gaulle quietly continued to cultivate French diplomatic channels to Hanoi, 
Beijing, and Moscow.143 Meanwhile he maintained his sharply critical stance towards the Johnson 
administration. On September 1, 1966, addressing a crowd of some one hundred thousand 
Cambodians in Phnom Penh, de Gaulle stressed that the United States was “more and more 
threatening for the peace of the world” and that only an American commitment to unilaterally 
withdraw troops from Southeast Asia could lead to peace talks. The United States, he said, would 
do well to follow the example France had given by extricating itself from the Algerian conflict 
under much worse circumstances.144 
In early 1968, Lyndon Johnson finally buckled under the pressure of a war going awry – 
and it would bring him to accept Paris as the locale for talks with the North Vietnamese. As early 
as February 1965, Thomas Hughes, the State Department’s director of intelligence, had 
concluded that “the question before the United States government is not whether France will 
play some role in this matter but only how it will play its role.”145 In May 1965, Hanoi had indeed 
tried to make contact with Washington via the Quai d’Orsay, prompting Bohlen to conclude that 
“Paris with some French involvement may be [the] only choice” as a locale for negotations.146 
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Reacting to de Gaulle’s address in Phnom Penh in the fall of 1966, Johnson had first mentioned 
the possibility of scheduled mutual withdrawals. And in 1967, several North Vietnamese “peace 
feelers” were issued from Paris.147 The large-scale Tet offensive launched by Vietcong and North 
Vietnamese forces on January 30, 1968, finally marked the political and psychological turning 
point in the Vietnam war. Even though the communist insurgents were successfully repelled, the 
offensive turned the tables of domestic public opinion against the Johnson administration. In a 
dramatic televised address to the American people on March 31, President Johnson finally felt 
compelled to declare a halt to the aerial bombing over most of North Vietnam and to call for 
negotiations. In addition, he surprised his countrymen by announcing that he would not stand as 
a candidate in the upcoming presidential elections. 
On April 18, 1968, Couve de Murville declared that Paris would be available as the 
location for preliminary talks if the United States and North Vietnam so desired. The 
circumspectly worded French offer broke the deadlock between the two sides about the 
negotiation site. Both Hanoi and Washington had initially proposed a range of other capitals in 
Asia and Europe, on which they failed to agree.148 President Johnson, to be sure, only accepted 
Paris with some reluctance. He feared that the French would throw in their lot with Hanoi during 
the talks. When Rostow informed him that the North Vietnamese had agreed to holding talks in 
the French capital, Johnson replied: “Well, I’d rather go to almost any place than Paris.”149 A few 
days earlier, at a regular Tuesday luncheon at the White House with Dean Rusk and Clark 
Clifford, the new secretary of defense, he had voiced similar sentiments, explaining that the 
French “are not in the least interested genuinely in peace.”150 One decisive advantage of Paris, 
however, was that all parties – including North Vietnam and China – had some form of 
diplomatic representation there. It was moreover politically palatable to all sides because France 
was an ally of the United States but one with manifest sympathy for Hanoi’s position on the war. 
Paris also proved suitable to both Beijing and Moscow, allowing Hanoi to avoid a choice between 
the two. On May 3, Hanoi finally offered to meet in Paris and Johnson accepted. Ten days later, 
Averell Harriman and Xuan Thuy, the respective heads of the American and the North 
Vietnamese delegations, had their first encounter in the Majestic Hotel on the Avenue Kléber. 
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Paris would remain the negotiation site until the Paris Peace Accords were signed in 1973 by the 
governments of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the United States. 
Johnson’s decision to accept Paris as the place for negotiations was widely interpreted as 
a victory for de Gaulle’s policy of independence, an interpretation that was naturally encouraged 
by French spokesmen. More importantly, however, the choice for Paris inaugured a period of 
Franco-American rapprochement, first on Vietnam and then on other issues. In early May 1968, 
the CIA judged that de Gaulle’s favorable response to Johnson’s call for negotiations had been 
primarily motivated by a recognition that “if France hoped to play some role in the talks, he must 
mitigate somewhat his uncompromising stand against US actions in Vietnam.”151 From the spring 
of 1968, the French indeed tempered their disapproval of American policies in Southeast Asia. 
As the host of the peace talks, the French government had no choice but to assume the cloak of 
impartiality, the more so since de Gaulle hoped to involve himself sooner or later in the 
diplomatic process as a mediator. Moreover, while the war would not end until 1975, the era of 
escalation shifted to an era of political negotiations and gradual military withdrawal – and there 
was thus much less to criticize from the French point of view. The day-to-day contact in the 
context of the negotiations with French experts such as Etienne Manac’h was also appreciated on 
the American side. 152  There was even an upsurge of sympathy among the French with the 
American plight in Southeast Asia as American troops began their withdrawal.153 De Gaulle was 
convinced of the sincerity of the American about-turn. In 1969, after having spoken to President 
Nixon, he even instructed the French embassy in Beijing to convince the Chinese of this and of 
Nixon’s desire to improve the Sino-American relationship more generally.154 
 Johnson’s decision to negotiate and to accept Paris as the locus for negotation thus did 
much to remove Vietnam as an irritant in the Franco-American relationship. De Gaulle, however, 
was not allowed to revel long in his triumph. The beginning of the Vietnam peace talks on May 
13, 1968, coincided with the outbreak of a student-worker revolt in the streets of Paris that would 
throw the country in sudden disarray and lead to serious economic trouble. One of the ironies of 
this history is therefore that de Gaulle’s diplomatic coup de théâtre came on the brink of domestic 
catastrophe, an irony that was the more poignant given that de Gaulle’s policy of independence 
was geared in no small measure towards strengthening domestic unity. Another is that just when 
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de Gaulle’s policy of independence appeared to have reached the pinnacle of success, it was beset 
by new and unanticipated problems to such a degree that this time it would be Johnson who 
would lend a hand to an ally in dire straits. 
 
 May – From Grandeur to Havoc 
“I no longer find this very amusing,” de Gaulle told François Flohic, one of his aides, on April 28; 
“there is no longer anything difficult, or heroic, to be done.”155 “France is bored,” the title of one 
article in Le Monde famously ran. 156  These statements have become noteworthy mostly in 
hindsight, as they belied the profound domestic crisis that followed. 
 In May 1968, the pendulum of France’s political history experienced one of its violent 
swings from reverence of the state to revolt against it. Within a matter of weeks, a local student 
protest transformed into a nationwide challenge to de Gaulle’s regime by the collective force of 
youth, labor, and opposition: on May 3, students of the Sorbonne university clashed with police, 
the beginning of ten days of street fighting; on May 12, communist and non-communist workers 
joined in a 24-hour sympathy strike; from May 14 to 22, wildcat strikes swept the country, 
bringing the economy to a halt with more than half of French workers on strike. De Gaulle’s call 
of May 24 for a referendum on a vaguely worded program of educational and economic reform, 
which he coupled with the prospect of resignation in case of a negative result, failed to restore 
order. On the contrary, his address to the nation was followed by further rioting in Paris and in 
large cities in the provinces. The May crisis revealed the government as being badly out of touch 
with its citizenry and out of control of the situation. The French state, as Jean Lacouture 
observed, “was a great body that had lost its nervous system and whose circulation had seized 
up” – and for de Gaulle this was nothing short of a personal catastrophe: “The France that he 
had picked up, ten years before, lying by the wayside, half-dead, was now falling to pieces in his 
hands.”157 For the first time since 1958, de Gaulle looked despondent. On May 28, François 
Mitterrand declared his candidature for the presidency. Georges Pompidou, de Gaulle’s prime 
minister, was bolstering his own position as semi-independent from that of the General. Finally, 
on May 29, de Gaulle had his legendary secret rendezvous in Baden-Baden with General Jacques 
Massu, the commander of the French forces in West Germany, and a number of other army 
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leaders to ascertain the state of mind and the loyalty of the army to the government. The 
following day, on May 30, the General told the nation that, after having considered “all the 
eventualities, without exception,” he had decided to dissolve the National Assembly and to have 
early legislative elections. 
 “The old man intends to slug it out,” Walt Rostow wrote to President Johnson from Paris 
on May 30. “He threw down the gauntlet without [the] slightest sign of uncertainty.”158 The 
Johnson administration had already begun to explore the implications of de Gaulle’s retirement, 
but underestimated the tenacity of the General.159 Undersecretary Nicholas Katzenbach, Ball’s 
successor at the State Department who also happened to witness the turmoil in Paris firsthand, 
noted that de Gaulle’s “very tough” speech “clearly implied [a] threat to rule by decree if 
necessary […].”160 Algeria was no longer part of the calculation and a military coup was not in 
view, but on many other accounts France appeared to be where de Gaulle found it in the spring 
of 1958: on the brink of civil strife, with the army standing in the wings. De Gaulle’s speech had 
“placed France on the knife edge of disaster,” the CIA even assessed.  
 
Over the short run, we believe that the government probably would succeed in restoring order 
and essential services, but only at the cost of poisoning political life for the indefinite future. The 
longer term outlook is therefore more ominous. The Gaullists have repeatedly violated and 
perverted their own constitution. They have treated even the moderate opposition with disdain 
and indifference. […] Thus the stage has been set for a polarization of political forces in France 
[…]. Whatever the short term outcome France faces a period of unrest and, eventually even civil 
war.161 
 
 In his May 30 address, de Gaulle had issued a call for “civic action” to assist the government 
in countering the threat of “dictatorship, that of totalitarian communism.”162 Most American 
reporting, however, stressed that de Gaulle’s authoritarian style, rather than any subversive 
communist plan, had brought about the crisis. The CIA, for instance, believed the crisis to be a 
logical response to the Fifth Republic’s presidential system. Following the Third and the Fourth 
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Republic, “the pendulum swung so far in the opposite direction that the Assembly was almost 
reduced to political insignificance.” This encouraged the government to “arrogantly” turn down 
the views of the labor unions, students, and the opposition parties of the left on even minor 
issues, even after the setbacks for the Gaullists in the parliamentary elections of March 1967. 
Students, whose numbers had surged from 170,000 to over 600,000 in a decade, still labored 
under a rigid testing system developed by Napoleon and in the outdated and crammed facilities 
of old universities. Pleas for reforming the system received almost no hearing. “It was this 
widespread frustration with the unresponsiveness of the system […] that gave depth and breadth 
to the massive protest movement […].” And when Prime Minister Pompidou gave in to all the 
major demands of students on May 13, the lesson was clear to all those whose aspirations had 
been nipped: “the government could be more successfully challenged in the streets than in the 
National Assembly.”163 
 The turn of events in France could not but inspire some gloating on the other side of the 
Atlantic. “If it weren’t so serious – as the saying goes – one would be tempted into just a little 
fugitive satisfaction at the deflation of his imperial authority,” the conservative commentator 
William F. Buckley Jr. opined. “Let’s face it, human beings being, unfortunately, human, it is 
satisfying to a part of one’s nature to see General de Gaulle’s enormous nose being rubbed into 
his apparent inability to govern his own country.”164 Even The New York Times, whose reporters 
had often risen to de Gaulle’s defense, declared in its editorial that, 
 
the turmoil in France on the tenth anniversary of General de Gaulle’s return to power seriously – 
perhaps irreparably – deflates the Gaullist mystique. A regime that has claimed order as its first 
achievement is shown to be presiding over disorder. A movement that boasts of being the wave 
of the future discovers that it, too, has its next generation in revolt. The ‘profound 
transformation’ President de Gaulle repeatedly claims he has accomplished in France turns out to 
be not so profound after all.165 
 
 Official Washington studiously avoided any hint of vindictiveness, as was to be expected. 
But there inevitably was some private gloating over de Gaulle’s problems. Sargent Shriver, the 
new American ambassador, who arrived in the midst of the student riots, made no secret of his 
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sympathy for the young activists. Whereas Bohlen had focused on the traditional diplomatic 
issues of policy and strategy, the bright and breezy Shriver – married to Eunice Kennedy and 
formerly a driving force behind the Peace Corps – was a quasi-celebrity whose main assignment 
was to improve the atmospherics of the bilateral relationship through public diplomacy. On his 
first day at the embassy, he therefore decided to venture out to the Latin Quarter and ended up 
squatting down with the students on Boulevard St. Germaine. “I presented my credentials to the 
French students before I presented them to de Gaulle,” he quipped.166 Although Shriver’s public 
demonstration raised more than a few eyebrows in diplomatic circles, old-hand Vernon Walters 
recalled that most American diplomats at the Parisian embassy, where he served as the military 
attaché at the time, sympathized with the rebellious youth and “some of them almost seemed to 
welcome these events as promising his [de Gaulle’s] overthrow.”167  
 This, of course, was not to be – nor was there going to be a ‘civil war’ as the CIA 
prognosticated. De Gaulle’s brinkmanship of May 30 put the forces of law and order back in 
control. Workers gradually returned to work in the ensuing weeks and the government took 
charge of the universities. On June 23 and 30, the Gaullists moreover won a massive election 
majority. Yet, there was little doubt that the May crisis had tarnished de Gaulle’s standing in 
French politics and had important implications for his foreign policy. In the view of most 
American diplomats, the May crisis was a welcome reality check after two years in which de 
Gaulle had taken his policy of independence to extremes. “France […] may be returning to reality; 
important, as is her due, but not the false, inflated, imperious France that de Gaulle has sought,” 
Shriver remarked at the height of the crisis, adding that this renewed sense of reality on the 
French side might offer a chance for improving the bilateral relationship.168 After May 1968, it 
was considered much less likely that de Gaulle would denounce the North Atlantic Treaty in 
1969. The seditious role played in the crisis by the French Communist Party – which de Gaulle 
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had chosen to emphasize as he cast the die on May 30 – moreover shed a sobering light on his 
policy of détente, entente, and finally cooperation with the Eastern bloc.  
 The most important political consequence of the May crisis, perhaps, was that de Gaulle 
could no longer pose as the executor of the unified will of the French people. Even as the 
General at long last emerged victorious, the personal mystique that had always surrounded him 
was no longer as compelling as before the crisis. De Gaulle had explicitly sought to unify the 
French around a foreign policy of grandeur. Most Frenchmen, however, seemed to believe that 
his preoccupation with French prestige abroad had instilled a wanton neglect of domestic issues. 
‘May’ showed that they were, at any rate, more concerned with their standard of living than with 
matters of foreign policy. As France returned to calm, it was clear to American officials that 
either de Gaulle or his successor would have to pay urgent attention to domestic concerns for the 
next couple of years. “Every sacred tree in France has been shaken beginning with university 
through trade unions to political parties, including communists and Gaullists,” Shriver observed 
in the wake of the crisis. “Whoever governs France after elections will face battery of difficult 
internal problems, and it is solution – or non-solution – of these problems that will dominate 
French political scene for immediate future (as opposed to de Gaulle’s ‘politique de grandeur’ 
which everyone, friend or foe, agrees can never be same again).”169 As a result of the May crisis, 
France was therefore likely to be a more tractable ally than it had been for years. 
 Another important consequence of the May crisis was that it swept away the economic 
underpinnings of de Gaulle’s policy of grandeur. On May 29, Katzenbach informed President 
Johnson that the crisis cost France an estimated $1 billion per week and that any settlement with 
labor would likely cause prices to go up and worsen France’s balance of payments and trade 
balance.170 De Gaulle’s decision to buy off domestic discontent with higher wages indeed led to 
economic trouble. The French balance-of-payments deficit, previously headed for somewhere 
between $200 million and $300 million, was suddenly anticipated to reach between $500 million 
and $600 million. Higher wages also caused inflation, leading to a flight from the franc and a run 
on gold and the deutsche mark. The free-market price of gold rose to more than $40 an ounce. 
After years of hoarding gold, France was now forced to sell some of it to raise money in order to 
maintain the franc. By September, the French central bank had lost an “astounding” $3 billion in 
reserves.171 
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Whereas until May 1968 monetary issues had been a source of friction, de Gaulle’s 
financial misfortune now set the stage for an unforeseen rapprochement between France and the 
United States. De Gaulle vowed throughout the crisis that he would not devalue the franc. It was, 
however, uncertain how long France could resist the pressure from the market given the 
hemorrhage of reserves – and by November the air was rife with speculation that the French 
central bank was reaching a breaking point. The United States, meanwhile, had powerful reasons 
to oppose a devaluation of the franc, in particular because it could set off a chain of events 
ultimately resulting in another attack on the dollar and a complete breakdown of the monetary 
system. As Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler advised President Johnson in early June 1968,  
 
the monetary system is in such fragile condition that even a mild devaluation could bring about 
massive fund movements […]. Almost certainly, it would have an adverse effect on sterling, 
which is still very weak. […] Should that happen, there would be repercussions on the dollar and, 
perhaps, general monetary chaos – with everyone trying to get out of currencies and into gold. 
Whether the monetary system, in its present form, could survive this series of steps is 
problematical. The U.S. might well have to cut the gold convertibility link to the dollar and float 
itself. And that would destroy the present system and probably badly cripple world trade.172 
 
By early June, the Johnson administration therefore began working on plans in the 
strictest confidence to save the franc, the pound, and the dollar.173 Above all, Washington was 
trying to dissuade any unilateral moves by the French and was similtaneously weighing in on 
Germany to revaluate the deutsche mark, since this would help to take off the pressure from the 
franc, the pound, and the dollar. It insisted on a multilaterally agreed currency adjustment, if any. 
In November 1968, fears of a unilateral devaluation by France reached a peak. On November 18, 
Walt Rostow hurriedly cabled Fowler, who had travelled to Europe, about “unverified reports 
that the French may unilaterally act to devalue the franc so substantially as to upset the world 
monetary system […] because the German Government is unwilling to revalue the mark 
upward.” President Johnson instructed the secretary of the treasury to take the matter up 
personally with Chancellor Kiesinger and to persuade him to “promptly contact President de 
                                                                                                                                                      
the crisis. In May and June, they were beginning to exchange huge numbers of francs in hopes of forcing such a 
devaluation (after which they could buy back francs at a much cheaper rate). 
172 Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to President Johnson, 6 June 1968. See: FRUS 1964-1968, 
vol. VIII, International Monetary and Trade Policy, #199. 
173 Memorandum, Walt W. Rostow to President Johnson, 4 June 1968, vol. 80, June 1-6, 1968, MtP, NSF, #45, box 
35, LBJL. 




Gaulle and urge no unilateral move until appropriate monetary authorities can convene and act 
on a multilateral basis.”174 A German concession in the monetary realm was considered crucial to 
head off a French devaluation, but the Germans proved extremely reluctant to do their part and 
refused to consider a revaluation of their own currency. On November 19, Johnson informed 
Harold Wilson that “our tentative approach would be to work for something like [a] 10 percent 
German revaluation and [a] 5 percent French devaluation, with small corresponding moves by 
Italy and The Netherlands.”175 One day later Rostow impressed on Johnson: “If we can hold the 
French – or hold them to a modest devaluation plus big short-term loans – the pound can be 
protected; and I’m still not sure that’s impossible because de Gaulle has staked so much on a 
policy of ‘no devaluation,’ out of simple pride.”176 
On November 23, taking the market by surprise, de Gaulle indeed announced that “the 
parity of the franc will be maintained.” One day later, in a national address, he furthermore 
announced draconic budget cuts in order to defend the currency.177 De Gaulle’s defiance of 
“odious speculation on the national currency” has been described as one more public show of his 
policy of independence.178 It had been made possible, however, only by a $2 billion international 
credit package, which had been agreed a few days before and in which the United States assumed 
a large part of the burden.179 President Johnson’s simultaneous message to de Gaulle, in which he 
expressed confidence in the franc and in France’s economic policies, also helped to stabilize the 
market. 180  “The international monetary system is not a field for pettiness and retribution,” 
Johnson wrote in his memoirs about his efforts to help de Gaulle avert a devaluation of the 
franc.181 The American embassy reported that the latter was indeed very pleased with Johnson’s 
willingness to come to the assistance of the franc.182  
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Johnson’s handling of the franc crisis of November 1968 – a crisis that Lacouture has 
labelled the “monetary equivalent of May”183 – thus greatly contributed to an improvement of the 
bilateral relationship near the end of his presidency. To be sure, this improvement was also aided 
by a commensurate deterioration of the Franco-German relationship. During the negotiations 
about the monetary crisis in Bonn in November, “the Germans to the end [had] refused to 
budge.”184 They did ultimately agree to measures to increase imports and reduce exports, but they 
did not revalue the deutsche mark.185 Johnson’s advisers instantly shared the view that de Gaulle’s 
ensuing decision not to devaluate the franc “was in part politically motivated and a response to 
the hard-headed German tactics at Bonn.” 186  At a National Security Council meeting on 
November 25, the bitterness between the French and the Germans over the monetary crisis 
figured prominently in the discussion. The sympathy, for once, was with de Gaulle. “The 
French,” Fowler remarked, “I think quite properly, feel that the Germans have not done as much 
as they could or should as partners in this operation.”187 Johnson’s readiness to continue to help 
de Gaulle was moreover evidenced by his insistent probing whether more should be done to 
bolster the franc. His decision to come to the support of the franc in November 1968 despite his 
earlier differences with de Gaulle and the concurrent inability of Paris and Bonn to work out a 
deal to defend the French currency marked an important adjustment in the trilateral relationship. 
For the first time since 1958, the adjustment was in favor of American-French accommodation. 
This adjustment was moreover reinforced by developments in the Cold War. 
 
Cold War – From Détente With the East to Tripartitism Revisited 
In the night of August 20, 1968, thousands of Soviet tanks occupied the streets of 
Czechoslovakia, followed by hundreds of thousands of Warsaw Pact troops. In Prague and other 
cities, Czech and Slovak citizens confronted the soldiers, denying them assistance such as the 
provision of food and water. They openly denounced the invasion and the Soviet leadership. 
Their non-violent struggle, however, stood no chance against the Soviet-led military machine. 
More than seventy Czechs and Slovaks were killed during the invasion and hundreds were 
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wounded. The Czechoslovak leader Alexander Dubcek was arrested and brought to Moscow, 
along with several of his colleagues. The crackdown sparked a wave of emigration, ultimately 
numbering 300,000 people, many of them highly qualified. It abruptly ended the so-called Prague 
Spring, the hopeful but brief period of political liberalization in Czechoslovakia that had begun 
with Dubcek’s rise to power in early January 1968. The invasion also led to the Brezhnev 
doctrine, which established that individual socialist states had ‘limited sovereignty’ within the 
‘socialist commonwealth’ – meaning that they risked military intervention if they strayed too far 
from the course charted in Moscow. And it sent a shiver through the West, reminding it of the 
repressive nature of the Soviet regime. 
The Soviet-led military intervention in Czechoslovakia of August 1968 was a serious 
disappointment to Johnson, who had hoped to convince the Senate to ratify the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty before the end of his presidency and to make significant headway in strategic 
arms control talks with Moscow.188 Fearful of repeating the Hungarian experience of 1956 and 
intent on arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, the Johnson administration had done 
preciously little in support of the Prague Spring.189 The documentary record strongly suggests that 
the Johnson administration was caught off guard by the Soviet military intervention. Rusk and 
Rostow had affirmed to Johnson as late as July 24 that “real crisis [in Czechoslovakia] has 
subsided” and that “the Soviets will not move militarily against them.” 190  When Soviet 
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin asked for a meeting at the White House to explain the ongoing 
military intervention, he found that – somewhat to his relief – the seriousness of the matter had 
not dawned on the American president.191 The Johnson administration had been so fixated on 
arranging an arms control summit in Moscow with Alexei Kosygin that it simply could not 
imagine a Soviet-led military intervention. “The political costs the Soviets would have to pay was 
one reason we thought they would not move,” Rusk explained a few days after Warsaw Pact 
soldiers crossed the border. “The ‘Cold War’ is not over,” Johnson unhappily observed. “We 
have been disillusioned if not deceived.”192 Largely because of the Czech crisis, Johnson was not 
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to have the arms control accomplishment that would have ended his presidency on a more 
positive note. 
Johnson’s disappointment, however, was a mild affliction compared to de Gaulle’s fate. 
For the latter, the crushing of the Prague Spring was little less than a foreign policy catastrophe. 
Although de Gaulle’s visit to Poland in September 1967 had already been a cold shower on 
French aspirations and Franco-Soviet rapprochement had lost steam by mid-1968 for lack of 
interest on Moscow’s part,193 de Gaulle had been much encouraged by the political liberalization 
in Czechoslovakia. Taken together with the increasingly independent stance assumed by Nicolae 
Ceausescu’s Romania, the course of events in Prague was bestowing a sense of inevitability to de 
Gaulle’s sequence of détente, entente, and cooperation with Eastern Europe. In a late July press 
conference, he could still credibly describe the developments in Czechoslovakia as “but an 
episode in the inevitable process of gradually relaxing Russian control over the countries of the 
socialist bloc.”194 Added to the plausible notion that the United States, beset by Vietnam and its 
own domestic turmoil, was beginning to reduce its presence in Europe, the “policy of blocs” 
indeed appeared to be giving way to an emerging Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. It all 
read like “the beginning of a scenario that might have been written at the Elysée.”195  
In private, the French government had been rather fearful that the developments in 
Czechoslovakia would spiral out of control – more so, in fact, than the Johnson administration. 
De Gaulle was above all concerned that the quick pace of events would provoke the Soviets into 
a violent response. In particular, when Warsaw Pact troops engaged in a large military exercise in 
Czechoslovakia in the summer, the signs did not look good to Paris. “They are going too quickly, 
and too far,” de Gaulle judged about the reformers in early July in a conversation with Jean-Marie 
Domenach, a French writer who had just returned from Prague. “The Russians will intervene, 
then, as always, the Czechs will give up fighting and night will fall once again over Prague.”196 
Michel Debré, serving this time as de Gaulle’s foreign minister, proved even less hopeful in late 
July. Four weeks before the invasion, he impressed on Undersecretary of State Katzenbach that 
“it was absolutely impossible for the Soviet Union to accept the course of liberalization in Czech 
because if this continued it would affect all other Eastern European countries and prove to be 
irreversible.” Debré “did not think that it would be possible to reverse this course in Czech, other 
than by force.” The French foreign minister “thought the Soviets were prepared to do this” and 
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that “it was conceivable, but unlikely, that Dubcek could avert the crisis by making major 
concessions to the Soviets.”197 Still, when de Gaulle’s nightmare did turn into reality, without the 
Czech army or police firing a single shot on the invaders, it was, as de Gaulle’s long-time aide 
Etienne Burin des Roziers recalled, “a very hard blow for him.”198 The Czech crisis above all 
revealed the severe constraints placed on his grand design for ending the Cold War by the sheer 
repressive nature of Soviet domination and the persistent force of communist ideology. It served 
to re-energize NATO and ended talk in the United States of substantial troop cuts in Europe. 
And it “dispelled most of the remaining fancies about French influence on Soviet behavior.”199 
Although both Johnson and de Gaulle were inclined to play down the crisis and to 
continue their pursuit of détente with the Soviet bloc as best they could, the Czech crisis at first 
seemed to only aggravate Franco-American differences. In the first official response to the 
Soviet-led incursion, the French government emphasized that it was yet another manifestation of 
the “politics of the blocs” that had been “imposed in Europe as a result of the Yalta agreements” 
and which France had been trying to overcome for years.200 By hence blaming the Czech crisis on 
the entire ‘Yalta system,’ de Gaulle appeared to implicate Washington as well as Moscow. This, in 
turn, caused Yalta veteran Averell Harriman – in one of his jabs for which he had earned the 
moniker “the crocodile” – to deliver a stinging rebuke in a radio interview:  
 
I think that President de Gaulle has somewhat oversimplified history when he compared the 
Warsaw Pact and the domination of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe with the free association 
of nations through NATO. […] There is one thing which de Gaulle says which is true: that he 
was not at Yalta, and therefore his impressions have not been gained from a knowledge of what 
went on, but a lack of knowledge.201 
 
Despite de Gaulle’s recurring critique of the bipolar power configuration in Europe and 
the angry responses this drew from some Americans, there was a noticeable improvement in the 
atmosphere between Paris and Washington in the wake of the Czech crisis. Majority opinion in 
France was far more condemnatory than de Gaulle of the Soviet Union. Many French officials, as 
Shriver reported, moreover believed that an “agonizing reappraisal” of French foreign policy was 
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in order after the Soviet aggression; they exhibited a new willingness to cooperate with the 
United States.202 In October, Henry Tanner of the New York Times reported, in an article that 
Shriver recommended to President Johnson, that “beneath the unruffled appearance of French 
diplomacy these days, there is a wide acceptance of the fact that the foundation of President de 
Gaulle’s concept of foreign policy has been shaken if not destroyed by the Soviet intervention of 
Czechoslovakia.” There were indications that, in Tanner’s words approvingly cited by Shriver, de 
Gaulle had been “more deeply upset over the Soviet military intervention than he lets on 
publicly.” 
 
High ranking [French] officials concede the basic Gaullist assumption which emerged from 
General de Gaulle’s visit to the USSR in June 1966 has been proved wrong by Czechoslovakia. 
This assumption was that the Soviets had moved far enough toward peacefulness and liberalism 
in international affairs to permit a western statesman to claim their friendship while at the same 
time encouraging the Poles, Czechoslovaks, Hungarians and others to demand national 
sovereignty. They now feel that liberalization in Eastern Europe will remain stagnant until ‘the 
heresy hits Rome,’ i.e. the USSR, and that is a long time off.203 
 
Building on the genuine groundswell of goodwill towards the United States among 
French officials and the faltering promise of détente, the Franco-American relationship turned 
toward a more cooperative mode in the fall of 1968. According to Shriver, even de Gaulle 
realized that “with the Soviets on warpath this is not the time to be feuding with [the] US.” On 
the eve of Foreign Minister Debré’s visit to Washington in October, the first visit by a French 
foreign minister in two years, the American ambassador pressed the importance of using the new 
ambience to lay the groundwork for a fundamental improvement of the bilateral relationship 
once de Gaulle left the scene.204 In fact, Walt Rostow had already asked the CIA in August to 
examine the possibilities for a rapprochement between the United States and France. Washington, 
to be sure, was under no illusion. “There are a number of ways in which Washington could 
accommodate Paris, particularly in economic, scientific, technical and financial matters,” the CIA 
reported upon Rostow’s request; however, “in [the] political arena, there is not a great deal which 
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can be accomplished so long as Paris and Washington have differing conceptions both of world 
issues and of the roles each should play in international efforts.”205 Although French foreign 
policy showed signs of adjustment in the aftermath of the Czech crisis, it was clear to both the 
CIA and the State Department that de Gaulle had not abandoned his basic objectives or 
fundamental principles. 206  Yet, the circumstances for a substantive improvement in the 
relationship had never before been so advantageous during Johnson’s term. 
At least as important as the implications of the Czech crisis in this regard was the 
increasing uneasiness in Paris with the re-emergence of Germany as a power to be reckoned with. 
Bonn was, as we have seen, already quite prepared in 1968 to use its monetary clout and to 
withstand the pressure from its Western allies to revalue its currency. With the evolution of its 
Ostpolitik since late 1966, Bonn was also increasingly taking an independent line in international 
diplomacy.207 Whereas France’s policy of détente had become largely immobile by 1968, the 
United States’ arms control initiatives and Germany’s initiatives for an opening to the East were 
overtaking those of France in importance. Reports in the spring of 1968 that German Foreign 
Minister Willy Brandt had denounced de Gaulle in a speech as “power hungry” also did not help 
matters. 208  The reemergence of German influence could not but affect the French attitude 
towards its eastern neighbor. The days of Adenauer, during which Bonn often referred itself to 
de Gaulle’s leadership, and Erhard, who was orientated on Washington, were quickly fading to 
make place for more self-possessed policies. In the wake of the Czech crisis, de Gaulle not only 
refused to offer an unambiguous pledge of military support to Germany, but he also suggested 
that Germany’s eastern policies had played a part in provoking the Soviet-led invasion. “The 
Russians were worried by the threat of a revitalized Germany joining with [the] Czech and 
perhaps even East Germany, plus the Chinese, in joint actions against Russia itself,” de Gaulle 
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explained to Shriver on September 23. “It was the spectre of China and Germany working 
together against Russia in the next five to ten years that was the real cause of their alarm and 
actions.”209  
Interestingly, the French reorientation on the West as a result of the Czech crisis and the 
resurgence of German power accounted for an unforeseen revival of tripartitism in French 
diplomacy in the fall of 1968. The invasion of Czechoslovakia set off a hectic pace of meetings at 
NATO, with many allies declaring themselves to be in favor of enhancing the defense posture of 
the alliance and – at long last – raising their defense spending. After de Gaulle’s first intimation to 
American sources in early January 1968 that France would not leave the North Atlantic Treaty in 
1969,210 Paris on November 16 joined in an official declaration of the North Atlantic Council 
stating that “the French government considers that the Alliance must continue as long as it 
appears to be necessary.”211 De Gaulle, however, as was to be expected, was strongly opposed to 
proposals for strengthening NATO in response to the crisis. Instead, Washington was receiving 
indications that he was interested in reviving his memorandum proposal of September 1958. De 
Gaulle intimated as much in a discussion with Ambassador Shriver in mid-September.212 During 
his Washington visit in October, Foreign Minister Debré also gave evidence of a renewed interest 
in a tripartite coordination of policies in his conversation with President Johnson, as he suggested 
that the major powers of the West should improve the regular co-ordination of their actions in 
Europe and the Middle East.213 The State Departement’s Director of Intelligence and Research, 
Thomas Hughes, furthermore believed that de Gaulle was considering some kind of tripartite 
nuclear cooperation in the wake of the Czechoslovak crisis.214  
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At the same time, French diplomats – not least of all the “thoroughgoing anglophile” 
Debré 215  – were throwing out feelers for a Franco-British rapprochement, potentially even 
leading to French acquiescence in British membership of the Common Market. This renewed 
interest on the part of France in strong relations with Great Britain was without doubt inspired 
by a desire to compensate for Germany’s growing political and economic weight on the 
European continent. It was highlighted in particular during the new British ambassador 
Christopher Soames’ audience with de Gaulle on February 4, 1969. In the course of a long tête-à-
tête, de Gaulle told Soames, whose standing with the General was undoubtedly enhanced because 
he was Winston Churchill’s son-in-law, of his willingness to engage in secret talks with London 
about the possibility of a looser organization of the Common Market in order to suit British 
tastes as well as of increased political and defense cooperation between France, Great Britain, 
Germany, and Italy.216 
Given that the Johnson administration was searching for ways to improve the 
relationship with France in the fall of 1968, these French overtures aroused interest. Any formal 
tripartite scheme obviously would not have been any more acceptable to the United States in 
1968 than it had been in 1958, since it would have caused a confrontation with Germany and 
undermined NATO; at any rate, such a scheme was never officially put forward by the French 
government. Yet there was a willingness among American officials to explore other ways to 
structurally improve the bilateral or even the trilateral relationship. This was evident, for instance, 
in a remarkable conversation between Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene 
Rostow and French Ambassador Charles Lucet against the background of the franc crisis in late 
November 1968. Giving his personal view, Rostow not only supported a Franco-British entente 
in order to keep growing German influence in check but even hinted at the future possibility of 
Franco-American nuclear collaboration: 
 
Rostow said he had never been able to understand one aspect of French European policy, namely 
the assumption that France could indefinitely control or manage the Germans. As the 
Ambassador knew, we strongly favored the Franco-German rapprochement, and tried never to 
do or say anything to weaken it. That relationship was fundamental to any hope of a European 
future. But to us the natural and prudent way to organize Europe was on the foundation of the 
                                                 
215 In the words of Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler, 474. 
216 On de Gaulle’s discussion with Soames, see Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler, 475-477; Wilson, A Personal Record, 
610-611; Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe, 232-234; Ledwidge, De Gaulle et les Américains, 392-397; Young, This Blessed 
Plot, 200-207. 




Entente Cordiale, which we could support on the basis of parity from the background [sic], within a 
strong NATO and OECD context. To Rostow, speaking personally, the political implication of 
the crisis was clear. Germany wished to assert its economic primacy. 
We knew of course of French sensitivity to the thought that we treated Britain differently 
from France. […] Rostow thought, speaking for himself, that in the right political setting, the 
issue of differential treatment of Britain and France, which was largely illusory, could be 
overcome, even in the nuclear field, without affecting NATO arrangements.217 (emphasis added) 
 
As it turned out, there would be no restoration of the ‘entente cordiale.’ de Gaulle’s 
private conversation with Soames even turned into a venomous affair between London and Paris. 
The virulently anti-Gaullist Foreign Office led by Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart transfigured 
de Gaulle’s words into an attack on NATO and Prime Minister Wilson decided, at the Foreign 
Office’s insistence, to violate the diplomatic mores by informing Chancellor Kiesinger during a 
visit to Bonn in February before responding to de Gaulle.218 The Soames affair certainly hindered 
Franco-British rapprochement for as long as the Labour government remained in power.219 But 
the rapprochement between France, the United States, and Great Britain in late 1968 would be of 
enduring significance. Lord Ismay’s oft-cited dictum about NATO – i.e., that it had been devised 
to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down – exercised its powerful logic 
on decisionmakers in Paris as well: from the French perspective, the Anglo-Saxons continued to 
be needed to keep the Germans in check and to keep the Soviets at bay. The events of 1968 
forced a re-orientation of French foreign policy towards the Western alliance and towards the 
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removal (under Georges Pompidou) in May 1971 of the French veto of British entry in the 
Common Market. 
The accommodation between the United States and France, meanwhile, would be taken 
further by the Nixon administration and would, as Rostow had envisaged, include covert 
collaboration in the nuclear realm. Johnson, however, deserves the credit for having laid the 
foundations, both by his consistent and sagacious policy of restraint in response to the Gaullist 
challenge and by the nature of his decisions in the course of the annus horribilis in both American 
and French foreign policy: 1968. While he had been incapable of developing a meaningful 
personal relationship with de Gaulle, Johnson’s constructive role was recognized in Paris as well. 
It was conveyed straight to the Oval Office by Michel Debré on October 15. The French foreign 
minister had been granted a meeting with the American president at the recommendation of 
Rusk.220 Debré, speaking as de Gaulle’s “interpreter,” stressed that Johnson had been president 
“during one of the most difficult years since the last war” and would leave office “with our total 
admiration.” Johnson responded in kind. He then invited Debré to join him in watching the 
lauching of the first Apollo test flight, part of the program to put a man on the moon. As they 
were seated side by side in two armchairs in front of the TV set, the American president towering 
over his guest, Debré turned, put his hand on Johnson’s arm, and said:  
 
Mr. President, despite everything you hear, despite everything that people may say, we consider 
you to have been a very good friend of France.221 
 
1969 – When “Great” Minds Meet: Nixon, Kissinger, and De Gaulle 
Helped by the Vietnam debacle and the abhorrence many Americans felt for the domestic 
upheaval of 1968, Richard M. Nixon won the presidency by a small margin in the popular vote 
but a large majority in the electoral college.222 It was a stunning comeback for the Republican. 
After having lost the presidential elections of 1960 by a minute margin to John F. Kennedy and 
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the Californian gubernatorial elections of October 1962, he had all but vanished into the political 
wilderness. Yet now he had entered the realm of world leaders that he had coveted so fervently 
for eight lonely years. For all his insecurities, Nixon felt that this was his natural habitat. 
By January 1969, de Gaulle was undoubtedly the leader with the greatest allure. The 
Nixon presidency’s three month overlap with that of de Gaulle was remarkable. Despite its 
brevity, it proved long enough to produce major changes in the dynamic of the Franco-American 
relationship, laying the groundwork for further improvements in the years after de Gaulle’s 
resignation on April 27. The absence of dialogue that had been characteristic of the Johnson 
years made way for a genuine meeting of minds. Nixon and his foreign policy czar Henry 
Kissinger cherished an admiration for the General and his statecraft that was rare among 
Americans. Their quest to put American foreign policy on a realist footing and to adjust it to a 
decline in America’s global position also greatly contributed to the new-fangled Franco-American 
amity. After a year of dramatic setbacks and nearing the end of his political life, de Gaulle would 
finally be presented with the American interlocutor with whom a more fruitful relationship could 
be developed. 
Sympathy for the General 
Ever since they first met in April 1960, during de Gaulle’s state visit to the United States, there 
existed an intimate rapport between the Frenchman and the Californian.223 This was, to some 
extent, rather surprising. As Eisenhower’s vice president, Nixon was a consummate career 
politician with strong ties to his party; de Gaulle was not only the contrary to a career politician in 
everything he did, but he intensely disliked party politics in his own country. Nixon’s Quaker 
background had little in common with de Gaulle’s Catholicism. There were undeniable 
differences between their personalities, too. Nixon was often painfully insecure and secretly 
manipulative, to which de Gaulle’s supreme self confidence and heroic record stood in sharp 
contrast. Yet from the outset they had caught each other’s imagination as belonging to the 
sublime crop of wielders of statecraft. 
 De Gaulle perceived in Nixon a budding statesman of considerable intellect, which he 
probably thought a rare phenomenon in American politics. “In his somewhat curious post of 
Vice-President,” de Gaulle recalled in his memoirs, “he struck me as one of those frank and 
steady personalities on whom one feels one could rely in the great affairs of State if they were to 
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reach the highest office.”224 There is little doubt that de Gaulle would have preferred Nixon to 
succeed Eisenhower as president. When Nixon wrote de Gaulle a letter upon having lost the 
election, he replied affectionately and asked him to lunch should he visit Paris.225 Nixon did so in 
June 1963, after he had lost the gubernatorial election in California, and again in 1967. At the first 
of these occasions, de Gaulle prophesied, in a toast on a patio behind the Elysée palace, that his 
guest “at some time in the future” would return to a “very high capacity” in American politics.226 
It was a remarkable morale booster from a foreign leader to someone whose political career had 
plunged to such depths that his obituaries had been written. He himself had announced after his 
rout at the Californian polls: “You won’t have Nixon to kick around anymore, because, 
gentlemen, this is my last press conference.”227 De Gaulle might have foreseen more clearly than 
others that Nixon’s role in American politics had not yet been played out because of his political 
qualities and that it would therefore be sensible to continue to invest in their personal 
relationship. There is certainly reason to assume that de Gaulle believed Nixon would return as 
the Republican candidate in the 1964 presidential elections; in January 1964, he privately declared 
an unambiguous preference for Nixon over the incumbent Johnson.228 And in 1967, de Gaulle 
emphatically told Vernon Walters in private that he continued to believe that Nixon, having 
“crossed the desert” like de Gaulle had, would be elected president.229  André Malraux once 
explained that de Gaulle furthermore felt a bond because “Nixon also had his ‘period of exile.’”230 
So when Nixon at long last reached the presidency in 1969, Le Monde’s André Fontaine had 
reason to write that “le général de Gaulle a trouvé l’interlocuteur américain qu’il souhaitait depuis 
longtemps.”231 
 As for Nixon, his esteem for de Gaulle was near infinite. He did not share the distaste for 
Gaullism that was common within the bipartisan establishment that had dominated American 
foreign policy for two decades. There are no known Nixon statements denouncing the General 
or his policies, nothing that approximates the denunciations by the likes of Acheson, McCloy, 
and Ball, no hint of the frustration occasionally expressed by Kennedy or – to a lesser extent – 
Johnson. He had, to be sure, not always been an active admirer, and for a long time he probably 
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shared the customary assessment of de Gaulle as vainglorious and obstreperous.232 But ever since 
the commonplace assessment of the General was belied in their first personal encounter, he held 
nothing but the highest regard for the Frenchman. Nixon was obviously also much taken with de 
Gaulle’s remarkable willingness to continue to see him during his years out of office and by de 
Gaulle’s predictions – “years before it was even suggested in the American press” – that he 
would one day be elected to the White House.233 In his book In the Arena (1990), he moreover 
described his conversations with de Gaulle as “among the most valuable ones I had during my 
public career” and cited profusively from de Gaulle’s writings (in particular Le fil de l’épee).234 His 
long chapter on de Gaulle in Leaders (1990) is not only a riveting tribute to a remarkable leader 
but a personal portrait filled with sympathy for a gentle giant: “Seldom has history seen a leader 
whose personality combined all the admirable qualities that de Gaulle’s did.”235 
 Nixon’s high regard for de Gaulle was undoubtedly occasioned by the fact that the latter was 
a leader of the calibre to which Nixon aspired. His esteem was that of an aspiring statesman for a 
living epitome of statecraft – the last one still in office in 1969. Similar to de Gaulle, he was 
relatively uninterested in domestic policies, considering them “a bore” whereas “in foreign policy 
you have the fate of the country at stake.”236 They were both highly sensitive to the link between 
the psychology of the nation and its foreign policy. In a seminal speech to San Francisco’s 
Bohemian Club in July 1967, Nixon had worrying questioned “whether America has the national 
character and moral stamina to see us through this long and difficult struggle”; in his memoirs, he 
makes clear that this concern was the motivating force behind his presidential campaign.237 His 
foreign policy was hence partially charged with the domestic purpose of restoring the self 
confidence of Americans and of keeping their isolationist instincts – particularly strong in liberal 
quarters at the time – at bay. Nixon’s most urgent foreign policy test upon resuming the levers of 
power was, of course, that of extricating the United States militarily from Vietnam – a test 
somewhat akin to the one de Gaulle had faced with regard to Algeria ten years earlier. Nixon’s 
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call on “the great silent majority of my fellow Americans” to support his controversial decision to 
keep American forces in Vietnam notwithstanding large and increasingly violent protests was 
certainly reminiscent of de Gaulle’s calls on the French people in times of crisis.238 In some ways, 
Nixon even appears to have styled his political persona after the Frenchman. In the preface of 
the 1968 edition of Six Crises (originally published in 1962), for instance, Nixon wrote: 
 
Sometimes a nation is ready and a man is not; sometimes a man is ready and nation is not; 
sometimes a nation decides that a man is ready for leadership and his is the right kind of 
leadership for the time. Only time will tell what course destiny will take in this watershed year of 
1968.239 
 
This sense of destiny and of the indivisible bond between a nation and a leader are at least as 
characteristic of de Gaulle as of Nixon. Nixon, like de Gaulle, had spent years as a statesman in 
frustrated abeyance before returning to the pinnacle of power. In addition, he yearned to be 
recognized as a writer-politician and an intellectual force in his own right – the hallmark of the 
truly great. In all of these respects, Nixon aspired to be – in the words of one scholar – 
“America’s de Gaulle.”240 
 It is important to note that the strength of the Nixon-de Gaulle relationship resulted from an 
ideological affinity as well. Both were politically conservative and internationally realist. They 
hence operated on similar wavelengths, even if they did not always agree. By American standards, 
Nixon was an unapologetic guardian of the national interest (certainly if one regards his more 
Wilsonian statements as little more than mandatory rhetoric to garner support, as Kissinger has 
suggested).241 In his first annual foreign policy report to the Senate, in February 1970, the new 
president stressed that “our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way 
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around.”242 He believed that without a clear view of the national interest, a foreign policy was 
bound to be mercurial and – as Vietnam showed – could easily go awry. This belief was accepted 
wisdom among realist students of international relations, but it was rather uncharacteristic for an 
American politician – let alone for one to be so open about it. “In a British or French state paper, 
such statements would have passed for truisms,” Kissinger later wrote. “In America, it was 
unprecedented for a president to stake his policy on the explicit affirmation of the national 
interest.”243 
 Nixon shared de Gaulle’s axiom that a dominant executive was a prerequisite for an effective 
foreign policy. “We need a strong President to deal on an equal footing with strong leaders of 
other powerful countries,” he wrote in In the Arena. “The alternative to strong Presidential 
government is government by Congress, which is no government at all.”244 This preference for a 
formidable executive and a relatively weak Congress, especially in the conduct of foreign affairs, 
was another hallmark of the American conservative political tradition. It also mirrored de 
Gaulle’s convictions about the French constitution, which he put in practice with the foundation 
of the Fifth Republic. De Gaulle’s grasp on French foreign policy was almost complete and his 
long-term vision rendered it an uncommon consistency. Nixon likewise assumed office 
convinced that the conduct of foreign policy was a quintessential presidential function that 
should not be left to bureaucrats. During the Nixon years, American foreign policy would be 
formulated in – and in many cases even executed from –  the White House (often in great 
secrecy). Not since the days of Franklin Roosevelt would the making of American foreign policy 
be so centralized. More than most other presidents, Nixon would meticulously prepare and time 
his speeches so that they would have the greatest possible effect. William Safire, William Bundy, 
and Cy Sulzberger have all emphasized that in all these respects Nixon followed the example of 
the contemporary statesman he most admired: “The model of de Gaulle was always with him.”245 
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Nixon, as Arthur Schlesinger jr. has observed in The Imperial Presidency (1974), tried “to establish a 
quasi-gaullist regime in the United States.”246 
 This operational mode was much encouraged by Nixon’s recognition of the ever-changing 
balance of power between nation-states, rather than their cooperation within a multilateral 
framework, as the central regulating mechanism in world politics – another similarity with 
Gaullism. Whereas the predominantly liberal American policymakers of the 1950s and 1960s 
denounced balance-of-power politics as a dangerous anachronism in the nuclear age and 
evocative of Europe’s past wars, Nixon was quite prepared to acknowledge – and even to 
promote – the existence of multiple military, political, and economic centers of power in the 
world. “Nixon did not accept the Wilsonian verities about the essential goodness of man or the 
underlying harmony among nations to be maintained by collective security,” Kissinger explained. 
“In Nixon’s perception, peace and harmony were not the natural order of things but temporary 
oases in a perilous world where stability could only be preserved by vigilant effort.”247 Like de 
Gaulle, Nixon entertained a geopolitical mindset rather than an institutional one. International 
stability would depend less on the regulated behavior of states in a multilateral framework than 
on an equilibrium based on the relative distribution of power within the international system. 
Nixon also diverged from thinking in strictly bipolar terms, believing that stability hinged on an 
equilibrium between the five great economic centers of powers in the world (albeit with the 
United States as its most powerful core) – or as he stated in an interview with Time magazine in 
January 1972: 
 
We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended 
periods of peace is when there has been balance of power. It is when one nation becomes 
infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor that the danger of war arises. [...] I 
think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, 
Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even 
balance.248 
 
 This multipolar world view was consistent with Nixon’s policy of détente. The containment 
of the Soviet Union would remain the overriding objective of American foreign policy, but 
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Nixon introduced sweeping policy changes towards this end. Despite his reputation as an 
anticommunist diehard, Nixon had no qualms about pursuing détente in the relationship with the 
Soviet Union – yet another similarity to de Gaulle. Whereas de Gaulle viewed détente as a first 
step toward ending the division of Europe, however, Nixon viewed it above all as a way to 
strengthen the American position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and to induce it to become less 
expansionist by ensnaring it in a multipolar web of interests. “The idea was to emphasize those 
areas in which cooperation was possible,” Kissinger has elucidated, “and to use that cooperation 
as leverage to modify Soviet behavior in areas in which the two countries were at loggerheads.”249 
Nixon pursued détente not because he shared liberal hopes of ending the Cold War by ‘building 
bridges’ to the East, as Johnson had tried to do, but because he believed it served the interest of 
the United States to deal with the Soviet Union on a less antagonistic basis. His pursuit of détente 
would be utilitarian and devoid of illusions. In his memoirs, Nixon wrote: 
 
Never once in my career have I doubted that the Communists mean it when they say that their 
goal is to bring the world under Communist control. […] But unlike some anticommunists who 
think that we should refuse to recognize or deal with the Communists lest in doing so we imply 
or extend an ideological respectability to their philosophy and their system, I have always believed 
that we can and must communicate and, when possible, negotiate with Communist nations. They 
are too powerful to ignore. We must always remember that they will never act out of altruism, but 
only out of self-interest. Once this is understood, it is more sensible – and also safer – to 
communicate with the Communists than it is to live in icy cold-war isolation or confrontation.250  
 
 The renewed consensus on containment was to find a more rational balance between goals 
and means, between interests and ideals, between confrontation and cooperation, between 
undifferentiated involvement and total disengagement.251 In a multipolar world, the Soviet Union 
would no longer be the object of an American-led struggle by all free nations, but one of the 
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players in a balance-of-power game still dominated by the United States as the most powerful 
nation. In addition, the multipolar vision allowed for a fundamentally different approach to China, 
which in Nixon’s view had to be brought out of its largely self-imposed isolation into the global 
equilibrium if only to play it off against the Soviet Union in a game of ‘triangular’ diplomacy.252  
 Nixon’s vision of a multipolar world inevitably also affected the American position vis-à-vis 
Europe. In his July 1967 speech, he had suggested that NATO was “obsolete” because “we live 
in a new world,” and that priority be given to setting up a “new alliance, multilateral if possible, 
bilateral if necessary.”253 Addressing the North Atlantic Council in April 1969, twenty years after 
the signing of the Washington Treaty, Nixon called on NATO to tune in to the “real world,” in 
which men are “driven by suspicion” and “take advantage of their neighbors” and which 
compelled a recognition of “the sometimes different interests of the Western nations.”254 Nixon 
also exhibited a greater willingness than Kennedy or Johnson to accept European autonomy.255 
While the Nixon administration would retain NATO in order to exert control over European 
security and to maintain a position of strength vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, it would otherwise 
move towards a position of aloofness. It no longer assumed, as the previous administrations 
tended to do (even though Kennedy, in particular, privately chafed at the assumption), that the 
United States and an integrating Europe shared all basic interests. This was least of all the case in 
the economic and the monetary sphere, where the Common Market was becoming an 
increasingly formidable competitor. But it was also true with respect to détente with the Soviet 
Union, where Brandt’s Germany was pursuing an increasingly self-determining policy, or the 
myriad of foreign policy issues beyond Europe. The Nixon administration furthermore distanced 
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itself from the intra-European debate between federalists and confederalists, abandoning the 
activist support that consecutive administrations had given to Jean Monnet and his followers 
since the late 1940s. It is telling that Nixon’s voluminous memoirs contain no references to the 
European integration movement or its champions. As far as Nixon was concerned, the era of 
American generosity and tutelage vis-à-vis Europe had come to an end. In a period of relative 
decline, Americans had to be far more attentive to their own interests. The Europeans, 
meanwhile, had to learn how to stand their own in a world of changing power relationships. 
Even as Nixon remained committed to NATO, his change of attitude towards Europe thus 
unmistakably generated a more amenable environment for Gaullist aspirations. 
 Nixon was instinctively far more attuned than his Democratic predecessors to the limitations 
of American power and more prepared to scale down his foreign policy ambitions accordingly. 
For any American president in the late 1960s, to be sure, the main foreign policy challenge would 
have been how to adjust to a decline in the global position of the United States. When Britain’s 
Institute for Strategic Studies assessed in early 1969 that “it was largely accidental that the end of the 
American desire and ability to be the Universal [sic] and dominant power should coincide with the 
end of eight years of Democratic rule” and that this change was rather the result of “recent 
experience at home and abroad” which “had exhausted their [the Americans’] confident sense of 
purpose and ability,” Nixon jotted in the margins: “Very important and accurate.”256 Yet, Hubert 
Humphrey’s response to America’s relative decline – and certainly George McGovern’s, if he had 
won the presidential elections of 1972 – would most likely have been intrinsically different.  
 Nixon’s response to the relative decline of American power followed the internationalist 
precepts of the conservative tradition. He was determined to counter the rising isolationist mood 
among in particular liberals by providing a more realistic basis for America’s interaction with the 
world. 257  He would also rely less on the costly, grand, almost architectural schemes of his 
Democratic predecessors for strengthening the Free World than on the ‘intelligent’ manipulation 
of power and events. Under Nixon, American foreign policy would cede many of the more 
idealistic pretensions associated with internationalist liberalism. It would be disinclined to 
promote democracy abroad. Instead, it would conform to the sobering axiom of Realpolitik: a 
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policy of well-defined realistic objectives, a shrewd attention to detail, an inclination to 
pragmatism and moderation, an aversion to ideology, an emphasis on diplomacy paired with a 
willingness to use force if required by the national interest. His policy would be guided by long-
range objectives, such as the normalization of relations with mainland China. But as Nixon 
explained in his memoirs: “I did not feel that there should be any single foreign policy priority. 
There were many priorities, moving in tandem, each affecting the others.”258 The Nixon Doctrine, 
based on Nixon’s impromptu statements to the press during a visit to Guam in July 1969, bid 
farewell to the undifferentiated globalism that he thought had inspired the foreign policies of 
Kennedy and Johnson.259 Nixon refused to be drawn into another Vietnam conflict because of 
the notion that conceding defeat in a regional conflict would adversely affect the entire calculus 
of power with the Soviet Union. In the final analysis, Vietnam was of peripheral interest to 
American security. The nascent strength of regional power centers compelled the United States 
to try alternative, less direct ways to influence world events and to counterpoise Soviet 
expansionism. American foreign policy, Nixon believed, should concern itself with the orderly 
devolution of American power to incipient regional powers. The era had passed in which 
American policymakers would see Europe as a challenging building ground and the Atlantic 
community as a scaled-down world community. 
 Nixon’s benevolent disposition towards de Gaulle was greatly reinforced by the looming 
presence of Henry Kissinger as his chief foreign policy adviser. The Harvard academic was at 
least as ardent an admirer of de Gaulle as the president. Born in Germany; a scholar of 
nineteenth century European balance-of-power politics (his dissertation had dealt with the 
Congress of Vienna); an acknowledged realist thinker about international relations –  for all these 
reasons, Kissinger was well placed to assess de Gaulle and his views in their European historical 
and political context. He was, in the apt words of one biographer, a “European mind in 
American policy.”260 In the course of the 1960s, Kissinger had shown himself to be one of the 
most insightful commentators in the United States on the topic of de Gaulle. Together with 
Walter Lippmann and his fellow European and Harvard academic Stanley Hoffmann, he was one 
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of the very few who were able to see things from de Gaulle’s end. Kissinger’s The Troubled 
Partnership (1965), for instance, contained an analysis of Franco-American differences over the 
Atlantic relationship that still ranks among the most perceptive. What is more, Kissinger believed 
de Gaulle’s strategic vision was clearly superior to that of the Americans: “The irony of the 
Franco-American rivalry is that de Gaulle has conceptions greater than his strength, while the 
United States power has been greater than its conceptions.” 261  Kissinger was not devoid of 
criticism of de Gaulle. He castigated, in particular, his “abrupt tactics” and “imperious style.”262 
Even so, Kissinger judged that de Gaulle’s views were frequently closer to the “historical truth” than 
those that inspired American policies.263 
 Kissinger’s The Troubled Partnership also deserves closer attention because it can be read as an 
antithesis to the views of George Ball, to whom the book contains many explicit and implicit 
references, and because it heralded the alternative approach the Nixon administration would follow. 
Kissinger not only took issue with Ball’s – and many others’ – belief that de Gaulle was an 
‘anachronistic ruler obsessed with national prestige,’ he assailed the transatlantic policies of the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations as illusory and too technocratic. Kissinger held America’s 
traditional sense of exceptionalism and the unrealistic expectations often entertained about the 
world beyond America’s frontiers responsible for the mood swings in the history of American 
foreign policy between isolationalism and activist internationalism. This foreign policy would 
have to be put on a more rational footing in order to provide a steadier and saner approach to 
international affairs. Kissinger was therefore determined to reconcile Americans with 
international political reality and with the notion that their foreign policy should put the national 
interest first. 
 In particular, American support for European unity along federalist lines, Kissinger argued, 
did not correspond to European political realities, which continued to revolve around the nation-
state, nor was an integrated Europe necessarily in the American interest. In this respect, Kissinger 
clearly distanced himself from the views of Ball and the other Europeanists at the State 
Department – and by implication those of Jean Monnet as well. “It was always somewhat 
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unrealistic,” he thought, “to imagine that the methods by which economic integration had been 
achieved could be applied automatically to the political arena.”264 According to Kissinger, the 
blame for the European crises in the mid-1960s did not rest solely on de Gaulle’s shoulders. By 
championing the federalist approach, the United States had contributed to the stalemate between 
European federalists and confederalists. He also disagreed with the thesis often put forward by 
Ball and other Europeanists that transatlantic cooperation could only be effective if the relatively 
small European nation-states merged into one political entity. What is more, such a centralized 
Europe would in Kissinger’s view hardly be in the American interest. The alternative, confederal 
vision of European unity would have the advantage of granting the United States much more 
leeway: “a confederal Europe would enable the United States to maintain an influence at many 
centers of decision rather than be forced to stake everything on affecting the views of a single, 
supranational body.”265 
 For all of these reasons, Kissinger counseled, the United States should no longer concern 
itself with the “internal evolution of a united Europe.” Instead, it must focus on maintaining 
bilateral relationships with all European countries; in addition, it should “use its ingenuity and 
influence in devising new forms of Atlantic cooperation.” In The Troubled Partnership, Kissinger 
explicitly built on the tripartite proposal de Gaulle had put forward in September 1958. He called 
for a “political body at the highest level for concerting the policies of the nations bordering the 
North Atlantic,” suggesting that the North Atlantic Council be superseded by an “executive 
committee” for the development of common policies and strategies.266 As importantly, Kissinger 
emphasized that the United States should be prepared to grant Europeans more autonomy. The 
formal allied consultation process to which the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations 
attached high importance tended to reduce the European allies to “advisors in an American 
decisionmaking process.” Kissinger essentially agreed with de Gaulle’s thesis that American 
dominance in the councils of decision was practically absolving the allies of their responsibilities 
and sucking the life out of the alliance. Rather than seeking to impose its views on the alliance, 
the United States should accept that its European allies held different views about world affairs. 
“A wise Alliance policy will not gear everything to the expectation that common positions can be 
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developed on a global basis,” Kissinger concluded; “it will also take account of the fact that the 
interests of Europe and America are not identical everywhere.”267  
 Kissinger also intensely disliked the managerial style of American foreign policy, castigating 
the “bureaucratic” and “process oriented” way in which it was forged, which he considered unfit 
for agile statecraft and held responsible for stilted and unproductive exchanges with allies. “We 
[…] have expected our Allies to fit themselves into an overall-strategy essentially devised in 
Washington.”268 This American division-of-labor approach to the allies, “with relatively little concern 
for their history or tradition,” he believed, failed to accommodate the legitimate needs of countries 
to have a unique sense of purpose. France was a case in point: a great power which had experienced 
the devastation of two world wars, lost a colonial empire, and on occasion reeled on the brink of 
civil war. “For the greater part of his career,” Kissinger empathized with de Gaulle, “he has had to 
be an illusionist. In the face of all evidence to the contrary, he has striven to restore France’s 
greatness by his passionate belief in it.” 269  Rather than exerting the power of comprehension, 
however, American diplomats indulged in crucifying de Gaulle for not fitting the American-made 
mold of the loyal European ally. “The problem for de Gaulle was not how to relate France to a 
division of labor,” Kissinger understood, “but his conviction that before France could relate itself to 
anyone, it had to relate itself to itself, that it had to have some sense of its purpose.”270 
 Kissinger reiterated many of the above views in other publications and in lectures in the 
mid-1960s.271 In a long essay in 1968, with the presidential elections in the offing, he moreover 
presaged many of the Nixon administration’s notions about the shift from strict bipolarity to 
increasing multipolarity, exploring its significance for the transatlantic relationship in particular. 
“Military bipolarity is a source of rigidity in foreign policy,” Kissinger posited. “A bipolar world 
loses the perspective for nuance; a gain for one side appears as an absolute loss for the other.” 
Therefore: 
 
Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on 
political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two 
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superpowers. […] A more pluralistic world – especially in relationships with friends – is 
profoundly in our long-term interest. […] Painful as it may be to admit, we could benefit from a 
counterweight that would discipline our occasional impetuousity and, by supplying historical 
perspective, modify our penchant for abstract and ‘final’ solutions. […] In the years ahead, the 
most profound challenge will be philosophical: to develop some concept of order in a world 
which is bipolar militarily but multipolar politically. […] historically, stability has always coincided 
with an equilibrium that made physical domination difficult.272 
 
 In the emerging international environment, Kissinger evidently no longer found a use for the 
conceptions of Atlantic unity that had inspired a whole generation of American policymakers – 
the generation of Dean Acheson and the bipartisan foreign policy establishment that had created 
the postwar international system. Whether they liked it or not, in the new world their conceptions 
had lost their relevance. 
 
NATO is in difficulties because it has yet to adjust to the political multipolarity of the late sixties. 
[…] This state of affairs has been especially difficult for those Americans who deserve most credit 
for forging existing Atlantic relations. Two decades of hegemony have produced the illusion that 
present Atlantic arrangements are ‘natural,’ that wise policy consists of making the existing 
framework more tolerable. ‘Leadership’ and ‘partnership’ are invoked, but the content given to 
these words is usually that which will support the existing pattern. European unity is advocated to 
enable Europeans to share burdens on a world-wide scale. 
Such a view fails to take into account the realities of political multipolarity. The aim of 
returning to the ‘great days of the Marshall Plan’ is impossible. Nothing would sunder Atlantic 
relationships so surely as the attempt to reassert the notions of leadership appropriate to the early 
days of NATO. […] It is not ‘natural’ that the major decisions about the defense of an area so 
potentially powerful as Western Europe should be made three thousand miles away. It is not 
‘normal’ that Atlantic policies should be geared to American conceptions. In the forties and 
fifties, practicing unity – through formal resolutions and periodic reassurances – was profoundly 
important as a symbol of the end of our isolationism. In the decade ahead, we cannot aim at unity 
as an end in itself; it must emerge from common conceptions and new structures. […] In the next 
decade the architectonic approach to Atlantic policy will no longer be possible.273 
                                                 
272 Essay by Henry A. Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” reprinted in: FRUS 1969-1976, vol. 1, 
Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1967-1972, #4. The essay was first published in Agenda for a Nation (Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968) and subsequently in Kissinger’s American Foreign Policy: Three Essays (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 51-97. 
273 Essay by Henry A. Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” reprinted in: FRUS 1969-1976, vol. 1, 





 In addition, Kissinger shared the French view that NATO was hardly a suitable instrument 
for promoting détente, distancing himself from the main conclusion of the Harmel exercise of 
1967. “A military alliance, one of the chief cohesive links of which is its integrated command 
arrangement, is not the best instrument for flexible diplomacy,” Kissinger reasoned. “A 
diplomatic confrontation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact would have all the rigidities of the 
bipolar military world.” Kissinger furthermore believed that “the major initiatives to improve 
relations between Western and Eastern Europe should originate in Europe with the United States 
in a reserve position.”274 
 Kissinger thus did not see NATO as the harbinger of an evolving Atlantic community, nor 
did he believe that the United States should seek to promote such an evolution. His convictions 
as well as those of Nixon about the transatlantic relationship were a far cry from Acheson’s 
earlier cited recommendation to Kennedy in 1961 that “the ultimate goal of Atlantic nations 
should be to develop a genuine Atlantic commonwealth, in which common institutions are 
increasingly developed to address common problems.” If anything, their conceptions about both 
world politics in general and the transatlantic relationship in particular more closely resembled 
those of de Gaulle (rid, of course, of de Gaulle’s dedication to France).  The Nixon 
administration was from the outset poised to pursue policies that were much more palatable to 
de Gaulle than those of any previous – or for that matter subsequent – American administration. 
In sum, it is hardly a spur of the imagination to interpret ‘Nixingerian’ foreign policy as Gaullism 
American-style. 
 There was no time to lose before imposing the new policy toward France on a restive 
foreign policy establishment. Upon entering office, the Nixon administration saw itself 
confronted with the nasty brawl in Europe over some of de Gaulle’s statements about the future 
of Europe in the earlier-mentioned Soames affair. In his memoirs, Kissinger recalled: 
 
Like old warriors of a battle whose memory sustained emotion and righteousness, all the 
American veterans of previous controversies with de Gaulle rushed into the fray. The new 
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administration was deluged with proposals from inside and outside our government to seize the 
opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to a federal Europe and to reject de Gaulle’s proposal 
[…] for a special directorate of the larger European powers. The new administration was being 
asked to pick up the fallen lance of its predecessor and tilt once more against the windmills of 
European dogma, to resume the acrimonious debate with France exactly where it had been 
suspended by our election.  
This we were determined not to do. […]275 
 
Franco-American Accommodation Under Nixon and Kissinger (until April 1969) 
Given their views on world politics and their considerable regard for de Gaulle, it is not 
surprising that Nixon and Kissinger saw ample room for improvement in the Franco-American 
relationship upon their arrival at the helm. “I have had a friendly exchange with de Gaulle,” Nixon 
scribbled on his papers for his first press conference as president of the United States. “I believe 
prospects for improved relations are good + will work toward that end.”276 The change of attitude in 
Washington was reciprocated in Paris. The spring of 1969 even witnessed a public information 
campaign by the French government, orchestrated from the Elysée, to boost relations with the 
United States. “This is the first time in history that the French have ever undertaken any publicity 
campaign to improve understanding between France and any other nation,” Ambassador Shriver 
cheerfully reported on the nationwide operation, which included posters in cities, small 
advertisements in every major French newspaper and magazine, and a film for use in movie theaters. 
The cost of the campaign – estimated at between four and five million dollars – was “more than the 
cost of operating the U.S. embassy in France for one year, and yet it has not and will not cost the 
U.S. government anything.”277 
 On February 23, only one month after his inauguration as president, Nixon left for an eight-
day trip to five European nations: Belgium (for a visit to NATO), Great Britain, Germany, Italy, 
France, and the Vatican. The State Department had advised against a trip so soon after the 
inauguration. Nixon, however, was determined to make his own foreign policy. Before venturing 
into discussions with the Soviets, the North Vietnamese, and the Chinese, he wanted to 
demonstrate to the Europeans that their security continued to be of the highest priority in 
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American foreign policy. He also wanted to “show the world” that he was “not completely 
obsessed with Vietnam” and to “dramatize for Americans at home that, despite opposition to the 
war, their President could still be received abroad with respect and even enthusiasm.”278 The 
impact of Nixon’s early visit was, of course, heightened by Johnson’s failure to visit Europe 
during his tenure (except for attending Adenauer’s funeral in 1967). His demonstration of humility 
and apparent willingness to consult with European leaders was indeed well received. “President 
Nixon’s European trip,” journalist Chalmers M. Roberts opined, “has written an end to the postwar 
era in which the United States sought to and did largely impose an American design on Western 
Europe.”279 From European quarters there was appreciation for “the pragmatic approach without 
fanfare.”280 
 Nixon’s visit to France was unquestionably the high point of the European trip.281 De Gaulle 
bestowed the American president full honors. He greeted his guest at the airfield with ringing 
words of welcome – in English. There was a splendid state banquet at the Elysée. De Gaulle had 
even agreed to dine at Ambassador Sargent Shriver’s residence, which, at the insistence of 
Nixon’s staff, had been completely refurnished and rid of all the Kennedy photographs and 
Catholic paraphernalia.282 Nixon had three long private conversations with de Gaulle, totalling ten 
hours, covering the whole range of foreign policy issues. “The scope of our conversations was as 
vast as the acres of formal gardens we could see from our meeting place in the Grand Trianon 
Palace,” Nixon later wrote.283  
 The records of the conversations between Nixon and de Gaulle demonstrate a 
likemindedness and degree of mutual confidence that contrast significantly with similar records in 
the Kennedy and Johnson years. In their first meeting, in de Gaulle’s office in the Elysée Palace, 
they agreed that the Soviet Union was no longer intent on “marching west” and that détente in 
the East-West relationship was – in de Gaulle’s words – “a matter of good sense,” even as Nixon 
underlined – and de Gaulle agreed – that “we should be hard and pragmatic in dealing with the 
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Soviets.” 284 Their second conversation, in the Grand Trianon palace in Versailles (once Louis 
XIV’s retreat), ranks as among the most substantial of any ever held between the General and an 
American president, primarily because it made clear that American foreign policy had taken a 
direction that was far more congenial to de Gaulle and that the personal relationship between the 
two heads of state was a formidable one. Nixon without delay took de Gaulle in “great 
confidence” by informing him of his inclination to establish a limited antiballistic missile system 
in order to protect the American nuclear deterrent – but  not American cities – against a nuclear 
strike by the Soviet Union, a subject of hot debate in Congress. He had been surprised, he said, 
when he had been presented with classified information that the Soviet Union had almost caught 
up with the United States in strategic missiles. Both sides still had a second strike capability, 
“which meant that a decision would have to be made in less than 20 minutes for something that 
could kill 60 or 70 million people,” but a missile defense system was increasingly considered 
needed to safeguard the American deterrent in the future.  
 After having thus taken de Gaulle in confidence, establishing a statesmanlike relationship of 
trust, Nixon went on to give his view on the French nuclear deterrent and on the position of the 
United States vis-à-vis Europe. The words of the new American president were a ringing 
endorsement of the views that de Gaulle had been expounding for years. “It was important for 
the good of the US,” said Nixon,  
 
that not only France should have nuclear weapons but in a broader sense that in the economic, 
political, and military fields that the European community have independent power and existence. 
… Things in Europe should be allowed to develop in their own way. Times had changed. […] 
The period in which the US could effectively assert leadership [in Europe] is no longer here. 
 
The Franco-American quarrels of the Kennedy and early Johnson years about nuclear 
proliferation and the future of Europe would clearly have no sequel under Nixon. De Gaulle, in 
turn, also assumed a position that seemed to go against the grain of earlier policies, for he pressed 
his American guest to maintain a significant troop presence in Europe regardless of the strong 
pressure in Congress to reduce it. “It would not be good,” he warned Nixon, “if the idea arose 
that the departing US forces should be replaced with German units.” 285  The spectre of a 
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resurgent Germany – not only economically and financially but also politically and militarily – had 
by the late 1960s evidently become a more pressing concern for de Gaulle than that of American 
domination in Europe.286 In addition, at Nixon’s urging, de Gaulle agreed to appoint an expert to 
begin discreet talks between the two countries on addressing the woes of the international 
monetary system. And they quickly agreed that their future exchanges on the affairs of state 
“need not necessarily pass through the usual diplomatic channels,” thereby bypassing the State 
Department.287 
 To be sure, the two presidents also had their share of differences. On the Middle East, for 
instance, their views diverged: de Gaulle argued for a solution to be imposed by the “Four 
Powers” whereas Nixon warned that Israel would never accept such a solution, and he opposed 
Nixon’s suggestion of arranging parallel talks on the Middle East between the United States and 
the Soviet Union for fear of being shut out.288 All the while, however, Nixon “made a good 
impression,” Prime Minister Couve de Murville recalled; “we had the idea that he was taking 
things personally in hand in order to have a policy that would be much more satisfactory to us 
than the policy of his predecessors.”289 Foreign Minister Debré told his staff that “a new era of 
understanding and cooperation was now opening between France and the United States, and the 
French should seek to cooperate as closely as possible with us in every area where French and 
American interests coincide.”290 And de Gaulle volunteered to his aides that the Franco-American 
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relationship could now enter an era of “much greater intimacy” because of his strong personal 
relationship with Nixon.291 At the end of the discussions, he agreed to visit Nixon in Washington 
in early 1970. 292  Nixon had unmistakably succeeded in establishing the Franco-American 
relationship on a new footing. “The new entente cordiale between the Presidents of France and 
the United States […] would alone have made the European trip worthwhile,” he assessed in his 
memoirs.293 
 Arguably the most important topic discussed during Nixon’s visit to Paris was not the Soviet 
Union or the situation in the Middle East, not even Europe or the French nuclear program, but 
the interrelated issues of establishing a normal relationship with China and ending the war in 
Vietnam. Discussing these with de Gaulle had for Nixon even been the primary reason for 
embarking on his European journey. “President de Gaulle’s cooperation would be vital to ending 
the Vietnam war and to my plans for beginning a new relationship with Communist China,” 
Nixon explained, for he considered Paris the best place for opening “secret channels of 
communication” with Hanoi and Peking.294  
 In regard to both issues, de Gaulle had set policies that served as an example to Nixon. 
France, of course, had officially recognized China as early as January 1964 (much to the dismay 
of the Johnson administration). Nixon’s discussions with de Gaulle in 1963 and 1967 also had 
helped to shape his views on dealing with China. “De Gaulle put it very directly” that “it was 
better to recognize China now when she needs you because of her weakness rather than to wait 
later when you have to recognize her,” Nixon recalled. “Nobody said it better, and needless to 
say, it made an impression on me.”295 De Gaulle indeed reiterated the point in their 1969 meeting. 
In addition, he expressed the view that Soviet behavior was increasingly motivated by a fear of 
China: “They [the Soviets] are thinking in terms of a possible clash with China tomorrow. They 
cannot face both China and the West (the US in particular) at the same time. Thus […] they may 
well opt for a policy of rapprochement with the West.”296 From July 1969 onwards, Nixon and 
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Kissinger would avidly use the ‘Paris channel’ – operated by the incomparable Vernon Walters – 
to relay secret messages to the Chinese leadership in Peking.297 De Gaulle moreover instructed his 
new ambassador in Peking, Etienne Manac’h, to impress upon the Chinese that the new 
American president was serious about normalizing the relationship.298  France thus played an 
important role in getting the new administration to engage China and the Soviet Union in the 
game of ‘triangular’ diplomacy, which would become a hallmark of Nixon’s foreign policy. 
 On Vietnam, too, Nixon paid tribute to de Gaulle. For a long time, as a contender for high 
office, Nixon had fiercely defended America’s military involvement in Vietnam as a way to 
contain an expansionist China. As president, he dreaded the domestic political consequences of a 
“loss” of South Vietnam to Communism.299 By early 1969, however, Nixon had concluded that 
the war had become – in his speechwriter William Safire’s words – “a bone in the nation’s throat” 
and that the United States had to disengage from it.300 But he was also determined that the end of 
the war should be “honorable” and leave American international prestige and credibility intact.  
 On both accounts, Nixon seems to have taken de Gaulle’s views seriously. When they 
discussed Vietnam in 1967, de Gaulle had advocated an early end to the war. “If I can do Algeria, 
you can do Vietnam,” de Gaulle said.301 In 1969, speaking to Nixon in the Elysée, the Frenchman 
again stressed that the United States end the war, but also that it should not depart “with undue 
haste” – or “en catastrophe” – and seek a negotiated solution with North Vietnam. In addition, he 
underlined that the French withdrawal from Algeria had been far more difficult to accomplish 
than an American withdwawal from Vietnam:   
 
The US did not have a million settlers in Viet Nam. The US had not been in Viet Nam for 130 
years as the French had in Algeria. Viet Nam was far from the US and not on its doorstep, the 
way Algeria was to France. 
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De Gaulle moreover suggested that for the United States to reach a settlement in Vietnam would 
be relatively painless because its predominant position in the world was not in danger: “its power 
and wealth was so great that it could do this with dignity.”302 
 There is indeed reason to believe that Nixon sought to emulate de Gaulle’s masterful but 
drawn-out retreat from Algeria, which ended in a political agreement with the rebels that avoided 
domestic disorder or international degradation.303 Moreover, as was the case with regard to China, 
Paris proved a convenient site for contacts with the North Vietnamese and French diplomats 
would serve as an important conduit.304 In his conversation with de Gaulle in the Elysée on 
March 2, Nixon volunteered that he had decided to begin secret talks with the North Vietnamese 
and he asked de Gaulle to convey to Hanoi that he was serious about ending the war.305 And 
when de Gaulle came to Washington for Eisenhower’s funeral in late March, Nixon said that he 
now had a withdrawal plan and intended to begin secret talks with the North Vietnamese. De 
Gaulle, in turn, told the American president of his distinct impression that the North Vietnamese 
were prepared to engage in peace talks.306 “In retrospect,” Nixon wrote in Leaders, “I believe this 
meeting laid the groundwork for Kissinger’s secret trips to Paris, which resulted four years later 
in the Paris Peace Agreement and the end of American involvement in Vietnam.” Without 
French assistance, “the negotiations could not have been carried to a successful conclusion.”307 
 The Franco-American relationship continued to improve until 1973, when tensions where 
rekindled by the Nixon administration’s declaration of the ‘Year of Europe’ and the Middle East 
War. Although de Gaulle’s successor Georges Pompidou carried on along the Gaullist track, he 
was often preoccupied with domestic economic and social problems and far more prepared to 
cooperate with NATO. French military relations with the treaty organization measurably 
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improved, resulting in practical collaboration in many areas.308 While Nixon did not hit it off well 
with Pompidou, the latter’s Foreign Minister Michel Jobert developed a close working 
relationship with Kissinger. 309  Distrustful of Chancellor Brandt’s Ostpolitik, the Nixon 
administration increasingly looked to France as America’s most like-minded ally in Europe. 
Kissinger even confided to Pompidou at the Azores summit in 1971 that if the United States 
entertained a special relationship with any country it was France. 310  British Prime Minister 
Edward Heath, in any case, who had succeeded Harold Wilson in 1970, would not have lost 
much sleep over this twist of sympathies. He was firmly committed to entering ‘Europe’ and saw 
the Anglo-American special relationship as an obstacle to the hallowed goal of membership. 
“Indeed,” Kissinger recalled, “he came close to insisting on receiving no preferential treatment.”311 
(emphasis in original) This state of affairs between the great powers of the West greatly facilitated 
British membership of the Common Market in 1973. 
 The most important area of cooperation, however, was also the most undisclosed: nuclear 
weapons. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger had a strategic hang-up about the existence of multiple 
centers of atomic decisionmaking in the West. Nixon had told de Gaulle as early as 1963 that he 
would be in favor, as Eisenhower had been, of sharing nuclear secrets with France.312 Kissinger 
had proven to be highly critical of the Kennedy and Johnson administration’s campaign against 
national nuclear forces, which he believed had only soured the transatlantic relationship. In The 
Troubled Partnership (1965) he wrote: “We might ask ourselves how an American administration 
would respond if an allied government publicly and repeatedly insisted that one of our major 
programs was ‘divisive,’ ‘dangerous’ and ‘useless.’” In addition, he had suggested that “the 
nuclear forces of our Allies should not be viewed as an alternative to United States strategic 
power, but as a complement” and that the “most constructive avenue for Atlantic cooperation 
would be to build on the existing nuclear programs rather than bring a new force into being.”313  
 Upon taking office, both Nixon and Kissinger undoubtedly realized that there was no better 
way of improving relations with Paris than by providing assistance to the French nuclear effort, 
provided that this assistance would remain secret. 314  In Paris, as we have seen, Nixon had 
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privately told de Gaulle that – in Couve de Murville’s words – “he had no objection to possession 
by France of an independent nuclear force,” and that “on the contrary, he thought it useful.”315 A 
month-and-a-half later, on April 21, after de Gaulle had let pass without dissent the date on 
which the North Atlantic Treaty could be formally denounced, Nixon issued a top secret 
directive to investigate military cooperation with France, including nuclear cooperation; in the 
subsequent five years, the White House issued directives to assist France in ensuring the security 
of its nuclear weapons,  developing its missiles, and conducting underground testing.316 For nearly 
two decades, the covert program of Franco-American nuclear collaboration was one of the best-
kept secrets of American and French diplomacy. It was finally exposed in 1989 by Richard 
Ullman in an article in Foreign Policy. Ullmann, a professor at Princeton University, revealed that 
the United States had provided substantial covert assistance to the French nuclear program from 
1974 onwards.317 The French historian Pierre Mélandri has suggested that nuclear cooperation 
commenced earlier and reached its apogee between 1971 and 1973, before the strains and 
suspicions surrounding Kissinger’s proclamation of 1973 as ‘The Year of Europe’ soured the 
bilateral relationship.318 Of what is known of it, this cooperation covered a wide range of areas, 
such as the miniaturization of warheads, missile design, MIRV-ing, and solid fuel; it may also 
have included coordination of tactical nuclear weapons targeting.319 What is certain is that, by 
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1974, the French force de frappe had moved from being an irritant in the Franco-American 
relationship to an asset of the Western alliance. 320  During the first Nixon administration, 
“relations between the United States and France flourished,” Kissinger assessed.321  
 It is true that Franco-American relations improved considerably after 1968, in part because 
Paris found some value in the new administration’s aloofness towards Europe. On July 23, 1969, 
for instance, President Pompidou told Ambassador Shriver that “wheat” was the “only 
outstanding issue between the U.S. and France.”322 But those who had helped to shape American 
policies towards Europe in the previous decades were anything but pleased. On the contrary, 
many American policymakers were deeply distraught at the new realism in American foreign 
policy. They were alarmed at the implications of Nixon’s hard-boiled balance-of-power politics 
for the transatlantic relationship, the European integration movement, and even the moral stature 
of the United States. They dreaded the economic nationalism inherent in Nixon’s ‘New 
Economic Policy’ and embodied by his Secretary of the Treasury John Connally who said: “My 
philosophy is that all foreigners are out to screw us, and it’s our job to screw them first.”323 And 
they lamented the administration’s lack of interest in European affairs, despite Nixon’s journey 
across the Atlantic early in the presidency. “No one in or out of authority is thinking much about 
Europe,” J. Robert Schaetzel, still the American ambassador to the EEC until 1972, complained 
to Acheson in September 1969. “If they do think about it at all it is in a mood of irritation or 
outright anger.”324 Even NATO hardly occupied the minds of the Nixon White House, as was 
evident from the fact that the post of NATO ambassador was left vacant for nearly one year. 
 The mental world of the members of the Council on Foreign Relations was indeed a world 
away from that of Nixon, and while Kissinger had made his policy career with the help of the 
Council, which published a number of his books, there was a potent antipathy among its ranks 
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toward the Harvard academic and his Realpolitik views as well.325 The secretive style of the 
Nixon-Kissinger team moreover sidelined a whole phalanx of public servants, reinforcing, in 
Stanley Hoffmann’s words, “the splintering and demoralization, indeed the fading away, of the 
foreign policy elite.”326 These officials were abhorred by what they perceived as Nixon’s and 
Kissinger’s cynical world view and manipulative manners.327 Dean Acheson seemed to be the 
exception, for he was surprisingly capable of establishing a working relationship with the new 
administration.328 He agreed to be brought into the firing line when Nixon called on him in the 
spring of 1971 as the elder statesman to help defeat Senator Mike Mansfield’s proposal to cut the 
American troop commitment to NATO by half. Yet Acheson was equally unhappy with the 
Nixon administration’s disregard for Europe. Deeply distrustful of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, 
which he felt was far too accommodating to the Soviets and threatened to undermine NATO, 
Acheson repeatedly pressed Nixon to re-energize his European policies “with a view to future 
joint action” among the allies. He had also backed a call in December 1968 on the president-elect 
to pursue a foreign policy geared towards the “development of Atlantic integration” which 
“would in the long run require new Atlantic political institutions of a federal character.”329 This 
sort of advice, however, which had been surrounded by a halo of respectability from the days of 
Truman to those of Johnson, fell on infertile ground in the Nixon years. “His role,” Walter 
Lippmann observed of Nixon at the beginning of his second term in office in 1973,  
 
has been that of a man who had to liquidate, defuse, deflate the exaggerations of the romantic 
period of American imperialism and American inflation. Inflation of promises, inflation of hopes, 
the Great Society, American supremacy – all that had to be deflated because it was all beyond our 
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Reading Lippmann’s remarks in a news summary, Nixon wrote: “A wise observation.”330 
 
De Gaulle Leaves the Scene 
In late March 1969, de Gaulle flew to the United States to attend the funeral of his wartime 
comrade Dwight Eisenhower. “One had the sense that if he moved to a window the center of 
gravity might tilt everybody into the garden,” Kissinger wrote about de Gaulle’s “overwhelming” 
presence at the reception of world leaders.331 Nixon spoke for an hour with the Frenchman on 
the Middle East, Vietnam, Franco-German relations, and American-Soviet relations, 
accompanied only by their interpreters.332 It was their last meeting. 
 On April 27, de Gaulle abruptly resigned from the presidency upon having lost a double 
referendum on regionalization and Senate reform. “To resign over such matters raised the 
suspicion that the referenda had been arranged at least in part to provide de Gaulle with a pretext 
for leaving office,” Kissinger observed in his memoirs.333 The Nixon administration was hardly 
taken by surprise by de Gaulle’s resignation, for his confidant André Malraux had informed 
Ambassador Shriver weeks in advance that he was secretly planning his resignation. The 
“financial, labor, social, and monetary situation,” Shriver moreover reported, was “so fragile that 
any serious problem in any direction could bring on political troubles of major proportions for 
President de Gaulle. […] The waves are rising.”334 Immediately upon hearing the news of de 
Gaulle’s resignation, Nixon sent de Gaulle a handwritten personal message to express his “deep 
sense of personal loss,” urging the Frenchman to pay a visit to the United States and assuring him 
that “scores of our cities and states would be honored if you could include them on your schedule.” 
He added: “Putting it in blunt terms – in this age of mediocre leaders in most of the world – 
America’s spirit needs your presence.”335According to Vernon Walters, who hand-delivered Nixon’s 
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letter to Colombey-les-deux-Églises, de Gaulle was genuinely touched by Nixon’s homage.336 The 
General’s instant reply was hardly any less flattering, as it stressed that “I have for you – with good 
reason – esteem, confidence, and friendship as great and as sincere as it is possible to have.”337 
 De Gaulle had left in style by, in the words of his biographer Lacouture, “managing to 
transform a defeat into a withdrawal.”338 Ever since May 1968, he had been searching for a 
reaffirmation of his legitimacy. Failing that, he was determined to leave his duties with his image 
and historical reputation intact, perhaps haunted by the memories of the tragic degeneration of 
his former mentor Philippe Pétain and his war comrade Winston Churchill (both of whom had 
stayed on too long).339 When de Gaulle left, he left without a word, never to appear in public 
again, resigned to his destiny, devoting himself to writing his memoirs in retirement at Colombey-
les-deux-Églises. He simply withdrew into history. “I had a contract with France,” de Gaulle 
explained to André Malraux in December 1969. “The contract has been broken. Therefore, it is 
no longer worth anything. […] The French no longer have any national ambition. They don’t 
want to do anything for France. I entertained them with banners, I persuaded them to be patient 
while waiting for – for what, if not for France?”340 Now that the contract was broken, he had lost 
the zest to rule. France had grown tired of its imperious superintendent, who was, in addition, 
beginning to feel the strain of old age. Yet the mark he had left on his nation and its foreign 
policy was indelible. The French were just ready to continue Gaullism without de Gaulle. The 
General died on November 9, 1970, twelve days before his eightieth birthday. 
Conclusion 
Between the French withdrawal from NATO in 1966 and de Gaulle’s resignation in April 1969, 
Franco-American relations experienced their lowest point as well as their greatest intimacy. The 
lowest point was in 1967 and early 1968, when de Gaulle opposed the United States at every turn 
– on monetary issues, Vietnam, nuclear strategy, the Middle East, and so forth. Its greatest 
intimacy came when Nixon and Kissinger took office in early 1969. Even if they did not fully 
embrace de Gaulle’s vision, Nixon and Kissinger sympathized with the philosophy behind 
Gaullist foreign policy to such a degree that they can truly be seen as the personifications of some 
American version of Gaullism. Their predilection for a strong executive (in particular vis-à-vis 
                                                 
336 Walter, Silent Missions, 500-501. 
337 Nixon’s letter to de Gaulle is reprinted in his memoirs. Nixon, Memoirs, 386. 
338 Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler, 577. 
339 Cogan, “The Break-Up: General De Gaulle’s Separation from Power,” 178. 
340 Malraux, Felled Oaks, 16-17.  




Congress), their penchant for balance-of-power politics, their inclination towards traditional 
statecraft shaped by national interests – all of this meant that they operated on the same 
wavelength as le grand Charles. They purposely sought to come to terms with de Gaulle’s policy of 
independence and pursued a foreign policy, in particular with regard to Europe, that was 
inherently more accommodating of de Gaulle’s views than that of any previous or subsequent 
administration. This was an important difference with the Franco-American rapprochement in 
Johnson’s last year in office, which was of an overwhelmingly pragmatic nature as it was the by-
product of the serious domestic and international setbacks both Washington and Paris 
experienced in 1968. 
Nixon’s rise to power moreover marked the end of the era in American foreign policy 
that had been dominated by the bipartisan establishment. American foreign policy would 
henceforth be less orientated towards Europe and more susceptible to political swings. As a 
result, the exalted anticipation of what NATO and European integration might achieve for the 
transatlantic relationship faded into the past. “The Atlantic alliance was built on a reality and 
marketed on an illusion,” Ronald Steel wrote in 1976.  
 
The reality was that the United States could not let Western Europe fall into Russian hands, and 
that the Europeans wanted American protection. The illusion was that the alliance would lead to a 
true partnership of equals with virtually identical interests. The illusion has dissipated. The reality 
remains.341 
 
 This was a pertinent synopsis of the American view of the transatlantic relationship at the 
end of de Gaulle’s time in power. To what extent, however, had de Gaulle contributed to the 
shift towards realism in American policies toward Europe? It is important not to overstate this 
role. The shift was prompted above all by the relative decline of American power during the 
1960s. At the end of the decade, the United States no longer occupied the same position of 
preeminence as in the first postwar decades. Economic adversity compelled the United States to 
concern itself more with protecting its own interests and less with shaping political and economic 
developments in Western Europe as part of any larger foreign policy design. This in itself greatly 
helped to improve Franco-American relations from early 1968 into the early 1970s. “As the 
United States distanced itself a little from Europe,” Costigliola rightly concludes, “Paris found it 
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somewhat easier to move closer to Washington while maintaining a measure of French 
independence.”342 
Yet the significance of the de Gaulle experience for the evolution of American policy 
toward Europe cannot be ignored. This significance amounts to more than the fact that de 
Gaulle provided a foreign policy paradigm that Nixon and Kissinger were to follow in many 
respects. It is equally important to note that de Gaulle, more than any other European leader, had 
exposed and even defined the limits of American power in Europe with his policy of 
independence. In addition, he had a determining influence over the course of European unity, 
rebuking the integrationary, Monnet-style method favored by the large majority of American 
policymakers, reasserting the position of the nation-state vis-à-vis the Commission, keeping 
Great Britain at bay for over a decade, and resuscitating the idea of ‘Europe’ as a strategic entity 
separate from the United States and the Soviet Union. De Gaulle could not destroy NATO, but 
he was capable of preventing it from developing into something more than a military alliance. 
The generous and energetic role that the United States had played in Europe since the mid-1940s 
was hence reaching a spiritual dead end by the mid-1960s; with it, American approaches to 
NATO and European integration shifted from Atlantic idealism to realism even before the 
Nixon presidency.  
This shift as well as de Gaulle’s role in making it happen was illustrated by a discussion in 
the National Security Council on May 3, 1967. The State Department paper prepared for this 
meeting still reflected the optimistic and supportive attitude towards European integration of 
earlier days.25  The ensuing discussion, however, revealed the growing bitterness about the 
direction in which the Common Market was developing and showed that European unity was no 
longer unambiguously desired in Washington. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler directed 
his dismay in particular at France: 
 
France is trying either to expel us completely from Europe or at least to diminish our power there. 
The French may even use the Common Market to achieve this objective. We must face up to the 
problem of how to make a coordinated effort in which all U.S. departments and agencies participate 
to induce Germany and Italy to separate themselves from the French effort to use the Common 
Market against the United States. 
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When Johnson expressed his skepticism about the effectiveness of such a campaign, Fowler went 
on undeterred: 
 
The French have been trying to use the Common Market structure for the past five years in an 
effort to diminish our economic, political, and military influence. This French effort in Europe 
affects our ability to be effective in other parts of the world. 
 
Others joined Fowler in censuring the European allies for their selfishness and resentment of 
American power. “Europeans have rejected the world after the loss of their colonies,” Vice 
President Hubert Humphrey observed. “They resent U.S. power. Détente is what they want.” 
The Europeans are “selfish” and should be pressured “to participate in the world outside their 
borders.” The American ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, chimed in: “The 
Europeans are causing problems for us in the United Nations. We no longer have a solid bloc of 
western allies behind us.” And Walt Rostow said: “Europe is neglecting the world. It is in an 
isolationist cycle.” The meeting was not significant for the decisions that were made; Johnson, 
while “agreeing with the sentiment expressed,” pressed his advisers to find practical ways to get 
the Europeans to make a larger contribution to NATO. But it revealed that the way in which 
American policymakers viewed Europe was souring under the pressure of Vietnam, financial 
problems at home, and French politicking in Europe.343  
Grand designs with lofty ends have a tendency of going bankrupt. This sobering reality 
made the Franco-American rapprochement in de Gaulle’s last year in office possible: by 1968, 
both the United States and France were finding out that they could not claim exception to the 
rule. As the decade approached its conclusion, neither side would find that the state of the world 
reflected the aspirations it had had at the decade’s beginning; in fact, either side had played an 
important – and underappreciated – role in denying the realization of the aspirations of the other. 
The 1960s had witnessed some of the most serious disputes in the history of the Franco-
American relationship. More often than not, the Americans had been enveloped in a war of 
words with the General – about the value of NATO, about the nature of American leadership, 
about European integration, about nuclear weapons, about Germany, about dealing with the 
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Soviet Union, about the international monetary system, about Vietnam. Differences of view 
between Washington and Paris would, of course, continue to trouble the relationship after de 
Gaulle had stepped down and new nadirs would be found. These differences are not likely to 






Atlantis Lost: The Reception of Gaullism in the United States 
 
 
We set out at the beginning of this study with three broad questions in mind. How did Americans 
interpret de Gaulle’s policy of ‘independence’ within the larger framework of their ideas about the 
transatlantic relationship? How did consecutive administrations actually deal with the challenges 
posed (within this framework) by de Gaulle’s ‘independent’ foreign policy from 1958 to 1969? 
And did de Gaulle’s policy of ‘independence’ modify American policies towards Europe and the 
Atlantic alliance? This conclusion will attempt to answer these three questions.  
De Gaulle – Hero of the Past 
The Diversity of American Opinion 
There was not one American evaluation of de Gaulle. Dean Acheson’s and George Ball’s 
condemnation of the General, for instance, differed greatly from the veneration exhibited by 
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger. President Eisenhower and his successor John F. Kennedy 
were – in different ways – tempted by de Gaulle’s powerful vision and personality and groped for 
common ground, but there was very little that connected President Johnson to his French 
counterpart (despite the Texan’s unfailing restraint). Someone like McGeorge Bundy showed an 
understanding of de Gaulle that caused Ball to accuse him of being a ‘Gaullist’; while this charge 
was overdrawn, Bundy certainly tended to be less condemnatory and more pragmatic in his views 
of de Gaulle than most officials (including his successor Walt Rostow). Secretary of State Rusk 
meanwhile appears to have lost his legendary patience and equanimity only when it came to de 
Gaulle, whereas the factual mind of Secretary of Defense McNamara remained largely 
undisturbed by the Gaullist challenge (even as he strongly opposed the French nuclear program). 
Ambassador Charles Bohlen’s influential advice that no American concession could alter de 
Gaulle’s course contrasted sharply with that of his predecessor James Gavin, who pressed 
Washington – in vain – to be more forthcoming (in particular in the nuclear realm). In short, 
there were many interpretations of de Gaulle and his policies. 
One might say that the American public, to begin with, generally entertained a favorable 
opinion of de Gaulle from his return to power in 1958 to his press conference of January 14, 





Common Market and rejecting the multilateral nuclear force. Before this press conference, he 
was most often portrayed as a hero from the war whose return to power had restored much-
needed stability to French politics, who extricated his country from Algeria and other colonies in 
Africa, and who stood tall in the Cold War crises of Berlin and Cuba. Following his January 1963 
press conference, however, popular admiration for de Gaulle as a statesman of high calibre 
turned into widespread damnation. The disenchantment was only deepened by the French 
withdrawal from NATO, de Gaulle’s criticism of the Vietnam War, his attack on the U.S. dollar, 
and his call for a free Quebec in the period from early 1966 to early 1968. During these years, de 
Gaulle transformed into the “mischief maker” within the Western alliance whose policies were 
seen as incorrigibly anti-American and dangerously nationalistic. 1  De Gaulle’s assault on 
American dominance within the Western alliance prompted American war veterans to return 
their medals, New York restaurant owners to pour French wine out on the street, and American 
ladies to return their French-made bags to department stores. From this period, the American 
public’s appraisal of the bilateral relationship was never to recover completely. The French were 
to remain at best ‘bad-weather’ friends: while they may be reliable when the chips are down (as de 
Gaulle had proven in the Cuban missile crisis), they were most often simply unbearable. 
The views in Congress largely kept pace with the fluctuation in public opinion, but there 
were also always voices in support of normalization of the bilateral relationship. De Gaulle’s well-
received address to a joint congressional session during his April 1960 visit, when the bilateral 
relationship still enjoyed the quiet before the storm, probably marked the high point of his 
standing among the representatives of the American people. By December 1967, however, de 
Gaulle was called “the most ungrateful man since Judas Iscariot betrayed his Christ” by 
Representative L. Mendel Rivers, a South Carolina Democrat.2 There was, however, also a sense 
in Congress – in particular within the Senate – that the Johnson administration shared part of the 
blame for alienating France and was losing the initiative in Europe by overreacting to de Gaulle’s 
policies and being too rigid about NATO reform. In 1965, for instance, Senator Henry Jackson – 
a Democrat from Washington State – had initiated a review of the problems in the Atlantic 
alliance, the first such review by the Senate since the consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty 
in 1949. The preparatory work of the Jackson committee had just been completed at the time of 
de Gaulle’s withdrawal notification of March 1966, and its public hearings were held during the 
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“critical” spring of 1966. In his final report, Jackson concluded that the situation had not been 
improved by “the tendency of some American policymakers to treat psychological and political 
problems as though they were primarily technical and to try to solve political problems with 
technical expedients.” 3  The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by J. William 
Fulbright, also held hearings in the summer of 1966 on the Johnson administration’s policies 
toward Europe and, for this purpose, had sent Senator Frank Church – an up-and-coming 
Democrat from Idaho – on the road to Europe. Introducing his committee’s final report, 
Fulbright emphasized that “it is too simple to blame President de Gaulle for the problems that 
have arisen in our relations with Europe […].” The high-ranking senator from Arkansas argued 
that a “more flexible and tolerant attitude” in American relations with Europe was desirable, and 
approvingly quoted an unnamed writer that “if America wants Europe to be a partner, she must 
let it be itself and not what she chooses to make it.”4 Johnson’s attitude of calmness and reason 
in response to the NATO crisis of 1966 was thus also induced by a political requirement to fend 
off criticism in Congress that his administration was partly to blame for de Gaulle’s actions.5 
Within America’s foreign policy apparatus – and the circles of the foreign policy 
establishment that continued to be plugged in to this apparatus through Dean Acheson, John 
McCloy and Averell Harriman – sympathy for de Gaulle indeed never ran very deep and 
recognition of his achievements was grudging at best. A stable France healed from its colonial 
sores was certainly seen as an asset to the Western world, but in most other respects de Gaulle’s 
foreign policy views were regarded as too injurious to deserve support. De Gaulle was without 
doubt a formidable leader, but also one whose ways were regrettably errant. Particularly in the 
State Department, traditionally a stronghold for the Atlantic idea and for the cause of European 
integration, sympathy for de Gaulle was hard to find. American diplomats were well aware of de 
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Gaulle’s long-standing aversion to NATO and European integration. They were, as a result, 
continually apprehensive that he might launch an attack on these landmarks of American postwar 
policy. They were, in addition, deeply disturbed by de Gaulle’s high-profile determination to build 
an independent nuclear deterrent, not only because they principally opposed the proliferation of 
nuclear weaponry but also because of its potential impact on German politics. Many diplomats 
were furthermore irritated with what they considered to be the folie de grandeur of French foreign 
policy – the gap between French means and de Gaulle’s aspirations. De Gaulle’s refusal to accept 
that France was at best a medium-sized power did not sit well with American policymakers who 
were preoccupied with managing the Western alliance as if it were only about devising an 
equitable division of labor in support of a common cause. They were certainly not prepared to 
accept de Gaulle’s pretension to speak for Europe. In particular the ‘Europeanists’ at the 
department rather preferred to treat Jean Monnet, whose vision of European integration and 
transatlantic cooperation they could easily associate with and who proved a master in cultivating 
his network of influential friendships in Washington, as their European equivalent. 
As evidence of a diminished French will to cooperate within the existing arrangements 
accrued in the course of the 1960s, Gaullism truly became the private albatross around the neck 
of many American policymakers who dealt with Europe. “He is a bastard who is out to get us,” 
James Gavin heard one official state in anger.6 Gavin, who served as Kennedy’s ambassador in 
France in 1961 and 1962, frequently urged the State Department to adopt a more 
accommodating pose toward France, but belittling the General had become the name of the 
game at the department and his proposals merely met with irritation. “I failed,” NATO Secretary 
General Paul-Henri Spaak similarly wrote about the State Department’s unresponsiveness to his 
suggestions to stake out a middle ground, “both in my attempts to convince the Americans that 
something must be done to meet the French half way and in my efforts to make them see that if 
they did nothing General de Gaulle would not hesitate to strike hard at the Alliance.”7 There is 
indeed reason to believe that American policymakers underestimated de Gaulle’s pertinacity until 
his January 1963 press conference, which caused a shock in Washington. It was after this 
“thunderbolt” that de Gaulle came to be seen by many State Department officials as a “virtual 
political demon.”8 
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Combined with the anti-American gist of de Gaulle’s rhetoric and policies, this anti-
Gaullist outlook of American policymakers hindered the development of much affinity between 
Washington and Paris at the diplomatic level. Not all American diplomats, to be sure, were of 
this anti-Gaullist mindset: Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William Tyler and the 
director of the department’s Intelligence and Research Bureau, Thomas Hughes, were two 
examples of officials who took a more moderate view of Gaullism. Deprecating behavior towards 
de Gaulle was also to be found less in the White House staff, which tended to be more pragmatic 
and less willing to spend presidential capital in the quarrel with de Gaulle, and the Defense 
Department, which was simply less involved in European policymaking. But the daily conduct of 
America’s foreign affairs vis-à-vis Europe was more often than not managed by those who held a 
grudge against de Gaulle (i.e. until Nixon and Kissinger centralized foreign policy decisionmaking 
in the White House). 
All the while, there was a small but notable minority of newspapermen and academics – 
some with connections in government – who exhibited a substantially higher degree of 
understanding of and intellectual sympathy for de Gaulle’s policy of ‘independence’ than either 
the State Department or general public opinion. Walter Lippmann, for one, was an ardent and 
self-professed admirer of de Gaulle and often defended him against American critics. During the 
war, Lippmann had admired de Gaulle as the “focal point of the French national spirit” and had 
censured President Roosevelt for his immovable enmity vis-à-vis the Free French. Believing that 
“the resurrection of France can come only by the liquidation of this psychosis of defeat,” he 
professed himself to be on the same wavelength as the Frenchman.9 Lippmann furthermore 
admired de Gaulle’s ability to see things from a historical perspective, describing him as “a man 
who can’t see very clearly what’s right in front of him, who sees pretty well what’s across the 
room, or halfway down the street, but who sees perfectly what’s in the distance.”10 
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Other American journalists who took a relatively benevolent view of de Gaulle and his 
policies appeared to flock to the New York Times. Of these, Cyrus Sulzberger was probably the 
most prominent as he was the newspaper’s chief foreign correspondent in the 1950s and 1960s 
and a member of the family that owned the paper. Residing in Paris for many years, Sulzberger 
was also a privileged visitor of the Elysée and many of his columns for the New York Times were 
in fact based on private audiences with the General.11 In 1964, Robert Kleiman, another New 
York Times journalist, published a slender volume entitled The Atlantic Crisis in which he argued 
that the United States should have been more receptive to de Gaulle’s ideas and bore at least 
partial responsibility for the clash of 1963. And in 1968, John Hess, at the time the Paris 
correspondent of the newspaper (who also helped found the European edition of the International 
Herald Tribune), stressed that Washington would do well to heed de Gaulle’s advice. “One can 
always find at least one argument that proves that he [de Gaulle] was morally right to act in that 
way,” Hess felt. “What is even more shocking for us Americans is that a detailed examination of 
each of our controversies shows that the positions taken up by him certainly served the best interests 
of the United States.”12 
Of the American academics who revealed an above-average appreciation for de Gaulle at 
the time, we have already examined the sympathizing views of Henry Kissinger (see chapter nine). 
The other academic that deserves mention in this context is a fellow Harvard University 
professor: Stanley Hoffmann. Perhaps not suprisingly, Hoffmann – like Kissinger – is of 
European origin, which gave him an innate advantage when it came to understanding the origins 
of de Gaulle’s political thought; born in Vienna (Austria) in 1928, he had lived and studied in 
France until 1955 before moving across the Atlantic to work at Harvard University. In the course 
of the 1960s, Hoffmann’s publications on French foreign policy constantly took issue with 
prevailing denunciations and revealed it to be a rational defense of the French national interest, 
not the upshot of a whimsical and anachronistic ruler.13 He also pointed out that de Gaulle’s 
‘heroic’ leadership style was not some yearning for a past of kings and dictators but part and 
parcel of French political culture.14 What is more, Hoffmann berated American policymakers for 
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their deprecation and their crude views of de Gaulle. “Cursing de Gaulle is not a policy,” he 
opined in The Reporter in January 1964.15 Academic interpreters of de Gaulle’s foreign policy such 
as Kissinger and Hoffmann – as well as, perhaps, Nicholas Wahl and David Calleo16 – provided a 
body of American scholarly opinion that presented a more benign view of Gaullism and felt that 
de Gaulle’s criticism of the United States deserved merit for its acumen and for the sense of pride 
and independent judgment it conveyed. 
On the whole, American opinion about de Gaulle thus ranged from outright 
condemnation and indignation at his anti-American slights to admiration for his achievements for 
France and for the quality of his statesmanship. Merely noting this, however, is not sufficient. 
How Americans interpreted de Gaulle’s policy of ‘independence’ from 1958 to 1969 depended 
mainly on how they themselves viewed the world-at-large and America’s role in it (in particular in 
relation to Europe). We shall therefore attempt to dig deeper into the reasons why Americans 
interpreted de Gaulle the way they did. 
Chapter two established an interpretive framework for understanding American policies 
regarding Europe in their historical and cultural context. This interpretive framework consisted 
of three interrelated aspects of this policy: the historical interplay between liberalism and 
conservatism, the New World’s longstanding ambivalence toward the Old World, and the 
evolution from aloofness to engagement in geopolitical approaches to the European question. 
The American experience with de Gaulle, it will be argued, was prejudiced by these three aspects. 
Whether Americans condemned or appreciated de Gaulle’s foreign policy generally depended on 
whether their foreign policy outlook was liberal or conservative. That de Gaulle invoked 
disturbing memories, earning him the reputation of an anachronism, has much to do with the 
historical ambivalence in the New World towards the Old. And de Gaulle’s foreign policy 
distressed in particular those Americans who favored throwing America’s weight in the scale of 
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intra-European politics on the side of political and economic integration and reform; those who 
took a more distant view of America’s role in Europe were generally less alarmed.  
 
A Conservative Mind in a Liberal Age 
American foreign policy during the early decades of the Cold War was, as we have seen, an 
uneasy – albeit reasonably effective – synthesis of the internationalist strains of the two traditions 
of liberalism and conservatism. This foreign policy synthesis induced the United States to unite 
the national interest with the ideology of the free world – or, to borrow the earlier quoted words 
of Klemens von Metternich, to set not only “power against power” but also “altar against altar.” 
This aspect of American foreign policy illuminates the American experience with de Gaulle as 
president of France in at least two ways. 
Firstly, it is important to recall that de Gaulle was a leader in the conservative tradition of 
European statecraft. His foreign policy outlook was, in the final analysis, that of a nationalist and a 
realist who adhered to the pre-ideological approach to balance-of-power politics typical of the 
French diplomacy of the Ancien Régime. One corollary was that de Gaulle disregarded the 
ideological – i.e. liberal – component in American foreign policy. In spite of its self-professed 
idealism, the United States was in his view no less engaged in power politics than any other 
country. World War II had, in his view, “readily manifested” the “United States’ desire for 
hegemony, […] which I had not failed to discern on every occasion.”17 De Gaulle’s judgment that 
Roosevelt’s “will to power cloaked itself in idealism”18 was in fact pertinent to his judgment of 
American foreign policy as a whole. His criticism of American leadership in the Cold War was 
the perceptive criticism of a conservative realist who discarded with the rhetoric and was quick to 
identify the hegemon’s self-serving motives. In this sense, his appreciation of the United States 
was not much different of his view of the Soviet Union. While this appreciation was not 
groundless, certainly not from the vantage point of the leader of the Free French who had been 
cold-shouldered by the Roosevelt administration, it was also one-dimensional. It ignored the fact 
that American policies in the Cold War were infused with genuinely pursued liberal ideals to a 
degree never before seen in a country (with the exception perhaps of Great Britain under William 
Gladstone). What is more, it encouraged de Gaulle to couch his challenge to American leadership, 
as Kissinger observed, “so woundingly” that it “spurred American self-righteousness rather than 
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the objective reexamination of Atlantic relationships which the situation demands.”19 By denying 
Americans their idealism, de Gaulle thus made it more difficult to enter into a constructive 
dialogue. 
Incidentally, the interplay between the two political traditions not only enabled the United 
States to combine the conservative’s pragmatic logic of power with the liberal’s power of ideals to 
good effect, it was also responsible for some of the glaring internal contradictions in postwar 
American foreign policy. This policy was in fact riddled with ambiguity and thus vulnerable to 
charges of hypocrisy. The period under study amply illustrates this, and it gave de Gaulle an easy 
target to shoot at. The Kennedy administration, for instance, simultaneously backed British 
membership of the Common Market and advocated the integration model of European 
cooperation. The first was deemed necessary to secure the orientation of the Common Market 
toward American interests; the second corresponded with the liberal conviction that to resolve 
the European question it was essential to move beyond the nation-state. This obvious internal 
contradiction – for Great Britain’s entry would inevitably strengthen the position of those who 
preferred the intergovernmental approach to European unity – was the outcome of a 
policymaking process in which both conservative and liberal inclinations were at play. De Gaulle 
was quick to perceive the Trojan-horse quality of Great Britain’s application. The American 
proposal for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) was another case in point. This pioneering and 
innovative proposal was designed to give European allies – in particularly Germany – a sense of 
real influence over nuclear decisions within the Western alliance. Yet the prospect of real 
influence was invalidated by Washington’s consistent reluctance to consider surrendering its veto 
over the use of its nuclear weapons. This reluctance gave critics of the proposal, such as de 
Gaulle, ample munition to deride the force as a multilateral farce. The MLF was therefore also a 
victim of the internal contradictions of American foreign policy caused by the interplay between 
liberalism and conservatism. 
Secondly, the distinction between political traditions in American foreign policy helps us 
to understand why Americans reacted differently to de Gaulle as well as why most Americans at 
the time looked upon de Gaulle’s foreign policy with disapproval.  
To begin with, American opinion about de Gaulle can be dissected along the liberal-
conservative dividing line. Liberal-minded Americans who supported an active foreign policy, 
such as George Ball and his Europeanists at the State Department, objected to de Gaulle’s 
foreign policy because of its emphasis on national sovereignty and its inclination to approach 
                                                 





international affairs as a balance of power. They were afraid that de Gaulle’s policy of national 
independence and grandeur was reintroducing the nationalist invective into European politics. 
They resented his vocal opposition to political and military integration, which they considered 
not only vital in harnessing the power of the free world against the Soviet Union but also 
unavoidable in a world of increasing interdependence. They objected to de Gaulle’s view of the 
North Atlantic Treaty as merely a ‘classical’ treaty in response to a transitory threat rather than as 
the harbinger of a more permanent bond between America and Europe. They distrusted his 
authoritarian style and disliked the Fifth Republic’s presidential system.20 And they suspected that 
French economic policies under de Gaulle were turning the Common Market into a protectionist 
bloc rather than a bulwark for the promotion of free trade. De Gaulle, in sum, ran opposite to 
the American liberal’s deepest convictions. 
Conservative internationalists, in contrast, were given to acknowledging the 
contemporary value of de Gaulle’s foreign policy, for its motivating ideas were akin to their own. 
They were, at any rate, more tolerant of ideological diversity within the Western alliance than 
liberal internationalists. They were also quite capable of comprehending de Gaulle’s behavior as a 
rational defense of the French national interest; Eisenhower’s remark to General Norstad with 
respect to the French nuclear program – “in fairness to de Gaulle we would react very much like 
de Gaulle if the shoe were on the other foot”21 – is a case in point. The ideological affinity 
between the Nixon administration and de Gaulle was, as we have seen, quite remarkable. Neither 
Nixon nor Kissinger had any hangups about supporting the French nuclear program. They 
welcomed de Gaulle’s intergovernmental conception of Europe. They admired and emulated his 
conduct of foreign affairs, both in terms of its focus on the national interest and of its style and 
method. More than Eisenhower, they were operating on the same wavelength as de Gaulle. 
Lippmann’s sympathy for de Gaulle, too, cannot be separated from his conservative views on 
foreign policy. (It is even only a small stretch of the imagination to discern a certain resemblance 
between the foreign policy views of the eighteenth century Alexander Hamilton and de Gaulle, 
since both valued a strong state served by a dedicated elite, military preparedness, national unity, 
and a strong executive for domestic as well as international purposes; both also stressed the 
limited value of treaties in regulating the behavior between states.) 
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At the same time, even though postwar American foreign policy was a synthesis between 
the two political traditions, the overall tide in American politics during the early decades of the 
Cold War, from the 1940s until the late 1970s (with a respite in the 1950s), was decidedly liberal. 
The greatest accomplishments in American politics during these years, both in the domestic and 
the international realm – from the social legislation of Truman’s Fair Deal and LBJ’s Great 
Society to the foundation of the United Nations and the Marshall Plan –, could only have come 
about in a political environment that was dominated by the forces of American liberalism. 
Roosevelt’s New Deal program of the 1930s had transformed the landscape of American 
electoral politics and had left a resounding legacy for subsequent presidents. For many American 
politicians and officials, participating in the New Deal programmes of the 1930s had been as 
defining an experience as serving in World War II – and both experiences had encouraged them 
to side with liberalism (be it in the fight against poverty or in the eradication of war). In the 
period examined in this study (1958-1969), the policies of in particular the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations were informed by the liberal values of the age. But the two Republican 
administrations in this period also reflected this liberal frame of mind. Eisenhower, for one, was a 
fiscal and social conservative, but he was also a strong proponent of European political and 
economic integration, of NATO’s integrated military command structure, and of decolonization; 
in addition, he was as much distressed as many liberals with the impact of high levels of defense 
spending on American society and with the pernicious influence of the ‘military-industrial 
complex.’ Both his secretaries of state, John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter, moreover had 
Wilsonian inclinations. Nixon was considerably more conservative than Eisenhower, in particular 
in matters of foreign policy, but he too felt compelled to couch his foreign policy in Wilsonian 
rhetoric. As Kissinger explained, “Nixon preferred to operate on two tracks simultaneously: 
invoking Wilsonian rhetoric to explain his goals while appealing to national interest to sustain his 
tactics.”22 De Gaulle was hence a conservative mind in an age that was in many ways dominated 
by American liberalism. By the same token, the Franco-American conflict during these years was 
a clash between an American foreign policy steeped in liberal values and a French foreign policy 
steeped in the conservative European tradition in addition to one between the conception of an 
‘Atlantic’ Europe and a ‘European’ Europe. 
 
                                                 





De Gaulle as the ‘Old’ Europe Reincarnated 
In chapter two, we stated that American political approaches to Europe have been prejudiced by 
the ambivalence in the New World towards the Old that resulted from the fact that America was 
both a departure from and a continuation of Europe. We also noted that the idea of the United 
States’ exceptionality hinged on being different from Europe. And while the American 
perspective on Europe can not be fully described in terms of either rejection and detachment or 
of veneration and affinity, the ‘old’ Europe most often was ‘old’ in a pejorative sense. This 
contrast between the New World and the Old World provides additional clues to understanding 
how Americans interpreted de Gaulle and his political persona. 
Firstly, majority American opinion came to view de Gaulle as a ‘narrow-minded’ 
nationalist of the ‘old’ European type whose policies harked back to the ill-conceived and 
destructive balance-of-power politics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This opinion 
became more pronounced when de Gaulle began to openly challenge American leadership within 
the Western alliance, i.e. beginning with his January 1963 press conference. From a hero of the 
great war who had pulled France back from the brink of civil war, de Gaulle became the 
reincarnation of the ‘old’ Europe that was supposed to make way for a ‘new’ Europe – a Europe 
that would evolve beyond the nation-state, a Europe whose trail was blazen by such practical and 
eminently modern men as Jean Monnet, that would take on the economic dynamism of the New 
World, a Europe that would indeed have learned some valuable lessons from the United States.  
There was always a strong pedagogical bent to American policies towards postwar 
Europe. American policymakers, who were inclined to consider Europe as a whole rather than as 
the accumulation of national societies, had little understanding or patience for the resilience of 
national outlooks. De Gaulle, however, defied their thesis that the European nation-state was 
growing obsolete. His dogmatic emphasis on the national interest appeared to them reminiscent 
of an unhealthy past. They regarded the Frenchman not as a Cold War revisionist, as his 
supporters did, but as a European reactionary; de Gaulle was, the American diplomat-writer 
Louis Halle judged, a “statesman swimming against the stream of history.”23 His authoritarian 
political style, too, was stripped of its contemporary significance; it became, instead, a holdover 
of the French Bonapartist tradition. De Gaulle furthermore seemed to return to the unyielding 
nationalism of a Georges Clemenceau after World War I. Americans who read John Maynard 
                                                 





Keynes’ portrayal of Clemenceau during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 – as someone like 
Dean Acheson most likely did – no doubt found it germane to de Gaulle: 
 
He [Clemenceau] felt about France what Pericles felt of Athens – unique value in her, nothing 
else mattering; but his theory of politics was Bismarck’s. He had one illusion – France; and one 
disillusion – mankind, including Frenchmen, and his colleagues not least. […] His philosophy had 
[…] no place for ‘sentimentality’ in international relations. Nations are real things, of whom you 
love one and feel for the rest indifference – or hatred. The glory of the nation you love is a 
desirable end – but generally to be obtained at your neighbour’s expense. […] This is the policy of 
an old man, whose vivid impressions and most lively imagination are of the past and not of the 
future.24 
 
This is not to say that de Gaulle’s nationalist policy of independence and grandeur was 
thought to have no future implications. On the contrary, American officials feared that de Gaulle 
was breathing new life into dangerous ghosts of the past. “De Gaulle is continuing on a 
dangerous course and setting dangerous trends in motion,” Bohlen cabled to Washington after 
one of de Gaulle’s speeches in 1965, adding that he agreed with former Prime Minister Paul 
Reynaud that “French nationalism is in the process of reviving American isolationism and now to 
top it off, it is reawakening the dreaded German nationalism.”25 George Ball’s earlier cited public 
reaction to France’s military withdrawal from NATO – “we have always recognized the danger 
that the European people, with reflexes conditioned by history, might from time to time be 
tempted to lapse into the habits of the past” – equally revealed this concern.26 And Thomas 
Finletter, the American ambassador to NATO, interpreted the French withdrawal as an 
indication of an ominous historical pattern: “World War II [...] began twenty-one years after the 
end of World War I, so to have France’s withdrawal from NATO take place twenty-one years 
after the end of the previous war is well in accord with the precedents.”27 Gaullist foreign policy 
was hence reviving the old European question in American foreign policy. By the same token, 
the rejection of Gaullism in the United States was an offshoot of the anti-Europeanism – or, 
more precisely, Europhobia – that had influenced American foreign policy from the outset. 
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 Secondly, whereas de Gaulle deliberately sought to personify France in times of crisis, 
Americans have exhibited a tendency to do exactly the opposite: to disconnect de Gaulle from 
the French people. This tendency is, of course, to be traced back to the dubious legitimacy of de 
Gaulle’s call of ‘June 18th’ to continue the war against Germany, Roosevelt’s stubborn refusal to 
recognize the Free French movement as the legitimate representative of the French people, and 
his penchant to regard America as the trustee of French sovereignty (at least until elections were 
held in France). It was, however, not reserved to Roosevelt, for the period under examination  
here provides sufficient evidence of similar attitudes among Americans who dealt with de Gaulle. 
De Gaulle was often isolated from his milieu, be it French or European, as if he was an 
aberration. The exclamation of one Kennedy administration official following de Gaulle’s January 
1963 press conference – that “one lonely, elderly ruler of a small country” was quelling the 
aspirations of “250 million other Europeans” – was just one case in point. 28  Ambassador 
Bohlen’s reports from Paris were often peppered with assurances that – despite de Gaulle’s anti-
American slights – his contacts in the Quai d’Orsay and in the country-at-large revealed a matrix 
of enduring goodwill toward the United States. “We at the Quai d’Orsay,” Bohlen cited one 
French foreign officer in 1964, “supply bricks for [the] Elysée but we are sometimes astonished by 
[the] building which results. Sometimes it’s [a] classic mansion but at other times [the] edifice is 
entirely feudal.” 29  Johnson’s letter of reply of March 1966 to de Gaulle’s announcement of 
withdrawal from NATO, as we have seen, even deliberately distinguished between de Gaulle and 
France in order to “offer a golden bridge to the French nation” back to NATO (see chapter 
eight).  
This inclination to distinguish between a nation’s leadership, which may be bad or seen to 
have erred, and its people, which are inherently good, is a common trait in American foreign 
policy. In the case of France in the 1960s, this distinction tapped into the historical ambivalence 
felt towards Europe: while de Gaulle was trying to restore French glory of the olden days of 
European statecraft, the French people were believed to be interested above all in building a 
better life in the ‘new’ Europe that was being constructed by the likes of Jean Monnet. Rejection 
of the ‘old’ France exemplified by de Gaulle and affinity with the ‘new’ France exemplified by 
Monnet were two reflections of this ambivalence. De Gaulle may have been motivated by “une 
certaine idée” of France that had been bequeathed by his patriotic upbringing and a national 
experience of centuries; the loyalty of the French, Americans hoped, was with the ‘new’ France 
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that had learned its lessons from the past and was moving away from the institutional framework 
of the nation-state. Most Americans were therefore never prepared to fully accept de Gaulle as 
the veritable spokesman of the French people, certainly not as its sole spokesman. Even if they 
did, they were inclined to do so without acknowledging the popularity of his challenge to 
American leadership. “It is a mistake for Americans to distinguish between the government and 
the people re[garding] foreign policy,” Ernest Goldstein cabled to President Johnson from 
France in February 1968; “they collectively voted for the General knowing his foreign policy, but 
were willing to swallow it for his domestic policy.”30 Goldstein should have gone one step further: 
de Gaulle’s challenge to the Americans was generally popular in France and his foreign policy 
served to strengthen domestic unity. If anything, de Gaulle’s domestic policies – not his foreign 
policy – were a source of unpopularity among the French (as the events of May 1968 were to 
show soon enough).  
For most Americans, however, recognizing this was going one step too far: it involved 
admitting that American leadership was not universally wanted. The vehemence of American 
reactions to de Gaulle’s verdicts on American leadership can only be fully understood if one 
recognizes that they chipped away at America’s self-perception as a nation and a civilization. 
While de Gaulle readily claimed exceptional status for France on the basis of its glorious history 
as a nation and a civilization, he denied the United States its own exceptionalism based on it 
being a departure from Europe. His portrayal of the United States as a hegemon and the co-
author of the division of Europe – the “Yalta-system” – grated many Americans, who cherished 
a rather more exalted view of the United States’ international position. In particular, de Gaulle’s 
propensity to put the United States on the same moral plane as the Soviet Union did not sit well 
with their view of the Cold War as a struggle between good and evil. De Gaulle was in fact 
attributing American foreign policy with the vices of the ‘old’ Europe. De Gaulle’s analysis that 
United States was as motivated by ‘selfish’ national interests as any other state – that “the will to 
power” was merely “cloaked in idealism” – was a denial of the American view that the United 
States was different from Europe. It thus went to the heart of the American self-image. 
 
De Gaulle (“The Ungrateful”) Between Aloofness and Engagement 
The third element of the interpretive framework introduced in chapter two concerned the historical 
alternation in American foreign policy vis-à-vis Europe between geopolitical aloofness and 
                                                 





engagement and this policy’s jolting evolution from the willed aloofness of the eighteenth and 
nineteeth centuries to the reluctant engagement in the context of World War II and the Cold War. 
Although after 1945 the terms of aloofness and engagement were redefined to reflect the abiding 
interest of the United States in a Europe that could never again pose a threat to the Western 
hemisphere, American foreign policy continued to be marked by shifts between aloofness and 
engagement within these redefined terms. So how does this help us to understand the American 
experience with de Gaulle? 
Firstly, the complex evolution of American foreign policy from willed aloofness to reluctant 
engagement meant that de Gaulle’s reading of the United States’ involvement in Europe was 
sharply at odds with that of most Americans. According to de Gaulle, the United States suffered 
from the hegemonic affliction that comes with being the most powerful. This affliction was in his 
view an important part of the problem that he defined as the ‘Yalta system’ or the ‘system of the 
blocs.’ De Gaulle did not give much credence to the possibility of a return to isolationism in 
American foreign policy. In Memoirs of Hope, for instance, he recalls a conversation with President 
Eisenhower in April 1960 in which the latter had expressed support for greater European self-
sufficiency, explaining that the United States did not want to do everything. Eisenhower 
nonetheless had also cautioned de Gaulle that an American return to isolationism was entirely 
possible, as it could result from a certain disillusion among Americans with the “very people who 
needed her help.” De Gaulle dismissed Eisenhower’s concern: “At the level of power to which 
she [the United States] had attained, her strongest temptations were towards intervention, and 
besides, how could she remain detached in the event of a world conflict, when at any moment 
and from any point of the compass she could be dealt a deathblow?” From his vantage point, the 
problem was rather the opposite: a propensity on the part of Americans to act as “a universal 
judge and policeman.”31 De Gaulle was in favor of alliance with the Americans in the Cold War, 
yet he was also determined to keep them at arms length in order to provide room for French 
independence and leadership in Europe. “I love the Anglo-Saxons,” he later volunteered to his 
information minister Alain Peyrefitte, “on the condition that they do not aspire to dominate 
us.” 32  French foreign policy under de Gaulle hence aimed to reduce American postwar 
predominance in Western Europe, undo the ‘Yalta system’ through a policy of détente, and help 
bring about a European-wide equilibrium in which the United States would merely serve as an 
ally of ultimate recourse.  
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All of this was incompatible with almost any American interpretation of the United 
States’ postwar involvement in Europe. This reading showed the United States as responding to 
calls from severely weakened Western European democracies for American support and 
protection. The first political imperative in American politics after World War II had been to 
bring ‘the boys back home’ and this imperative was overruled only after much hesitation. It had 
also taken the Truman administration much persuasion to get the Senate to ratify the North 
Atlantic Treaty of 1949. The United States thus did not seek hegemony after the war; leadership 
rather devolved to it by a combination of European consent, American resources, and Soviet 
expansionism. If it could be called an empire, an epithet Americans intensely disliked, it was – in 
the words of the historian Geir Lundestad – only an “empire by invitation.”33 The role of leader 
of the Western alliance was not of its own making, but thrust upon the United States by the 
political, moral, and financial bankruptcy of Europe. When de Gaulle criticized American 
involvement in Europe, it was hence often seen unbecoming of an ally that owed its continued 
existence as a sovereign state to this very involvement. He was seen as ungrateful. 
American policymakers, in addition, believed that they could not be as cavalier as de 
Gaulle about the possibility of a return to isolationism. Many of them had been too disillusioned 
with the return to isolationism following World War I and their determination to avoid repetition 
following World War II was one pillar underneath the bipartisan foreign policy consensus of the 
day. They knew that it had not been easy to get American foreign policy to shift gears in response 
to the Soviet threat, and to persuade the Senate to ratify the North Atlantic Treaty and to agree to 
higher defense spending. They realized that in the early twentieth century, too, it had been 
asserted (wrongly, as it turned out) that American isolationism belonged in the past. The Cold 
War had forced a reinvention of American foreign policy in support of an internationalist 
approach and, as authors of this reinvention, American policymakers felt it was by no means 
certain it would continue to be supported in the long run by American public opinion. As 
Thomas Finletter wrote, American foreign policy after World War II was in important ways a 
“search for a substitute for isolation” and much depended on how this “substitute” was 
ultimately assessed by the majority of the American people.34 Regardless of the Cold War, there 
were always reappearances of the isolationist sentiment to worry about. This sentiment was 
evident among prominent Republican politicians like Senator Robert Taft in the 1940s and early 
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1950s, in George Kennan’s BBC Reith lectures of 1957, and in the recurrent Congressional calls 
for troop reductions in Europe (often instigated in the 1960s by the Democratic majority leader 
in the Senate, Mike Mansfield). De Gaulle’s criticism of the United States’ involvement in Europe 
was believed to only strengthen the forces of disengagement.  
At the same time, the idea that the United States should withdraw in its own hemisphere 
until it would be called upon to deal with the next European conflagration was, after two world 
wars, only acceptable to diehard isolationists. Most Americans felt that the United States could 
not be denied an imperative voice in determining the future of Europe, certainly not as long as it 
bore the brunt of the defense burden. This was, for instance, reflected in President Kennedy’s 
instruction in May 1962 to Ambassador Gavin to point out to de Gaulle that he “really cannot 
have both our military presence and our diplomatic absence” (see chapter six). The American 
proponents of aloofness were not averse to devolving more responsibility to the European allies, 
but not if this implied giving up all control over European affairs. If anything, de Gaulle’s 
rationale for reducing the American presence in Europe and the nationalism of his policies were 
counterproductive because they convinced American policymakers that Europe was far from 
ready to be freed from American tutelage and to be left to its own devices. De Gaulle’s pursuit of 
French – and by extension European – ‘independence’ from the United States thus paradoxically 
led to greater calls for strong American leadership in European affairs.  
Secondly, whether Washington’s relationship with de Gaulle was good or bad largely 
coincided with whether it pursued a strategy of aloofness or of engagement with respect to 
Europe. In this regard there was a clear difference of dynamic in the relationship with de Gaulle 
under, on the hand, Eisenhower and in particular Nixon and, on the other hand, Kennedy and 
Johnson (at least until the latter imposed his policy of restraint on the activists in his 
administration).  
Both Eisenhower and Nixon – not coincidentally the two most conservative presidents of 
our period – responded to America’s relative decline by striving to reduce the burden of its 
international involvement. Both were also more tolerant of European autonomy vis-à-vis the 
United States and less concerned by the political implications of Gaullism for the future of 
Europe, and they were therefore less inclined to inject American power into intra-European 
politics (regardless of Eisenhower’s fervent support of the ill-fated EDC proposal in the early 
1950s). Eisenhower, for instance, worried about the fiscal burden caused by the high American 
troop levels in Europe. He also strongly favored larger European self-sufficiency in defense 
matters, which helped to explain his support for the EDC as well as his willingness in the waning 





sympathy for the notion of Europe as a “genuine third force comparable to the United States or 
to the Soviet Union.”35 Nixon was above all concerned with conceptually adjusting American 
foreign policy to the decline in American power and prestige in the course of the 1960s and 
extricating the United States from Vietnam without giving the Soviet Union the edge in the Cold 
War. In the context of his view of a multipolar world, he went further than any other American 
president since World War II in permitting Europe an autonomous position. Nixon, in addition, 
reversed a bipartisan record of activist American support for European integration, focusing 
instead on maintaining and manipulating advantageous bilateral relationships. Because the gist of 
both Eisenhower’s and Nixon’s policies was towards aloofness from Europe (while maintaining 
the Cold War alliance), they were both in a reasonable position to develop something of an 
understanding with de Gaulle on the proper role and the degree of involvement of the United 
States in Europe. 
The Kennedy administration’s approach to Europe, by contrast, was unmistakably one of 
engagement in support of European integration within an Atlantic-oriented setting, and this 
policy of engagement carried over into the Johnson administration until it was toned down by 
Johnson’s determination not to pick fights with de Gaulle and by the growing absorption in the 
Vietnam quagmire. Kennedy’s policies were also a response to the relative decline of the United 
States, but he aimed to offset this decline by actively shaping Europe into a more unified, active, 
and constructive partner of the United States. It was a policy aimed at sharing more of the 
burden without giving up much of the control. These policies were furthermore dominated by 
officials at the State Department who had personally contributed to the European integration 
movement earlier in their careers, such as George Ball and Robert Schaetzel. Their inclination to 
continue this stance in government was firmly supported by foreign policy wise men such as 
Dean Acheson and John McCloy, who believed strong American leadership in Europe continued 
to be necessary for political reasons. Their efforts were moreover intimately wound up with those 
of Jean Monnet, and they often directly involved ‘Mr. Europe’ in shaping American policies.  
The Kennedy administration’s policy of engagement in Europe conflicted with de 
Gaulle’s foreign policy aims in various ways. We have already noted that de Gaulle’s rebuttal of 
Kennedy’s design for an Atlantic partnership in early 1963 must be understood as a defensive 
move against an activist American foreign policy (see chapter six). To this notion one may add 
that the activism of the Kennedy administration was paradoxically much reinforced by the 
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American perception that the threat of Gaullism was growing. De Gaulle’s veto of the MLF, for 
instance, made it even more important to the American proponents of the MLF to realize it. 
Unease about de Gaulle’s policy of independence was in fact a major determinant of many 
American policies towards Europe; in Walt Rostow’s words, “a good deal of European and 
Atlantic policy as […] taken up with coping with de Gaulle’s enterprises in ways which permitted 
the EEC and NATO to survive.”36 Both NATO and the Common Market did survive. But de 
Gaulle’s opposition to American activism in Europe was not without effect. It contributed to the 
dismantlement of Kennedy’s strategy of forceful engagement. The evolution of Johnson’s 
policies toward a more aloof stance toward Europe – a result of his decision in 1964 to let the 
MLF whither on the vine, the growing burden of Vietnam, the increasing domestic turmoil, the 
emergence of the Common Market as an economic rival – was only temporarily interrupted by 
the need to show American leadership in the NATO crisis of 1966 and 1967. Even during this 
crisis, Johnson refused to place America’s power behind a European crusade against de Gaulle, as 
Acheson and Ball had wanted. He understood that de Gaulle had exposed limits to what the 
engagement of American power in Europe could achieve. The postwar era of America’s deep and 
often activist involvement in intra-European politics was waning. 
 
Dealing With De Gaulle: The Hegemon’s Predicament 
The second part of this book examined how the United States dealt with the challenges posed by 
de Gaulle’s foreign policy in key areas of the transatlantic relationship. In each chapter the area or 
issue at hand was looked at from the vantage point of the incumbent American president (or in 
some cases, consecutive presidents). The conclusions to be drawn from their dealings with de 
Gaulle are perhaps as kaleidoscopic as the complexity of the issues. The most pertinent 
conclusions have already been drawn at the end of each chapter. Some more general conclusions 
may nevertheless be drawn here. How did the consecutive American presidents measure up to de 
Gaulle’s challenge? How did the United States come across as the preponderant power – or the 
hegemon – within the Western alliance? Would a more accommodating policy towards de Gaulle 
have been possible? Should the United States have heeded de Gaulle’s foreign policy design or 
was it right to resist some of its main ideas?  
 
                                                 






How did consecutive administrations actually deal with the challenges posed by de Gaulle’s 
‘independent’ foreign policy from 1958 to 1969? We have seen how Eisenhower and Kennedy 
genuinely tried to come to terms with de Gaulle’s ‘tripartite’ memorandum of September 1958, in 
particular by offering to expand the ‘special’ relationship with Great Britain to France and by 
pledging that Washington would consult Paris prior to the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in 
the world barring emergency situations. Both, however, also had to take the views of the other 
European allies – Germany above all – into account, as they were highly sensitive to any notion 
of a ‘directorate’ within the Western alliance. Discussions about de Gaulle’s memorandum 
proposal lasted until the very end of Eisenhower’s presidency and continued into the Kennedy 
presidency. In particular, Eisenhower’s search for a compromise with de Gaulle preoccupied him 
more than is commonly understood. Neither did Kennedy thrust aside de Gaulle’s memorandum 
proposal during his first year in office, even though the gist of his policies ran counter to de 
Gaulle’s ‘tripartite’ vision. De Gaulle’s memorandum diplomacy finally reached a cul-de-sac in 
1962, in part because of Kennedy’s management of the Cold War (specifically his unilateral 
handling of the Cuban missile crisis) and evidence of the enduring Anglo-American affinity 
(exhibited above all at the Nassau meeting between Kennedy and Macmillan of December 1962).  
The inconspicuous ending of de Gaulle’s diplomatic drive for equal status with the 
Anglo-Saxons set the stage for the much more overt crisis over NATO that had been 
foreshadowed in de Gaulle’s initial memorandum and that is analyzed in chapter eight. The 
question remains, however, to what extent one can indeed speak of a crisis, as only the 
comprehensiveness and the briskness of the French withdrawal from NATO in 1966 had been a 
surprise to Washington. The Johnson administration had in fact anticipated this withdrawal and 
awaited – and used – the occasion to breath new life into an alliance paralyzed by de Gaulle’s 
obstructionism. If one can speak of a NATO crisis in 1966 and 1967, this is because the French 
withdrawal coincided with a desire across Europe for détente in the Cold War as well as with 
serious disagreements about financing the allied troop presence in Germany. It was, in addition, a 
crisis within American policymaking circles. Prominent members of the foreign policy 
establishment, led by the formidable Acheson and Ball, were greatly disenchanted by Johnson’s 
refusal to stand up to the General and lead the forces of European and Atlantic integration. In 
their stead, pragmatic minds gained the decisive upperhand in the making of American foreign 
policy. Under Johnson’s self-possessed leadership, NATO showed more flexibility and resilience 





reflection of the limited means with which the United States could stand up to de Gaulle by 
isolating him or France within Europe. There was little support among the European allies, least 
of all in the all-important Germany, for an outright confrontation with de Gaulle. With regard to 
the organization of the Atlantic alliance, the United States was thus compelled to maneuver in 
between Scylla and Charibdis: to withstand de Gaulle’s unacceptable demands for a special status 
within the alliance while heeding a continual reluctance among the European allies to ostracize 
France over its policies vis-à-vis NATO. 
In particular Kennedy and Johnson also felt their hands to be tied behind their backs with 
regard to France’s nuclear efforts. The United States was unable to force France to halt its 
nuclear program and thereby create a new strategic reality in the West. The story told in chapter 
seven moreover underscores de Gaulle’s ability to scuttle the American proposal for a multilateral 
nuclear force because he considered it detrimental to his foreign policy goals. In this realm, too, 
the options of the United States – the nuclear superpower – to impose its will on an intractable 
European ally therefore appear to have been limited.  
The same could be said of the conflict with de Gaulle over the movement toward 
European unity. Many Americans had staked their hopes about Europe on this movement, which 
in their view was moved along by the supranational method pioneered by Jean Monnet rather 
than by de Gaulle’s proposals for cooperation between Europe’s nation-states. The end of the 
story, however, was that they were little more than restive bystanders as de Gaulle’s 
intergovernmental approach to the Common Market gained the upperhand in the course of the 
1960s. De Gaulle’s veto of Kennedy’s Atlantic ‘partnership’ idea and the ensuing conclusion of 
the Franco-German treaty of January 22, 1963, clearly exposed the limits of American power in 
Western Europe, even as Washington was successful in forcing Bonn to distance itself from the 
most objectionable features of de Gaulle’s policies. After the clash of 1963, American policies 
would never again assume the measure of engagement in Europe’s internal affairs that marked 
the early Kennedy years. The Common Market was increasingly seen as an economic rival to the 
United States and how Nixon and Kissinger abandoned America’s longstanding support for 
strengthening the position of the center in relation to the nation-states. At the end of de Gaulle’s 
tenure in 1969, the status of the movement towards European unity and of the relationship 
between America and Europe differed substantially from mainstream American anticipations 
about the transatlantic relationship at its beginning in 1958. 
By 1968, the foreign policies of both the United States and France had reached a dead 
end, thus creating the conditions for a remarkable shift from divergence to accommodation in 





office, prompted by the domestic and international setbacks that both Washington and Paris 
experienced. It was given a significant further boost under Nixon and Kissinger, whose views of 
foreign policy coincided with those of de Gaulle to an unprecedented degree. Their duo 
stewardship marked not only the end of the era in American foreign policy that had been 
dominated by a liberally-bent bipartisan establishment; by the same token, it also symbolized the 
re-emergence of the conservative foreign policy tradition in the United States. As such, this turn 
of events was a vindication of de Gaulle’s views. The adjustment, first under Johnson and then 
under Nixon, was furthermore an indication that the hegemonic power of the United States 
within the Western alliance was subject to real and increasingly sharp limits. 
What the history told in this study thus has shown is how little leverage the United States 
actually had over de Gaulle’s France. The preponderance of its power and the attractiveness of its 
idealism made the United States the natural leader within the Western alliance, but by the 1960s 
this no longer entailed the ability to force a wayward ally of France’s calibre to follow suit. De 
Gaulle obviously believed that he was not risking the security of France by withdrawing French 
forces from NATO. He also knew that the French were generally supportive of his public stand 
against American supremacy. “The French as a whole have favored or have been indifferent to 
President de Gaulle’s attack on NATO,” Henry Tanner, for instance, reported in The New York 
Times. “There has been no movement in opposition to it. Politicians who have tried to make 
NATO an issue at political rallies report sadly that they got no response. Executives of 
organizations that advocate closer trans-Atlantic links say that there has been no significant 
increase in their mail.”37 De Gaulle was also aware that most European allies, in particular those 
who were also member of the Common Market, preferred a calm response to his transatlantic 
dissent. NATO could do without France, but the Common Market could not. Washington was 
able to contain the Gaullist heresy within the alliance by exploiting its leadership position, but it 
was thus unable to banish the heretic. What is more, under Nixon the heresy even reached  
Washington. If the United States was ‘imperial’ at all, as has become fashionable to state among 
historians and commentators, it was an emperor without clothes – and, like the child in Hans 
Christian Andersen’s classic tale, de Gaulle was the little fellow to break the spell with his 
perceptive skills.  
What this history has also shown is that consecutive American presidents were aware of 
the scarcity of their options in dealing with de Gaulle. They were on the whole more pragmatic, 
more determined to maintain a workable relationship with de Gaulle, and more tuned in to 
                                                 





political realities in Europe – and in Germany in particular – that prohibited a policy of isolating 
France, than most American diplomats. Members of the White House staff in the turbulent 
Kennedy and Johnson years were almost as critical of the State Department’s anti-Gaullism, 
which was often seen as part of the problem, as of de Gaulle. At the presidential level, 
moderation almost always prevailed in the face of de Gaulle’s real or perceived slights against the 
United States. American hegemony within the Western alliance may no longer be perceived as 
consensual, as de Gaulle had withdrawn France’s consent, but it was still accommodating. 
From the historical narrative in this book one may deduce that the Franco-American 
relationship from 1958 to 1969 knew four distinct phases. In the first phase, from May 1958 to 
December 1962, the conflict between the United States and de Gaulle was still muted. The Cold 
War was at its height. De Gaulle was busy extracting France from Algeria and establishing the 
Fifth Republic. The Franco-American disagreement about the organization of the Western 
alliance was still largely hidden from the public view. De Gaulle’s opposition within the Western 
alliance was as yet subdued, allowing for a generally constructive relationship. By the spring of 
1962, however, the incongruity between Washington and Paris about military-strategic issues (in 
particular nuclear policies) and the future of Europe was becoming increasingly obvious and 
already led to a deterioration in the relationship. By then, the crisis of 1963 was clearly in the 
offing. 
The second phase began with de Gaulle’s “thunderbolts” of January 1963 – his veto of 
Britain’s membership of the Common Market, disavowal of the MLF, and the signing of the 
Franco-German Treaty – and lasted until Johnson’s decision in December 1964 against pressing 
the European allies on the MLF. This phase was one of open and often emotional discord, with 
Germany as the apple of discord. It was characterized by an assertive American reaction to de 
Gaulle’s rebuke of Kennedy’s Grand Design for an Atlantic partnership. In the third phase, from 
early 1965 to early 1968, there was hardly any room for constructive dialogue left between Paris 
and Washington. The Franco-American relationship had reached an impasse from which it 
seemed impossible to escape.  This period was punctured only by de Gaulle’s acts of resistance to 
what he perceived as American domination, followed by ever so many Johnson-led holding 
actions. Following France’s NATO withdrawal in 1966, the relationship reached an all-time low 
in 1967 when de Gaulle opposed American policies at every turn. The fourth phase, finally, began 
in the spring of 1968, as the foreign policies of both Washington and Paris ran into domestic as 





April 1969 and continued under Pompidou, was characterized by a shift from divergence to 
accommodation and rapprochement. 
These phases are only loosely linked to the periodic transfers of presidential power in 
Washington. At the same time, however, there were marked differences between the American 
presidents and their respective working relationships with de Gaulle – and these differences 
unmistakably played a role in the development of the bilateral relationship from 1958 to 1969. 
Each of these transfers introduced a new personal dynamic in the relationship; in all cases except 
the transition from Kennedy to Johnson, they also introduced a new set of policies vis-à-vis 
Europe.38 
Eisenhower, for one, could bank on the relationship of mutual respect with de Gaulle 
that had developed during World War II. He was the only one who could see eye to eye with de 
Gaulle in terms of political stature, as they had both proven their mettle during the war and both 
were statesmen who could draw on a wealth of experience. Although Eisenhower had repeatedly 
clashed with de Gaulle during the war, he had never conformed to Roosevelt’s unreasonable 
antagonism and always had kept the lines of communication open. As president, he had 
moreover become highly aggravated by the volatile ‘weakness’ of the Fourth Republic; for this 
reason, too, he genuinely welcomed de Gaulle’s return to power. Eisenhower was not devoid of 
criticism of his French colleague, but he valued his opinions as those of a fellow statesman and a 
steadfast ally in the Cold War. De Gaulle, meanwhile, appears to have genuinely liked the affable 
‘Ike.’ Their congenial personal relationship helped to establish a cooperative ambiance in the 
Franco-American relationship that was open to dialogue, despite the differences of opinion 
discussed in earlier chapters. 
 Kennedy’s relationship with de Gaulle, in contrast, was inevitably marked by the 
generation gap between the two. Their personal relationship was, as a result, from the outset 
imbalanced and awash with friction (which is not to say that it was bad). Kennedy was fascinated 
by de Gaulle and stood in awe of his historical record and leadership style; he was both 
deferential to de Gaulle – an attitude that may have been reinforced by his wife’s French roots 
and her personal liking for de Gaulle – and irritated to the point of despair with his opposition to 
American policies. Kennedy’s relationship with de Gaulle was hence the most complicated and 
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incongruous of the four American presidents who dealt with de Gaulle from 1958 to 1969. This 
was reinforced by Kennedy’s own unsettled views of Europe and the transatlantic relationship; 
more than once Kennedy appeared to be privately uncomfortable with the ambitious official 
policies of his administration (whether in support of European integration and Britain’s 
membership application or of the MLF). His searching intellect might have produced an 
understanding with de Gaulle on some issues. De Gaulle meanwhile looked upon Kennedy as a 
novice, albeit a talented one for whom he moreover cherished a certain personal sympathy. 
Because of Kennedy’s premature death, it will remain an open question whether they might have 
been able to develop a more balanced personal relationship and a more constructive political 
relationship. 
Compared to Eisenhower and Kennedy, Johnson’s relationship with de Gaulle was 
notable for the absence of any personal rapport. Johnson lacked Eisenhower’s wartime record or 
Kennedy’s cosmopolitan East Coast outlook and worldly manners. As a Texan of provincial 
tastes and a politician who clearly felt more at home in Congress than among world leaders, he 
stood a world away from de Gaulle. There was no ideological affinity between the two either, as 
Johnson was also the most liberal president of the era. De Gaulle was unfailingly courteous in his 
– most often indirect – contacts  with Johnson, but he clearly felt the absence of a rapport and he 
is known to have denigrated Johnson to his associates as a ‘cowboy’ in politics.39 Johnson’s 
inability to establish a working relationship with de Gaulle was best illustrated by the fact that 
they could not agree on visiting each other even once, whether in France or in the United States, 
during the more than five years of his presidency (which took up nearly half of de Gaulle’s period 
in office). The renowned ‘LBJ treatment’ might have been highly effective in dealing with 
Congress, but it had no use for dealing with de Gaulle. Of all presidents, Johnson was moreover 
the least captivated by de Gaulle’s ideas or personality.  
At the same time, Johnson deserves credit for the unruffled manner in which he handled 
the French challenge. His unswerving restraint brought important psychological and political 
compensations for the United States and the alliance, reduced the symbolic appeal of de Gaulle’s 
policies, and made the beginnings of Franco-American accommodation in 1968 possible. Amidst 
the howls of indignation, Johnson was able to see de Gaulle’s defiance in perspective. He 
preserved NATO by reforming it with a soft hand. NATO Ambassador Harlan Cleveland hence 
bowed him out in 1969 by stating that “our effectiveness in NATO […] was wholly dependent 





that fact better recognized by the public which has been focusing mostly on Vietnam during the 
same three years.”40 Charles Bohlen, too, gave Johnson substantial credit. “As far as de Gaulle is 
concerned,” the oldhand of American diplomacy judged, “Johnson displayed a maturity and an 
understanding for which he deserves the highest marks.”41 This study therefore supports the 
recent reappraisal among historians of Johnson as a foreign policy president and corroborates the 
view that the Vietnam War did not decisively undermine his European policies.42 
 A meeting of minds, however, had to wait until Nixon’s assumption of the presidency in 
January 1969. The overlap between Nixon and de Gaulle was only three months, but it was 
sufficient to establish the bilateral relationship on a different footing. American foreign policy in 
fact switched from Johnson’s skillfully exercised holding action against de Gaulle to a mindful 
search for accommodation and collaboration. Indeed, in December 1971, Henry Kissinger 
confided to President Georges Pompidou that if the United States had a special relationship with 
any European country it was France. 43  Both Nixon and Kissinger clearly looked up to the 
General as a paragon of leadership. They shared many notions with de Gaulle about the proper 
conduct of foreign policy. De Gaulle was, at the end of his political life, thus finally presented 
with an American interlocutor with whom he could see eye to eye on most issues. All of this, of 
course, begs the question how the Franco-American relationship would have evolved if Nixon 
had not been defeated by Kennedy in the presidential elections of 1960 by a margin of 120,000 
votes (two tenths of a percentage point (0.2%) in the popular vote). 
 
The Bypassed Potential of a More Accommodating Stance 
Would a more accommodating American stance towards de Gaulle have been possible if Nixon 
had been elected in November 1960? 
One might argue that the possibilities of an entente with de Gaulle were inherently 
limited; that an alternative approach would have involved a departure from well-anchored 
policies; that the prevailing American perceptions of the transatlantic relationship in the 1950s 
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and 1960s, which have been described earlier, stood in the way of any accord at the official level; 
that France was not the most important European ally that the United States had to attend to, for 
that ally was Germany; that de Gaulle was not one to compromise his strategic vision; and that a 
degree of tension in the Franco-American relationship appears to have served de Gaulle’s 
purposes well. 
Although we are moving into the treacherous realm of historical speculation, it 
nonetheless appears safe to refute that the relationship might have been less antagonistic. Under 
Nixon, Washington probably would have been more receptive of de Gaulle’s views on a variety 
of issues. Their friendly first encounter in April 1960, de Gaulle’s instantly favorable impression 
of Nixon as a statesman, and their likeminded – i.e. conservative – approaches to the conduct of 
foreign affairs might have made for a constructive relationship. The Franco-American 
relationship might have known fewer irritants than was the case under Kennedy, who engaged 
American power in Europe with few restraints. While there undoubtedly would have been 
important policy differences, the policy clash between de Gaulle and Kennedy – and subsequently 
Johnson – might not have occurred. This, in turn, might have taken the sting out of the anti-
American gist of de Gaulle’s foreign policy. 
The United States might, in particular, have been less condemning of the French nuclear 
program. The Kennedy administration’s campaign against national nuclear forces in the context of 
its strategic revision did much to sour the bilateral relationship, as did the ensuing MLF proposal 
that remained a bone of contention within the alliance until 1965. Accepting – or even supporting – 
the French ambition not only would have been the more pragmatic policy – it was always unlikely 
that the United States could pressure France into aborting its nuclear program –  but it would also 
have acknowledged that the force de dissuasion would strengthen the overall deterrent capacity of the 
Western alliance by introducing an additional center of atomic decisionmaking that the Soviets 
would have to take into account. As such, the coming into being of the French nuclear force helped 
to reduce continual European anxieties about the credibility of the American nuclear security 
guarantee more than repeated American pledges. Whether any American president would have 
pushed the nuclear button in defense of Europe – and thereby risk New York for Hamburg – 
remains speculative. The doubts per se about this aspect of the American nuclear security 
guarantee, however, carried the risk of emboldening the Soviet Union; in spite of its military 
credibility, the American nuclear arsenal would then have failed as a deterrent because it lacked 
political credibility. The French ‘bombinette’ was often ridiculed for its limited military use. From 
                                                                                                                                                      





a strictly political point of view,  however, it was the more credible deterrent for Europe simply 
because of France’s geographic position.44 It took until June 1974, in the Ottawa Declaration of 
NATO government leaders, for the United States – led by Nixon – to officially recognize the 
contribution of the French nuclear force to security in Europe.45 
Acquiescing in – or providing assistance to – the French nuclear force would also have 
made sense for other, political reasons. American opposition to the force de dissuasion was always 
hard to explain in view of the continued assistance to the British deterrent; “[…] neither General 
de Gaulle nor any other French leader,” as Raymond Aron put it, “can admit the official 
Washington thesis according to which the dissemination of atomic weapons becomes dangerous 
when these weapons cross the Channel, but not when they cross the Atlantic.” 46  American  
consent or assistance might have reduced de Gaulle’s already strong suspicion of Anglo-
American scheming at the expense of French influence in Europe. In addition, the United States 
might have recognized that the French nuclear force helped to eliminate remaining insecurities in 
France about a German military resurrection, thus removing an impediment to reconciliation 
between the two former archenemies. While the well-nigh obsessive fears of the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations about the German reaction against nuclear discrimination may not have 
been entirely incomprehensible at the time, they appear less justified in hindsight. Nuclear 
discrimination of France, by contrast, had mostly negative results: it did not achieve the goal of 
stopping the French nuclear program midstream and burdened the bilateral relationship with an 
important European ally. 
 The amended McMahon Act of 1958 and the formidable position of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy made it exceedingly difficult for any administration to provide nuclear support to 
France on the same level as to Great Britain. Yet a more tolerant stance towards the French nuclear 
program was not unthinkable. Eisenhower had no problem with the French nuclear program and he 
would have been prepared to furnish nuclear assistance if there had been no congressional 
restrictions (about which he bitterly complained time and again). Nixon did begin a – covert – 
program of nuclear cooperation with France, which suggests that he would at the very least have 
refrained from Kennedy’s attempt to scuttle the French program had he been elected president in 
1960. Within the Kennedy administration there were also voices in favor of nuclear cooperation 
with France, although they were by far in the minority. Ambassador James Gavin, in particular, 
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repeatedly advocated nuclear assistance to France, which embroiled him with the State 
Department.47 Outside the administration, there was support for such a policy from Republican 
quarters.48 The Kennedy administration, however, went in the opposite direction: it considered 
amending the original McMahon Act of 1946 a mistake and therefore sought to terminate the 
independent British nuclear force as well as the French nuclear force. Its policies were therefore 
stricter than the law. As the French historians Marcel Duval and Pierre Mélandri observed in 
discussing the Franco-American nuclear relationship, “Republicans have generally showed 
themselves to be more realist, and Democrats more idealist.”49 One consequence was that there 
was more tension in the Franco-American relationship than there might have been. 
 As for de Gaulle, he does not appear to have been principally opposed to purchasing 
American nuclear technology,50 although he told Nixon in July 1963 that he could not conceive 
of any American government helping the French nuclear program.51 De Gaulle was, in addition, 
not averse to coordinating nuclear strategies. “When the time comes,” he wrote to Kennedy on 
January 11, 1962, “it will no doubt be advisable to organize the combined use of the Western 
nuclear armaments.”52 He just did not want to openly request American assistance nor would he 
have accepted any constraints on his policy of independence. “This is not a man who confuses 
tactics and strategy; he will not go in what he believes to be the wrong strategic direction merely 
because it is tactically easier to get there,” one memorandum of the Kennedy years correctly 
observed. “He would rather move toward what he considers the right kind of Europe with a 
wasteful and expensive nuclear program than toward the wrong kind of Europe with an efficient 
nuclear program.”53 This does not mean, however, that a Franco-American accord on nuclear 
matters was entirely out of the question. 
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The second area in which a more accommodating American stance vis-à-vis de Gaulle 
appears to have been possible concerned the future of European unity. It is unlikely that Nixon 
would have identified himself as closely as Kennedy with Jean Monnet’s supranational 
conception of an integrated Europe, which was moreover due largely to George Ball’s and Dean 
Acheson’s influence during these years. Nixon would, by the same token, have been less openly 
critical than the Kennedy administration of de Gaulle’s conception of European unity built on 
the premise of the continuing preeminence of the nation-state. He would hence also have been 
more prepared to take a backseat with regard to intra-European issues, such as British membership 
of the Common Market. More generally, Nixon – like Eisenhower – might have tolerated a greater 
diversity of views within the Western alliance than Kennedy. What is more, a more detached policy 
on the part of the United States might even have had beneficial implications for the movement 
toward European unity in the 1960s. There is truth in Kissinger’s supposition that the United 
States, by adding its weight to de Gaulle’s opponents in Europe, carried partial responsibility for 
the stalemate between European federalists and confederalists during much of this decade. Even 
some American supporters of European integration felt that American policymakers were too 
deeply involved in the politics of European unification and made European federalists 
“vulnerable to Gaullist taunts that they are simply stooges of the American ‘federator.’”54 In 
addition, the Kennedy administration’s adamant support for Great Britain’s entry into the 
Common Market may have been counterproductive because it strengthened de Gaulle in his 
belief that Great Britain was America’s Trojan Horse. It also strengthened the resolve of its 
proponents, in particular the Dutch and the Belgians, not to discuss de Gaulle’s proposals for a 
political union until Great Britain had been admitted as a member. 
 Franco-American agreement was probably least likely with regard to the organization of the 
Western alliance, given de Gaulle’s fundamental opposition to NATO’s integrated military 
command structure and the importance of NATO in American foreign policy. Even so, without 
Kennedy’s radical push for an overhaul of the alliance’s strategy, the strategic debate between 
Washington and Paris would have been less antagonistic. Without Kennedy’s strategy of flexible 
response, which required centralization of military control and a substantial reinforcement of allied 
conventional forces, there might even have been more leeway to meet de Gaulle’s objections to 
military integration along the lines of the Lemnitzer-Ailleret agreement of 1967 while avoiding 
the preceding crisis prompted by the abrupt French withdrawal from NATO in 1966. There was 
always the possibility that de Gaulle would withdraw France from NATO the way he did, and he 
                                                 





might have done this irrespective of American policies, but the penchant of the Kennedy – and 
subsequently the Johnson – administration to isolate France within the Atlantic alliance also left 
Paris with few other options. 
Had Nixon been elected president in 1960, de Gaulle’s tripartite memorandum proposal 
might, in addition, have experienced a more productive second life. De Gaulle did try to generate 
interest for his proposal with Kennedy, as we have seen, but to little avail as the latter’s policies 
ran counter to the gist of this proposal. Although de Gaulle was undoubtedly also asking for too 
much by insisting on formalized coordination (as Eisenhower clearly believed), it is possible that 
Nixon would have more vigorously pursued the development of a semi-formal consultative 
mechanism with Great Britain and France. Such a mechanism might have been found less 
objectionable within the alliance with regard to non-European issues that did not directly concern 
European security, in particular since Germany had relatively few interests beyond Europe. 
Considering de Gaulle’s views on Southeast Asia, such tripartite consultation might at least have 
helped to avert America’s ill-advised march into the Vietnamese quagmire. Alas, history does not 
reveal its alternatives. 
 
Was De Gaulle’s Foreign Policy Design Superior? 
In May 1963, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote to Arthur Schlesinger Jr. from Paris that de Gaulle had 
a mobilizing vision on a Europe ‘from the Atlantic to the Urals’ whereas – to his regret – the 
United States did not: “That is why in the final analysis his views are politically more 
compelling.”55 “The irony of Franco-American rivalry,” Henry Kissinger likewise observed in 1965, 
“is that de Gaulle has conceptions greater than his strength, while the United States power has been 
greater than its conceptions.”56 Even Dean Acheson had to admit the difficulty in the American 
governmental system of forging a unifying and appealing foreign policy vision:  
 
The great problem that the U.S. government has is that the government itself is an alliance. We 
have to carry on negotiations within the government, within the Executive Branch, and between 
the executive and legislative branches. Sometimes you even get the judges in on this. By the time 
you get something worked out, and have the press telling wrong slants about it, you are in such a 
state of confusion yourself, and your allies are so confused too, that it is remarkable that we do as 
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well as we do.57 
 
Yet neither a critical appraisal of American foreign policymaking nor of American attitudes 
towards de Gaulle, albeit justified in themselves, necessarily lead to the conclusion, drawn by 
historians such as Frédéric Bozo, that de Gaulle’s foreign policy design was superior to that of 
the United States.58 It is surely not good enough to fault the United States for not going along with 
de Gaulle’s design without acknowledging the contradictions and weaknesses of this very design. 
Four observations about this design are therefore in order. 
Firstly, one cannot help but wonder whether de Gaulle’s policy of “détente, entente, 
coopération” with the Communist bloc deserves as much credit as Bozo gives it. De Gaulle was 
able to pursue this policy comparatively risk-free as long as he did not deviate from the Western 
consensus on German reunification; this policy could only add to his stature among those in 
Europe who yearned for a relaxation of the Cold War and thereby bolster France’s position vis-à-
vis its allies. The United States had to be more cautious, however, if only because it was the 
leading power within the Western alliance and the implications of any of its actions would be far 
greater than those of France. Washington was not principally averse to lessening Cold War 
tensions after the crises over Berlin and Cuba had subsided. In the spring of 1964, Johnson 
declared himself in favor of “building bridges” with Eastern Europe – albeit not yet the Soviet 
Union – through trade contacts, mutual visits, and humanitarian aid. In the summer of 1966, he 
committed the United States to seeking relaxation in the relationship with the Soviet Union in 
order to induce a peaceful settlement of the division of Germany and Europe. But, as the 
manager of the Western alliance, Washington realized that pursuing détente was not without its 
potential drawbacks and dangers. It would only yield beneficial results if the softening on the 
Soviet side was fundamental. In the other event, the core issues of the Cold War were unlikely to 
be brought much closer to their resolution whereas the resolve of the Western alliance to stand 
its ground would likely be weakened. A rush towards détente could easily end up fanning 
European neutralism, which was never wholly absent, without causing a change-of-heart on the 
Soviet side. The challenge for the United States therefore was to engage in more constructive 
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relations with the Soviet-led bloc while avoiding the impression among the allies that they could 
let down their defensive guard. There was, in addition, always the risk that an active policy of 
détente would encourage Eastern European countries to attempt to break free from Soviet 
domination while the West did not have the wherewithal to come to their assistance in the case 
of a Soviet crackdown – and thus would end in a repeat of the Hungarian crisis of 1956.  
De Gaulle realized that a policy of détente was not without its pitfalls, but he largely 
relied on his personal skill as a tactician to avoid these. In spite of the apparent warmth of the 
Franco-Russian relationship, for instance, he did not waver from the official Western position on 
German reunification (although he made clear that he did not consider it an urgent issue). De 
Gaulle also stressed the gradual character of his policy, presenting détente as a succession of 
small deliberate steps which would – as part of an organic evolution – develop into entente and 
ultimately coopération between all European countries. At the end of the road, the Cold War 
presumably would have lost its meaning. This required a steady hand to guide events without 
provoking the powers-that-be in such a way that the evolution of East-West relations would be 
set back for years. De Gaulle, for instance, privately expressed his concern that Czech reformers 
such as Dubcek were “going too quickly, and too far.”59 When the Prague Spring was crushed in 
August 1968, he intimated that German policies had contributed to provoking the Soviet-led 
invasion.  
However, it is hard to escape the conclusion that de Gaulle overestimated the degree to 
which détente could be controlled once the jinni was out of the bottle. He was furthermore 
overplaying his hand by pursuing a rapprochement with Eastern Europe independently from his 
allies while the Soviet Union continued to regard the United States as its main interlocutor. The 
Kremlin even seems to have preferred to deal with Washington out of a residual wariness of 
German revanchism, which it feared could not be contained by France once unleashed. On the 
core issues of the Cold War there was very little ‘give’ in the Soviet position. The prospect of an 
entente between Paris and Moscow which went beyond the pomp and ceremony of state visits 
and bilateral cooperation in strictly confined areas was hence remote, and this seems to have been 
better understood in Washington than in Paris.  
De Gaulle also overestimated the degree to which the Soviet leadership was capable of 
letting go of control. The clampdown on the Prague Spring – as well as the one in Poland 
thirteen years later – made clear that political liberalization in Eastern Europe would remain 
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stagnant without a comparable political conversion in the Soviet Union. As long as Moscow was 
determined to retain a firm grip on its Eastern European satellites, i.e. until Mikhail Gorbachev 
began his failed effort to reform the Soviet system, the prospect of a fundamental relaxation of 
East-West relations – let alone a dissipation of the blocs – was practically nil.  
This brings us to a more fundamental question: was a policy which was singularly 
designed to ‘overcoming the blocs’ necessarily the right policy in bringing an end to the Cold War? 
De Gaulle had described the political liberalization in Czechoslovakia in 1968 as “but an episode 
in the inevitable process of gradually relaxing Russian control over the countries of the socialist 
bloc.” He had presented it as evidence that the “politics of blocs” was gradually giving way.  In 
the wake of the crackdown, the French government officially stated that the crackdown was the 
result of the “politics of blocs which has been imposed on Europe as a result of the Yalta 
agreements,” thereby extending the responsibility to the United States. The aim of ‘overcoming 
the blocs’ was popular in France, but it blurred fundamental distinctions between the two sides in 
the Cold War. The two blocs did not operate on the same political or moral plane. As the 
historian John Lewis Gaddis pointed out, “one only needs to contrast Hungary’s attempted 
departure from the Warsaw Pact in 1956 with France’s actual departure from its military role in 
NATO,” to understand the difference between the two Cold War alliances.60 The verdict which 
the Czech crisis placed on de Gaulle’s conception of ending the Cold War through a dissipation 
of the blocs was evident to most French officials, too, who strove to warm up the bilateral 
relationship with the United States in its aftermath. In the final analysis, the Cold War ended 
because the Soviet system, which hinged on repression, was deeply flawed and unable to 
withstand the economic, military-technological and the ideological contest with the West. The 
Western alliance, meanwhile, was able to maintain its political cohesion and vitality in part 
because of the American ability to orchestrate unity while allowing for a measure of diversity and 
dissent. 
Secondly, de Gaulle’s approach to the German question also appears less than convincing. 
This is far from saying that he made no contribution to the normalization of relations between 
France and Germany. On the contrary, de Gaulle’s politics of reconciliation with Adenauer, 
culminating in his triumphal visit of 1962 and the Franco-German Treaty of 1963, constitutes 
one of his positive political legacies. Yet de Gaulle was unable to rid French foreign policy of its 
ambivalence toward German power. His rapprochement with Germany always assumed that 
France could somehow retain the lead. De Gaulle’s ambivalence about the prospect of German 
                                                 





reunification was not merely the result of fears of a deep-rooted German bellicosity, although 
these always lurked in the background. Rather, de Gaulle was concerned about the obvious 
implications of such an event for the balance of power within the Franco-German relationship 
and consequently of the relative influence of France within Europe. De Gaulle’s politics of 
détente was at least in part designed to establish France as the East’s natural partner in the West 
with regard to the conditions under which Germany could be reunified. It is, in addition, hard to 
believe that the force de dissuasion was not also thought of in Paris as removing any remaining 
French insecurities about a future German military threat.61 There was thus an unarticulated 
French interest in Germany’s prolonged state of dependency, since it compelled Bonn to defer to 
Paris on matters requiring leadership in Western Europe. His approach to Germany was also not 
dissimilar to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s self-deluding comparison of the British-
American relationship with the ancient one between the Greek and the Romans, i.e. a 
relationship in which the power of the latter was employed to good effect due to the brains and 
political astuteness of the former. 
This ambivalence led to a duplicity in the French attitude toward German reunification 
that rendered French policies largely ineffective when the circumstances to achieve reunification 
arose. De Gaulle’s policy of ‘overcoming the blocs,’ if successful, would have led to a Europe 
‘from the Atlantic to the Urals’ in which Germany – not France – was likely to become the 
predominant power next to Russia. France could hope to avoid this if it effectively blocked 
reunification, which was highly unlikely, or if, as de Gaulle seems to have hoped, it struck up the 
old alliances with Russia or Poland. However, neither strategy was likely to be as effective as two 
other possibilities for counterbalancing German strength that ran counter to other elements of 
his grand design: to deepen European integration and to forge closer links with Great Britain and 
the United States. This became, in fact, already quite clear at the end of de Gaulle’s political life. 
Evidence of Germany’s growing self-confidence, in particular its refusal to revalue the 
Deutschmark to take the pressure off the franc, in addition to the Czechoslovak crisis, caused 
him to return to his tripartite proposal – thus bringing matters to a full circle where they left off 
in 1958. Germany’s increasingly powerful monetary position within Europe and Chancellor 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik were the driving factors, too, behind the decisions at the European summit in 
The Hague of December 1969 to work towards an Economic and Monetary Union. Fear for 
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German predominance moreover prompted de Gaulle’s successor Georges Pompidou to remove 
the French veto to British entry into the European Economic Community.  
The discomfort with the prospect of German reunification shaped French policies to 
such an extent that it left François Mitterrand without a working compass when Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl, with American support, rushed to reunify Germany during the events that brought 
an end to the Cold War. The French body politic only seems to have come to terms with the 
prospect of a reunified – and hence less dependent – Germany until it seemed unavoidable. The 
reunified Germany remained a member of NATO, and the Soviet Union orientated itself on the 
United States and Germany rather than France. Mitterrand was only able to play the European 
card after the fact, when he persuaded Kohl to trade in the German Deutschmark for the 
European Economic and Monetary Union. This showed that German reunification and 
European unity were two sides of the same coin, forcing a degree of European integration which 
de Gaulle would have found objectionable.62 
Against this background, American Cold War policies vis-à-vis Germany look rather less 
dismal. Ever since the Truman-Acheson days, German reunification on favorable terms to the 
West was the mainstay of American policies towards Europe. From the American perspective the 
challenge had been twofold: to reconstruct West Germany into a reliable partner and to coax 
jittery European allies into accepting it as an equal. American policymakers were above all 
determined not to feed into a latent German revanchism. They felt hence compelled, sometimes 
to an excessive degree, to test European policies for their impact on German political opinion. It 
led to ill-considered policies such as Kennedy’s campaign against the French nuclear force and 
the MLF. But on the central question of German reunification it is difficult to fault American 
policies. 
Thirdly, it is equally difficult to see how the United States could have accepted de 
Gaulle’s claim for France to speak for Europe, certainly not in combination with his belief in the 
perennial preeminence of the nation-state. Charles Bohlen fittingly argued, in a long analysis in 
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August 1963, that “Gaullism is essentially French nationalism [...]. It is also European nationalism, 
but in a very vague form in view of the basic contradiction between French nationalism and any 
serious form of European unity.”63 There was a basic contradiction between, on the one hand, de 
Gaulle’s unrestricted exercise of national sovereignty and his aim of an independent foreign 
policy and, on the other hand, his view of a ‘Europe’ that would speak as a unit independently of 
the two superpowers. De Gaulle’s assumption that France could claim leadership in Western 
Europe and that this claim would be found acceptable by the other Europeans was an inherent 
flaw in his design as well. American deference to French leadership in Europe would have had to 
rest on the assumption that the European allies could indeed unify around this claim. Most 
Europeans, however, preferred the more distant leadership of the United States to the 
domination by one – or by a selected few – of their European neighbors. It was a political reality 
that Washington could not ignore. This reality consistently interfered with any attempt to come 
to terms with de Gaulle’s initiatives; it is, for instance, evident in Eisenhower’s response to de 
Gaulle’s memorandum of September 1958. In this regard, his biographer Lacouture’s judgment 
of de Gaulle’s proposals for European political unity is on the mark: 
 
It was a splendid plan, but its major fault was to presuppose that France was the heart, the soul, 
the kernel of Europe; that the shared hope of Europeans, French and non-French, lay in 
independence rather than in security; and that the influence of France seemed less of a threat to 
their liberty than the hegemony of the United States.64 
 
Finally, the achievement of de Gaulle’s foreign policy aims was far more dependent on 
the continued American involvement in Europe than he purported it to be. We have already 
concluded that by the end of 1968, de Gaulle was interested in strengthening ties with the 
‘Anglo-Saxons’ in order to offset growing German power and assertiveness. He was indebted to 
the Americans in various other ways for the success of his foreign policy. By opposing American 
policies and warding off America’s presence in Europe, de Gaulle could raise the international 
standing of France and enhance the symbolic value of his foreign policy of independence and 
grandeur. Yet the efficacy of this method hinged on the very American commitment to European 
security.65 De Gaulle’s intransigence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the Berlin crisis of 1961, for 
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instance, served to enhance his prestige with Adenauer while being entirely dependent on 
Kennedy’s preparedness to take military action if push came to shove. Kennedy’s less 
intransigent stance, at the same time, helped to reinforce doubts about the American security 
guarantee, which in turn greatly strengthened the French case for an independent nuclear force. 
The strategic value of this force would nonetheless lie in part in its ability to trigger the much 
larger American nuclear force. The point is that all of this could only work as long as the United 
States remained committed to European security, for France would otherwise be left to face the 
potential consequences of its brinkmanship alone. This commitment also enabled de Gaulle to 
withdraw France from NATO without any repercussions for French security. He justified this 
move on the grounds that NATO was a fig leaf for American dominance. Yet, he was able to do 
it free of risk precisely because NATO was there to stay and the United States would remain 
committed to defend Germany. De Gaulle was moreover careful enough to preserve some of the 
benefits of NATO, such as access to its early warning air defense system without which the 
French nuclear force would be – as Walt Rostow once remarked – “deaf, dumb, and blind.” 
In sum, there were also good reasons for the United States not to consent in de Gaulle’s 
vision. De Gaulle possessed a compellingly broad view on world affairs. But this view was the 
product of a particularly French perspective with limited support within Europe. It was moreover 
not without important internal contradictions. Its coherence stemmed mainly from the fact that it 
was a rational defense of French national interests on the basis of a clearly recognizable – but hardly 
uncontroversial – set of principles. As a strategic design removed from its national context, however, 
it holds up less well.  
Atlantis Lost – The Paradigm Shift in American Views of Europe 
The extent to which de Gaulle’s policy of independence influenced American policies toward 
Europe is often overlooked. Conventional wisdom holds that the French challenge to American 
leadership within the Western alliance had little effect. 66  De Gaulle’s Cold War revisionism 
certainly did not end the bipolar alignment or the United States’ hegemonic position in Western 
Europe. NATO, too, survived the French withdrawal. De Gaulle furthermore failed in his effort 
to organize Europe around a Franco-German union led by France and independent of the 
United States. Washington’s response to de Gaulle’s actions had much to do with these failures; 
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as Acheson said in the wake of de Gaulle’s thunderbolts in early 1963, “the power of the U.S. to 
shape the inevitable for de Gaulle is immense.”67 Neither was de Gaulle successful in eliminating 
the federalist inspiration behind the movement toward European unity. The ‘European’ Europe 
of nation-states, stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, did not materialize during his lifetime. 
“I could understand the disenchantment that de Gaulle showed towards the end of his life,” his 
antipode Jean Monnet therefore wrote, “when he looked at that part of his work which he had 
failed to complete on a scale that was worthy of his destiny.”68 
De Gaulle’s policy of independence and grandeur nonetheless had an impact on 
American policies toward Europe in a number of important ways. Firstly, as Walt Rostow 
admitted, the European policies of in particular the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations 
were to a considerable degree born out of a desire to contain de Gaulle’s nationalist defiance.69 
This was, for instance, the case with Kennedy’s design for an Atlantic partnership and with the 
MLF proposal, both of which would not have occupied a central place in American foreign 
policy in the absence of the specter of Gaullism. It also holds true for Johnson’s growing 
emphasis on détente from 1966 onwards, as this emphasis in part resulted from the need to 
regain the political initiative in response to the NATO crisis prompted by the French withdrawal 
and to de Gaulle’s early overtures towards the Communist bloc. The crisis of 1966, as Andreas 
Wenger put it, was moreover “instrumental in the shift from the bilateral superpower détente of 
1963 to the multilateral European détente of the 1970s.”70 De Gaulle’s withdrawal from NATO 
thus gave occasion to the NATO-ization of détente.  
Secondly, French policies forced the United States to face up to new strategic realities. 
The coming into being of the French nuclear force, for one, added a center of atomic 
decisionmaking in the alliance that introduced the prospect of the “French nuclear tail wagging 
the NATO dog.” 71  American strategic thinkers such as Albert Wohlstetter were wrong to 
discount the military value of the force de dissuasion. Both Pierre Gallois’s doctrine of proportional 
deterrence and André Beaufre’s doctrine of multilateral deterrence had an irresistible military 
logic to them. Would not the slightest risk of French atomic bombs exploding over Kiev and 
Moscow make the Kremlin think twice before engaging in any large-scale aggression in Europe? 
Would not the existence of more than one center of decision in the West complicate Soviet 
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decisionmaking and hence strengthen deterrence?72 The first generation of the French nuclear 
force became partially operational in the fall of 1963 with the delivery of plutonium bombs to six 
Mirage IV bombers; by 1966, the planned force of fifty bombers was operational and scattered 
over nine airfields. This was a small but not negligible nuclear capability. “Although questions 
were raised in the 1960s about the planes’ vulnerability to a first strike, and their ability to 
penetrate the Soviet air defense system, the likelihood that a few would survive to deliver their 
bombs could not be discounted,” Michael Harrison judged.73 Moreover, the next generations of 
the French nuclear force, in particular the missile-launched nuclear submarines, the first of which 
became operational in the early 1970s, were to be more effective. 
 Similarly, de Gaulle’s policies with regard to the movement toward European unity 
created unwanted realities from the American vantage point. De Gaulle twice vetoed British 
membership, reducing the opportunities for the United States to influence European affairs 
through the ‘special relationship.’ Although de Gaulle was unable to eliminate European 
federalism altogether, he was successful – through his ‘empty chair’ policy – in imposing an 
intergovernmental approach that respected the principle of national sovereignty as well as the 
protectionist-minded common agricultural policy. French economic policies helped to transform 
the Common Market into an economic rival to the United States rather than the hoped-for 
bulwark of free trade. By the end of the 1960s, the Common Market had thus travelled a 
different road from the one that American supporters of European integration – the friends of 
Jean Monnet – had envisioned earlier. For this, de Gaulle was chiefly responsible. 
De Gaulle’s policy of independence thus revealed as well as defined the limits of 
American power in Europe. His return to power in 1958 heralded the end of easy American 
postwar predominance in Western Europe. “In spite of its untidiness,” George Ball revealed in his 
memoirs, “I had always liked the Fourth Republic; its very weakness was its most attractive virtue, 
because it was incapable of resisting the accommodations in favor of a greater Europe which I 
believed necessary.”74 One of de Gaulle’s innovations was therefore his exercise of ‘le pouvoir de 
dire non,’ in particular his ability to say ‘no’ to the schemes of the more powerful United States. 
More than any other European leader, he brought fundamental differences within the Western 
alliance to light about the nature of the transatlantic relationship and the future of Europe. 
Instead of a gradually evolving Atlantic community, there was – as a committee of the House of 
Representatives concluded after a study mission to Europe in 1967 – “an increasing cleavage 
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between the attitudes that prevail in the United States and those currently held by our European 
allies.”75 This brings us to our final observation. 
As a result of the experience of dealing with de Gaulle and of the political and historical 
context in which Americans judged his policies, the Gaullist challenge to the United States put a 
stamp upon American perceptions and expectations of the transatlantic relationship. “Europe 
would never look to America with quite the same reverence after de Gaulle,” the American historian 
William Hitchcock observed.76 This study suggests that America would never look at Europe with 
quite the same affinity and sense of involvement. 
We have already noted in the introduction to this study that the pervasive idea among 
American policymakers of an evolving Atlantic community, built on the Cold War nexus between 
North America and Europe and on the institutions that were being created in its wake, had the 
features of a foreign policy ‘paradigm.’77 Challenges to a ruling paradigm may result in a paradigm 
‘crisis,’ in which case there may actually be competing paradigms, leading to a paradigm ‘shift,’ 
which means that the original paradigm has undergone significant change or has been replaced 
with a new paradigm as a result of the crisis. 
The same sequence can be observed in the Franco-American relationship from 1958 to 
1969. Strengthening the Atlantic community was undeniably part of American strategic 
conventional wisdom at the beginning of this period. This was the result – as explained earlier – 
of the requirements of the Cold War and the notion’s ability to wed the liberal and conservative 
political traditions in support of a bipartisan foreign policy and reconcile longstanding 
ambivalences about Europe. Notwithstanding its inherent ambiguity, the goal of an Atlantic 
community presented a more or less coherent set of beliefs or assumptions about the 
transatlantic relationship that served as a guide for thought and action – and hence can described 
as a foreign policy paradigm. This paradigm was challenged by de Gaulle in various ways, leading 
to a crisis. American and French views of the transatlantic relationship were actually competing 
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paradigms, each demanding its separate world view. American reactions to de Gaulle’s policy 
statements were so vehement because many felt that the United States had given generously to 
enable Europe to recover from World War II and grow strong in unison with the United States. 
Yet now this very strength – under de Gaulle’s leadership – appeared to threaten the alliance with 
Europe itself and to return Europe to the age of narrow-minded nationalism. From Washington’s 
point of view, de Gaulle’s ‘deviant’ policies and frequent public disagreements put at risk the 
fundamental achievements of American policy in Europe since World War II. “We were not 
concerned at the prospect of Europe devoting its energies to its own genuine, political interests, 
for we were convinced that these interests would be identical with our own,” Dean Rusk told a 
French journalist in 1964. “But we were concerned at the thesis that in order to be genuine, 
European interests would necessarily have to be different from those of the United States.”78 
De Gaulle’s frequent clashes with the United States ultimately helped to force a paradigm 
shift in American perceptions of the transatlantic relationship. This shift entailed the loss of the 
notion that the United States and Western Europe were part of a budding Atlantic community in 
which political and institutional ties were to become ever tighter. It also meant the ambition to 
assume a leadership role in strengthening either Atlantic or European integration was abandoned, 
the former because it no longer appeared realistic and the latter because it was no longer 
unequivocally perceived to be in the American national interest. The disenchantment with the 
pace and direction of European integration, which had begun under Johnson, was reflected in the 
policies of Nixon and Kissinger. By the late 1960s, the United States had clearly become of two 
minds about the objective of a united Europe. Even a stallwart supporter of European 
integration like J. Robert Schaetzel wrote in retrospect that “the excitement of the 1950s and ‘60s 
in a bold and exciting adventure has been lost as the [European] Community flounders in 
bewildering detail, endless national wrangling and shows little evidence of becoming the ‘United 
States of Europe.’”79 The United States still had – and has – overwhelming interests in Europe. 
However, it had lost interest in either Europe or the transatlantic relationship as a challenging 
building ground. What emerged from the Franco-American clash of the 1960s was a United 
States more attuned to the national interest as well as a Europe more aware of ‘European’ 
interests. The American ability to read its national interest in the broadest possible terms 
diminished. The Europeanization of Europe, as Ralf Dahrendorf observed, was by the early 
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1970s reciprocated in the Americanization of America.80 In the process, the liberal pipedream of 
an Atlantic community as a scaled-down world community vanished and made place for an 
Atlanticism grounded in realism. 
It would be going too far to explain this shift in American transatlantic attitudes from de 
Gaulle’s policy of independence alone. While the idea of an Atlantic community had been 
influential among American policymakers, it was inevitably blighted by the most often more 
pragmatic and short-term considerations customary at the top level of decisionmaking. At this 
level, where issues and crises had to be confronted squarely and without much time for reflection, 
national requirements often prevailed. “As a motivating ideal in Atlantic politics, the vision of an 
increasingly comprehensive and institutionalized political structure – an Atlantic commonwealth 
– was never quite plausible […],” Francis Bator therefore wrote in hindsight. “Neither we nor the 
Europeans have been ready for it.”81 Developments in the Cold War, the tragedy of the Vietnam 
War, the United States’ relative economic decline, the domestic turmoil in the second half of the 
1960s – all of these also contributed to a lessening of interest among Americans in strengthening 
the transatlantic relationship. Underlying this shift, too, was the fading of the bipartisan foreign 
policy generation – the so-called Establishment that determined the gist of America’s postwar 
policies – and the fragmentation of the foreign policy elite into opposing ideological camps.  
Yet dealing with de Gaulle was an important and demoralizing experience for many 
American policymakers. There was a palpable sense of disillusionment among those who had 
spent their public careers strengthening the transatlantic relationship and supporting European 
integration. Dean Rusk voiced his disappointment as follows:  
 
My chief regret […] is that Europe has drawn into itself and is not playing the role on the world 
scene that is waiting for Europe to play. The United States is too lonely as a world power. We 
need to have others associated with us, and we ought not to be the only ones who have some 
capability of action in all parts of the world. Now, a unified Europe could play that role. But a 
Europe of national states is not likely to be able to play a leading role as one of the great powers.82 
 
Someone like Schaetzel ended his long diplomatic career on a similar note of 
disappointment and even bitterness. For a decade he had been in official positions of influence, 
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first as deputy assistant secretary of state for Atlantic Affairs and then as ambassador to the 
European Communities, but it was a decade of precious little achievement in which the 
atmospherics of the transatlantic relationship had only deteriorated. “The soft-background music 
of Atlantic harmony and devotion to Europe cannot block out the public memories of years of 
errors and omissions, interrupted by sharp charges and angry responses,” Schaetzel concluded in 
1975. Neither did Great Britain’s long hoped-for entry into the Common Market in 1973 bring 
new life to the European integration movement. “Britain turned from earnest new member into 
neo-Gaullist, obstructive, threatening withdrawal,” Schaetzel wrote. “Gaullism was alive and well 
in Brussels, only the language of obstruction was now English.” These were the years of 
‘Europessimism,’ marked by economic and political stagnation, the oil crisis after the Yom 
Kippur war of 1973, and Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974. But, in Schaetzel’s view, the 
problem lay in Washington, too. For Nixon’s and Kissinger’s conduct of diplomacy 
corresponded to “the instincts of the European pragmatists and the universal surge of 
nationalism.”83 Schaetzel’s disappointment with the state of affairs in Europe was therefore also a 
disappointment with America itself. 
Many American policymakers held de Gaulle’s policies from 1958 to 1969 responsible for 
this state of affairs. De Gaulle had let the jinni of European nationalism out of the bottle that 
America had made.  “It is a great pity,” wrote Ball in 1968,  
 
that General de Gaulle should have led that attack [the nationalist counterattack against rapid 
progress in European unity], that he should have put his extraordinary skills at the service of an 
outworn cause. For he – as no other man – had the charisma and authority and the iron will to 
lead Europe firmly and steadily toward unity. [...] He could well have been the first president of 
some early form of European state.”84 
 
And in his memoirs, Ball judged that de Gaulle had been “one of the destructive elements in the 
larger chemistry of the West. […] It is a tragedy [for the European people] not only for the 
breakage caused, but – what is even more poignant – because of the opportunity missed.”85 
In response to the French withdrawal from NATO, Harold van B. Cleveland explained 
the disenchantment as follows:  
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What seems to trouble Americans [about the current state of Atlantic affairs] is that they expected 
something better – much better. They expected an Atlantic relationship in which conflicts of 
national interest, far from growing, would gradually give way to increasing cooperation and, in 
Western Europe’s case, to supranational union. They were not prepared to find themselves 
involved in the seemingly indefinite exercise of power which is no longer unambiguously desired 
by their European allies.86 
 
Acheson, of course, had never shunned the exercise of power. But he, too, sounded a 
note of disappointment at the end of the decade, holding de Gaulle’s “nationalist separatism” 
accountable for sapping the life out of NATO and encouraging the return of American 
isolationism.87 In his memoirs, which appeared in 1969 (and won the Pulitzer Prize in 1970), he 
pondered the results of his years at the helm:  
 
To the responsibilities and needs of that time the nation summoned an imaginative effort unique 
in history and even greater than that made in the preceding period of fighting. All who served in 
those years had an opportunity to give more than a sample of their best. Yet an account of the 
experience, despite its successes, inevitably leaves a sense of disappointment and frustration, for 
the achievements fell short of both hope and need. How often what seemed almost within grasp 
slipped away. Alas, that is life. We cannot live our dreams.88 
 
Acheson’s words corresponded with the decline of the Establishment that had shaped 
American foreign policy since the late 1940s. President Nixon still turned to the elder statesman 
for advice despite their earlier animosity – and the latter felt it incumbent upon him to furnish it 
out of a reverence for the presidential office. But Acheson was no longer the towering presence 
over American foreign policy representing the illustrious postwar generation of diplomats. His 
death in October 1971, at the age of seventy-eight, marked the end of an era.  
“To the future historian, the unity and vitality of the North Atlantic Community, evoked 
by the challenges our time, may well appear to be the outstanding event of the twentieth 
century,” three American supporters of the Atlantic community idea declared in 1963. 89  This 
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statement rings hollow now. For many Americans, in the course of dealing with de Gaulle, 
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ATLANTIS VERLOREN. AMERIKA EN DE GAULLE VAN 1958 TOT 1969 
 
Geschiedkundigen en politicologen hebben ruime aandacht gegeven aan De Gaulle’s markante 
buitenlandse politiek van 1958 tot 1969. Dat geldt niet voor de – vaak felle – reacties op deze 
politiek. In de Verenigde Staten bijvoorbeeld riep De Gaulle reacties op die nog onvoldoende zijn 
onderzocht en verklaard. Geschiedkundigen hebben de ups and downs in de Amerikaans-Franse 
betrekkingen van 1958 tot 1969 meestal verklaard uit de opeenvolgende fasen in De Gaulle’s 
buitenlandse politiek. Een goed begrip van de reflexen aan Amerikaanse kant en van hun 
uiteenlopende karakter is hiervoor echter eveneens van belang.  
Ook is er over het algemeen weinig aandacht voor de gevolgen van De Gaulle’s buitenlandse 
politiek voor het Amerikaanse verhouding met Europa en de ontwikkeling van de 
transatlantische relatie. Hoewel de Koude Oorlog tot 1989 de internationale verhoudingen zou 
blijven bepalen (en daarmee ook de Amerikaanse betrokkenheid bij de Europese veiligheid), is in 
de jaren zestig in het Amerikaanse beleid een verschuiving aanwijsbaar naar realisme en een 
grotere afstandelijkheid jegens Europa. Deze verschuiving kan niet los worden gezien van De 
Gaulle’s streven naar een ‘onafhankelijke’ Franse – en Europese – positie in de wereldpolitiek. 
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt en analyseert daarom de reacties in de Verenigde Staten op de 
buitenlandse politiek van president Charles de Gaulle van Frankrijk in het kader van de 
ontwikkeling van de verhouding tussen Amerika en Europa. Het geeft antwoord op drie vragen:  
 
1. Hoe interpreteerden Amerikanen De Gaulle’s buitenlandse politiek in het licht van hun 
ideeën en opvattingen over de transatlantische relatie? 
2. Hoe gingen de verschillende Amerikaanse regeringen in de periode van 1958 tot 1969 om 
met de uitdagingen die De Gaulle in het kader van de transatlantische relatie stelde? 
3. Had De Gaulle’s streven naar een ‘onafhankelijke’ buitenlandse politiek gevolgen voor 
het beleid van de Verenigde Staten jegens Europa en het Atlantische bondgenootschap? 
 
De reikwijdte van het Amerikaans-Franse debat tussen 1958 en 1969 over de toekomst van 
Europa en van de transatlantische relatie overtrof die van welk debat tussen bondgenoten ook. 
De transatlantische context waarin dit debat zich ontvouwde, wordt in de proefschrift dan ook 
breed opgevat. De militair-strategische, politieke, economische, monetaire en sociaal-culturele 
aspecten van de transatlantische relatie passeren de revue. De Amerikaanse percepties van en 
reacties op De Gaulle worden voorts met nadruk verklaard tegen de achtergrond van het 
historisch gegroeide denken in de Verenigde Staten over Europa en van de politieke tradities in 
het Amerikaanse buitenlandse beleid. Dit proefschrift is daardoor ook een ideeëngeschiedenis. 
Bijzondere aandacht gaat daarbij uit naar het in het begin van de Koude Oorlog in zwang 
geraakte idee dat Amerika en Europa stapsgewijs naar elkaar zouden toegroeien in een ‘Atlantic 
community’. Het idee van een ook in institutionele zin alsmaar hechter wordende transatlantische 
gemeenschap stond haaks op het streven van De Gaulle naar een ‘onafhankelijke’ buitenlandse 
politiek. Dat dit idee in de Amerikaanse buitenlandse politiek aan het eind van de jaren zestig aan 
zeggingskracht belangrijk had ingeboet, valt hiervan evenmin los te zien. 
 
BRONNEN 
Voor dit proefschrift is uitvoerig bronnenonderzoek verricht in de volgende presidentiële 
archieven van de National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in de Verenigde Staten: 
de Harry S Truman Library in Independence (Missouri), de Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in 
Abilene (Kansas), de John F. Kennedy Library in Boston (Massachussetts), de Lyndon B. 
Johnson Library in Austin (Texas) en het Nixon Presidential Materials Project in College Park 





Center in Middelburg en van de documenten over de Harmel-exercitie van 1967 die de Navo in 
2004 op het internet plaatste. Het Amerikaanse State Department heeft voorts veel documenten 
afgedrukt in de serie Foreign Relations of the United States, waarvan in dit proefschrift dankbaar 
gebruik is gemaakt. 
 
INDELING 
Het proefschrift bestaat uit twee delen. In het eerste deel worden de gezichtspunten met 
betrekking tot de buitenlandse politiek en de transatlantische relatie van De Gaulle en in de 
Verenigde Staten geanalyseerd. Deze hoofdstukken bieden het interpretatiekader voor de rest van 
het proefschrift. Het tweede deel bestaat uit zeven min of meer chronologisch gerangschikte 
hoofdstukken, die ieder analyseren hoe de Amerikaanse regering reageerde op de Franse 
uitdaging rondom een centraal thema in de transatlantische relatie. Het laatste hoofdstuk 
beschrijft hoe en waarom aan het einde van De Gaulle’s presidentschap de bilaterale 
betrekkingen, na in 1967 een dieptepunt te hebben bereikt, een opmerkelijke toenadering te zien 
gaven. 
 
Deel I – Separate Worlds, Different Visions 
1 – From the Atlantic to the Urals 
In het eerste hoofdstuk worden De Gaulle’s buitenlandspolitieke uitgangspunten en diens 
opvattingen over de Verenigde Staten vóór 1958 ontleed. Hoewel voor De Gaulle het nationale 
belang van Frankrijk voorop stond, kan hij niet als nationalist in enge zin worden gekenschetst. 
Zeker zo belangrijk was zijn politieke conservatisme. In buitenlandspolitiek opzicht was hij een 
realist met een scherp oog voor de krachtsverhoudingen tussen staten. Hij had echter ook oog 
voor het belang van zelfbeheersing en nam daarbij een voorbeeld aan de pre-ideologische raison 
d’État diplomatie van het Ancien Régime. De invloed van de Romantiek deed zich vooral gelden in 
zijn neiging de buitenlandse politiek van landen – ook die van de Verenigde Staten – te herleiden 
tot een nationaal karakter dat berust op geografische gegevens en historische ervaringen. De 
Gaulle toonde zich voorstander van de modernisering en de liberalisering van de Franse 
economie, maar hij stond kritisch tegenover de maatschappelijke gevolgen van het industriële 
kapitalisme. Hij hechtte daarom geloof aan een Europees beschavingsmodel waarin de Franse 
cultuur een – zo niet hét – hoogtepunt vormde, en dat zich onderscheidde van zowel het 
communisme als van het in zijn ogen ongebreidelde en waardenarme Amerikaanse kapitalisme. 
De Gaulle’s ideeën over Europese samenwerking kregen tijdens en kort na de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog vorm. In zijn uitspraken daarover zijn twee niveaus zichtbaar: het geografische 
Europa (“van de Atlantische Oceaan tot aan de Oeral”) en de economische en politieke 
samenwerking tussen landen in West-Europa. Van vrede op het Europese continent kon volgens 
De Gaulle alleen sprake zijn als de Europese natiestaten er in zouden slagen een duurzaam 
evenwicht (‘equilibrium’) te bereiken, enigszins vergelijkbaar met het negentiende-eeuwse 
Concert van Europa. De opkomst van Duitsland na 1870 had de krachtsverhoudingen in Europa 
uit balans gebracht. Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog zag De Gaulle de kans op een hernieuwd 
evenwicht verstoord door de uitbreiding van de Europese invloedssfeer van de Sovjet-Unie en 
door de overheersing van de Verenigde Staten. Enerzijds riep de groeiende rivaliteit tussen de 
twee supermachten het spookbeeld op van een nieuwe en nog verschrikkelijker oorlog, anderzijds 
waren zij volgens De Gaulle juist geneigd tot een (stilzwijgend) akkoord dat hun overwicht intact 
liet. De centrale vraag voor De Gaulle’s naoorlogse buitenlandse politiek was daarom hoe 
Frankrijk zijn veiligheid en invloed kon waarborgen in een Europa waarin de Verenigde Staten en 
de Sovjet-Unie de lakens uitdeelden en waarin Duitsland van nature de overige Europese landen 
dreigde te overvleugelen. Tegen deze achtergrond en om Frankrijk een nieuw platform te bieden 
waarop het een leiderschapsrol kon vervullen, zag De Gaulle belang in nauwere politieke en 





In De Gaulle’s verhoopte Europese evenwicht was slechts een rol op afstand weggelegd 
voor de Verenigde Staten, al was hij voorstander van hun militaire betrokkenheid bij Europa om 
het Sovjet-gevaar te bezweren. Hij was ervan overtuigd dat Frankrijk – en West Europa – zich 
voor zijn veiligheid nimmer geheel op hen zou kunnen verlaten. Tegelijkertijd vreesde hij, 
gesterkt door zijn ervaringen in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, de Amerikaanse neiging tot 
overheersing meer dan de terugkeer van het Amerikaanse isolationisme.  
 
2 – The Atlantic “Community” in American Foreign Policy 
Om de Amerikaanse reacties op De Gaulle te kunnen verklaren en beoordelen, worden in het 
tweede hoofdstuk de historische ontwikkeling van de Amerikaanse verhouding tot Europa 
alsmede het eerder genoemde idee van een ontluikende Atlantische ‘gemeenschap’ (‘Atlantic 
community’) geanalyseerd. Voor een goed begrip van beiden is inzicht in de politieke ideeën die 
op de Amerikaanse buitenlandse politiek inwerken van belang. In de Amerikaanse buitenlandse 
politiek is in dat opzicht van oudsher sprake van een wisselwerking tussen een conservatieve en 
een liberale traditie, die ieder een internationalistische en een isolationistische stroming kennen. 
Deze wisselwerking gaat vaak gepaard met botsingen, maar heeft van tijd tot tijd ook geleid tot 
syntheses. Voor het onderwerp van dit proefschrift is van belang dat na de Tweede Wereldoorlog 
sprake was van een synthese tussen de internationalistische varianten van het conservatisme en 
het liberalisme, die de Amerikaanse buitenlandse politiek van eind jaren veertig tot eind jaren 
zestig beheerste. Deze synthese kenmerkte zich door de wens de nieuwe wereldorde te vestigen 
op grond van liberale beginselen (democratie, vrijhandel, internationaal recht) én door de 
bereidheid machtspolitiek te bedrijven tegen het communistische gevaar. Zij werd belichaamd 
door een ‘foreign policy establishment’ dat nauwe banden onderhield met zowel de 
Democratische als de Republikeinse partij en dat vastbesloten was een terugkeer naar het 
isolationisme van de jaren twintig en dertig te voorkomen. De synthese van liberalisme en 
conservatisme kwam bijzonder goed tot uitdrukking in het gedachtegoed van Dean Acheson, die 
als Trumans minister van Buitenlandse Zaken grote invloed uitoefende op de naoorlogse 
internationale politieke orde waarin De Gaulle verandering wilde brengen. Als adviseur van 
Kennedy en Johnson was Acheson bovendien nauw betrokken bij het formuleren van het 
Amerikaanse antwoord op De Gaulle. 
Behalve de wisselwerking tussen tradities in de Amerikaanse buitenlandse politiek, is de 
historische ambivalentie in de Amerikaanse houding ten opzichte van Europa van belang. 
Affiniteit met en afwijzing van Europa hebben in de Verenigde Staten van meet af aan om de 
voorrang gestreden. Het ‘Europese vraagstuk’ werd er lange tijd vooral gedefinieerd in termen 
van afwijzing: hoe kan Amerika worden afgeschermd van de destructieve aard van de Europese 
politiek? Voor transatlantische affiniteit kwam pas echt ruimte na de Amerikaanse interventies in 
twee wereldoorlogen en in het licht van de communistische dreiging. Deze affiniteit kwam onder 
meer tot uitdrukking in het idee van een zich op de grondvesten van de Navo steeds verder 
ontwikkelende Atlantische ‘gemeenschap’. Dat dit idee vooral ook door Acheson actief werd 
gepropageerd, is geen toeval. Het hing namelijk onlosmakelijk samen met de naoorlogse 
buitenlandspolitieke synthese: de Atlantische ‘gemeenschap’ was het tussenstation waar de 
(conservatieve) voorstanders van het traditionele strategische partnerschap met het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk en de (liberale) voorstanders van een wereldgemeenschap van democratieën elkaar in 
de context van de Koude Oorlog vonden. Tegelijkertijd bleef het idee van een Atlantische 
‘gemeenschap’ doortrokken van de historische ambivalentie in de Amerikaanse houding ten 
opzichte van Europa. Het berustte op affiniteit en verbondenheid met Europa, maar dan vooral 
met het gereconstrueerde Europa van Jean Monnet – een Europa dat meer op Amerika zou gaan 
lijken. Amerikanen wezen het ‘oude’ Europa onverminderd af.  
Het Atlantische gemeenschapsidee vervulde in het kader van de Koude Oorlog 
belangrijke functies. Naast het communistische gevaar bood het een rechtvaardiging van de 





met het isolationistische verleden. Het kwam tegemoet aan de Amerikaanse voorkeur om het 
bondgenootschap als een groep gelijkgezinde landen te beschouwen waarbinnen de Verenigde 
Staten hoogstens als managers hoefden op te treden. Het bood ideologisch tegenwicht aan de 
Europese neiging tot neutralisme in de Koude Oorlog. Het bood een raamwerk waarbinnen de 
Europese integratiebeweging zich kon ontplooien op voor de Verenigde Staten aanvaardbare 
voorwaarden. Het bevorderde de opneming van Duitsland in het westerse bondgenootschap. En 
het bood perspectieven voor de samenwerking met Europese landen bij de bestrijding van het 
communisme buiten Europa. Maar het gemeenschapsidee veronderstelde ook dat er aan 
Europese zijde voldoende draagvlak voor bestond. Ook op dit punt zou president De Gaulle roet 
in het eten gooien. 
 
Deel II – Dealing With De Gaulle  
3 – Organizing the West 
In het derde hoofdstuk staat het voorstel van De Gaulle voor een nieuwe veiligheidsorganisatie in 
het Westen centraal. De Gaulle deed dit voorstel op 17 september 1958 in een vertrouwelijk 
memorandum aan Eisenhower en Macmillan, waarvan het bestaan overigens al snel uitlekte. De 
organisatie moest bestaan uit de Verenigde Staten, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Frankrijk en zou 
moeten zorgen voor de mondiale coördinatie tussen de drie landen op politiek- en militair-
strategisch niveau. In de regionale werkverdeling zou Frankrijk daarbij een bijzondere 
verantwoordelijkheid toekomen voor West-Europa en Afrika. De Gaulle leek bovendien formele 
inspraak in het Amerikaanse beleid en medezeggenschap over de inzet van Amerikaanse 
kernwapens te eisen. Het memorandum bevatte een nauw verholen dreigement: De Gaulle 
koppelde toekomstige Franse deelneming aan de Navo aan de aanvaarding van zijn voorstel. 
 Washington zat van meet af aan in de maag met De Gaulle’s voorstel. Aanvaarding was 
nauwelijks denkbaar, maar verwerping riskeerde Franse uittreding uit de Navo. Eisenhower zocht 
daarom naarstig naar een middenweg. Vooral in de nadagen van zijn presidentschap brak hij zich 
het hoofd over een oplossing en bleek hij bereid zijn Franse tegenvoeter op enkele punten 
tegemoet te komen. (Datzelfde gold in toenemende mate voor  Macmillan, die bovenal hoopte 
hierdoor De Gaulle te verzoenen met toetreding van het Verenigd Koninkrijk tot de EEG.) 
Eisenhower was bovendien voorstander van Amerikaanse steun aan het Franse 
kernwapenprogramma; het Congres verbood deze steun, waarover Eisenhower zich herhaaldelijk 
bitter beklaagde. Voor De Gaulle gingen Eisenhowers concessies niet ver genoeg. Wel deed hij in 
augustus 1960 een dramatisch aandoende poging om volledige overeenstemming over zijn 
voorstel te bereiken. Eisenhowers openhartige brief aan De Gaulle van 30 augustus 1960 legde 
het blijvende verschil van mening tussen Washington en Parijs bloot en vormde het einde van 
diens pogingen om De Gaulle tegemoet te komen. In 1961 deed De Gaulle enkele opmerkelijke 
pogingen de net aangetreden Kennedy voor zijn voorstel te winnen. Kennedy verklaarde zich tot 
dezelfde concessies bereid als Eisenhower. De regering-Kennedy werd echter al snel opgeslokt 
door andere besognes. Anders dan Eisenhower was Kennedy bovendien afkerig van steun aan 
het Franse kernwapenprogramma. De Gaulle lijkt de hoop op overeenstemming langs de lijnen 
van zijn oorspronkelijke memorandum voorgoed te hebben opgegeven na de unilaterale 
handelwijze van de Verenigde Staten in de Cubacrisis in oktober 1962 en de Brits-Amerikaanse 
topontmoeting in Nassau op de Bahamas in december 1962. 
De Gaulle’s voorstel van september 1958 voor een nieuwe veiligheidsorganisatie was voor 
de Verenigde Staten onaanvaardbaar omdat deze organisatie de Navo zou hebben ondermijnd, 
zou hebben geleid tot grote politieke problemen in de betrekkingen met Duitsland, Italië en 
kleinere bondgenoten, en Frankrijk – en het Verenigd Koninkrijk – vergaande zeggenschap zou 
hebben gegeven over het Amerikaanse beleid. Eisenhower had bovendien weinig vertrouwen in 
de oude Europese koloniale machten wat de omgang met de ‘derde wereld’ betreft. Bij de 
beoordeling van de Amerikaanse reactie moet ook worden betrokken dat Frankrijk in die jaren 





burgeroorlog balanceerde, en dat de Franse afschrikkingsmacht alleen nog op papier bestond. De 
Gaulle, kortom, vroeg meer dan redelijkerwijs van Eisenhower of Kennedy kon worden verwacht. 
 
4 – Of Arms and Men 
Hoofdstuk vier traceert de ontwikkeling in 1961 en 1962 van het geschil tussen Kennedy en De 
Gaulle over militair-strategische onderwerpen. Kennedy was vastbesloten de afhankelijkheid van 
kernwapens, die inherent was aan Eisenhowers nucleaire vergeldingsstrategie (‘massive 
retaliation’), te verminderen. Zijn ‘flexible response’-strategie noopte tot de uitbreiding van de 
conventionele strijdkrachten van het bondgenootschap en tot de versterking van de greep op het 
westerse nucleaire arsenaal. Tegen deze achtergrond en uit vrees voor sluimerende Duitse 
nucleaire ambities begon de regering-Kennedy in 1962 – na een forse interne discussie – een 
heuse campagne tegen het Franse kernwapenprogramma. Kennedy’s militair-strategische 
hervormingsprogramma kreeg een kritische ontvangst in Europa, maar Frankrijk spande de 
kroon. De Gaulle onderstreepte dat de Amerikaanse nucleaire veiligheidsgarantie haar 
geldingskracht had verloren sinds de Sovjet Unie eind jaren vijftig het vermogen had ontwikkeld 
de Verenigde Staten met langeafstandsraketten te treffen. Kennedy’s wens de afhankelijkheid van 
kernwapens te verminderen, bevestigde in zijn ogen slechts de juistheid van deze stelling. De 
Gaulle’s kritiek was niet alleen van betekenis op inhoudelijke gronden. Voor de invoering van de 
nieuwe strategie in bondgenootschappelijk verband was de medewerking van Frankrijk om 
verschillende redenen onontbeerlijk. Deze medewerking zou echter achterwege blijven. 
 
5 – Whose Kind of ‘Europe’?  
Hoofdstuk vijf draait om het vraagstuk van de Europese eenwording. Zowel Kennedy als De 
Gaulle koesterde ernstige bedenkingen bij de Europese Economische Gemeenschap (EEG), zij 
het om verschillende redenen. Beiden zouden proberen met behulp van ambitieuze 
beleidsinitiatieven de toekomst van de EEG naar hun hand te zetten. Kennedy was in de eerste 
plaats bezorgd over de verslechtering van de Amerikaanse betalingsbalans en vreesde dat de 
ontwikkeling van de EEG ten koste van de Amerikaanse economie zou gaan. Zijn State 
Department werd vooral gedreven door een ideologische en persoonlijke betrokkenheid bij de 
Europese integratiebeweging en met angst voor de politieke implicaties van het gaullisme. De 
invloed van Monnet, in veel opzichten de tegenpool van De Gaulle, was hierbij onmiskenbaar. 
Onderminister van Buitenlandse Zaken George Ball, gesteund door Acheson, wist Kennedy 
uiteindelijk te winnen voor het idee van een Atlantisch ‘partnerschap’ tussen de Verenigde Staten 
en het Europa-op-weg-naar-eenwording. Kennedy’s toespraak in Philadelphia van 4 juli 1962, 
drie maanden nadat De Gaulle’s Fouchetplan was gestrand in onderhandelingen tussen de Zes, 
vormde het hoogtepunt van het Amerikaanse activisme in de Europese politiek en drong De 
Gaulle in het defensief. Ook de Trade Expansion Act van september 1962 en het voorstel voor 
een multilaterale kernwapenmacht (MLF) binnen de Navo maakten deel uit van Kennedy’s ‘grand 
design’ voor de transatlantische betrekkingen. De strijd met De Gaulle om de toekomst van 
Europa spitste zich voorts toe op de door Washington krachtig gesteunde EEG-
lidmaatschapsaanvraag van het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Kennedy’s ‘grand design’ werd geplaagd 
door verschillende tegenstrijdigheden. De meest funeste tegenstrijdigheid was echter dat het 
Atlantische ‘partnerschap’ mede was ontworpen om De Gaulle’s invloed in Europa tegenwicht te 
bieden, maar dat het welslagen ervan niettemin afhankelijk was van diens bereidheid daaraan mee 
te werken. Kennedy speelde hoog spel door geen rekening te houden met een Frans ‘nee’. 
 
6 – The Clash 
Hoofdstuk zes behandelt de crisis in de Amerikaans-Franse betrekkingen en Kennedy’s Europese 
beleid als gevolg van De Gaulle’s roemruchte persconferentie van 14 januari 1963, waarin hij de 
MLF en de Britse lidmaatschapsaanvraag bij de EEG afwees, en de ondertekening van het Frans-





van 1962. Zij kwam echter pas tot uitbarsting na de – chaotisch voorbereide – topbijeenkomst 
van Kennedy en Macmillan in Nassau op de Bahamas in december 1962, die in het teken stond 
van de toekomst van de Britse kernwapenmacht. Na deze topbijeenkomst deed de regering in 
Washington verwoede pogingen Parijs te bewegen tot een constructieve houding, in het 
bijzonder ten aanzien van de MLF. Hierachter gingen diepgaande meningsverschillen schuil, 
vooral tussen het State Department en het Pentagon. De Kennedy-regering liet – in strijd met 
eerder ingenomen standpunten over de force de frappe – doorschemeren bereid te zijn Frankrijk op 
nucleair gebied dezelfde steun te leveren als het Verenigd Koninkrijk.  Het Amerikaanse aanbod 
sloot echter niet aan op de Franse behoefte. Het State Department stelde bovendien een 
fundamentele koersverandering van het Franse buitenlandse beleid als voorwaarde. De Gaulle’s 
persconferentie van 14 januari kwam niettemin als een schok en riep aan Amerikaanse zijde grote 
verontwaarding op. Bestrijding van het gaullisme in Europa werd plotseling een topprioriteit voor 
de Amerikaanse regering. Zoals zo vaak fungeerde Duitsland als de spil in het Frans-Amerikaanse 
conflict. Acheson en McCloy werden in stelling gebracht om Kennedy het initiatief terug te 
bezorgen. Kennedy’s publicitair geslaagde bezoek aan Europa, met inbegrip van Duitsland, in 
juni en juli 1963 maakte eveneens deel uit van het Amerikaanse tegenoffensief. Na dit bezoek 
werden de verhoudingen enigszins genormaliseerd. Kennedy’s ‘grand design’ had niettemin 
schipbreuk geleden op De Gaulle’s onverzoenlijke houding. Als gevolg van deze crisis werd voor 
het eerst een geleidelijke ‘verzakelijking’ in de Amerikaanse visie op de EEG zichtbaar. 
 
7 – The Demise of the Last Atlantic Project 
Hoofdstuk zeven toont aan dat De Gaulle’s tegenspel meer dan tot dusver is erkend 
verantwoordelijk moet worden gehouden voor de teloorgang van het Amerikaanse voorstel voor 
een multilaterale kernwapenmacht (MLF) binnen de Navo. De Amerikaanse campagne voor het 
voorstel draaide op volle toeren nadat Johnson in april 1964 had bepaald dat er eind dat jaar een 
overeenkomst met de geïnteresseerde bondgenoten zou moeten liggen. Het Verenigd Koninkrijk 
vreesde de gevolgen van een Amerikaans-Duitse nucleair onderonsje voor de ‘special 
relationship’ en Harold Wilson leek dan ook te vermurwen. In december 1964 liet Johnson echter 
na de Britse premier, op bezoek in Washington, de duimschroeven aan te draaien. De verklaring 
hiervoor ligt in het Franse tegenoffensief en de effecten hiervan op de Duitse houding en op de 
Navo. Washington was ervan uitgegaan dat Frankrijk zich niet actief zou verzetten tegen de 
verwezenlijking van de MLF. Dit bleek een misrekening, want de Franse opstelling verhardde 
zodra de MLF onder Amerikaanse druk inderdaad op een overeenkomst leek af te stevenen. Ten 
eerste zette De Gaulle de regering in Bonn stevig onder druk door te suggereren dat de Frans-
Duitse betrekkingen bij Duitse deelneming aan de MLF onherstelbare schade zouden leiden en 
door te dreigen met tegenmaatregelen in EEG-verband. Ten tweede dreigde Frankrijk met 
terugtrekking uit de Navo. Hoe dan ook verkeerde Frankrijk als lidstaat van de Navo in de positie 
de verwezenlijking van de MLF in Navo-verband te blokkeren, waardoor het onaantrekkelijke 
vooruitzicht van een MLF buiten de Navo om steeds dichterbij kwam.  
Op instigatie van nationaal veiligheidsadviseur McGeorge Bundy greep Johnson 
uiteindelijk in aan de vooravond van Wilsons bezoek. Johnson maakte de Britse premier duidelijk 
dat de Verenigde Staten de MLF niet aan de Europese bondgenoten zouden opdringen, waarmee 
het voorstel in feite ten dode was opgeschreven. De geschiedenis van de MLF toonde aan dat de 
Verenigde Staten geen voorstellen tegen de wil van Frankrijk konden doorvoeren, dat zij 
Frankrijk binnen Europa niet konden isoleren en Duitsland niet konden dwingen tégen Frankrijk 
positie te kiezen. De teloorgang van het project ging bovendien gepaard met belangrijke 
verschuivingen in het Amerikaanse beleid jegens Europa. De deceptie onder Europeanisten als 
Ball en Acheson was groot. De MLF-crisis van 1964 gaf Johnson de gelegenheid de greep op zijn 
apparaat te versterken en zijn geduldige en ingehouden aanpak van De Gaulle als beleidslijn in te 
voeren. Daarmee waren de bakens verzet voor de Amerikaanse reactie op de volgende crisis: de 






8 – De Gaulle Throws Down the Gauntlet 
Het achtste hoofdstuk beschrijft hoe Johnson reageerde op Frankrijks terugtrekking uit de Navo 
in 1966 en De Gaulle’s eis dat Amerikaanse troepen binnen een jaar uit Frankrijk zouden zijn 
vertrokken. Uit de geraadpleegde bronnen blijkt dat Washington al vanaf 1964 actief op het 
Franse vertrek uit de Navo. Sommigen, zoals Walt Rostow, zagen hierin zelfs een welkome 
mogelijkheid om de Navo nieuw leven in te blazen. Verzoeningspogingen om De Gaulle van zijn 
besluit af te houden bleven hoe dan ook achterwege: een Navo zonder Frankrijk was in 
Amerikaanse ogen te verkiezen boven een Navo naar Frans model. 
 Bij het formuleren van een antwoord op de brief van De Gaulle van 7 maart 1966 trad de 
richtingenstrijd binnen de regering-Johnson over het Europabeleid opnieuw aan het licht. 
Acheson en Ball wilden De Gaulle krachtig van repliek dienen en een politiek tegenoffensief 
lanceren. Het Pentagon van McNamara was pragmatischer aangelegd en zag een gelegenheid om 
het aantal Amerikaanse troepen in Europa te verminderen (en voerde de terugtrekking ook 
gezwind uit). De staf van het Witte Huis was voorstander van een zo nuchter mogelijke 
benadering van de crisis. Johnson, daarin aangemoedigd door ambassadeur Bohlen in Parijs, gaf 
hieraan eveneens de voorkeur: “If a man tells you to leave his house, you tip your hat and go.” 
De pragmatici trokken uiteindelijk aan het langste eind. Degenen die sinds het aantreden van de 
regering-Kennedy het Europa-beleid hadden gedomineerd, zoals Acheson en Ball, waren – 
opnieuw – ernstig teleurgesteld door Johnsons pertinente weigering de confrontatie met De 
Gaulle aan te gaan. Hun rol was echter uitgespeeld. 
 Ook de afhandeling van het Franse afscheid van de Navo draaide uit op een teleurstelling 
voor de tegenstanders van De Gaulle binnen de Amerikaanse regering. Frankrijk kreeg in de 
onderhandelingen over Frankrijks nieuwe relatie tot de Navo en over de grondslag voor de 
aanwezigheid van Franse troepen in Duitsland namelijk zijn zin. De aanvankelijke eis van het 
State Department en van bondskanselier Erhard dat de Franse troepen alleen onder Navo-vlag in 
Duitsland zou kunnen blijven, bleek onhoudbaar. Verder bleef Frankrijk deelnemen aan het 
luchtverdedigingssysteem van de Navo (NADGE), dat van belang was voor de force de frappe. De 
opnieuw gebleken onwil van de Europese bondgenoten om Frankrijk te isoleren, legde 
beperkingen op aan de voorstanders van de harde lijn jegens De Gaulle. 
Johnson slaagde er niettemin in de Navo nieuw leven in te blazen, vooral door de 
invoering van een nucleair consultatiemechanisme, de ‘NATO-ization’ van détente in het 
Harmel-rapport en de organisatorische herinrichting van de Navo. Het is bovendien van belang 
te onderstrepen dat de crisis van 1966 om meer ging dan alleen de relatie tussen Frankrijk en de 
Navo. Het ging ook om de vormgeving van de betrekkingen met het Oostblok in een tijdperk 
van ontspanning en om de lastenverdeling binnen de Navo. In de recente geschiedschrijving 
heeft Johnson voor de manier waarop hij de veelomvattende crisis van 1966 in goede banen wist 
te leiden terecht waardering gekregen. 
 
9 – Grand Designs Go Bankrupt 
Hoofdstuk negen beschrijft hoe en waarom de Verenigde Staten en Frankrijk, nadat hun 
bilaterale betrekkingen in 1967 een dieptepunt hadden bereikt, in de loop van 1968 geleidelijk 
toenadering tot elkaar zochten.  
In 1967 kreeg De Gaulle’s buitenlandse beleid de trekken van een spreekwoordelijke 
kruistocht tegen de ‘Angelsaksen’. Zijn oproep voor een ‘vrij’ Quebec tijdens een bezoek aan 
Canada is hiervan een sprekend voorbeeld. Zijn steeds openlijker kritiek op het Amerikaanse 
optreden in Vietnam verstoorde de verhoudingen eveneens, te meer omdat Frankrijk nog invloed 
in Vietnam werd toegedicht. Vanaf midden jaren zestig was voorts het conflict tussen Parijs en 
Washington over het internationale monetaire stelsel naar de voorgrond getreden. De Gaulle viel 
de bevoorrechte positie van de U.S. dollar aan, wisselde op grote schaal Amerikaanse dollars in 





dankte). Hij ondermijnde daardoor het vertrouwen in de inwisselbaarheid van de dollar in goud, 
die de kern vormde van het Bretton Woods-stelsel. De aanzet tot de ‘gold crisis’ van november 
1967 tot maart 1968 werd uiteindelijk gevormd door de devaluatie van het Britse pond. In de 
Verenigde Staten zagen velen Frankrijk echter als de kwade genius. Johnson handelde in de 
overtuiging dat de economische situatie vergelijkbaar was met die aan de vooravond van de 
Grote Depressie in 1929. De Gaulle leek dus ook op dit gebied de tijd terug te draaien naar een 
onheilspellend verleden.  
De goudcrisis bleek de laatste keer te zijn dat Amerika en De Gaulle zouden botsen. De 
verklaring voor de onverwachte toenadering tussen Washington en Parijs vanaf het voorjaar van 
1968 lag in de ernstige politieke en economische problemen waarin zowel de Verenigde Staten als 
Frankrijk verstrikt waren geraakt. Voor de oplossing van deze problemen waren zij op elkaar 
aangewezen. Het Amerikaanse Vietnam-beleid kreeg een nieuwe wending door Johnsons besluit 
de onderhandelingen met Noord-Vietnam te openen. Parijs bood een bruikbaar kanaal voor 
contacten met de Noord-Vietnamezen, eerst heimelijk maar vanaf mei 1968 ook in het kader van 
officiële onderhandelingen. Juist op het moment dat de Amerikaans-Vietnamese 
onderhandelingen in Parijs begonnen, verzwakte De Gaulle’s binnenlandspolitieke positie 
aanzienlijk door de studentenopstanden en arbeidersstakingen van mei 1968. De Gaulle wist met 
veel moeite zijn gezag te herstellen. De Franse economie verzeilde als gevolg van de meicrisis 
echter in ernstige problemen. In november 1968 kwam de waarde van de franc zodanig onder 
druk te staan dat De Gaulle tegen wil en dank een devaluatie leek te moeten toestaan, te meer 
omdat Duitsland weigerde de eigen munt op te waarderen om de druk op de franc te verlichten. 
Johnson zag een kans Frankrijk aan zich te verplichten: hij besloot tot Amerikaanse kredietsteun 
die het De Gaulle mogelijk maakte de devaluatie af te wenden. De toenadering werd eveneens in 
de hand gewerkt door de Sovjet-inval in Tjechoslowakije in augustus 1968. De inval was een 
forse streep door de rekening voor De Gaulle’s toenaderingsbeleid tot het communistische blok, 
dat een einde aan de Koude Oorlog had moeten maken. De Frans-Duitse betrekkingen, tot slot, 
verslechterden in deze periode eveneens. Onder deze omstandigheden was in het najaar van 1968 
aan zowel Franse als Amerikaanse kant zelfs sprake van hernieuwde belangstelling voor het 
‘tripartitisme’ waarvoor De Gaulle aan het begin van zijn presidentschap in 1958 bij Eisenhower 
en Macmillan een lans had gebroken.  
De overlap tussen de regeerperioden van Nixon en De Gaulle bedroeg slechts drie 
maanden. Zij was aanzienlijk belangrijker dan door deze korte duur wordt gesuggereerd. Kort na 
zijn aantreden bracht Nixon een geslaagd bezoek aan De Gaulle in Parijs en in deze periode werd 
de kiem gelegd voor de geheime nucleaire samenwerking die in de jaren tachtig aan het licht zou 
komen. Was de Amerikaans-Franse toenadering onder Johnson vooral van pragmatische aard, 
onder de conservatieve Nixon was sprake van een opmerkelijke geestverwantschap. Nixon en 
Kissinger koesterden grote bewondering voor de staatsman De Gaulle. (Andersom koesterde De 
Gaulle genegenheid voor Nixon, die hij op het dieptepunt van zijn politieke loopbaan in 1963 in 
Parijs onthaalde.) De Gaulle strekte Nixon in een aantal belangrijke opzichten zodanig tot 
voorbeeld dat diens buitenlandse beleid kan worden beschouwd als een Amerikaanse vorm van 
gaullisme. Evenals de Fransman was hij aan de macht gekomen na een lange ‘tocht door de 
woestijn’. Beiden voerden een presidentiële buitenlandse politiek gericht op de verdediging van 
nationale belangen; de volksvertegenwoordiging diende zich buiten de internationale politiek te 
houden. Wat Vietnam betreft liet Nixon zich inspireren door De Gaulle’s stapsgewijze 
terugtrekking uit Algerije. Nixons ideeën over een multipolaire wereld en het aanknopen van 
diplomatieke betrekkingen met communistisch China lagen eveneens dicht bij die van zijn Franse 
tegenvoeter. Voor Kissinger geldt dat hij de jarenlange steun aan het Europese federalisme op 
een laag pitje zette en het accent verlegde naar het onderhouden van de bilaterale betrekkingen 
met Europese bondgenoten. De geestverwantschap van Nixon met De Gaulle roept de 
intrigrerende maar uiteindelijk niet te beantwoorden vraag op of de Amerikaans-Franse 





Kennedy zou hebben gewonnen. De Frans-Amerikaanse betrekkingen waren aan het einde van 
de periode-De Gaulle hoe dan ook beter dan ooit. 
 
CONCLUSIE 
In de conclusie worden de drie vragen uit de inleiding beantwoord.  
Wat de eerste vraag betreft – hoe interpreteerden Amerikanen De Gaulle’s buitenlandse 
politiek in het licht van hun ideeën en opvattingen over de transatlantische relatie? –, valt 
allereerst het uiteenlopende en wisselende karakter in de Amerikaanse oordeelsvorming op. In de 
Amerikaanse publieke opinie vormde De Gaulle’s persconferentie van januari 1963 een duidelijk 
keerpunt. Vóór deze persconferentie werd het beeld van De Gaulle bepaald door zijn verleden als 
oorlogsheld, zijn succes bij het stabiliseren van de Franse politiek en de beëindiging van het 
Algerijnse conflict, en zijn ferme optreden als bondgenoot in de crises van de Koude Oorlog; 
vanaf januari 1963 werd het beeld getekend door De Gaulle’s vaak ongezouten kritiek op het 
Amerikaanse buitenlandse beleid en zijn tegen de Amerikaanse hegemonie gerichte initiatieven. 
De opvattingen in het Congres hielden ongeveer gelijke tred met de publieke opinie. Wel klonk 
vooral in de Senaat herhaaldelijk kritiek door op de manier waarop de Amerikaanse regering De 
Gaulle tegemoet trad. Verschillende senaatscommissies kwamen rondom de Navo-crisis van 1966 
bijvoorbeeld tot de conclusie dat deze crisis niet uitsluitend op De Gaulle’s conto viel te schrijven. 
In het Amerikaanse corps diplomatique en de gelederen van het ‘foreign policy establishment’ 
bestond van meet af aan weinig sympathie voor De Gaulle. Vooral het State Department was een 
anti-Gaullistisch bolwerk. Bij Amerikaanse diplomaten zat de angst voor herleving van het 
Amerikaanse isolationisme en van het Europese nationalisme – vooral in Duitsland – diep. Zij 
beschouwden Monnet, niet De Gaulle, als de vertolker van het naoorlogse Europa. Er was, tot 
slot, ook een kleine maar belangrijke groep columnisten en academici – Walter Lippmann, 
Stanley Hoffmann, Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Sulzberger – die aanzienlijk meer begrip voor De 
Gaulle toonde. 
 Belangrijk voor de verklaring van de verschillen in de reacties is de vraag naar de 
buitenlandspolitieke overtuigingen van de Amerikanen zelf. De Gaulle was een bij uitstek 
conservatief staatsman en dreigde alleen al om die reden in conflict te komen met de liberaal 
geïnspireerde regeringen-Kennedy en –Johnson. De regeringen-Eisenhower en vooral –Nixon 
hadden door hun conservatieve signatuur minder moeite met De Gaulle’s politieke 
uitgangspunten. Het Amerikaans-Franse conflict van de jaren zestig over de transatlantische 
relatie is dus voor een deel te verklaren uit de ideologische wrijving tussen een destijds van 
liberale ideeën doordesemd Amerikaanse buitenlandse politiek en een Franse buitenlandse 
politiek van conservatieve snit. De Amerikaanse kritiek op De Gaulle hing voorts samen met de 
ambivalentie in de verhouding tussen de Nieuwe en de Oude Wereld. De Fransman belichaamde 
in de ogen van veel Amerikanen meer dan wie ook het ‘oude’ Europa dat verantwoordelijk werd 
gehouden voor twee wereldoorlogen. De afwijzing van het gaullisme in de Verenigde Staten was 
dan ook tevens een uiting van anti-Europeanisme en zelfs van eurofobie. 
 Ten aanzien van de tweede vraag – hoe gingen de verschillende Amerikaanse regeringen 
in de periode van 1958 tot 1969 om met de uitdagingen die De Gaulle in het kader van de 
transatlantische relatie stelde? – valt op dat de hegemoniale macht van de Verenigde Staten aan 
belangrijke beperkingen onderhevig was. De Gaulle kon zich weinig gelegen laten liggen aan in 
Washington levende opvattingen. De Europese bondgenoten waren over het algemeen niet van 
zins conflicten met Frankrijk op de spits te drijven, mede gelet op de Franse positie in de EEG. 
De opeenvolgende Amerikaanse presidenten bleven bovendien streven naar een werkbare relatie 
met hun Franse tegenpool. Hoewel de Amerikaanse verontwaardiging soms tot grote hoogte 
steeg, toonde de Amerikaanse reactie op De Gaulle’s buitenlandse politiek dan ook vooral de 
inschikkelijke kant van de naoorlogse Amerikaanse hegemonie in West-Europa. Deze 






In de Amerikaans-Franse betrekkingen van 1958 tot 1969 doet zich de volgende fasering 
voor. Van mei 1958 tot december 1962 is sprake van een gedempt conflict (‘muted conflict’). 
Deze eerste fase wordt overheerst door de crises van de Koude Oorlog. De Gaulle’s prioriteiten 
liggen bovendien bij het beëindigen van het Algerije-conflict en de hervorming van het Franse 
politieke bestel. Zijn verzet tegen de Amerikaanse overheersing in het westerse bondgenootschap 
voltrekt zich grotendeels achter de schermen. Tegen het voorjaar van 1962 is duidelijk dat deze 
fase ten einde loopt, vooral als gevolg van diepgaande meningsverschillen over de force de frappe en 
de toekomst van Europa. De tweede fase duurt van januari 1963 tot december 1964 en kenmerkt 
zich door open conflict. Zij wordt ingeluid door De Gaulle’s persconferentie van 14 januari en 
afgesloten door Johnson’s besluit over de MLF. Het is de fase waarin de Verenigde Staten een 
assertieve houding aannemen om de groeiende invloed van het gaullisme in Europa tegen te gaan. 
De derde fase loopt van begin 1965 tot begin 1968. In deze fase is sprake van een impasse in de 
verhoudingen. De Gaulle’s charges tegen het Amerikaanse leiderschap worden opgevangen door 
een ogenschijnlijk laconieke Johnson. Er is geen voedingsbodem voor een dialoog. De laatste 
fase begint in het voorjaar van 1968 en loopt door tot na De Gaulle’s vertrek in april 1969. De 
hierboven beschreven ontwikkelingen in 1968 dwingen Washington en Parijs tot een 
opmerkelijke toenadering. Onder Johnson is deze toenadering vooral pragmatisch van aard; 
onder Nixon is ook sprake van een ideologische geestverwantschap.  
Wat de vraag naar de effecten van ‘De Gaulle’ op de Amerikaanse buitenlandse politiek 
betreft, neemt het proefschrift afstand van de gangbare vaststelling dat er nauwelijks effecten 
waren aangezien er (vooralsnog) geen einde kwam aan het bipolaire stelsel van de Koude Oorlog. 
In de eerste plaats stonden veel Amerikaanse initiatieven jegens Europa in het teken van de wens 
de invloed van het gaullisme in te perken; vooral beïnvloeding van de Duitse politieke oriëntatie, 
die voortdurend vatbaar werd geacht voor een nationalistische herleving, was hierbij van belang. 
Ten tweede dwong De Gaulle de Verenigde Staten zich te verzoenen met nieuwe strategische 
uitgangspunten. Daarbij valt in het bijzonder te denken aan het Franse kernwapenarsenaal en aan 
de ontwikkeling van de EEG in intergouvernementele richting en in een rivaliserend handelsblok. 
Ten derde heeft De Gaulle bijgedragen aan een paradigmaverschuiving aan Amerikaanse kant 
met betrekking tot de transatlantische relatie. Het idee van een steeds hechter wordende 
Atlantische ‘gemeenschap’ boette in de jaren zestig aan zeggingskracht sterk in en maakte plaats 
voor een realistischer en afstandelijker benadering van de Europese bondgenoten. In de politieke 
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